DEANGELO GEORGE ROBINSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D23-0330

LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

_____________________________

DEANGELO GEORGE ROBINSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Adrian G. Soud, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Robert J. Pearce, III,

Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Welch, Assistant

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

February 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.

The issues in this speedy trial case are whether (a) the four

factors in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954), were met; and

(b) what remedy is required if a violation of the right to speedy trial

is established. Based on the panel’s opinions, (a) Chief Judge

Edwards and Judge Makar agree that the Melton factors were met

while Judge Boatwright disagrees, finding that factors one and

three were not met; (b) all judges agree that if the Melton factors

1

were met the remedy for a violation of the right to speedy trial

under applicable precedent is to discharge the defendant, see State

v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001); (c) all judges agree

that Robinson did not comply with the procedural requirements of

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, Florida’s speedy trial

rule, which would have entitled him to a discharge; (d) parts III

(A)-(B) of Judge Boatwright’s opinion—in which Chief Judge

Edwards and Judge Makar join—analyze and pass upon the

question of whether Williams remains valid or should be

reconsidered; and (e) all judges concur in the certification of the

following question of great public importance:

WHETHER THE HOLDING IN STATE V. WILLIAMS,

791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), SHOULD BE

MODIFIED TO CLARIFY THAT FLORIDA RULE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.191 DOES NOT

ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS INCLUDING

THE RIGHT TO AUTOMATIC DISCHARGE AFTER

EXPIRATION OF THE RULE’S PRESCRIBED TIME

PERIOD?

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions; QUESTION

CERTIFIED.

EDWARDS, C.J., concurs with opinion.

BOATWRIGHT, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.

MAKAR, J., concurs in part and in result with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

2

Case No. 5D23-330

LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

EDWARDS, C.J., concurring.

Appellant, Deangelo George Robinson, appeals the order

denying his motion for discharge based on the claimed expiration

of the speedy trial period found in Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.191.1 Florida Department of Law Enforcement

(“FDLE”) agents forcefully arrested, then searched, Robinson in

Suwannee County pursuant to a Duval County warrant for his

arrest on attempted murder and firearm charges.2 That Duval

County warrant was the sole basis for pursuing and arresting him.

Put another way, absent that warrant, FDLE’s detention and

search of Robinson would have completely lacked probable cause.

After FDLE had him in handcuffs, they discovered drugs on his

person and a search of his car revealed more illegal drugs and

firearms. For reasons unexplained, Duval County’s attempted

murder charges against him were put on the back burner.

Robinson was turned over to Suwannee County where he was

convicted and received a 20-month prison sentence on the drug and

firearm possession charges. The issue on appeal is whether

postponing prosecution of the charges for which a defendant is

initially arrested stops the speedy trial clock. For the reasons

explained below we hold that it does not. We are compelled to

reverse and remand for the trial court to grant Robinson’s motion

for discharge.

BACKGROUND FACTS

1 This appeal was initially filed in the First District Court of

Appeal and was transferred to this Court pursuant to the

realignment of districts on January 1, 2023.

2 Robinson was previously convicted of possession of firearms

by a convicted felon.

3

On March 29, 2015, Robinson’s son accidentally hit another

child with a homemade toy sword on a playground. That child’s

father asked Robinson’s son to quit swinging that sword around.

When Robinson learned of this event, he drove to the other child’s

apartment and confronted that child’s father. It was alleged that

after some discussion, Robinson retrieved a pistol from his car,

walked up to that child’s father and shot him in the head. Several

witnesses identified Robinson as the shooter, leading the

Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (“JSO”) on April 7, 2015 to obtain a

warrant for his arrest for the crimes of attempted murder and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Thus, the references

to the Duval County charges and the Duval County warrant

throughout this opinion.

FDLE Search and Takedown

Robinson proved to be elusive. The JSO sought assistance

from the FDLE to try to locate and arrest Robinson on the active

Duval County warrant. In late October of 2015, the FDLE

determined that he was attending a large music festival in

Suwannee County. The FDLE contacted the Suwannee County

Sheriff’s Office, advised they were bringing in FDLE teams to

apprehend Robinson, and requested assistance in executing the

Duval County warrant. The JSO did not participate in the

Suwannee County operation.

On November 2, 2015, members of the FDLE’s Special

Operations Group3 (“SOG”) in one vehicle, followed Robinson from

the music festival back to a Suwannee County motel. The deputies

waited in a separate vehicle parked at an adjacent restaurant, 40–

50 yards away from where the takedown was to occur. Those

Suwannee County deputies would later testify that FDLE ran the

entire operation, that FDLE was there specifically to arrest

Robinson, and that the only reason for approaching and

apprehending Robinson was to execute the Duval County warrant.

Robinson was not on Suwannee County’s radar at all for any local

matters at that time.

3 The FDLE SOG was compared by some witnesses to a SWAT

team.

4

With guns drawn, FDLE agents approached Robinson near

his vehicle, took him to the ground, and placed him in handcuffs.4

The first Suwannee deputy took about ten seconds to run over to

where the takedown had already occurred, arriving after the

FDLE had Robinson on the ground in handcuffs. The second

Suwannee deputy reached the scene a few seconds later. FDLE

agents told the deputies there was a gun in Robinson’s vehicle; the

deputies went to the car and confirmed that. As FDLE officers

patted down the handcuffed Robinson, they found illegal drugs

which they handed over to the deputies. A more detailed search of

the vehicle revealed more drugs and firearms. The first Suwannee

County deputy prepared one probable cause affidavit that said in

part, “[a]fter arrest of the defendant, vehicle was found to have a

concealed firearm, plain view, drugs in the center portion vehicle

between the seats.” The same deputy prepared another probable

cause affidavit that said, “[t]he Suwannee County Sheriff’s Office

assisted FDLE in an arrest of the above-named defendant for

murder in Jacksonville, Florida.”

Booked and Convicted on “Local Charges”

That same day, November 2, 2015, FDLE turned Robinson

over to Suwannee County so that he could be booked into their jail.

Initially, the Suwannee deputies expected that Robinson would be

transported to Jacksonville to face the charges set forth in the

active Duval County warrant. At some point, it was agreed that

Suwannee County would prosecute Robinson on the drug and

firearms possession crimes, which were termed the “local charges.”

No explanation was given for delaying Robinson’s prosecution on

the more serious Duval County charges. The paperwork prepared

by the Suwannee County deputies reflected that Robinson was

being booked into their jail only on the local charges. The deputies

were unable to include detailed information in their booking

reports about the Duval County charges because they never had a

copy of that warrant.

4 Robinson did not resist the FDLE officers during the

takedown.

5

Robinson was charged and convicted in Suwannee County on

the local drug and firearms charges. He was sentenced to serve

20.4 months in prison. Two days before the end of that sentence,

he was transported to Jacksonville on April 28, 2017. On the

following day he went through the first appearance process where

he was formally charged and booked on the Duval County

attempted murder and firearm charges set forth in the April 2015

Duval County warrant.

Robinson filed a motion for discharge, claiming that the

November 2, 2015 takedown and detention by FDLE was an arrest

for speedy trial rule purposes and that the speedy trial period had

run before he was formally charged on the Duval County charges

on April 29, 2017. The trial court scheduled a hearing during

which the State presented the testimony of the two Suwannee

County deputies and Robinson testified on his own behalf.

