De Witt Long v. Sugai

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DE WITT LAMAR LONG, No. 22-15997

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:19-cv-

00235-JMS-RT

v.

SUGAI, Correctional Sgt. at Halawa OPINION

Correctional Facility, sued in his/her

individual and official capacities;

LYLE ANTONIO, Chief of Security

at Halawa Correctional Facility, sued

in his/her individual and official

capacities; WYATT, Correctional Sgt.

at Halawa Correctional Facility, sued

in his/her individual and official

capacities; TORRES, Case

Manager/Correctional Counselor at

Halawa Correctional Facility, sued in

his/her individual and official

capacities; INMATE GRIEVANCE

OFFICER, Halawa Correctional

Facility, sued in his/her individual and

official capacities; DOES, John and

Jane, 1-50,

Defendants-Appellees.

2 LONG V. SUGAI

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 8, 2023

Pasadena, California

Filed February 5, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, William A. Fletcher, and John

B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

SUMMARY *

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated

in part the district court’s judgment in favor of prison

officials in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

by Hawaii prison inmate DeWitt Lamar Long, a practicing

Muslim, alleging that prison officials violated his First

Amendment right to free exercise of religion and

unconstitutionally retaliated against him for engaging in

protected First Amendment activity.

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, at the

screening stage, of Long’s claims for injunctive

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

LONG V. SUGAI 3

relief. Although Long’s pro se complaint alleged only past

actions by defendants, his “Request for Relief” asked,

among other things, that staff be properly trained and that

Ramadan meals be served hot. The district court should

have allowed Long to amend his complaint to allege facts

showing a need for injunctive relief.

The panel vacated the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of Sergeant Lee, holding that delivery of Long’s

evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially

burdened his free exercise of religion. The district court

should have evaluated the four factors set forth in Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), to determine whether the burden

was justified. The panel remanded to allow the district court

to conduct that analysis.

The panel affirmed the district court’s partial summary

judgment in favor of Chief of Security Antonio on Long’s

claim that he was transferred from a medium-security

facility to a high-security facility in retaliation for filing

grievances. The panel agreed with the district court that the

sequence of events leading to the transfer was insufficient to

show retaliatory intent.

The panel affirmed the district court’ judgment,

following a bench trial, in favor of Sergeant Sugai on Long’s

free exercise of religion and retaliation claims, determining

that ample evidence supported the district court’s findings.

Finally, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment,

following a bench trial, in favor of Chief of Security Antonio

on Long’s free exercise claim. The district court did not err

by concluding that (1) the substantial burden on Long’s free

exercise rights caused by his transfer to a high-security

facility was justified; and (2) Chief of Security Antonio was

not authorized to arrange weekly transportation to a

4 LONG V. SUGAI

medium-security facility for religious services and therefore

was not a proper defendant.

COUNSEL

Curt Cutting (argued) and Rebecca G. Powell, Horvitz &

Levy LLP, Burbank, California; Maxwell Lyster and Macy

Merritt (argued), Certified Law Students, Pepperdine Caruso

School of Law Ninth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Clinic,

Malibu, California; for Plaintiff- Appellant.

Jennifer H. Tran (argued), Caron M. Inagaki, and Isaac H.

Kenneth Ickes, Deputy Attorneys General; Anne E. Lopez,

Hawaii Attorney General; Hawaii Attorney General’s

Office, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Hawai‘i prison inmate DeWitt Lamar Long is a

practicing Muslim. In a pro se complaint, he alleged various

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials,

including Sergeant Rodney Sugai, Chief of Security Lyle

Antonio, and Sergeant Wyatt Lee. As relevant to this appeal,

Long alleged that defendants violated his First Amendment

right to free exercise of his religion and unconstitutionally

retaliated against him for engaging in protected First

Amendment activity.

Long appeals from the district court’s screening

dismissal of his claims for injunctive relief; its summary

LONG V. SUGAI 5

judgment in favor of Sgt. Lee; its partial summary judgment

in favor of Chief Antonio; and its judgment after a bench

trial in favor of Sgt. Sugai and Chief Antonio.

