People v. Helzer

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GLEN TAYLOR HELZER,

Defendant and Appellant.

S132256

Contra Costa County Superior Court

012057-6

January 22, 2024

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and

Evans concurred.

PEOPLE v. HELZER

S132256

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Defendant Glen Taylor Helzer pleaded guilty to five

counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and admitted associated

special circumstances as follows: the murders of Ivan and

Annette Stineman, with robbery and kidnapping special

circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i), (ii)); the murder of

Selina Bishop, with the special circumstance of murder to

prevent testimony (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)); and the murders of

Jennifer Villarin and James Gamble, with a multiple-murder

special circumstance for Gamble’s murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).

Defendant also pleaded guilty to conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1));

two counts of kidnapping (§ 209); extortion (§§ 518, 520); three

counts of robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)); three counts of

burglary (§§ 459, 460); attempted robbery (§§ 211, 212.5,

subd. (a), 664); false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237); and possession

of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378).

He also admitted a weapons enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1))

connected with the burglary, robbery, and false imprisonment

counts. Following a penalty trial, a jury returned a verdict of

death for the five counts of murder and the court imposed a

judgment of death. Defendant also received sentences of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the

kidnapping counts, 25 years to life for the conspiracy count, and

1

All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

1

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

additional determinate sentences for the remaining counts.

This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the

judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant, his brother Justin Helzer, 2 and their friend

Dawn Godman were charged as codefendants in the kidnapping

and murders of Ivan and Annette Stineman and the murders of

Selina Bishop, Bishop’s mother, Jennifer Villarin, and Villarin’s

friend James Gamble. Godman subsequently pleaded guilty to

18 counts in exchange for her agreement to testify against

defendant and Justin. After the trial court denied the brothers’

motions for separate trials, defendant pleaded guilty to all

charges and received a penalty phase trial.3

A. Prosecution Evidence

1. Defendant’s Background

The prosecution presented evidence at the penalty phase

regarding defendant’s life before he committed the charged

crimes. This evidence covered defendant’s experience with the

Mormon faith and his excommunication; his work as a financial

advisor, which was how he met the Stinemans; his drug abuse;

and moneymaking schemes, with the crimes in this case

resulting from one of those schemes.

2

We refer to defendant’s brother by his first name to avoid

confusion.

3

Justin pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. After

defendant entered his guilty pleas, the trial court severed the

proceedings and Justin was tried before defendant’s penalty

phase trial occurred. A jury found Justin guilty of all charges

and legally sane, and sentenced him to death.

2

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

a. The Mormon Church

Defendant was raised in the Mormon church and practiced

this religion into adulthood. A former Mormon bishop testified

regarding his understanding of the Mormon faith. Among other

tenets, he described the belief that individuals can receive

revelations from God, communicate with spirits, and become a

god. A woman who attended church with Godman also provided

testimony regarding Mormon beliefs, including the view that

certain men were prophets of God.

Defendant began to disagree with the direction of the

church’s principles and spoke of getting messages from “Spirit.”

He told others that killing is sanctioned if it is God’s will, and

cited passages from the Bible and Book of Mormon for support.

He believed there was no right or wrong, and that all people had

the potential to become gods. Defendant believed he was close

to becoming a god. He also believed he was a prophet and he

held meetings in the church parking lot with Justin.

Sometime in 1999 or 2000, defendant spoke at a church

event about taking a hiatus from the Mormon church. His

appearance was “striking” — he had long, dark hair and facial

hair, wore peculiar glasses, and wore a long black trench coat.

He was eventually excommunicated from the church.

b. Financial work

In 1992, defendant began working as a financial advisor

trainee at a Morgan Stanley branch in Concord. A stockbroker

at the firm described defendant as “a good, clean Mormon kid”

who was “happy-go-lucky” when he joined the team. Defendant

had many clients, including the Stinemans who were retired

and financially well off. Defendant developed a friendly

relationship with the Stinemans and frequently visited their

3

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

home to help with their finances. The Stinemans spoke fondly

of defendant.

In 1996, after defendant got married and shortly after the

birth of his first daughter, he began to change. Defendant

started smoking, staying out late at night clubs, and going into

work late. Clients began complaining to defendant’s manager

that he was not returning their phone calls. Defendant told his

manager that he did not believe his actions would impact his life

or his career, and when he was through having fun, he would

come back to work and function as a financial advisor and a

father.

Defendant left the firm in 1998. He told several people

that he was faking a psychiatric illness and had himself declared

legally insane to collect disability payments and avoid legal

punishment. Defendant had to visit doctors to confirm the

existence of a disability. In preparation for the visits, he would

deliberately not shower or shave and would practice how to act

in front of the doctors. Defendant was formally terminated from

the firm in 1999.

c. Drug use and moneymaking schemes

Between 1996 and the time he was arrested, defendant

used marijuana, Ecstasy, and methamphetamine. He also made

methamphetamine in his garage and sold Ecstasy at raves.

Defendant met Godman at a church event in late 1997.

They had extensive conversations about defendant’s philosophy

of living one’s life in alignment with God; Godman accepted

these principles as true. She believed that defendant and Jesus

Christ were brothers, and that defendant was a prophet of God.

In February 2000, Godman joined defendant in selling drugs.

4

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In 1998, defendant met Keri Mendoza. She thought

defendant was “full of life and love.” They began a romantic

relationship and she eventually moved in with defendant and

Justin. Defendant introduced her to Ecstasy about one month

after she moved in. During the course of their relationship,

Mendoza provided the primary source of income for herself and

defendant. She also loaned defendant money. Despite this,

defendant was in significant debt. He wanted to be “set for life”

and had several illicit moneymaking ideas to try to make that

happen.

In late 1998 or early 1999, defendant proposed several

escort schemes. Many involved throwing parties where men

could pay to get into the party and then have their choice of the

women in the room. Another scheme involved tricking young

stockbrokers into having sex with underage girls and then

blackmailing the stockbrokers’ company for money. None of

these schemes came to fruition.

At some point in 1998, defendant came up with the idea of

“Transform America.” The idea was to create an organization of

people who were committed to bring Harmony, a self-help

program he had previously attended, to the world. The plan

required an “inner core” of three people — defendant plus two

others who had to earn his trust and be loyal to him. Lina

Richardson, who met defendant at a Harmony training, testified

that one example of the kind of trust and loyalty defendant

wanted was if he killed someone and brought the body home, a

person would cut up and hide the body without asking a single

question. The inner core was originally defendant, Justin, and

Mendoza. After defendant and Mendoza ended their

relationship around December 1999, Godman became the third

5

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

person. In March or April 2000, defendant, Justin, and Godman

moved into a house located on Saddlewood Court in Concord.