After receiving evidence and entertaining argument of

counsel, the trial court ruled that the speedy trial time had not run

because, “the [Duval County] warrant was not served upon the

defendant at the time FDLE officers and Suwannee sheriff’s

officers approached him on November 2, 2015.” The trial court

found that it was “very clear that April 28th of 2017 was the date

that the defendant was served with a [Duval County] warrant and

was detained or arrested, rather, on that warrant,

notwithstanding the approach of November 2, 2015.” The trial

court’s February 6, 2020 written order stated that the motion for

discharge was denied for reasons stated on the record, referring

obviously to the statements above. 5

5 Robinson’s petition for writ of prohibition filed in the First

District Court of Appeal seeking review of the denial of his motion

for discharge was per curiam denied by an unelaborated order.

Robinson v. State, 326 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). That prior

decision does not prevent this appeal. See Topps v. State, 865 So.

2d 1253, 1258 (Fla. 2004) (“[U]nelaborated orders denying relief in

connection with all extraordinary writ petitions issued by Florida

courts shall not be deemed to be decisions on the merits which

would later bar the litigant from presenting the issue under the

doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless there is a

citation to authority or other statement that clearly shows that the

6

Robinson ultimately entered a “best interest” guilty plea on

the Duval County charges. On October 13, 2022, he was

adjudicated guilty and sentenced to serve 20 years in prison on the

attempted murder charge and a concurrent 15 years on the

firearms charge with 1994 days of jail credit.

This timely appeal followed.6

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court’s ruling on a speedy trial-based motion for

discharge presents mixed questions of fact and law.” Davis v.

State, 253 So. 3d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citing State v.

Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001)). “The trial court’s

factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent,

substantial evidence, but its legal conclusions are subject to de

novo review.” Id. There are no disputes as to any findings of fact

in this case. We are presented with pure questions of law involving

application of the Melton elements and Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.191.

ANALYSIS

Florida’s Speedy Trial Rule

Rule 3.191 provides the mechanism by which a defendant may

secure the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.191. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

“guarantees the accused a speedy trial to limit the duration of

possible public scorn, adverse impact on employment, and other

consequences brought about by arrest or indictment that can only

be cleared by a verdict of not guilty or a permanent dismissal of

issue was considered by the court on the merits and relief was

denied.”).

6 The trial court ruled and the State stipulated, below and on

appeal, that denial of his motion for discharge was dispositive. See

Gilliam v. State, 312 So. 3d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). Thus,

the issue is preserved for appeal.

7

the charges.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Klopfer v. North

Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967)). This Court has described the

right to a speedy trial as “an important safeguard to prevent undue

and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety

and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the

possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to

defend himself.” Id. (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,

120 (1966); State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973)).

Rule 3.191(a) provides that every person charged with a felony

shall be brought to trial within 175 days of arrest, and the time

period commences when the person is “taken into custody” as

defined in 3.191(d), which reads in pertinent part:

(d) Custody. For purposes of this rule, a person is taken

into custody:

(1) when the person is arrested as a result of the

conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the

crime charged;

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191. The rule is not self-executing as the

defendant is normally required to serve a notice of expiration of

speedy trial time, which results in a hearing within five days, and

the requirement that the prosecution shall be ordered to bring the

defendant to trial within ten days. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p).

That opportunity to bring the defendant to trial within ten days is

referred to as the “recapture period.” Gilliam, 312 So. 3d at 1282.7

If the speedy trial period has run and the defendant is not brought

to trial within the recapture period, on proper motion, the

7 While not found in the rule, the Florida Supreme Court has

held that the recapture period is not available to the State if it fails

to file charges until after the 175 days has lapsed. State v.

Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001). We join our dissenting

colleague in requesting the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider

State v. Williams for the reasons set forth in parts III A and B of

Judge Boatwright’s opinion. The information charging Robinson

with attempted murder in the first degree and possession of a

concealed weapon by a convicted felon for the March 2015 shooting

was filed June 19, 2017.

8

defendant “shall be forever discharged from the crime.” Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). To say the least, that is a dramatic remedy.

“Arrest” as Defined by Melton Elements

Whether an arrest has occurred for purposes of Florida’s

speedy trial rule is not as clear as it could be. The word “arrest”

means different things in different circumstances. “[A] person may

be ‘in custody’ for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings, yet not

have been arrested for purposes of the speedy trial rule.” Davis,

253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 599

(Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). “Likewise, police ‘seizure’ of an individual

may trigger Fourth Amendment protection and yet not constitute

an arrest for purposes of speedy trial.” Id. The potential for

confusion is exacerbated rather than mitigated by the supreme

court’s use of adjectives to refer to a “technical arrest” or a “formal

arrest” as neither term is used in rule 3.191. See Griffin v. State,

474 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1985); Davis v. State, 286 So. 3d 170, 172

(Fla. 2019) (Davis II). To further complicate matters, the

definition of “arrest” in Florida speedy trial jurisprudence differs

from the federal speedy trial rule even though both are grounded

in the same Sixth Amendment right.

Florida’s speedy trial rule provides that “[t]he time periods

established by this subdivision shall commence when the person is

taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode

that gave rise to the crime charges.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d). We

might be tempted to end our analysis here, as Robinson’s arrest on

the Duval County charges resulted in him being taken into

custody; however, we must continue. “A formal arrest, complete

with fingerprinting and formal charges, is not always necessary to

start the running of the speedy trial time.” State v. Christian, 442

So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). But “something more than an

investigatory detention is required.” Id.

The “seminal case on what constitutes an arrest under the

speedy trial rule is Melton v. State.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238. In

Melton, the supreme court had this to say:

It is uniformly held that an arrest, in the technical

and restricted sense of the criminal law, is “the

9

apprehension or taking into custody of an alleged

offender in order that he [or she] may be brought into the

proper court to answer for a crime.” When used in this

sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A

purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or

pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure

or detention of the person to be arrested by a person

having present power to control the person arrested; (3)

A communication by arresting officer to the person whose

arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there

to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the

person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of

the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain

him.

75 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1954) (internal citations omitted). “All four

Melton elements must be present to conclude that an arrest has

occurred.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Brown v. State, 623

So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).

The only Melton element at issue here is the third one. The

first element is satisfied as it is clear that FDLE’s purpose and

intention on November 2, 2015, was to arrest Robinson under the

authority of the Duval County warrant. The second element is also

satisfied because FDLE agents did seize and detain Robinson by

taking him down, handcuffing him, and turning him over to

Suwannee County to be jailed. Element four was met, as Robinson

testified that he understood that it was the FDLE agents’ intent to

arrest him there in the motel parking lot. When asked whether he

felt like he was free to leave, Robinson testified that he was

“definitely not free to leave” and “was scared to flinch because I

figured they probably would have shot me if I would have.”

Commendably, the parties stipulated that Melton elements two

and four have been established.

We turn our focus, then, to Melton element three—was there

a communication by arresting officers, here the FDLE agents, to

Robinson of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an

arrest. Robinson testified during the hearing on his motion for

discharge that the FDLE agents ran towards him with guns

drawn, “saying they were there to arrest me for a warrant out of

10

Duval County.” Immediately after that statement, Robinson was

on the ground being handcuffed. In response to the State’s cross

examination, Robinson clarified the sequence of events: it was

while the FDLE agents were trying to get him on the ground that

they told him that they were arresting him for a Duval County

warrant for attempted murder. This testimony is undisputed.

The State tries to undercut Robinson’s testimony, pointing out

that no FDLE agents testified during the motion hearing.