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Long’s

claims for an injunction and vacate its summary judgment in

favor of Sgt. Lee. We otherwise affirm.

I. Factual Background

Long is a practicing Muslim. With the exception of a

short period in a private prison in Arizona, he has been

imprisoned at Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) in

Aiea, Hawai‘i. He was incarcerated in HCF’s medium-

security facility between December 16, 2015 and May 8,

2017, when he was transferred to HCF’s high-security

facility.

A. Non-Pork Meals

Soon after his arrival at HCF in December 2015, Long

requested meals consistent with his Islamic faith. He did not

insist on a strict halal diet, but he did request a “non-pork

diet.” Long stated in a prison grievance that after submitting

his request he was served meals with pork seven or more

times and was not offered a substitute meal. On January 6,

2016, prison officials approved Long’s request for a

specialized diet. For approximately a month following the

approval, Long received accommodating religious meals.

During his time at HCF, Long filed several grievances

relating to his meals at the medium-security facility,

accusing Sgt. Sugai of harassment and of deliberately

denying him non-pork meals, in violation of the posted meal-

accommodations list. The district court concluded that

Sugai was not responsible for the denial of non-pork meals.

The court found that several of the denials occurred before

6 LONG V. SUGAI

Long’s religious-diet request was approved. The court also

found that Sugai did not disregard the posted meal-

accommodations list.

In early February 2016, while Sgt. Sugai was overseeing

the kitchen, Long received a meal containing pork remnants.

Long exchanged the meal for a pre-wrapped substitute

vegetarian meal. The district court found that the substitute

meal also contained strands of pork and that Long became

sick from the meal. Long contended that Sugai had directed

inmates who worked in the kitchen to contaminate Long’s

meal with pork, but the district court found that “any cross-

contamination between pork-based foods and Plaintiff’s

vegetarian foods was not attributable to Sgt. Sugai.” The

court noted that Gary Kaplan, a prison “program control

administrator,” attributed the cross-contamination to “the

fact that the kitchen uses the same utensils for the vegetarian

meal that they use to serve the pork.”

Long testified at trial that on at least three occasions

between March 2016 and May 2017 Sgt. Sugai prevented

him from getting any food at all, and that, at other times,

Sugai directed inmate workers to give Long smaller

portions. The record contains a signed declaration from an

inmate-worker stating that Sugai would direct him to make

“Mr. Long’s trays smaller than other trays.” Crediting

Sugai’s testimony, the district court found that Sugai had not

prevented Long from getting meals and had not directed

anyone to give him smaller portions.

On July 23, 2016, Long filed a grievance alleging that

Sgt. Sugai had denied him a non-pork meal and had

intimidated him by cursing at him and calling him a crybaby.

Long testified at trial that the “next time when [he] went to

the chow hall,” Sugai ordered him to pick up his non-pork

LONG V. SUGAI 7

meal and take it back to his housing unit rather than eat in

the dining hall. Long testified that Sugai effectively imposed

his own version of the prison’s “meals to modules”

program—a meal-delivery program reserved for inmates

whose mental or physical disabilities required that they eat

in their cells. Long testified that he was forced to eat in his

cell for the next six to eight months. However, the district

court found that Sugai had sent Long to eat in his housing

unit only a “few times,” and that he did so because Long

“was being ‘argumentative’ and ‘disruptive’ with the kitchen

staff regarding the food service.”

B. Transfer to High-Security Facility

On May 8, 2017, three days after he filed his last

grievance against Sgt. Sugai, Long was transferred from the

medium-security facility to a high-security facility at HCF.

Chief Antonio testified at trial that he ordered the transfer to

the high-security facility in order to create a “cooling off

period” between Sgt. Sugai and Long.

In the high-security facility, Long lost access to many

benefits he had enjoyed at the medium-security facility. His

telephone use was restricted to fifteen minutes every other

day. He was not allowed to buy food in the commissary, to

use the microwave, or to use a law library. He was strip

searched and escorted when he moved about the facility.

