holding that Boglin’s plea was involuntary when the trial court ascertained that Boglin had signed the Ireland form, but failed to ascertain that Boglin had read and understood the form or to engage in any colloquy with Boglin to show that his plea was voluntary
How later courts described this case
- holding that Boglin’s plea was involuntary when the trial court ascertained that Boglin had signed the Ireland form, but failed to ascertain that Boglin had read and understood the form or to engage in any colloquy with Boglin to show that his plea was voluntary
- the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the voluntariness of a waiver of the right to appeal or to seek collateral review, and trial counsel’s effectiveness may be challenged on direct appeal if properly preserved, or collaterally in a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim.P., petition, despite the presence of the waiver
- “It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur with that part of the majority opinion that holds that "a waiver of the right to seek postconviction relief . . . cannot operate to preclude a defendant from filing a Rule 32 petition challenging the voluntariness of the guilty plea, the voluntariness of the waiver, or counsel's effectiveness." However, I dissent from that part of the majority opinion that holds that the appellant did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea because the trial court allegedly did not comply with the requirements set forth in Rule 14.4(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., Boykin , and Twyman . I appreciate the necessity of ensuring that a defendant understands his rights when he signs documents such as the ones the appellant signed in this case. However, in this case, even though it did not specifically ask the appellant whether he understood his rights, the trial court had a reasonable basis for concluding that the appellant understood his rights and that he voluntarily waived them. It asked the appellant if he could read and write and if he had signed each of the documents of his own free will, and the appellant responded that he had. Therefore, the trial court could have concluded, by implication, that the appellant had read the documents. Also, once he signed the documents, there was, as there is with any other contract, a presumption that the appellant understood the documents and that the documents were valid. Finally, the trial court personally addressed the appellant and had the opportunity to observe his demeanor and body language during the plea proceeding. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the appellant understood what he was doing. Requiring that every guilty plea colloquy contain the "magic words" "do you understand" will undercut the effectiveness of a form that was intended to be a practical solution in the courtroom. Instead, the determination of whether a defendant understands his rights should be made on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. *Page 937