Furthermore, the two Suwannee County deputies who did testify

at the hearing said that they did not hear anybody tell Robinson

he was being arrested on the Duval County warrant and neither of

them mentioned the warrant to Robinson. However, the record is

clear that the first Suwannee County deputy physically joined the

FDLE agents about ten seconds after the takedown and the second

deputy arrived still later. Both deputies testified that Robinson

was already on the ground and in handcuffs by the time the

deputies were actually on scene. One deputy testified that while

he did not hear anybody say they were arresting Robinson on the

Duval County warrant, he had to admit that he could not say that

it did not happen. The trial court may have been free to reject

Robinson’s unrebutted testimony if he had found Robinson to not

be a credible witness, but there was no such finding. Nor did the

trial judge discuss whether or when Robinson was told by FDLE

that he was being arrested on the Duval County warrant.

Robinson argues that the FDLE agents were required by law

to inform him that they were arresting him on the Duval County

warrant. He refers to section 901.16, Florida Statutes (2021),

which states in pertinent part that “[a] peace officer making an

arrest by a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of the

cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued.”8 While we

need not rely on that argument, neither will we accept the State’s

invitation to presume that the FDLE agents ignored section

901.16, especially in light of Robinson’s unrebutted and

unchallenged testimony that the agents complied with their

8There are statutory exceptions to this required

communication of arrest based on a warrant, but none apply here.

11

statutory obligation to advise him that he was being arrested on

that warrant as he was being taken to the ground and handcuffed.

Further, law enforcement had no reason other than the warrant to

approach, much less detain, Robinson prior to the take down.

The First District’s case of Gilliam v. State dealt with similar

issues. In August, 2018, Mr. Gilliam was stopped in St. Lucie

County, Florida by a local law enforcement officer. Gilliam, 312

So. 3d at 1281. When the officer had dispatch check Gilliam’s

license it turned out he had “an extraditable felony warrant out of

Duval County.” Id. The officer reported that he then “placed

Gilliam in custody and advised him why.” Id. After placing

Gilliam in custody, the officer searched his car and found both

drugs and paraphernalia. He was booked into the St. Lucie County

Jail on the local drug charges but was not booked on the Duval

County warrant. Id. 1281–82. After spending sixteen months

dealing with the St. Lucie County charges, he was released to the

Duval County authorities on December 21, 2019. On February 3,

2020, the information on the Duval County charges was filed; the

next day, Gilliam moved for discharge based on the speedy trial

rule. Id. at 1282. The trial court denied his motion.

As the First District noted, “[t]he Florida Supreme Court has

consistently held that the speedy trial period begins upon a

defendant’s initial arrest.” Id. at 1283 (citing Bulgin v. State, 912

So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. 2005)). “[T]he date of the original arrest is

the focal point for speedy trial considerations, irrespective of

changes made in charges.” Id. (quoting Weed v. State, 411 So. 2d

863, 865 (Fla. 1982)). The First District conducted a Melton

analysis and concluded that Gilliam’s motion for discharge should

have been granted. Id. 1284–85.

Just as in our case, the search of the defendant’s vehicle in

Gilliam occurred after he had been detained and placed in custody

pursuant to a Duval County warrant. Absent the probable cause

to arrest provided in both cases by Duval County warrants, law

enforcement would have been conducting unlawful warrantless

searches of Gilliam’s and of Robinson’s vehicles. However, both

defendants were arrested on warrants; thus, the post-arrest

searches in both cases were the legitimate bases for prosecution of

the defendants on local charges. “Where a person is arrested

12

pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate, numerous cases

have held that the person is in ‘custody’ within the meaning of the

speedy trial rule.” Id. at 1284 (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So.

2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1975)). The fact that neither Gilliam nor

Robinson were booked into the local county jail on a Duval County

warrant is immaterial, as they were both detained and taken into

custody because of their warrants.

Thus, despite some factual differences, Gilliam supports our

conclusion under a Melton analysis that the speedy trial clock was

triggered when FDLE agents arrested Robinson in Suwannee

County on the Duval County warrant. The trial judge’s denial of

Robinson’s motion for discharge was improperly based on when the

Duval County warrant was formally served, which is not a Melton

element, although it has been discussed but not adopted by the

Florida Supreme Court as an event that might in the future trigger

the speedy trial clock.

In both Gilliam and our case, the trial judges focused on when

the defendant was formally advised of the Duval County charges,

either by first appearance or service of the arrest warrant. That

set of circumstances is what the Florida Supreme Court described

as a “formal arrest” in Davis II. “We determine that ‘arrest’ in the

speedy trial context should mean formal arrest, which is the only

type of detention by law enforcement that implicates the Sixth

Amendment speedy trial right.” Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 172

(emphasis added). However, the supreme court then made it clear

in Davis II that Florida’s speedy trial rule, as written, did not

require a “formal arrest.” Id. The court defined “formal arrest,”

as used in federal speedy trial jurisprudence, as “when an accused

is taken into custody for the purpose of being ‘held to answer’ in

court for specified criminal charges.” Id. at 174 (quoting United

States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1971)). The supreme court

in Davis II went on to say that “[f]ormal arrest would therefore

necessarily be preceded by a determination and assertion that

probable cause exists to believe that the suspect committed the

crime(s) for which he or she is being arrested.” Id. Of course, in

the matter now before us, the warrant for Robinson’s arrest

included the finding of a Duval County circuit judge that “there

exists probable cause” to believe that Robinson committed the

13

crimes of attempted murder in the first degree and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon.

Whether Robinson’s arrest based on the warrant might

constitute a “formal arrest” is, for now, beside the point. This is

because, rather than adopt the “formal arrest” standard used in

federal proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court referred that

proposed rule change to the Florida Bar’s Criminal Procedure

Rules Committee. Indeed, in Davis II the Court announced that

“[i]n the meantime, we adhere to Griffin v. State, which adopted

the ‘arrest’ definition from Melton v. State, for purposes of

determining when the speedy trial rule period begins to run under

our current rule.” Id. at 172 (internal citations omitted). For

whatever reasons, that referral did not result in a change in rule

3.191.9 Thus, Melton, as we applied it above, still governs.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we find that on November 2, 2015, when FDLE

agents arrested Robinson in Suwannee County under authority of

the Duval County warrant, the speedy trial time began to run. The

fact that he was charged and convicted in Suwannee County for

crimes that were based on contraband discovered incident to or

following that initial arrest did not stop the speedy trial clock. As

he was neither charged nor tried within 175 days from that date,

he was entitled to have his motion for discharge granted. We are

compelled to reverse the trial court’s order denying that motion.

We remand for entry of an order granting Robinson’s motion for

discharge, vacating the related judgment and sentence, and for

any further proceedings related to terminating his imprisonment

on the underlying charges.

9As discussed in Judge Boatwright’s opinion, the Florida

Supreme Court is considering just such a change in the rule.

14

Case No. 5D23-330

LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

BOATWRIGHT, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part.

I disagree with the majority’s holding that all four Melton

factors were present under the circumstances in this case. In

particular, for the reasons explained below, I do not believe the

record supports that Robinson established the presence of the first

and third Melton factors. Thus, I would affirm the trial court’s

denial of Robinson’s motion for discharge.

I.

