Opinion

Ex Parte Lynn

  • 543 So. 2d 709
  • 1988 WL 147499
Court
Supreme Court of Alabama
Filed
Dec 30, 1988
Status
Published
Author
Jones
On the bench
Jones, Maddox, Steagall
Cited by
100 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.0%

one venire-member’s “husband was related to the defendant”; another veniremember was “a classmate of the co-defendant” and had “a child by the co-defendant’s brother”

How later courts described this case

  • one venire-member’s “husband was related to the defendant”; another veniremember was “a classmate of the co-defendant” and had “a child by the co-defendant’s brother”
  • venireperson's father "had a felony record and had been convicted of a drug related offense" and venireperson was "reputed to be connected with drugs"
  • one venire-member was a “classmate of the co-defendant as well as having a child by the co-defendant’s brother”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

I agree completely with Justice Maddox's concurring opinion. I write separately to raise a "red flag": If the prosecuting attorneys of this State celebrate the opinion of affirmance in this case as a victory and heed not the obvious warnings, the ultimate result, in the not too distant future, will be the loss of all peremptory challenges in the criminal jury selection process.

This case, along with scores of others of like import, will furnish the requisite empirical data to prove Justice Marshall's worst fears and to make a mockery of Justice Powell's confidence that trial judges and prosecutors would "perform conscientiously their respective duties under the Constitution" — and the loss will be a tragedy, for the "peremptory challenge" procedure, *Page 715

properly exercised, furnishes the ultimate best hope of insuring a fair and impartial trial. But it will, and should, give way, as did Swain v. Alabama , 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), if we heed not Batson's "one last chance" and stubbornly persist in "doing business as usual."

How long, oh, how long will we persist in the hollow notion that black jurors are less likely to convict criminally accused black defendants than are white jurors to convict white defendants? Rather than to face and accept reality, we choose to "play the game" of circumvention and risk the loss of a valuable and traditionally accepted practice of jury selection.

For obvious reasons, the answer lies not with this Court, but with the trial judges, who must courageously police the prosecutor's use of the "intuitive judgment or suspicion" grounds for striking black jurors and thus effectuate a racially balanced criminal trial jury. It is the trial judges who are the last bastion of hope to preserve a good jury selection system and still insure a constitutional trial.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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