Around the time they moved to this house, defendant came

up with a plan called “Children of Thunder.” The plan was to

extort money from one of defendant’s past clients to fund

Transform America and bring about the second coming of Jesus

Christ peacefully. Defendant believed that the second coming

would be preceded by darkness and apostasy, and to avoid the

darkness, he would sacrifice a few to save billions. According to

Godman, defendant planned to “take one of [his] past clients . . .

and extort them for their money that was in their [brokerage]

account, to kill them and to have another individual take —

deposit the money in another individual’s account, and then

have that individual withdraw the money and give it to

[defendant].” The individual withdrawing the money would also

be killed. The Saddlewood house in Concord was going to be the

base of operations for the first step of this scheme.

2. Circumstances of the Crimes

Defendant identified former clients of his who maintained

a brokerage portfolio of at least $100,000. Justin purchased a

Beretta nine-millimeter semiautomatic firearm and defendant

removed the serial number from his own .22-caliber

semiautomatic pistol.

Defendant, Justin, and Godman thought of ideas for how

to dispose of the bodies. One involved getting dogs from a

shelter and having the dogs eat the bodies. They adopted three

dogs for this purpose. They gave the dogs large amounts of

animal meat and bones to see how much they could eat;

defendant determined they could not eat enough to consume

three people. Defendant, Justin, and Godman decided instead

6

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to dismember the bodies, put the pieces in duffel bags, and use

a Jet Ski to dump the bags out on the Sacramento-San Joaquin

Delta (Delta). They purchased tools and supplies to implement

the plan, including a reciprocating saw, a skill saw, water

gloves, ski masks, a briefcase, duffel bags, handcuffs, and leg

irons.

Around May 2000, defendant began dating Selina Bishop.

Defendant’s intention was to have Bishop deposit money from

the Children of Thunder scheme and then kill her. Defendant

told her that he was going to be inheriting $125,000. He asked

Bishop if she would be willing to open new bank accounts and

deposit $25,000 in each account, then transfer the money to

defendant in $20,000 increments. In exchange for helping him,

Bishop could keep the remaining $5,000 from each increment.

Defendant, Justin, and Godman thought about,

considered, refined, and prayed about this scheme for at least

three months before selecting July 30, 2000 as the date to act on

their plan. In early July, they scouted the residences of each

person on defendant’s list of former clients, and defendant put

them in order of who to attack first. A corporate airline pilot

was at the top of the list. The pilot had the most money in his

brokerage accounts, was single, and lived in a location with easy

access that was somewhat isolated from his neighbors. The

Stinemans were second on defendant’s list.

Godman testified that on the early morning of July 30, she

gathered with defendant and Justin to declare war on Satan by

openly stating their intent to follow through with what they

believed was God’s will. Defendant attempted to establish an

alibi by asking a friend to buy four movie tickets for later that

day and then go to a restaurant and buy enough food for four

7

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

people. Defendant was concerned that the friend followed

through with the alibi and called to make sure everything went

as planned.

Around noon, Godman bought a bottle of wine.

Defendant’s plan was to go to the pilot’s house with Justin, and

say he was with a new company and had just made a lot of

money. Defendant would say that the wine was for a new

customer down the road, but they did not want the bottle.

Defendant would ask the pilot to join him in a drink to celebrate.

If he had guests, defendant thought they could kidnap and kill

up to five people to avoid leaving any witnesses. If more than

five people were present, defendant and Justin would “find a

way out” of the house.

That night, defendant and Justin drove to the pilot’s house

in defendant’s car while Godman followed in Justin’s truck.

They knocked on the door, but no one answered. They moved on

to the next people on the list, the Stinemans. Defendant and

Justin parked away from the Stinemans’ house while Godman

parked Justin’s truck down the street to keep an eye on the

house and look out for police. Defendant and Justin walked up

to the Stinemans’ house wearing business suits. Defendant

carried a briefcase containing handcuffs, a gun, a blowtorch to

use for threatening, a Taser gun, and a cell phone. Ivan

answered the door and both men entered the home.

Approximately one hour later, defendant drove to Godman

in the Stinemans’ white van. Godman saw the silhouettes of

four people in the van. Defendant said, “I got it,” and drove

away. Godman likewise drove back to the Concord house.

Back at the house, defendant questioned Ivan while

Godman questioned Annette, in separate rooms, about their

8

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

plans for the next few days. When they all reconvened,

defendant explained to the Stinemans that he had money

trouble and they would need to stay with him until he got the

money out of their accounts. While the Stinemans slept,

defendant, Justin, and Godman took methamphetamine to stay

awake and went over plans on how to take money out of the

Stinemans’ accounts.

The following morning, on July 31, Godman called Morgan

Stanley pretending to be Annette, and directed the branch

manager to liquidate the Stinemans’ account. Defendant then

had Ivan cancel appointments for the next few days and call

family members to say they were taking a short vacation.

Defendant forced the couple to make out checks totaling

$100,000 to Selina Bishop.

Defendant gave the Stinemans a drug that was supposed

to kill them, but the drug did not work as planned. Defendant

and Justin carried Ivan and Annette into the bathroom.

Defendant put a plastic bag over Annette’s face and Justin put

a bag over Ivan’s face to suffocate them. When that did not

work, defendant started banging Annette’s head on the

bathroom floor. Justin started doing the same to Ivan.

Defendant placed Annette partially inside the bathtub, slit her

throat with a knife, and turned her over so the blood flow would

suffocate her. The Stinemans eventually died; Annette from the

suffocation and Ivan from the beating. Godman watched while

the Stinemans were murdered.

Godman changed her clothes and wrote a $10,000 check

that she signed with Annette’s name. She drove to the

Stinemans’ bank and deposited the check into Ivan’s account

“[t]o distract the police.” Godman used a wheelchair in an

9

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

attempt to disguise herself. When she returned to the

Saddlewood house, she observed several black plastic bags

containing the Stinemans’ body parts.

The following day, on August 1, Godman tried to deposit

the Stinemans’ checks into Bishop’s bank account. The branch

manager tried to contact the Stinemans to confirm the

transaction and left a message on their machine. Later that day,

defendant and Godman drove to the Stinemans’ house to

retrieve the answering machine tape and other identifying

information; they had already taken the Stinemans’ social

security cards the night of the kidnapping. Godman called

Bishop’s bank, pretending to be Annette, and left a message for

the branch manager with the Stinemans’ social security

numbers. She explained that they were visiting their sick

granddaughter, Bishop, and they needed the money deposited

quickly.