On April 28, 2017, Robinson was served with the Duval

County warrant at issue in this case. Subsequently, Robinson filed

a motion for release, as well as a motion for an adversarial

probable cause hearing, alleging that he had been arrested on the

charges relevant to this case on April 28, 2017, but the State had

not filed an information within the applicable time limits. On June

19, 2017, the State filed an information charging Robinson with

attempted first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. Based on the State filing the information, it

appears that Robinson abandoned his two previous motions and

then filed an unlimited waiver of his speedy trial rights waiving

his constitutional rights and any rights under rule 3.191.1

Robinson then changed course and filed a motion for discharge

pursuant to rule 3.191. In his motion, he alleged that he had

actually been taken into custody on the Duval County warrant on

1 Although not raised by either party on appeal, Robinson

waived his speedy trial rights prior to filing his motion for

discharge. He filed his waiver on October 2, 2017, after the 175-

day period had elapsed. However, under Florida Supreme Court

precedent addressing analogous circumstances, Robinson’s post-

expiration waiver would not foreclose his right to a discharge

under rule 3.191(a). See State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570, 579 (Fla.

2010).

15

November 2, 2015, when he was apprehended in Suwannee

County, rather than April 28, 2017, the date on which he had

previously claimed he was first arrested on the charges at issue.

In the motion for discharge, Robinson argued that the State had

failed to bring him to trial within 175 days of November 2, 2015.

Robinson argued that he was entitled to discharge under rule

3.191 because the State had failed to file formal charges within 175

days after the date on which he was apprehended in Suwannee

County. He contended that because he had been “arrested” within

the meaning of rule 3.191 in Suwannee County on November 2,

2015, the State had until April 25, 2016, to bring him to trial, but

it failed to do so. He further asserted that because the State had

not filed an information within 175 days of November 2, 2015, the

State was not entitled to a recapture period. Thus, he argued he

was entitled to a discharge.

The trial court held a hearing on Robinson’s motion for

discharge. The State called two Suwannee County Sheriff’s Office

(SCSO) deputies, who had arrested Robinson on the Suwannee

County charges, to testify regarding the circumstances

surrounding Robinson’s takedown on November 2, 2015. According

to their testimonies, on October 30, 2015, a special agent with

FDLE contacted SCSO, explaining that FDLE had located

Robinson, who was wanted for charges in Duval County, at a park

in Suwannee County, where he was attending a music festival.

FDLE sought SCSO’s assistance in apprehending Robinson

because it was concerned about approaching him at a crowded

music festival when he was known to be potentially armed. FDLE

agents coordinated with SCSO deputies to orchestrate a takedown

of Robinson. FDLE agents located Robinson as he was leaving the

festival in a vehicle and followed him to a motel in Suwannee

County.

The SCSO deputies were passengers in a separate vehicle

driven by an FDLE special agent. The FDLE agent parked the

vehicle at a nearby restaurant approximately 40 to 50 yards away

from the motel. After the FDLE agents had positively identified

Robinson, they effected the takedown as he was entering his

vehicle in the parking lot of the motel. The SCSO deputies exited

the vehicle immediately after they received the takedown

command. It took their group approximately ten seconds to get to

16

the parking lot, where FDLE agents had Robinson on the ground.

One of the SCSO deputies testified that the driver’s side door of

Robinson’s vehicle was open, where he saw, in plain view, a gun

that was partially hidden and a bag containing what he suspected

were illegal mushrooms. The deputy also indicated that upon their

arrival, an FDLE agent, noting the open car door, immediately

remarked, “Do you see a gun? There’s a gun.” The SCSO deputies

further observed that the FDLE agents had removed illegal drugs

from Robinson’s pocket during their search of his person. At that

time, the SCSO deputies, who had been previously made aware by

FDLE that Robinson was a convicted felon, decided to arrest

Robinson as a result of the firearm and drugs that were found in

plain view during the takedown. They arrested Robinson on

charges of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana over 20

grams, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a full

investigation, he was additionally charged with trafficking in

methamphetamine and possession of MDMA.

According to the SCSO deputies, they initially arrived on the

scene to assist FDLE with the Duval County warrant, but they

ultimately decided to arrest Robinson for the drug and firearm

charges, which were entirely unrelated to the Duval County

warrant. They testified that they never arrested Robinson on the

Duval County warrant, nor did they ever advise him that he was

under arrest for the Duval County warrant. They additionally

stated that they never heard the FDLE agents tell Robinson he

was under arrest for the Duval County charges. However, on cross-

examination, one deputy was asked to speculate whether anyone

could have mentioned the Duval County warrant to Robinson, to

which he responded, “I could not say no,” but reiterated that he

never heard it being said.

The SCSO deputies wrote in the arrest affidavit for their local

charges that Robinson had been arrested on the Duval County

charges. However, they explained the reason for doing this was

that they thought FDLE was independently going to arrest

Robinson for those charges, which it never did. Rather, FDLE

elected to allow SCSO to pursue the local charges, and it merely

placed a detainer on Robinson for the Duval County charges. This

detainer documentation was entered into evidence.

17

Robinson did not call any witnesses to testify at the hearing;

however, he took the stand on his own behalf. Robinson testified

that prior to the November 2, 2015 encounter, he knew he had an

outstanding warrant for his arrest out of Duval County because

his child’s mother had apprised him of the warrant. Robinson then

provided what could be construed as conflicting testimony

regarding the exact statements by the FDLE agents. On direct

examination, Robinson stated that as he was walking towards his

vehicle, FDLE agents told him he was under arrest for the Duval

County charges. However, on cross-examination, he stated he was

only told that he was under arrest for the Duval County charges

while he was being taken down to the ground by the FDLE agents

and at no other time were the Duval County charges mentioned to

him.

There were no other witnesses called to testify. Only the two

SCSO deputies and Robinson testified at the hearing. The FDLE

agents did not testify.

During closing arguments, the main focus was whether, under

Melton, Robinson had been arrested on the Duval County warrant.

Robinson’s counsel argued that all four Melton factors were

present, thus proving Robinson had been arrested for the Duval

County charges within the meaning of rule 3.191 during the

November 2, 2015 takedown. Robinson’s counsel specifically

focused on the presence of the third Melton factor, arguing that

Robinson’s testimony conclusively established the FDLE agents

had communicated to him that he was under arrest for the Duval

County charges.

The State argued that all four Melton factors were not

present. In regard to the first Melton factor, although the State

initially argued that the FDLE agents could have detained

Robinson on reasonable suspicion based on the warrant, the

State’s primary contention was that the circumstances clearly

established that FDLE’s intent to arrest Robinson on the Duval

County warrant immediately changed once the agents saw the

contraband and firearm in plain view in Robinson’s car. The State

asserted that this was evidenced by FDLE’s decision not to move

forward on the Duval County warrant but rather to defer to the

18

SCSO deputies on the local charges, which were evident and

substantial at the onset of the takedown.

The State additionally called into question Robinson’s

credibility. In particular, the State argued that the SCSO deputies

testified they never heard the FDLE agents tell Robinson that he

was under arrest for the Duval County charges, and Robinson

admitted he previously knew about the warrant because his child’s

mother informed him of the charges. In addition, the State argued

that Robinson’s testimony was not credible because it was unlikely

that the FDLE agents were advising Robinson of the Duval County

warrant while they were securing him due to the high alert of the

situation. Rather, it was more likely that they were making sure

he was secure on the ground and that the other individuals in his

party were secure instead of informing him of the charges in the

first ten seconds of the takedown. The State concluded by arguing

that Robinson had not been arrested on the Duval County charges

such as to trigger rule 3.191, but that a detainer had been placed

on him for those charges while he was being prosecuted for the

Suwannee County charges.

