holding that physicians’ testimony as to the cause of employee’s neck injury was not subject to the Frye standard
How later courts described this case
- holding that physicians’ testimony as to the cause of employee’s neck injury was not subject to the Frye standard
- noting that the trial court had found the employee to be “permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury to his neck, a body part not listed in the schedule”
- “Carpal tunnel syndrome may also be caused by a onetime acute trauma or accident.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur in the main opinion. Although I dissented in International Paper Co. v. Melton , 866 So.2d 1158
(Ala.Civ.App. 2003), my dissent in that case was predicated upon the speculative nature of the medical evidence supporting the trial court's finding of causation. In this case, however, two medical professionals unequivocally tied Manuel's carpal tunnel syndrome to his work, and the trial court could properly have found that evidence "clear and convincing" so as to meet the standard set forth in § 25-5-81 (c), Ala. Code 1975.