Finally, he was unable to attend Friday Jumu’ah prayer

services, which were held only in the medium-security

facility. Jumu’ah services are “commanded by the Koran

and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith

and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer.” O’Lone v. Est. of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (citing Koran 62:9–10).

After Long was transferred to the high-security facility,

he filed a grievance against Chief Antonio complaining

8 LONG V. SUGAI

about the lack of access to prayer services and requesting

transportation to Friday Jumu’ah services at the medium-

security facility. The request was denied. The district court

found that Antonio credibly testified that it was not feasible

to transport Long to the medium-security facility to attend

the prayer services. Two days after filing another grievance

regarding restrictions in the high-security facility, Long was

moved to a private prison in Arizona. He was later

transferred back to HCF, and was incarcerated there when

he filed his complaint in this case.

C. Evening Meal Delivery during Ramadan

Shortly after his transfer to the high-security facility,

Ramadan began. During Ramadan, Sgt. Lee delivered his

evening meal to him at about 3:30 p.m.—even though Long

could not break his fast until sundown, at about 7:30 p.m.

Long stated that by the time he could eat, the food was cold,

congealed, and unsafe under prison food-safety guidelines.

He stated further that the cold food aggravated his stomach

ulcers, and that on several occasions he was “unable to eat

the dinner meal.” He stated that he asked if Lee could call

the kitchen to request a hot meal or allow Long to use a staff

microwave to reheat the food. Lee refused, telling Long that

the kitchen was closed and that prison policy forbade staff

from using a staff microwave to heat food for inmates.

II. Procedural Background

Long alleged several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Sgt. Sugai, Chief Antonio, Sgt. Lee, a case manager

named “Ms. Torres,” and unnamed Doe defendants in their

official and individual capacities. Long was pro se in the

district court. He was assigned pro bono counsel for this

appeal.

LONG V. SUGAI 9

Long alleged § 1983 claims based on First Amendment

protections against government infringement on the free

exercise of religion and against government retaliation for

protected speech. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883

(9th Cir. 2008) (righ to free exercise of religion); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (right to file

grievances). He also alleged a § 1983 claim based on the

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, contending

that the Doe defendants violated his due process rights by

failing to respond to and address his prison grievances. See

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). He

requested injunctive relief and damages.

In a screening order, the district court dismissed with

prejudice Long’s claims for injunctive relief and damages

against all defendants in their official capacities. The court

dismissed without prejudice Long’s § 1983 individual-

capacity claims against Ms. Torres and the Doe defendants.

The court allowed Long’s § 1983 individual-capacity claims

against Sgt. Sugai, Chief Antonio, and Sgt. Lee to go

forward and ordered that these three defendants be served.

In a subsequent order, the district court granted summary

judgment to Sgt. Lee on Long’s free exercise claim arising

out of the early food delivery during Ramadan. In the same

order, the court also granted partial summary judgment to

Chief Antonio on Long’s retaliation claim arising out of his

transfer to the high-security facility.

The remaining claims—Long’s free exercise and

retaliation claims against Sgt. Sugai and his free exercise

claim against Chief Antonio—went to trial. After a bench

trial, the district court entered judgment for Antonio and

Sugai.

10 LONG V. SUGAI

III. Discussion

A. Screening of Claims for Injunctive Relief

As noted above, at the screening stage, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), the district

court dismissed with prejudice Long’s claims for injunctive

relief. Long did not ask the district court for leave to amend.

The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at

screening is the “same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v.

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). We review

the dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s complaint at screening de

novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1997));

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112.

The district court correctly noted that Long’s pro se

complaint alleged only past actions by defendants.

However, in the “Request for Relief,” Long’s complaint

asked “that staff rea[ss]ess their policy and proce[]dures, and

be properly trained so as the religious rights of all are

respected equally[;] that the policy or practice of not

allowing (High) prisoners to attend Friday Islamic services

be changed, as well as during Ramadan evening meals be

served hot and or the microwave be made available.”