The trial court then denied the motion for discharge, finding

that Robinson had not been arrested on the Duval County

charges—during the takedown or any other time. The court

explained: “The approach of FDLE, the reason for their approach,

meaning the warrant, does not render the conduct and the

approach to the defendant and the searching of the defendant that

of an arrest.” The court additionally elaborated that the SCSO

deputies had provided a valid explanation as to why they had

initially stated in the arrest affidavit that Robinson had been

arrested on the Duval County charges. The court indicated that it

also relied on the State’s documentation evidencing that a hold had

been placed on Robinson for the Duval County charges as a result

of the November 2, 2015 takedown, and it accordingly determined

this to be a situation where a detainer was in place, rather than

an actual arrest such as would trigger the provisions of rule 3.191.

II.

19

The right to a speedy trial is triggered “when the person is

arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode that gave

rise to the crime charged.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d)(1). However,

it should be noted that “a detainer placed by one county for a

prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within

the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the

running of the speedy trial time.” State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55,

56 (Fla. 1977). As delineated by the majority, the Florida Supreme

Court in Melton articulated a four-factor analysis for determining

whether a custodial detention constitutes an arrest and thus

triggers the provisions of rule 3.191. 75 So. 2d at 294. For a court

to conclude that an arrest has occurred within the meaning of rule

3.191, “all four Melton elements must be present.” Davis, 253 So.

3d at 1238 (citing Brown v. State, 623 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1993)). Therefore, it is the defendant’s burden to prove the

existence of an arrest pursuant to Melton when filing a motion for

discharge under rule 3.191. See State v. Cheek, 294 So. 3d 934, 941

(Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (finding that where the defendant did not

establish all four of the Melton factors were present, he had failed

to prove he was arrested within the meaning of rule 3.191 for

speedy trial purposes).

This Court has recognized the difficulty in establishing the

presence of all four Melton elements.2 Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1242.

Regarding these elements, our Court has said that “requiring the

presence of all four elements demands a level of clarity and

certainty that is often lacking in these situations” as it can place

“too much emphasis on the presence or absence of any single

element.” Id. In particular, some elements require a very

subjective analysis. For instance, under element one, “the court

must somehow determine whether the officer subjectively

2 This court previously argued that a totality of the

circumstances test would be better in determining whether an

arrest was made, rather than the formalities required by the

Melton analysis. Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1242–43. However, on

certification, the Florida Supreme Court declined to recede from

the Melton analysis and instead advocated for a rule change. Davis

II, 286 So. 3d. at 170.

20

intended to effect an arrest.” Id. As evident in this case, proving

the subjective intent of the arresting officer can be a challenge.

As to the first Melton factor, Robinson was required to

establish that “there was a purpose or intention” by the law

enforcement officers to effect an arrest on the Duval County

warrant. The SCSO deputies were the only law enforcement

officers who were present at the hearing. And although the SCSO

deputies testified they had initially been contacted to assist FDLE

with its efforts to effectuate an arrest on the Duval County

warrant, they ultimately testified that they arrested Robinson

solely on the local charges resulting from the contraband found

during the takedown, which was in plain view. In addition, they

indicated that the FDLE agents never asked them to arrest

Robinson on the Duval County warrant, nor was Robinson

arrested on the warrant. Thus, there was no proof that the SCSO

deputies’ intent was to arrest Robinson on the Duval County

warrant.

In regard to the FDLE agents’ intent, the SCSO deputies

specifically indicated that the FDLE agent who initially

apprehended Robinson, as he was entering his vehicle,

immediately advised them of the contraband in plain view in

Robinson’s car, and the FDLE agents promptly deferred to the

SCSO deputies to proceed forward in booking Robinson on the local

charges. The importance of this is that the FDLE agents did not

testify at the hearing, meaning the record is devoid of any

testimony regarding their intent after they saw the contraband as

they apprehended Robinson. The State’s position was that the

“situation turned” during the takedown when the FDLE agents

saw the contraband in Robinson’s vehicle and thus, their intent

changed. This is a plausible theory of how the takedown occurred,

and is consistent with the SCSO deputies’ testimony that the

Duval County warrant was not brought up based on what was

discovered during the takedown. Obviously, the trial court deemed

this argument persuasive when it found that “the approach of

FDLE, the reason for their approach, meaning the warrant, does

not render the conduct and the approach to the defendant and the

searching of the defendant that of an arrest.”

21

This case is therefore distinguishable from Gilliam v. State,

which is relied upon by the majority. 312 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA

2021). In Gilliam, it was a St. Lucie County officer who

apprehended Gilliam, advised him why he was being arrested,

searched him, and then decided to place charges based on the

contraband found during his search incident to arrest. Notably,

when it found the first Melton factor to be present, the court stated,

“The arresting officer explained in the report: ‘Upon running

Gilliam, dispatch advised he had an extraditable felony warrant

out of Duval County. I placed Gilliam in custody and advised him

why.’” Id. at 1284 (emphasis added). This statement constituted

direct evidence demonstrating that the arresting officer intended

to effect an arrest under the authority of the Duval County

warrant and that he explained that intent to Gilliam before the

officer searched Gilliam and found the contraband forming the

basis of the separate local charges. Id. In this case, however, there

is a degree of separation between the FDLE agents who initially

apprehended Robinson and the SCSO deputies who ultimately

arrested him. It was not the FDLE agents who indicated their

intent to effectuate an arrest, but rather, it was the SCSO deputies

who arrested Robinson on their local charges. As observed by the

State in its closing argument, FDLE’s conduct following the

takedown constituted evidence of its intent not to arrest Robinson

on the Duval County warrant.

There was competent substantial evidence to support the trial

court’s finding that there was not an arrest on the Duval County

warrant. Notably, there was evidence to support that although the

FDLE agents’ original intent was to arrest Robinson on the Duval

County warrant, their intent changed during the takedown and

subsequent investigation. As the State argued, the FDLE agents

could have seized Robinson solely based on reasonable suspicion or

alternatively their intent changed once they viewed the

contraband in plain sight in his car. According to the State, once

the FDLE agents apprehended Robinson under these

circumstances, they clearly did not have an intent to move forward

to arrest him on the Duval County warrant, or else they would

have taken some sort of affirmative step to effectuate an arrest on

the Duval County warrant (or would have indicated to the SCSO

deputies that they should move forward on those charges as well).

22

Robinson could have called the FDLE officers as witnesses to

clarify their intent and meet his burden but chose not to do so. The

error of not calling the FDLE agents to testify was apparently

recognized by defense counsel when the State began to posit

alternative theories as to why Robinson may have been detained.

Robinson’s counsel recognized this key issue, stating to the court:

“So I don’t know if I need to talk to the State about providing you

those depos or getting an FDLE witness here. I did not expect that.

And that is when the reasonable suspicion part came up, I’m stuck

on what to do.” However, Robinson instead decided to rely solely

on his own testimony regarding what the FDLE agents

communicated to him, but his testimony did not address the FDLE

agents’ subjective intent when they ultimately effectuated the

takedown. As a result, he did not establish the subjective intent of

the FDLE agents or at the very least that the FDLE agents’ intent

did not change.

