holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars actions against state officers in their official capacities when those actions are, in effect, actions against the State and holding also that the commissioner of DOC is entitled to state-agent immunity because the commissioner represents a department of the State
How later courts described this case
- holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars actions against state officers in their official capacities when those actions are, in effect, actions against the State and holding also that the commissioner of DOC is entitled to state-agent immunity because the commissioner represents a department of the State
- stating that "claims against state officers in their official capacity are `functionally equivalent' to claims against the entity they represent"
- holding that the trial court's attempt to compel compliance with its judgment through monetary sanctions violated § 14
- holding that § 14 prohibited an award of monetary sanctions against a state official in his official capacity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur in the rationale in part and in the judgment insofar as the main opinion addresses case number 1020533. I agree that the State and its agencies are immune from suit for money damages or monetary penalties for contempt. The repeated statements in Part II, which addresses case number 1020533, to the effect that the State and its agencies are absolutely immune from suit in any court, however, fail to recognize the common and established exceptions to State immunity, such as the exceptions for suits seeking declaratory relief or performance of ministerial duties. Indeed, Part III of the main opinion relies on the exception for suits seeking performance of ministerial duties, although Part III does not expressly recognize the exception or cite the authority for it.
I respectfully dissent from the main opinion insofar as it, principally in Part III, affirms certain injunctive relief ordered by the trial court. The injunction requires far more than performance of a ministerial duty. The injunction orders the commissioner to receive prisoners at a rate that will often be so unsafe that it is illegal. Therefore, the injunction violates *Page 791
§ 43, Ala. Const. 1901, by usurping the executive power to execute the laws faithfully.
I concur in the main opinion insofar as it, principally in Part I, addresses cases number 1021048 and number 1021049. I agree that they be dismissed as moot.