The following afternoon, on August 2, Bishop visited the

Saddlewood house. While defendant distracted Bishop in the

living room, Justin came up beside them and hit Bishop over the

head with a hammer several times. Defendant and Justin took

Bishop into the bathroom where defendant then cut her throat

with a hunting knife. After watching Bishop die, Godman went

into the living room to clean the carpet. Godman could hear a

saw running in the bathroom. Defendant and Godman burned

Bishop’s possessions in the fireplace, as they had already done

with the Stinemans’ clothing and belongings. While the fire was

burning, defendant wanted to see if one of their dogs would eat

human flesh. He fed the dog two small pieces of Bishop’s skin.

Defendant realized that Bishop’s mother, Jennifer

Villarin, could identify him. Early the next morning, on

10

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

August 3, defendant and Godman drove to Bishop’s apartment

in Woodacre, California, where Villarin was staying. Defendant

found Villarin and Gamble asleep. He shot Villarin twice in the

face. Gamble managed to exit the bed before defendant shot him

through the chest.

Back at the Saddlewood house, defendant decided they

needed to remove the Stinemans’ and Bishop’s teeth to prevent

their identification. Later that day, defendant, Godman, and

Justin drove to the Delta with the remains of the three victims

and a rented Jet Ski in tow. Defendant and Justin loaded the

bags of remains on the Jet Ski, took them into the water to

discard the bags, and then returned for more. They repeated

this process several times, with Godman joining Justin for the

last trip. They returned to the Saddlewood house once finished.

Defendant, who had plans to leave on a trip, left Justin

and Godman a list of things to do, including cleaning the house

and returning the Jet Ski. Justin and Godman also disposed of

several incriminating items. Justin and Godman tried to clean

the carpet themselves but eventually decided to hire

professional cleaners. The cleaners cleaned the carpet on

August 6, leaving behind industrial-sized fans to dry the carpet.

Defendant returned from his trip that afternoon.

3. The Investigation

On August 3, the Stinemans’ daughter went to their

house. She had been unable to contact them for four days and

was concerned. After noticing several things that looked awry

in the house, she feared her parents were missing and called the

police. Concord police officers responded and began to

investigate the couple’s disappearance.

11

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Meanwhile, Marin County Sheriff’s deputies responded to

a call at Bishop’s apartment. They found Villarin’s and

Gamble’s bodies, both with gunshot wounds. Emergency

medical personnel arrived and declared both victims dead.

Marin County Sheriff’s Detective Steve Nash obtained and

served a search warrant that morning for the Woodacre

residence where Villarin’s and Gamble’s bodies were found.

An autopsy revealed the cause of Villarin’s death was two

gunshot wounds to the head. Gamble’s cause of death was a

gunshot wound to the upper chest. He suffered five gunshot

wounds.

In an effort to find Bishop during the investigation,

Detective Nash learned that she was dating a man who lived

with his brother in Concord. Detective Nash recovered Bishop’s

pager from the café where she worked and traced a phone

number on it to Justin. Phone records for Justin led Detective

Nash to the Saddlewood Court address in Concord; Detective

Nash soon learned that defendant also lived at that address. He

also learned that Justin had recently purchased a gun

consistent with the weapon used to kill Villarin and Gamble.

Detective Nash obtained a search warrant for the Saddlewood

premises.

Around 4:00 a.m. on August 7, 2000, Marin County officers

and Concord SWAT team members assembled in anticipation of

serving the warrant approximately two hours later. After

officers entered the residence, defendant tried to flee out a back

window but officers stopped him. While a detective

subsequently interviewed defendant in the back of a patrol car,

he threw himself out of the partially open window and ran off.

He ran into a neighbor’s house and threatened to kill the

12

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

resident if he did not give defendant his keys. When defendant

saw the resident’s dogs running toward him, he fled from the

house and ran into another neighboring home, this time

threatening the resident with a knife to obtain a change of

clothes and keys to her car. The resident’s son called the police,

who arrived and detained defendant when he ran out of the

house.

The search of the Saddlewood premises, which ultimately

involved the execution of multiple search warrants, revealed a

substantial amount of evidence implicating defendant, Justin,

and Godman in the crimes. Meanwhile, nine gym bags

containing the victims’ remains were recovered from the Delta,

each weighed down with stepping stones from the Saddlewood

premises or rocks from the Delta. Inside the gym bags, the large

body parts and removed organs were individually wrapped in

black plastic bags.

The pathologist who performed the autopsies testified

about the condition of the Stinemans’ and Bishop’s remains. In

addition to being dismembered, the bodies showed signs of

stabbing and blunt force trauma that occurred before death and

significant mutilation after death, including removal of internal

organs, jaws, and teeth.

4. Victim Impact Evidence

The Stinemans’ two adult daughters testified about their

family life, the trusting relationship their parents had with

defendant, and their grief. A friend of the Stinemans, a friend

of Villarin, several members of Villarin’s and Bishop’s family,

and Gamble’s mother also testified about their memories of the

victims and the pain of their loss.

13

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

B. Defense Evidence

1. Background Evidence

The defense presented evidence of mental illness in

defendant’s family, his involvement in the Mormon church

growing up, and his kind and energetic nature.

Several witnesses testified about defendant’s mission for

the church in Brazil, and his return. A fellow missionary

described that defendant was excited, passionate, and

hardworking when they first arrived in Brazil. Defendant

related well to people and was readily accepted. Defendant had

“some interesting ideas” about the end of the world, and they

discussed the end of the world and the second coming of Christ.

He believed that during the apocalypse, church leaders would

become warrior prophets who would lead their people and

“defend their faith as a warrior of sorts.” Defendant believed he

would become one of the warrior prophets.

Defendant grew increasingly frustrated with the mission

president and other church leaders. If church leaders wrote

something that defendant disagreed with, he claimed that he

knew more than them and did not have to be accountable to

them. Toward the end of his mission, defendant held beliefs that

were “totally incompatible with the scriptures and Mormon

doctrine.” When defendant returned from Brazil, his views on

scripture began to change and he started to believe that the

church “was going in the wrong direction.” He appeared

exhausted and depressed.

Approximately one month after returning from his

mission, in December 1991, defendant ran into a former

classmate, Ann, and persuaded her to join the church. They

began dating after she was baptized into the church and got

14

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

married in April 1993. Ann’s uncle worked for Morgan Stanley

and set up interviews for defendant; he began working there one

week before the wedding. Ann testified that before they got

married, defendant had been very sheltered within the church

and did not have a realistic view of the world.