Regarding the third Melton factor, the majority’s position

appears to be that Robinson’s testimony was uncontroverted and

dispositive as to whether there was a communication by the

arresting officers that they intended to arrest Robinson on the

Duval County warrant. In particular, the majority relies on the

fact that Robinson stated he was told he was under arrest for the

Duval County warrant as he was taken to the ground. Since the

SCSO deputies arrived at Robinson’s location within ten seconds

after the takedown signal was given, the majority assumes that

the deputies could not have heard what was communicated to

Robinson as he was taken to the ground, and thus, his testimony

was undisputed. While it is true that “[a]s a general rule,

uncontroverted factual evidence cannot simply be rejected,” it may

be rejected if “it is contrary to law, improbable, untrustworthy,

unreasonable, or contradictory.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d

543, 560–61 (Fla. 2010). In addition, this principle usually arises

where there is only one person to testify regarding the facts at

issue. See State v. G.H., 549 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)

(finding that where an officer was the only person to testify at a

suppression hearing, and where his testimony was neither

impeached, discredited, controverted, self-contradicting, nor

physically impossible, the trial court was bound to accept the

officer’s testimony as to what occurred for purposes of granting or

denying the motion to suppress).

23

However, Robinson’s testimony was not uncontroverted. The

SCSO deputies specifically testified that they never told Robinson

he was under arrest for the Duval County charges and that they

did not hear the FDLE agents tell him he was under arrest for

those same charges. And although it took the SCSO deputies

approximately ten seconds from the takedown command to arrive

at the scene, the circumstances indicated they were almost

immediately within earshot of the FDLE agents. There is nothing

in Robinson’s testimony, or the testimonies of the SCSO deputies,

demonstrating that the SCSO deputies were unable to hear what

was transpiring as the FDLE agents were effectuating the

takedown. Additionally, as this short period of time is crucial to

the majority’s position, Robinson’s testimony was not clear as to

the timing of the statements, as he provided conflicting testimony

regarding when he was actually told he was under arrest for the

Duval County charges. Robinson first testified that the FDLE

agents told him about the Duval County warrant as they were

approaching him, but then contradicted himself on cross-

examination by stating that he was informed about the warrant as

they were taking him to the ground.

Robinson’s overall credibility was at issue as he was a

convicted felon, rendering the veracity of his statement even more

tenuous. Moreover, Robinson testified that he independently knew

about the Duval County warrant because his child’s mother had

advised him of the warrant. He admitted he immediately

speculated that the FDLE agents were approaching him based on

the Duval County warrant because he was unaware of any other

reason for their approach. This gave Robinson an independent

basis for knowing about the Duval County warrant rather than

being informed of such by the FDLE agents. The State keyed in on

these credibility issues by arguing that Robinson’s testimony was

not credible because it was unlikely that the FDLE agents were

advising Robinson of the Duval County warrant while they were

securing him due to the high alert of the situation; rather, it was

more likely that they were focused on ensuring he was secure on

the ground and the other individuals in his party were secure

instead of informing him of the charges.

24

Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the court

ruled that the FDLE officers did not “arrest” Robinson on the

Duval County warrant on November 2, 2015. The court gave

detailed reasons on the record as to why there was not a valid

arrest. Although the court did not specifically comment on

Robinson’s credibility, by determining that there was not a valid

arrest for the purposes of Melton it can be inferred that the court

necessarily disregarded Robinson’s self-serving testimony.

Under the standard of review by which we are constrained,

the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the

trial court’s finding that there was no arrest on the Duval County

warrant as the result of law enforcement’s actions on November 2,

2015. See Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 174 (“The trial court’s factual

findings will be sustained if they are supported by competent,

substantial evidence.”); see also State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120,

132–33 (Fla. 2003) (holding that “competent, substantial evidence

is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and a reviewing court

must assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its

weight”; and stating that evidence contrary to a trial court’s ruling

“is outside the scope of the inquiry, for a reviewing court cannot

reweigh the ‘pros and cons’ of conflicting evidence.”) (internal

citations omitted). The majority appears to hold that the trial court

did not make the necessary factual findings or that Robinson’s

credibility was inadequately addressed to support its ruling.

However, nothing in either rule 3.191 or Melton (and its progeny)

requires a trial court to make any particular degree of factual

findings regarding the Melton factors. Regardless, even if the trial

court made conclusions, rather than factual findings, reversal is

only required “[w]hen the appellate court is convinced that an

express or inferential finding of the trial court is without support

of any substantial evidence, is clearly against the weight of the

evidence, or that the trial court has misapplied the law to the

established facts.” Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. 1956)

(explaining that under these circumstances, the trial court’s

decision is “clearly erroneous” and the appellate court will reverse

because the trial court has “failed to give legal effect to the

evidence” in its entirety). As a result, the decision of the trial court

is not clearly erroneous, because based on the evidence presented,

the court could have correctly concluded that Robinson failed to

establish that there was an arrest under Melton.

25

In sum, as the Florida Supreme Court has articulated, the test

here is not that of a “totality of circumstances.” Rather, Robinson

was required to establish all four Melton factors were present to

successfully move for discharge. Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 174–75.

Because Robinson failed to establish the presence of all four of

Melton factors, the trial court correctly denied the motion to

discharge.

III.

I disagree with the majority that there was a valid arrest

under a Melton analysis, and I consequently disagree with the

majority’s determination that Robinson should be discharged.

However, insofar as the majority has opined that there was a valid

arrest, I agree with their application of the current precedent in

regard to a discharge under rule 3.191. I write further to elaborate

on the problems arising from our current precedent’s disregard of

the plain text of rule 3.191.

A.

Florida’s rules of procedure “are construed in accordance with

the principles of statutory construction.” Saia Motor Freight Line,

Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006) (citing Brown v. State,

715 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1998) (“Our courts have long recognized

that the rules of construction applicable to statutes also apply to

the construction of rules.”)). As such, the Florida Supreme Court’s

express adoption of the “supremacy-of-text” principles of statutory

construction in Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d

942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020), applies to the construction of rule 3.191.

To interpret the meaning of legal texts, Ham counsels:

[W]e follow the “supremacy-of-text principle”—namely,

the principle that “[t]he words of a governing text are of

paramount concern, and what they convey, in their

context, is what the text means.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan

A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts 56 (2012). We also adhere to Justice Joseph Story’s

view that “every word employed in [a legal text] is to be

26

expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,

unless the context furnishes some ground to control,

qualify, or enlarge it.” Advisory Op. to Governor re

Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration

Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the

United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner,

Reading Law at 69).

308 So. 3d at 946–47 (alterations in original).

The right of an accused to a speedy trial in Florida is

guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution.

Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 174. In addition, rule 3.191 provides a

procedural mechanism to enforce a defendant’s right to a speedy

trial. Rather than rely on a constitutional guarantee, Robinson

relies on rule 3.191 for his relief. The relevant language of rule

3.191 is as follows:

(a) Speedy Trial without Demand. Except as

otherwise provided by this rule, and subject to the

limitations imposed under subdivisions (e) and (f), every

person charged with a crime shall be brought to trial

within 90 days of arrest if the crime charged is a

misdemeanor, or within 175 days of arrest if the crime

charged is a felony. If trial is not commenced within these

time periods, the defendant shall be entitled to the

appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (p). The

time periods established by this subdivision shall

commence when the person is taken into custody as

defined under subdivision (d). A person charged with a

crime is entitled to the benefits of this rule whether the

person is in custody in a jail or correctional institution of

this state or a political subdivision thereof or is at liberty

on bail or recognizance or other pretrial release condition.

This subdivision shall cease to apply whenever a person

files a valid demand for speedy trial under subdivision

(b).

