holding that further discovery was needed before the plaintiffs' wrongful-death action could be dismissed based upon the defendants' claim of State-agent immunity
How later courts described this case
- holding that further discovery was needed before the plaintiffs' wrongful-death action could be dismissed based upon the defendants' claim of State-agent immunity
- adopting the "new test" for determining when State employees sued in their individual capacities are entitled to assert the defense of State-agent immunity, as formulated by a plurality of the Court in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000)
- stating that officers have the authority to "enforce[ ] ... the criminal laws of the State"
- “As a general rule, a motion to dismiss ‘ “for failure to state a claim is properly granted only when it appears beyond a doubt that the *22 plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.” ’ ” (quoting Patton v. Black, 646 So.2d 8, 10 (Ala.1994), quoting in turn Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 371 So.2d 899 (Ala.1979))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I concur as to Parts I and II. Regarding Part III, I concur in the result but dissent from the rationale. The state of the record in this case is similar to the state of the record in Patton v. Black , 646 So.2d 8 (Ala. 1994). In Patton , I stated, "I was almost persuaded that the defendant was correct in her argument that [the record showed] that the plaintiff did not state any set of facts upon which relief could be granted . . . ." 646 So.2d at 11 (Maddox, J., concurring in the result). That is the situation I find myself in with this case; consequently, I concur in the result reached by the majority in Part III, as I did in Patton , 646 So.2d at 10 . However, because the majority adopts the formulation of the test for determining when State employees sued in their individual capacities are entitled to assert the defense of State-agent immunity, that was set out in Ex parte Cranman , [Ms. 1971903, June 16, 2000], ___ So.2d ___ (Ala. 2000), I must respectfully dissent from the rationale of Part III. Therefore, as to Parts I and II, I concur; but as to Part III I concur in the result but dissent from the rationale.