For claims under the PLRA, we have “held that ‘a district

court should grant leave to amend even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

other facts.’” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

LONG V. SUGAI 11

Long, who is currently incarcerated at HCF, argues that

he should have been allowed to amend the complaint to

allege facts showing a need for injunctive relief. We agree.

Because we can “conceive of facts” that would justify

injunctive relief, the district court should have granted leave

to amend. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1116

(9th Cir. 1975).

B. Summary Judgment

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. We must “determine

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of

material fact and whether the district court correctly applied

the relevant substantive law.” Id.

1. Free Exercise Claim against Sgt. Lee

As noted above, while Long was confined in the high-

security facility during Ramadan, Sgt. Lee brought Long’s

evening meal to him at about 3:30 p.m. By the time Long

could break his fast at about 7:30 p.m., the food was cold,

unappetizing, and potentially unsafe to consume. The food

also exacerbated his stomach ulcers. Long contended that

delivering his evening meal during his fast violated the Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court

granted summary judgment to Lee.

In granting summary judgment, the district court relied

on a single case, LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1993), in which we held that serving prisoners

unappetizing but nutritious “Nutraloaf” did not constitute

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

We wrote in LeMaire that food “served cold, while

unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”

12 LONG V. SUGAI

Id. (quoting Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575

(11th Cir. 1985)).

LeMaire, decided under the Eighth Amendment, does

not control Long’s First Amendment claim. The question in

the case before us is not whether serving cold, unappetizing,

and possibly unsafe food is cruel and unusual punishment.

Rather, it is whether serving such food unconstitutionally

burdened Long’s free exercise of his religion.

In ruling on a prisoner’s First Amendment free exercise

claim, we first determine whether the challenged prison

policy or practice substantially burdened the prisoner’s free

exercise of his or her religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791

F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). If it does, we then apply

the four factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78

(1987), to determine whether the burden was “reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur, 514

F.3d at 884 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Long, by the time Long could eat his evening meal at about

7:30 p.m., the food was often inedible and potentially unsafe,

and, if eaten, exacerbated his stomach ulcers. We take

judicial notice of the fact that some food cannot safely sit at

room temperature for four hours. See Food Facts: Serving

Up Safe Buffets, F.D.A. (2017),

https://www.fda.gov/food/buy-store-serve-safe-

food/serving-safe-buffets [https://perma.cc/36EW-CVJ5]

(strongly advising that perishables left at room temperature

for more than two hours be discarded); Leftovers and Food

Safety, U.S.D.A., https://www.fsis.usda.gov/food-

safety/safe-food-handling-and-preparation/food-safety-

basics/leftovers-and-food-safety [https://perma.cc/QQ8F-

G8CP] (last updated July 31, 2020) (describing food left out

LONG V. SUGAI 13

for more than two hours as in the “danger zone” because

bacteria can rapidly grow at room temperature); 10

Dangerous Food Safety Mistakes, C.D.C.,

https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/ten-dangerous-

mistakes.html [https://perma.cc/DTG7-Y4SX] (last updated

Oct. 24, 2023).

The evidence before the district court, viewed in the light

most favorable to Long, establishes that the 3:30 p.m.

delivery of Long’s evening meal during Ramadan

substantially burdened his free exercise of his religion. A

“substantial burden exists when the state places ‘substantial

pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate

his beliefs.’” Jones v. Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1142 (9th Cir.

2022) (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995

(9th Cir. 2005)). “[M]ore than an inconvenience on religious

exercise,” a substantial burden has “a tendency to coerce

individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.”

Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir.

2013)). A prison practice “may impact religious exercise

indirectly, by encouraging an inmate to do that which he is

religiously prohibited or discouraged from doing.” Slade, 23

F.4th at 1140; see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995

(“[C]ompulsion may be indirect. . . .” (quoting Thomas v.

Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981))).