27

Notably, rule 3.191(a) does not contain any language

requiring an information be filed within this 175-day period. In

addition, according to the express language of the rule, the remedy

upon expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period is not an

automatic discharge, but is instead specifically set forth in

subdivision (p). Subdivision (p), entitled “Remedy for Failure to

Try Defendant within the Specified Time,” provides in pertinent

part:

(2) At any time after the expiration of the prescribed time

period, the defendant may file a separate pleading

entitled “Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time,” and

serve a copy on the prosecuting authority.

(3) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a

notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall

hold a hearing on the notice and, unless the court finds

that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists,

shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within

10 days. A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-

day period through no fault of the defendant, on motion

of the defendant or the court, shall be forever discharged

from the crime.

The rule requires that to be forever discharged from the crime, a

defendant would need to file a “Notice of Expiration of Speedy

Trial” after the expiration of the prescribed time period. The State

would then be granted a total of 15 days following the filing of a

Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial as a recapture period to bring

a defendant to trial.

In this case, Robinson did not comply with the requirements

of rule 3.191(p). He did not file a Notice of Expiration of Speedy

Trial, nor was the State granted an opportunity for recapture.

Based on the plain text of the rule, he should not be granted an

automatic discharge.

However, the Florida Supreme Court (over 20 years ago)

interpreted rule 3.191 to mean that the recapture period applies

only when the information or indictment charging the defendant

is filed within the speedy trial period, and the State is not entitled

28

to the recapture period if it fails to act until after the 175-day

speedy trial period has expired. State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088,

1091 (Fla. 2001). As a result, if the State fails to file charges before

the 175-day speedy trial period lapses, the State “loses the benefit

of recapture” and the defendant is entitled to discharge under rule

3.191. Thus, the court in Williams held “that the speedy trial time

begins to run when an accused is taken into custody and continues

to run even if the State does not act until after the expiration of

that speedy trial period. The State may not file charges based on

the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired.” Id.

The rule, as interpreted in Williams, is unworkable in the

context of this case, where Robinson was never charged with a

crime based on the Duval County warrant. If Robinson was in fact

arrested, as claimed by the majority, it was only within the

constraints of Melton. Formally, the warrant was never served on

Robinson at the time of the November 2, 2015 encounter. He did

not go through a first appearance proceeding on these charges.

Rather, internally he was considered to have a detainer placed on

him regarding the Duval County charges. Most importantly, since

Robinson was not formally charged, the court process that should

have alerted the State to the commencement of the running of the

speedy trial time was never initiated; i.e., the State never received

the executed warrant which would have alerted it to the fact that

the speedy trial clock had been triggered. Without any such

notification, the State could not have known that it needed to file

an information in this case and as such, was not provided with the

benefit of recapture under rule 3.191. As Justice Wells astutely

observed in this context: “I reiterate that making the speedy trial

rule run from the time of arrest rather than from the time of filing

of an indictment or information ignores the reality of the

organization of law enforcement and state attorneys in this state.”

In re Amends., 886 So. 2d 197, 201 (Fla. 2004) (Wells, J.,

concurring).

The complications evidenced by the facts in this case

demonstrate precisely why the recapture provision was added into

the rule. Previously, rule 3.191 provided for an automatic

discharge; and the recapture provision was later added into the

rule in 1984. However, the Williams court, by its decision, added

29

the automatic discharge back into the rule. As Justice Lawson has

pointed out:

This is, after all, the speedy trial rule, not the speedy

discharge rule. And, that opportunity for a speedy trial is

what the express terms of the rule unambiguously

provide a defendant and the State. Ironically, over thirty

years ago we specifically removed, as antithetical to the

rule’s purpose, the very remedy of immediate discharge

that the majority writes back in with its anti-textual

“interpretation.”

Born-Suniaga v. State, 256 So. 3d 783, 791 (Fla. 2018) (Lawson, J.,

dissenting) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 committee notes (1984));

State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570, 576 (Fla. 2010) (“The creation of the

recapture period emphasizes the purpose of the rule—‘to promote

the efficient operation of the court system and act as a stimulus to

prosecutors to bring defendants to trial as soon as practicable, thus

minimizing the hardships placed on accused persons awaiting

trial.’ In other words, the recapture period illustrates the principle

that the defendant has a right to a speedy trial, not a right to a

speedy discharge without trial.”).

In sum, when applying Florida’s principles of construction to

rule 3.191, there is no sound means of reconciling Williams with

the plain language of rule 3.191. It is impossible to read into rule

3.191 the remedy provided to Robinson by Williams—i.e., an

automatic discharge without first affording the State an

opportunity for recapture. However, though I disagree with

Williams, I recognize that this court is constrained by its holding.

State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020) (“In a case where we

are bound by a higher legal authority—whether it be a

constitutional provision, a statute, or a decision of the Supreme

Court—our job is to apply that law correctly to the case before us.

When we are convinced that a precedent clearly conflicts with the

law we are sworn to uphold, precedent normally must yield.”);

accord Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 550–51 (Fla. 2020). Thus,

Judge Makar and I agree that even if there had been a valid arrest

under Melton, but for the opinion in Williams and its progeny, an

affirmance would still be appropriate because Robinson did not

comply with the procedural requirements of rule 3.191 which

30

would have entitled him to a discharge. As such, Judge Makar’s

certified question in his concurring opinion is justified, and I join

in certification. Therefore, the precedent should be re-visited or a

rule change should be implemented.3

B.

Not only is the text of the rule not being adhered to, but the

ruling in Williams transformed a procedural rule into a

substantive rule. Rule 3.191 was designed to provide a procedure

to protect the speedy trial right guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. See generally R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d 1167, 1169–

72 (Fla. 1992); State v. Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1986).

However, the automatic discharge read into rule 3.191 by the

Florida Supreme Court in Williams does not comport with Sixth

Amendment jurisprudence and creates a statute of limitations not

provided for by the legislature. See Williams, 791 So. 2d at 1093

(Wells, J., dissenting) (explaining that this rigid interpretation of

rule 3.191 has “created a judicial statute of limitation without

foundation in the language of the rule”); Bulgin v. State, 912 So.

2d 307, 314 (Fla. 2005) (Wells, J., dissenting) (stating that an

3 Indeed, this exact rule change has been proposed and is

presently pending before the Florida Supreme Court on its own

motion. The proposed change to rule 3.191 seeks to rectify the

issues caused by Williams, and would require the defendant to file

a notice of expiration of speedy trial and then afford the state an

opportunity for recapture (rather than being granted an automatic

discharge) in all cases. In re Amends., Case No. SC22–1123

(proposed on Jan. 18, 2024) (not yet reported). Notably, in addition

to the mandatory recapture period, the proposed change to rule

3.191 provides that the 175-day speedy trial period does not begin

until a defendant has been formally charged (as opposed to

arrested), thus effectively eliminating the need for a Melton

analysis concerning whether a defendant has been “arrested”

within the meaning of rule 3.191. Id. Finally, the proposed rule

change provides that where it is determined that rule 3.191 has

been violated, any discharge under the rule shall be without

prejudice unless there is a determination that the defendant’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Id.

31

automatic discharge “eviscerates the statute of limitations enacted

by the legislature”); Reed v. State, 649 So. 2d. 227, 229 (Fla. 1995)

(Overton, J., dissenting) (stating in regard to the creation of an

automatic discharge under 3.191, “I write to express my belief that

the majority has now crossed the line and made our speedy trial

rule substantive rather than procedural by this construction and

that, consequently, it is unconstitutional.”).

