The opinion
I concur in the conclusion reached by the majority that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Morrisette's claim under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-35 (d)(2). I write specially to note that Fluor argued in its motion to dismiss and again in its petition for a writ of mandamus that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Morrisette's claim even under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-35 (d)(3), because, it said, Fluor is covered by Georgia workers' compensation law. Morrisette did not dispute that fact in his response to Fluor's motion or in his response to Fluor's petition. Thus, I agree with the conclusion that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under § 25-5-35 (d)(3). I therefore concur in the issuance of the writ.