We have consistently held that the failure to provide food

consistent with a prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs

constitutes a substantial burden on the prisoner’s free

exercise. In Shakur, 514 F.3d at 881–82, a Muslim prisoner

requested a kosher meat diet consistent with Islamic Halal

requirements because the vegetarian diet offered to him gave

him gas and irritated his hernia. When the prison denied his

request, he brought an action under the Free Exercise Clause.

14 LONG V. SUGAI

Id. at 882–883. We held that the prison’s refusal

“implicate[d] the Free Exercise Clause” and that the district

court was therefore required to analyze the Turner factors.

Id. at 885; see also McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198

(9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“Inmates . . . have the right to

be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good

health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.”); Ward

v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding same);

Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding same).

Our sister circuits agree that nourishment consistent with

a prisoner’s religious beliefs and practices must be provided

in a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Holland v. Goord, 758

F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that pressure “to

provide a urine sample by drinking water during [inmate’s]

fast . . . placed a substantial burden on [his] religious

exercise.”); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 199–200 (4th Cir.

2006) (“Under . . . the Free Exercise Clause . . ., a prisoner

has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with

his . . . religious scruples,’ including proper food during

Ramadan.” (last two ellipses in original) (quoting Ford v.

McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003))); Ford, 352

F.3d at 597 (recognizing a clearly established right to the Eid

ul Fitr feast, which celebrates the successful completion of

Ramadan); Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2000)

(finding that prison officials substantially burdened an

inmate’s free exercise rights by refusing to provide meals in

his cell at particular times to accommodate his religious

practices).

Makin v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 183 F.3d

1205, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999), is directly on point. There, a

Muslim prisoner housed in punitive segregation during

Ramadan was unable to eat his evening meal when it was

LONG V. SUGAI 15

delivered to his cell. Id. at 1208–09. To maintain his fast,

he saved his “supper and food such as dry cereal and crackers

. . . from lunch and breakfast” to eat after sundown. Id. at

1209. Although the inmate managed to fast under these

circumstances for the entire month of Ramadan, the Tenth

Circuit held that the prison’s actions infringed on the

inmate’s right to free exercise of his religion and that the

defendants had not offered “any legitimate penological

interests to justify that infringement” under Turner. Id. at

1214. In Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1134–35 (10th

Cir. 2021), the court characterized Makin as “clearly

establish[ing] a substantial burden for a partial religious

deprivation” where “prison officials failed to provide meals

to an inmate at appropriate times throughout the month of

Ramadan.”

Our own cases as well as out-of-circuit cases thus clearly

establish that delivery of Long’s evening meal at 3:30 p.m.

during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of

religion. The district court should have evaluated the four

Turner factors to determine whether the burden was

justified. Because the court did not conduct that analysis, we

remand to allow it to do so. The district court also did not

conduct a qualified immunity analysis. If the court

concludes, after conducting the Turner analysis, that the

burden was not justified, our remand allows the court to

conduct a qualified immunity analysis.

2. Retaliation Claim against Chief Antonio

As noted above, Chief Antonio transferred Long from

the medium-security facility to the high-security facility

within HCF after Long filed grievances against Sgt. Sugai.

Long contended that the transfer was retaliation for filing the

16 LONG V. SUGAI

grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. The district

court granted summary judgment to Antonio on this claim.

A successful First Amendment retaliation claim by a

prisoner requires “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68 (footnote

omitted). With respect to the fifth factor, the Supreme Court

has cautioned that “‘federal courts ought to afford

appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying

to manage a volatile environment,’ especially with regard to

‘the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a

common subject of prisoner claims.’” Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1995)).

The district court found that the first, third, and fourth

factors weighed in favor of Long. However, with respect to

the second and fifth factors, the court found that Chief

Antonio’s transfer advanced the legitimate correctional goal

of maintaining order and safety within the prison, and that

there was insufficient evidence to show that this asserted

goal was pretextual. To establish impermissible motivation,

Long must “put forth evidence of retaliatory motive, that,

taken in the light most favorable to him, presents a genuine

issue of material fact as to [Antonio’s] intent” in transferring

Long. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005)).