After defendant married and moved out of his parents’

house, he discovered cable television and junk food. Their first

daughter was born in the summer of 1995. Defendant and Ann

separated around one year later. Defendant felt his life had

been sheltered and he wanted to discover life outside of the

church, including drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, and

having a nonmonogamous lifestyle. Their second daughter was

born in 1998. Ann noticed “significant” changes in defendant’s

behavior and appearance after the birth of their second

daughter. When they had met, he was “really neat, really clean,

pretty meticulous about his appearance, clean cut.” In 1998, he

started wearing dark and wrinkled clothing, grew his hair out,

and looked as if he stopped showering. He stopped working for

Morgan Stanley the same year, though Ann did not find out he

left his job until 1999. Defendant was excommunicated from the

church around the same time he left his job in 1998.

Defendant’s sister left for her mission in 1995 and

returned in early 1997. Upon her return, she noticed “severe

changes” in defendant. He had “thrown away his religion” and

had been experimenting with smoking and drugs. In 1999,

during a visit home, defendant seemed angry and his

appearance was “scraggly.” Defendant started fights with his

sister because he thought she was rejecting his philosophical

and religious ideas.

15

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

2. Expert Evidence

Clinical psychologist Richard Foster met defendant in

1995 for counseling. Defendant and his wife had a “discrepancy”

in their sexual desires which created tensions in their marriage,

and Dr. Foster sought to help defendant work through their

issues. Defendant believed that he was “entitled” to have “a wife

whose sexual behavior is like what he witnesses in pornographic

films.” He also felt like he “was pretty much able to make

happen whatever he wanted to happen,” and grew frustrated he

could not make his wife do what he wanted. During Dr. Foster’s

second meeting with defendant, he presented the doctor with a

“highly detailed plan” that was “infused with a lot of narcissism”

to find an ideal woman who would have sex with him daily.

During their final meeting, defendant was “convinced that the

only way to avoid his misery was to leave his wife.” Dr. Foster

did not diagnose defendant based on their few meetings but

later opined that defendant’s behavior was consistent with

narcissism.

Psychologist Jeffrey Kaye testified that he met defendant

in early September 1998. Dr. Kaye ran an Intensive Outpatient

Program (IOP) at a health care facility, which involved multiple

group therapy sessions on a weekly basis to try to reduce the

number of hospitalized patients. The patients in the program

were typically diagnosed with bipolar disorder, major

depression, schizophrenia, or posttraumatic stress disorder.

Defendant came to the program because he was upset and not

able to function in his job. During their first meeting, Dr. Kaye

believed defendant was in a manic phase. Defendant

complained that he could not concentrate, was irritable and

inappropriately angry, and believed people were judging him.

Dr. Kaye diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder, and a

16

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

psychiatrist on the program’s staff prescribed medications.

After defendant stopped attending meetings, Dr. Kaye reached

out via telephone and described defendant as paranoid,

isolating, and refusing to take his medications. Defendant often

spoke about conversing with spirits.

Defendant returned to treatment two weeks after

Dr. Kaye’s phone call. At a meeting in late November, Dr. Kaye

believed defendant’s mood swings had worsened and

recommended he voluntarily hospitalize himself, but defendant

declined. At a meeting in December, defendant appeared to be

experiencing a panic attack. In January, defendant showed up

at the clinic dressed “very bizarrely,” looking like “some kind of

strange cartoon character.” In February 1999, defendant was

involuntarily hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. When

Dr. Kaye saw defendant again in March, he had improved. At

various times, they had discussed how defendant could get

disability payments.

Psychologist Douglas Tucker specialized in addiction. He

spoke with defendant once for three hours before testifying on

his behalf. Prior to meeting with defendant, Dr. Tucker

reviewed defendant’s IOP records and his psychiatric

hospitalization records. He diagnosed defendant with

schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. This meant defendant

exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and

delusions, at times when he was not manic or depressed.

Dr. Tucker further diagnosed defendant with smoked

methamphetamine dependence. The doctor testified that

defendant believed he was hearing God’s voice, and that taking

medication interfered with his ability to communicate with God.

Defendant further believed he was “not actually a human being;

that he is a manifestation of God’s consciousness that is an

17

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

illusion, and has the illusion of being an individual, but is

actually a fragment of a larger whole, which has this illusion of

individuality in order that it might distinguish good from evil

and find . . . its way towards God.” When discussing defendant’s

drug abuse, Dr. Tucker explained that “a grandiose delusion or

religious delusion that you’re God gets heightened quite a bit

when you use a stimulant drug like methamphetamine, so it’s

actually rewarding for the person to feel that their

communication with God is that much better.” Dr. Tucker

opined that it is difficult to fake mental illness, especially mania.

He believed defendant had a genuine mental illness because his

symptoms were consistent.

Psychiatrist John Chamberlain interviewed defendant

seven times and concluded that defendant suffered from

schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; methamphetamine

dependence; cannabis dependence; and alcohol abuse. He

testified that defendant “manifested significant grandiosity.” At

times defendant was “wrestling with the concept” of whether he

was becoming a divine being and spoke of himself, God, and

Jesus as if “they were sort of brethren on the same path in

development or that he was somehow of God.” When

Dr. Chamberlain would ask defendant a question or to slow

down when discussing his religious beliefs, defendant would get

irritable at the distraction from his own thoughts.

Dr. Chamberlain did not believe that defendant was

malingering a mental illness.

II. CHALLENGE TO GUILTY PLEA

Detective Nash obtained and executed two Marin County

Superior Court search warrants for the Saddlewood premises in

Concord. Detective Nash also assisted the Concord Police

18

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Department in obtaining and executing a third search warrant

for the Saddlewood premises, issued by the Contra Costa County

Superior Court. Before trial, defendant and his codefendants

filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to these

warrants.

Defendant now raises a blanket suppression argument on

appeal. He asserts that the officers who executed the Marin

County warrants acted in flagrant disregard of the constraints

imposed by the warrants by conducting what defendant

characterizes as a general search of the Saddlewood premises.

He contends that as a result of this claimed violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights, all evidence seized pursuant to the

execution of the Marin County warrants, as well as evidence

subsequently obtained as purported “fruits” of these seizures,

must be suppressed, and he must be entitled to withdraw his

guilty plea and be tried on any remaining evidence. We reject

defendant’s claims and conclude blanket suppression of the

evidence is not warranted.

