recognizing that the Legislature has not established a procedure for determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled and concluding that Perkins did not “suffer from mental retardation under the definitions considered by the United States Supreme Court in reaching its holding in Atkins….”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the Legislature has not established a procedure for determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled and concluding that Perkins did not “suffer from mental retardation under the definitions considered by the United States Supreme Court in reaching its holding in Atkins….”
- holding that Perkins was not mentally retarded because, among other reasons, Perkins’s full-score adult IQ was 76
- “The record establishes that Dr. John Goff, a licensed clinical neuropsy-chologist and clinical psychologist, testified on Perkins’s behalf ...; he did not conclude that Perkins was mentally retarded. We find Dr. Goffs diagnosis pivotal in light of the fact that, when the penalty phase of Perkins’s trial was conducted, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), and its progeny were applicable, and evidence of mental retardation established a strong mitigating circumstance to be considered in determining the appropriate sentence.” (footnote omitted)
- "As the judicial branch of government, this Court can only interpret the law. We urge the Legislature to expeditiously develop procedures for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for execution."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
But for two exceptions, which do not affect the result, I concur in the main opinion. First, in my opinion, the reason we apply the plain-error standard of review on this particular remand is that Perkins did not contend at trial that mental retardation barred the imposition of a death sentence upon him. Second, I do not necessarily join in that part of footnote 1 urging the Alabama legislature "to expeditiously develop procedures for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for execution." I neither encourage nor discourage such legislation. This Court is capable of rightly resolving these issues if and when they are presented, whatever the statutory scheme may be at the time. *Page 458