Chief Antonio maintained that he transferred Long for

permissible reasons: He stated that he was aware that Long

“had complained of harassment and retaliation by Adult

LONG V. SUGAI 17

Correctional Officer (‘ACO’) Rodney Sugai,” and that

reports “had been prepared by HCF Staff, including ACO

Sugai that related to Plaintiff’s misconducts.” He further

stated that “[b]ased on these circumstances, [he] decided that

it was in the best interest of Plaintiff and ACO Sugai to

separate them in order to 1) prevent any further conflicts,

2) to allow time for HCF administration to investigate the

complaints, and 3) in the case that the allegations were

substantiated to prevent any further improper conduct on the

part of either party. [] Because ACO Sugai was responsible

for the kitchen area that the [medium-security facility]

utilizes, it was necessary to move Plaintiff to the Special

Needs Facility (‘SNF’).”

Pointing only to this sequence of events, Long asks us to

infer that Chief Antonio had a retaliatory motive. We agree

with the district court that this sequence, standing alone, is

insufficient to show retaliatory intent. Without additional

evidence, there is no genuine dispute of material fact over

whether Antonio transferred Long based on an improper

motive.

C. Bench Trial

After a bench trial, the district court ruled against Long

on his three remaining claims: two against Sgt. Sugai and

one against Chief Antonio. On appeal, Long challenges

several findings supporting the district court’s rulings. We

can reverse “only if the district court’s findings are clearly

erroneous to the point of being illogical, implausible, or

without support in inferences from the record.” Oakland

Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 960

F.3d 603, 613 (9th Cir. 2020). A finding is “clearly

erroneous” only when the reviewing body, looking at the

entire body of evidence, “is left with the definite and firm

18 LONG V. SUGAI

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v.

Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,

395 (1984)).

1. Claims against Sgt. Sugai

The district court tried the free exercise and retaliation

claims against Sgt. Sugai.

a. Free Exercise

Long contended that Sgt. Sugai had violated his First

Amendment free exercise right in four ways: (1) denying

Long non-pork meals; (2) directing kitchen workers to

contaminate Long’s meal with pork strands; (3) directing

kitchen workers to give Long smaller portions; and

(4) forcing Long to eat in his housing unit for six to eight

months.

The district court rejected Long’s contentions. As to (1),

the district court found that, to the extent that Long was

denied non-pork meals, Sugai was not responsible for the

denials. The court held that the evidence showed that, on the

occasions at issue, Long was not on the meal-

accommodations list and that Sugai had no role in compiling

that list. As to (2) and (3), crediting Sugai’s testimony, the

court found that Sugai did not so direct kitchen workers. As

to (4), the court found that Sugai directed Long to take his

meals in his housing unit on only a few occasions and that

he did so based on permissible security concerns. Ample

evidence supports the district court’s findings.

b. Retaliation

Long contended that Sgt. Sugai retaliated against him for

exercising his First Amendment right to file grievances. The

LONG V. SUGAI 19

alleged retaliatory acts were the same predicate acts as for

Long’s free exercise claim against Sugai. The district court

rejected his retaliation claim for the same reasons it rejected

his free exercise claims. Ample evidence supports the

district court’s findings.

2. Claim against Chief Antonio

The district court also tried the free exercise claim

against Chief Antonio. Long contended that Antonio

violated his First Amendment free exercise right in two

ways: (1) by transferring him to the high-security facility

where there were no Friday Jumu’ah prayer services, and

(2) by refusing to arrange transportation to the medium-

security facility so that Long could attend Jumu’ah services

there. As to (1), the district court concluded that Long’s free

exercise rights were substantially burdened by the transfer,

but after applying the four Turner factors, the district court

found that the burden was justified. We find no error in that

conclusion. As to (2), Antonio testified that he would have

forwarded any request to attend religious services to an

official with authority to approve such requests. Based on

this testimony, the court found that Antonio was not

authorized to arrange weekly transportation to the medium-

security facility for religious services, and that he was

therefore not a proper defendant. We also find no error in

that conclusion.

Conclusion

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED in part,

REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.