Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Ex Parte Bryant, 682 So. 2d 39 (1996)
Additionally, we find it noteworthy to mention the following fact scenario in Ex parte Bryant, 675 So.2d 552, 553 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Bryant, 682 So.2d 39 (Ala.1996):
The opinion
I respectfully dissent from the majority's denial of the petition for writ of mandamus.
Canon 3(C)(1), Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics states:
"A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his disqualification is required by law or his impartiality might be questioned . . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
As stated in Ex parte Duncan , 638 So.2d 1332 (Ala. 1994), the pertinent question is, " 'Would a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, find that there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality?' " 638 So.2d at 1334 , quoting Matter of Sheffield , 465 So.2d 350 , 356 (Ala. 1984)). The fact that the trial judge had been the district attorney and was a member of the bar, as was the petitioner, who was himself a prominent member of the bar, not to mention the fact that he had received a campaign contribution from the petitioner, would certainly give a "person of ordinary prudence" reason for questioning the judge's impartiality. This is not to say that I believe the judge is biased in favor of or against this petitioner; I do not. I do maintain, however, that the public would have reason to think otherwise.
Although I am quite sure that the petitioner has failed to meet the burden set in Rutledge v. State , 523 So.2d 1087
(Ala.Cr.App. 1987), I believe the wiser course of action would be for the trial judge, in circumstances such as the one present in this case, to grant a motion for recusal. Consequently, I must respectfully dissent.