A. Trial Court Proceedings

On November 19, 2002, Godman filed an “Omnibus Notice

of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence and Traverse

Various Search Warrants.”

Godman challenged the three searches of the Saddlewood

premises on a variety of grounds. As relevant here, Godman

argued that both Marin County Superior Court warrants were

issued without probable cause, were overbroad, and were based

on material misrepresentations and information unlawfully

obtained during prior unlawful searches. She argued that the

second Marin County Superior Court warrant further exceeded

19

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, and the items seized under

the authority of the warrant were outside its scope.

The court began hearings on the motion on January 31,

2003. Regarding the initial search of the Saddlewood premises,

the trial court found no error in the magistrate’s determination

that probable cause existed in issuing the search warrant. The

court explained, “I believe, based upon what was before the

magistrate in Marin, that there was a fair probability that

evidence regarding the Woodacre murders could be found at

Saddlewood Court in Concord.” The court found that there were

no material misrepresentations made, and the affidavit did not

contain statements that were deliberately false or made with a

reckless disregard for the truth.

Regarding the second search warrant issued for the

Saddlewood premises by the Marin County Superior Court, as

relevant here, Godman argued the search exceeded the scope of

the warrant and that once officers were inside the premises,

they seized items with “virtually no limits on the extent and

scope” of the search. Godman further argued that officers

collected evidence related to the Stinemans that fell outside the

scope of the Marin County warrant. Godman also asserted that

the Marin County magistrate did not have authority to issue a

warrant to seize evidence relating to the Stinemans. The

prosecution responded that by the time evidence related to the

Stinemans was seized on August 7, it had become “patently

obvious” that the Marin County investigation (for Villarin and

Gamble) and the Contra Costa County investigation (for the

Stinemans) “were inseparable and were inextricably

interrelated.”

20

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The trial court concluded the Marin County magistrate

had jurisdiction to issue the second warrant for Saddlewood,

noting that the Woodacre murders of Villarin and Gamble were

unsolved at the time it was issued, Bishop was still missing, and

there was enough information to conclude that evidence of the

murders and disappearance would be found in the Saddlewood

premises. The court concluded that even if the magistrate

exceeded her jurisdiction, the good faith exception articulated in

United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 salvaged the search

and seizure. The court further concluded that probable cause

existed, the warrant was not a general warrant, and the search

did not exceed the scope of the warrant.

Regarding the warrant issued by the Contra Costa

Superior Court, the trial court rejected the defense’s argument

that it was the fruit of the previous searches. Yet the court

acknowledged that without knowing additional details, some of

the items in the return — “Halloween-type costumes, kitchen

items and home decorations” — could have been beyond the

scope of the warrant. The court delayed ruling on whether this

search exceeded the scope of the warrant and withdrew its

previous ruling on whether the search exceeded the scope of the

second Marin County Superior Court warrant.

The court held another hearing on February 21, 2003. The

prosecution argued that the defendants had the burden to prove

which seized items, if any, fell outside the scope of the search

warrants. The prosecution also advised that the evidence room

at the police station was open for counsel to go through the

evidence that had been collected. Noting that trial was

scheduled to begin in September, the court set a new hearing in

June to give the parties time to sort through the evidence.

21

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

At some point after the February hearing, Godman’s

counsel filed a supplemental pleading with a list of the

challenged items; defendant joined the pleading. The list

included items seized pursuant to both Marin County search

warrants.

The parties returned on June 13, 2003. At that hearing,

the defense argued that all the seized evidence had to be

suppressed because of the officers’ “flagrant disregard” for the

terms of the warrants during the execution of the searches. The

court reminded the defense that it had instructed counsel, if

they wanted, to be more specific with which items they thought

were outside the scope of the warrants. Defense counsel

acknowledged the court’s request, and explained that it was

basing its argument on a different point — namely, that “it

doesn’t matter if the few items that we parse today are found to

be outside the scope of the warrant[.] . . . [T]he search was so

flagrant in exceeding the terms of the warrants . . . that all

evidence must be suppressed. And that goes to volume more

than it does to now parsing particular items.” The prosecution

responded that the officers had probable cause to seize every

item retrieved from the Saddlewood premises.

After discussing the challenges involved in having the

court review the entire universe of seized documents, the court

proposed that it instead address the challenged items first.

Godman contended that going through the items labeled indicia

would be the defense’s “biggest problem” because some items

grouped together and described as a “single item” actually

contained multiple documents — some that “probably” qualified

as indicia of the crimes and others that were outside the scope

of the warrant. The prosecution argued that the seizures could

be upheld by reference to the warrant, the plain view doctrine,

22

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

and the inevitable discovery rule. The parties then discussed

some of the specific items challenged in Godman’s motion. The

prosecutor argued that the search warrants permitted the

officers to “go virtually anywhere into any box inside the house”

and they had the authorization to seize “not only indicia” but

also trace evidence. The court also noted that once information

about the dismembered bodies came to light, and there was

evidence that the bodies had been sawed, the officers had

probable cause to seize items relating to the saw and the

condition of the bodies.

After discussing some individual items, the court asked

the prosecution to respond to each item challenged in Godman’s

pleading with a justification for the seizure. The prosecution

agreed and offered to have both primary investigating officers

testify.

B. Testimony Regarding the Warrants

Another hearing took place two weeks later on June 27,

2003. At that hearing, witnesses testified regarding the

procurement and execution of search warrants for the

Saddlewood premises.

Detective Nash testified first. He explained that he

became involved with the Villarin and Gamble murders on

August 3, 2000, and secured a warrant for the Saddlewood

premises on the morning of August 7. As additional information

appeared, Detective Nash obtained a second search warrant

later that day and then provided an oral affidavit in support of

a third warrant requested by the Concord Police Department

that same evening.

The first search warrant that Detective Nash obtained

authorized a search of the Saddlewood premises and two

23

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

identified vehicles, and specifically listed eight categories of

items to be searched for: (1) a nine-millimeter semiautomatic

handgun; (2) nine-millimeter fully copper-jacketed ammunition;

(3) expended nine-millimeter cartridges; (4) receipts and

documents related to nine-millimeter handguns and

ammunition; (5) a light-colored woman’s T-shirt or other short-

sleeved shirt with small flowers; (6) dark or possibly black pants

or jeans; (7) “[i]ndicia of ownership, including but not limited to

leasing documents, Department of Motor Vehicles documents

indicating ownership of the vehicle, letters, credit card gas

receipts, keys and warranties”; and (8) “[i]ndicia of occupancy or

ownership; articles of personal property tending to establish the

identity of persons in control of the said premises, storage areas

or containers where the above items are found consisting of rent

receipts, cancelled checks, telephone records, utility company

records, charge card receipts, cancelled mail, keys and

warranties.” Detective Nash and other officers served the

warrant at 6:00 a.m. on August 7, 2000.