Additionally, although the Florida Constitution grants the

Florida Supreme Court exclusive rule-making authority, this

power is limited to rules governing procedural matters and does

not extend to substantive rights. Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481,

484 (Fla. 1993). The Florida Supreme Court has previously stated

that statutes of limitations provide substantive rights and

supersede our procedural rules. Id. However, under Williams, the

procedural rule supersedes legislative authority in establishing a

judicially created statute of limitations. In this case, Robinson was

initially charged by information with attempted first-degree

murder. There is no statute of limitations for that charge, as it is

a life felony. § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). Therefore, rule 3.191,

as interpreted in Williams, effectively creates a 175-day statute of

limitations for an offense which otherwise carries no statutory

time limit for prosecution. See Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597,

601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Sharp, J., concurring) (stating that “the

speedy trial rule as interpreted by case law, has drastically

shortened the statute of limitations for prosecution of crimes, and

as such it has become the defendant’s best defense and ally”).

In addition, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the

right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment, however, does not

provide strict guidelines or timing rules as prescribed in rule 3.191.

Rather, the Sixth Amendment generally provides a more flexible

balancing test to determine whether the right has been violated.

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the United

States Supreme Court provided the following analysis:

A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach

speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little

more than identify some of the factors which courts

should assess in determining whether a particular

defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some

32

might express them in different ways, we identify four

such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the

defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the

defendant.

Id. at 530. Thus, the rule becomes one of a totality of the

circumstances test, where no one factor is “either a necessary or

sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of

speedy trial”; but “[r]ather, they are related factors and must be

considered together with such other circumstances as may be

relevant.” Id. at 533.

Rule 3.191 is designed as a procedure to protect this

constitutional right. However, Robinson has not alleged that his

Sixth Amendment right has been violated, nor has he alleged any

prejudice. As a result, he has no substantive claim for a dismissal

under the Sixth Amendment. Robinson’s claim is based solely on

the passage of time under rule 3.191. In this regard, the Sixth

Amendment speedy trial rule was “not primarily intended to

prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time.” United

States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). Rather, the right is

primarily “designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy

incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless

substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while

released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by

arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” Id.

However, in Williams, the court created an alternative substantive

deadline based not on the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but

merely on the passage of time. Robinson was never prejudiced in

this matter, as he did not suffer from a lengthy pre-trial

incarceration because he was already serving a prison sentence on

the Suwannee County charges. See State v. Joyner, 460 So. 2d 584,

585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding the defendant failed to show his

speedy trial rights were violated and stating: “There was no

oppressive pretrial incarceration because Joyner was serving a

lengthy state prison sentence.”). Thus, he would have had no

remedy for a violation of his Sixth Amendment right but for the

judicial interference in this area of substantive law vis-à-vis

Williams. As Justice Lawson aptly stated, these unnecessary

automatic discharges are created when the “judiciary unjustifiably

interferes with substantive law or executive discretion under the

33

guise of procedural rulemaking.” Born-Suniaga, 256 So. 3d at 792

(Lawson, J., dissenting).

IV.

I respectfully dissent because I do not think that Robinson

met his burden to show that the four Melton factors were present

and accordingly believe that an affirmance is appropriate.

However, I concur with the majority to the extent of their

application of the current precedent in Williams and its progeny in

regard to a discharge under rule 3.191 and their acknowledgment

that the precedent in Williams should be re-visited or a rule

change should be implemented. Additionally, as indicated above,

this case precisely illustrates the unworkability of the current

precedent interpreting rule 3.191 in cases where the State has not

been alerted to the need to file an information and where the State

has not been given the benefit of the recapture provision provided

by rule 3.191. As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, Florida’s

focus on the Melton factors unnecessarily overcomplicates the

inquiry. Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 175. As this Court has previously

explained, and the Supreme Court recognized, there is a legitimate

and unresolved concern that “the narrowed focus on the Melton

factors, along with the wording of the current rule [3.191], could,

in theory, lead to a determination that an individual has been

arrested for speedy trial purposes even though he or she was not

arrested for the purpose of being held to answer in court for

criminal charges.” Id. This is exactly what has happened in this

case. Robinson can point to no violation of a substantive right that

would provide him with an automatic discharge on this attempted

murder charge. However, based on the decision in Williams, a

procedural rule has supplanted substantive laws. As the Florida

Supreme Court has appropriately stated, “a procedural rule

designed to protect a substantive right should come into play when

the substantive right is implicated—not before.” Id. Therefore, I

reiterate the need for this precedent to be re-visited or re-

evaluated through the rule making process.

34

Case No. 5D23-330

LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

MAKAR, J., concurring in part and in result.

In this speedy trial case, the record supports the conclusion

that each of the four factors in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla.

1954), were met and thereby established that an arrest was made

for purposes of triggering the 175-day period set forth in Florida’s

speedy trial rule. In this regard, the sole purpose of the FDLE’s

encounter with Robinson in Live Oak after the Suwannee Music

Festival was to arrest him on the Duval County warrant, which

they did; that local sheriff’s officers arrested Robinson on drug

charges arising from a post-arrest search does not negate FDLE’s

arrest on the Duval attempted murder and felony handgun

possession charges—two concurrent arrests are permissible. Plus,

the record doesn’t support the notion that FDLE and the sheriff’s

officers called an audible during the arrest with FDLE essentially

making a split-second decision to abandon its monthslong plan to

arrest Robinson; instead, both authorities understood that they

were both arresting Robinson, albeit on different charges.

The parties contest the third Melton factor, which is whether

there was “communication by the arresting officer to the person

whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there

to effect an arrest[.]” Id. at 294. Again, the record establishes that

the FDLE officers’ sole purpose was to arrest Robinson and that

Robinson understood that he was being arrested. Melton does not

require that the arresting officer specify the details of the warrant

involved, only that an arrest is intended. Even if Robinson’s

undisputed testimony was less than credible, it would nonetheless

be consistent with the statutory obligation of an arresting officer

to “inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that

a warrant has been issued” absent circumstances that are not

present in this case. See § 901.16, Fla. Stat. (2023) (entitled

“Method of arrest by officer by a warrant”). Officers are presumed

to comply with their statutory duties; thus, even though they did

not testify, the FDLE officers who arrested Robinson

presumptively informed Robinson of the reason for the arrest and

that a warrant existed. On the record presented, the third Melton

factor is met, thus I concur in the conclusion that Robinson was

35

arrested for purposes of triggering Florida’s speedy trial rule. And

because the State did not file the Duval County charges for almost

two years, the 175-day period in the rule had expired.

Next is the remedial question. On this point, the record shows

that Robinson was less than vigilant in protecting his right to a

speedy trial and did not avail himself of the procedural protections

of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. Were the

jurisprudential slate a clean one, affirmance would be in order

because of these shortcomings. What stands in the way, as Judge

Boatwright points out, is the supreme court’s decision in State v.

Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), which concluded that

the “State may not file charges based on the same conduct after

the speedy trial period has expired.” Judge Boatwright’s analysis

demonstrates why Williams needs to be reconsidered and its

holding modified; and why rule 3.191 needs to be modified as well

to provide greater clarity. In addition, I would certify a question of

great public importance, such as “Whether the holding in State v.

Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), should be modified to

clarify that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 does not

establish substantive rights including the right to automatic

discharge after expiration of the rule’s prescribed time period.”

In summary, I concur in Chief Judge Edwards’s opinion,

which concludes that the Melton factors were met and that the

speedy trial time period expired; I also concur in parts III (A)-(B)

of Judge Boatwright’s opinion and in result because that’s what is

required under the holding of Williams, a precedent that ought to

be revisited and for which a certified question is justified.

36