Detective Nash and the Marin County Sheriff’s Office

worked together with the Concord Police Department to execute

the warrant. The agencies held a briefing prior to the initial

entry and then, starting on August 8, held joint briefings at least

twice daily. Detective Nash oversaw and coordinated crime

scene processing and supervised the collection of evidence.

Detective Nash testified that he made a conscientious effort to

seize only items specifically listed in the search warrant or items

that the officers believed they had probable cause to seize as the

fruits or instrumentalities of the crime under investigation.

Upon initial entry on August 7, Detective Nash did a

cursory examination of the entire premises. He saw two carpet

dryers and noticed that the carpets had been recently cleaned.

24

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Detective Nash also noticed staining on the carpet that

appeared consistent with blood or another biological substance.

After less than one hour, he left the house to secure a second

warrant for the Saddlewood premises and the two vehicles.

Meanwhile, the remaining officers continued to search the

premises under the authority of the first warrant. When officers

located an item that they believed had evidentiary value, “[t]hey

would stop and then . . . come take a look at it, determine if it

was possibly going to be seized or not seized.” If they did not

believe an item was needed, then it was not seized. With seized

items, the officers photographed the item, packaged it, and then

placed it in a U-Haul truck. If the item contained blood or

otherwise could not be left in the truck, it was immediately

taken to Marin County.

Detective Nash returned with the second Marin County

warrant for the premises at 1:00 p.m. that afternoon. The

warrant identified 13 categories of items: (1) forensic evidence;

(2) carpet from the house; (3) blood and objects with apparent

blood on them; (4) any object with human tissue, bone, or hair

on it; (5) a man’s long-sleeve striped shirt that had been

removed from a garbage can in the Saddlewood garage; (6) a pair

of men’s low-cut work boots with small dark stains, removed

from a garbage can in the Saddlewood garage; (7) a pair of latex

gloves removed from a garbage can in the Saddlewood garage;

(8) access to the house and vehicles by officers and other

personnel for the purpose of investigating the death and/or

disappearance of Selina Bishop; (9) “[i]tems of identification

which might tend to establish the identity of persons who might

have been within the premises to be searched”; (10) diaries,

journals, lists, photographs, audio or video recordings, and any

other materials setting forth or expressing threats, anger, or

25

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

violence toward the victims; (11) all electronic storage devices

capable of storing electronic data; (12) indicia of ownership of

the vehicles; and (13) “[i]ndicia of occupancy or ownership;

articles of personal property tending to establish the identity of

persons in control of the said premises, storage areas or

containers where the above items are found consisting of rent

receipts, cancelled checks, telephone records, utility company

records, charge card receipts, cancelled mail, keys and

warranties.”

Upon his return to the premises, Detective Nash held a

briefing with the officers and provided them with copies of the

second warrant so they could determine what fell within the

scope of the warrant. A deputy district attorney arrived on the

scene around the same time, along with Concord police officers,

because “someone saw something related to [the] Stinemans and

was aware that they were a missing couple and that’s when

[they] started making some links at that point.”

In the late afternoon or evening of August 7, Detective

Nash and his team became aware that body parts had been

recovered in gym bags in the Delta. The officers believed the

remains may have belonged to the Stinemans and Bishop. On

the evening of August 7, Detective Nash assisted the Concord

Police Department in obtaining a search warrant from the

Contra Costa County Superior Court. This warrant authorized

a search of the Saddlewood premises for 15 categories of items:

(1) various pieces of property stolen from the Stineman

residence, including financial documents, a missing answering

machine tape, and Social Security cards; (2) two men’s suits;

(3) lime green women’s clothing; (4) women’s tan driving gloves;

(5) a gold-colored cowboy hat, receipt for such a hat, or a photo

of such a hat; (6) receipts for purchase or rental of a wheelchair;

26

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

(7) handwriting and/or handprint exemplars for defendant,

Justin, and Godman; (8) documentation of names and account

information of persons who had accounts with Morgan Stanley;

(9) “[d]ocumentation, such as letters, notes, diaries, journals,

etc., which tend to prove a connection between Selina Bishop

and [defendant], and any documentation which tends to show

the nature of that relationship”; (10) latex gloves; (11) hair dye;

(12) forensic testing; (13) “[a]ny item which would tend to show

where Mr. and Mrs. Stineman are, including any documents or

items showing travel from or within the Bay Area”; (14) latent

print testing; and (15) any footwear with a waffle-type pattern

on the sole. The warrant was executed beginning on the

morning of August 8.

On August 10 or 11, Detective Nash and the officers

became aware that the cut marks in the bones suggested the use

of a power reciprocating saw. More details about the condition

of the bodies, and the Jet Ski rental, were discovered over the

following few days. Officers were still actively searching the

Saddlewood premises pursuant to the warrants at the time.

When asked about the seizure of receipts at the

Saddlewood premises, Detective Nash explained that even if a

receipt does not contain the name of the purchaser, officers

consider that item indicia of occupancy because “we track people

all the time . . . by receipts to identify who made the purchases.”

Pursuant to the second search warrant, officers seized a bathtub

after it showed a positive reaction for the presence of blood.

They seized floorboards from the house for the same reason.

When defense counsel questioned why officers seized certain

items — like posters of dragons — not specifically identified in

that warrant, Detective Nash explained that officers seized

evidence of “witchcraft and occult type activities” that were

27

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

found “in plain view” after they learned that the organs had

been removed from the victims. The officers also seized a poster

depicting a marijuana leaf because they believed it showed drug

usage at the residence and is “kind of a gateway drug that people

that use higher level of drugs will start.”

Detective Steve Chiabotti of the Concord Police

Department also testified at the hearing. Detective Chiabotti

testified that he was the lead detective for the Concord

investigation into the Stinemans’ disappearance and

participated in obtaining the third Saddlewood search warrant.

He and his team held daily briefings with the Marin County

officers to discuss developing information and share what

evidence had been collected. When asked at the hearing

whether he used a guideline to distinguish between items to be

seized and those not to be seized, Detective Chiabotti replied

that in his mind, “anything that was related to instrumentality

of the crimes that [they] were investigating, evidence that would

tend to show who committed the crimes, how the crimes were

committed, evidence which went to state of mind rather,

planning, preparation,” was subject to seizure.

Marin County officers ended their search of the

Saddlewood premises on August 15, eight days after serving the

first search warrant. Concord officers relinquished control of

the premises around August 22.

On July 25, 2003, the trial court denied the motions to

suppress. The court found that the detectives were credible

witnesses, and that they had a right to search the entire house

and look for trace evidence, which allowed them to look

“virtually in every nook and cranny” of the premises. The court

found that every seized item was either within the scope of the

28

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

warrant or within plain view and incriminating in nature. The

court further ruled that any item that might have been outside

of the Marin County warrants would have been inevitably

discovered during execution of the Contra Costa County

warrant.

C. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures

by government officials. “The warrant clause of the Fourth

Amendment expressly provides that no warrant may issue

except those ‘particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.’ ” (People v. Bradford

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1291 (Bradford).) “ ‘General

warrants,’ ” which involve “ ‘ “a general, exploratory rummaging

in a person’s belongings,” ’ ” are prohibited by the Fourth

Amendment. (Bradford, at p. 1291.) But “in a complex case

resting upon the piecing together of ‘many bits of evidence,’ the

warrant properly may be more generalized than would be the

case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct

evidence.” (Ibid.) “Even if the warrant is legally sufficient”

insofar as it is based on probable cause and describes with

sufficient particularity the place to be searched or the person or

things to be seized, the search may still be “unreasonable” when

“it results in the seizure of property which was not specifically

described in the warrant and is unrelated to probable criminal

activity.” (People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67, 98; see § 1538.5,

subd. (a)(1)(B)(ii), (iv) [a defendant may move to suppress

evidence when the search was pursuant to a warrant and, inter

alia, the “evidence obtained [was] not that described in the

warrant” or the method of execution of the warrant was

29

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

unlawful].)4 At the same time, “the mere fact a large number of

items were seized, many of which were not listed in the warrant,

does not establish that the search was an illegal general search.”

(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1043 (Kraft).)

“When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to

suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, ‘[w]e defer to

the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where

supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on

the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent

judgment.’ ” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 166

(Carrington).) “In reviewing factual determinations for

substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the

evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve

evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be

upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though

substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial

court might have reached a different result had it believed other

evidence.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)

“Accordingly, ‘[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the order denying the motion to suppress’ [citation], and ‘[a]ny

conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the superior

court ruling.’ ” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979; see

also People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 [deferring to

trial court’s finding regarding officer’s purpose during search];

People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673–674 [same].)

4

“Pursuant to article I, section 28, of the California

Constitution, a trial court may exclude evidence under Penal

Code section 1538.5 only if exclusion is mandated by the federal

Constitution.” (People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934.)

30

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Defendant concedes the warrants here satisfied the

particularity requirement and were supported by probable

cause. But in making his blanket suppression challenge, he

contends the officers exceeded the scope of the two Marin

County warrants during their search of the Saddlewood

premises.5 He asserts that, in executing these warrants, the

officers acted with flagrant disregard of the terms of the

warrants and used the term “indicia” to justify seizing items

they did not have probable cause to seize under the plain view

doctrine. As a consequence, defendant argues, the trial court

should have suppressed all evidence seized pursuant to these

warrants, as well as evidence subsequently obtained as “fruits”

of these seizures. Defendant further argues that the trial court’s

error in not granting the suppression motion means that

defendant must be allowed to withdraw the guilty pleas that he

entered after the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

In arguing that wholesale suppression is required here,

defendant relies on federal precedent finding such a remedy

appropriate in certain “ ‘extraordinary’ ” circumstances (U.S. v.

Foster (10th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 846, 852 (Foster)) in which

5

Defendant bears the burden of proof on this issue. (See

Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 101 [“In general,

the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue of illegally

obtained evidence”]; see also Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure

(The Rutter Group 2021) § 6:17, p. 6–19 [“If a warrant was used,

the search or seizure is presumed to be lawful, and the burden

of demonstrating that it was illegally executed remains with the

defendant” (fn. omitted)]; Caskey, Cal. Search & Seizure (2023)

§ 3:1, p. 316 [“At the hearing on the motion to suppress, who has

the burden of proving the government did/did not violate the

fourth amendment? The burden of proof lies with the

prosecution if the search was without a search warrant; with the

defense if the search was pursuant to a search warrant”].)

31

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

officers conducting a search exceeded the parameters of the

authorizing search warrant to such an extent as to render the

search a general one (ibid.; see also U.S. v. Uzenski (4th Cir.

2006) 434 F.3d 690, 706; U.S. v. Liu (2d Cir. 2000) 239 F.3d 138,

140; U.S. v. Chen (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 714, 716).

“Without passing upon the question ourselves, we

previously have acknowledged that a majority of the federal

circuits recognize the remedy of blanket suppression in a

sufficiently egregious case.” (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1044,

citing Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1304–1307.) But as we

explained, courts in these cases “rarely have actually concluded

that police conduct was so extreme as to warrant total

suppression. The remedy has been justified when the police

exceeded the ‘scope of the warrant in the places searched’

[citations], the police used the warrant as a pretext to search for

evidence of unrelated crimes [citation], or the police were

motivated ‘ “by a desire to engage in indiscriminate ‘fishing’ ” ’

rather than by ‘considerations of practicality’ [citation]. The

mere magnitude of the seizures does not establish a violation of

the federal Constitution.” (Bradford, at p. 1306, fn. omitted.)

We again assume for argument’s sake that the remedy of

total suppression may be appropriate in extreme circumstances

of flagrant government misconduct. (Bradford, supra,

15 Cal.4th at p. 1306; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1044.) And

as in Bradford and Kraft, we conclude that the facts here do not

warrant this extreme remedy.

Defendant contends the officers deliberately disregarded

the terms of the warrants, effectively transforming them into

unconstitutional “general warrants.” According to defendant,

Detective Nash applied for a narrow, particularized warrant —

32

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

while withholding his true “investigative purpose” and his

subjective intent to seek a broad array of documents and

evidence relating to the Stinemans’ murder while executing the

warrants. We are not persuaded that the officers converted the

search into “ ‘ “a general, exploratory rummaging” ’ ” (Bradford,

supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1291) in executing the two search

warrants at issue here.

The search warrants were obtained in the context of a

complex, rapidly evolving investigation relating to two known

homicides and additional missing persons. By their plain terms,

the warrants authorized particularized but broad seizures,

allowing the officers to search all areas where they might find

specified firearms, ammunition, keys, receipts, documents, and

indicia of occupancy or ownership. (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at

p. 1043 [finding it permissible for officers to “look[] in a spot

where the specified evidence of crime plausibly could be found,

even if it was not a place where [the specific items] normally are

stored”]; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 563 [where search

warrant authorized police officers to search for notes,

memoranda, and other documents, officers properly “looked in

places where they might expect to find the documents listed in

the search warrant in the event defendant had attempted to

hide them or throw them away; those places included trash

receptacles and a bedroom closet”]; Skelton v. Superior Court

(1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 158 [“Since the warrant mandated a search

for and seizure of several small and easily secreted items, the

officers had the authority to conduct an intensive search of the

entire house, looking into any places where they might

reasonably expect such items to be hidden”].) Under these

circumstances, the officers did not exceed the scope of the

33

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

warrant in the places searched. (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at

p. 1306.)

The record also belies defendant’s claim that Detective

Nash, or any of the other officers, used the warrants “as a

pretext to search for evidence of unrelated crimes” (Bradford,

supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306). On the contrary, the trial court

credited Detective Nash’s testimony that they made a

conscientious effort to seize only those items of evidence either

listed in the warrants or those they had probable cause to seize.

Detective Nash carefully supervised the collection of evidence

and, along with other involved agencies, held regular briefings

both prior to the initial entry of the premises and at least twice

daily thereafter. The detective’s actions do not demonstrate an

effort to engage in a pretextual search or conceal relevant

information from the magistrate who issued the warrants.

When additional information was obtained following the

detective’s initial entry, revealing a carpet stain consistent with

blood and efforts to conceal this evidence, the detective left the

house after less than one hour to secure a second warrant

allowing for the seizure of forensic evidence. He then made

copies of the second warrant for the other investigating officers

performing the search. The fact that Detective Nash’s affidavit

in support of the second warrant does not mention the

Stinemans does not support defendant’s claim of pretext or

flagrant disregard; it is unsurprising given the evolving

investigation that was unfolding.6

6

As noted ante, members of the district attorney’s office and

Concord police officers arrived at the Saddlewood premises after

Detective Nash obtained the second search warrant. They

34

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We also are not persuaded by defendant’s efforts to show

that “the police were motivated ‘ “by a desire to engage in

indiscriminate ‘fishing’ ” ’ rather than by ‘considerations of

practicality’ ” (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306). As in

Bradford, the sequence of events we have already recounted

here “does not demonstrate that the officers had not been briefed

or prepared as to the objects of the search [citation], or that their

search amounted to a ‘fishing expedition.’ [Citation.] Nor was

the behavior of the officers so unconscionable as to amount to a

due process violation.” (Id. at pp. 1306–1307.) And defendant’s

reliance on the “numerosity and . . . bulk” of the items seized is

unavailing. (See Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [“the mere

fact a large number of items were seized, many of which were

not listed in the warrant, does not establish that the search was

an illegal general search”]; Bradford, at p. 1296 [rejecting the

defendant’s argument that “because the officers seized more

items not named in the warrant than items named, this

circumstance establishes the exploratory nature of the

search”].)7

“started making some links at that point” but did not become

aware that body parts had been recovered in gym bags in the

Delta until the late afternoon or evening of August 7. Believing

that the remains may have belonged to the Stinemans and

Bishop, on the evening of August 7, Detective Nash assisted the

Concord Police Department in obtaining a search warrant from

the Contra Costa County Superior Court. This third warrant,

not challenged here, specifically mentioned evidence relating to

the Stinemans’ murders. The warrant was executed beginning

on the morning of August 8.

7

Defendant repeatedly objects to Detective Nash’s

treatment of the “indicia” language in the warrants, contending

35

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In addition to noting the substantial amount of material

seized from the Saddlewood premises, defendant mentions

certain items — the seizure of eyeglasses, a day planner, posters

depicting a marijuana leaf and fantasy themes,8 items perceived

to be connected to witchcraft, and various receipts — as

purportedly indicative of a general search. But some of these

items could reasonably be regarded as falling within the

warrant descriptions authorizing the seizure of indicia of

occupancy or ownership, or as “[i]tems of identification which

might tend to establish the identity of persons who might have

been within the premises to be searched” — a broad description,

the detective seized whatever evidence he wanted “without

regard to how that term was defined in [the] warrants.”

According to defendant, the “Marin detectives were not guided

by their warrants description of indicia, but by their own

standard operating procedures.” The detectives never testified

that their standard practice was to ignore the terms of the

warrants. As noted, Detective Nash instead explained they

endeavored to seize items within the scope of the warrants, and

the trial court found the testifying detectives to be credible.

Even assuming additional evidence was obtained, blanket

suppression is not an appropriate remedy here. As in Bradford,

in light of the totality of the record before us, we are not

persuaded that the detectives’ conduct rises to the level of

flagrant disregard that might justify defendant’s request to

suppress all evidence seized incident to the execution of a

warrant. (See Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306 [“The

officers may have entertained the hope that evidence pertaining

to unrelated crimes also would be discovered, but it is very

apparent that the search was not simply a pretext for a general

search for evidence of unrelated crimes”].)

8

These posters were described by the defense in

proceedings below as featuring dragons, “Valhalla warriors

w[ith] axes [and] sword in fight,” a “Skeleton — Grateful Dead

type,” and “a Wonder Woman type.”

36

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

but one that officers were entitled to rely upon. (See

Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012) 565 U.S. 535, 547–548;

People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 207 [“As many

courts have observed, ‘officers executing a search warrant are

“required to interpret it,” and they are “not obliged to interpret

it narrowly” ’ ”]; People v. Howard (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 373, 376

[upholding the seizure of currency under a warrant provision

describing “ ‘articles of personal property tending to establish

the identification of person or persons having dominion or

control’ of the premises”].) In his testimony at the suppression

hearing, for example, Detective Nash explained that officers

seized the eyeglasses as indicia of who had been present in the

residence. At some point in the investigation, he testified, police

determined that the victims wore glasses, and they determined

“it[ was] possible that [the glasses they found during the search]

were the victims’ glasses.” Similarly, Detective Nash testified

that police frequently use receipts to determine occupancy of a

home, and that even when receipts do not contain the name of a

purchaser, police “track people all the time by . . . receipts.”9

9

Insofar as there is any question whether certain indicia of

occupancy were properly seized under the first warrant for the

Saddlewood premises, given the specific phrasing of its

provisions relating to indicia of occupancy or ownership of the

premises, it seems clear that these items would have been

inevitably seized under the terms of the second warrant

concerning “[i]tems of identification which might tend to

establish the identity of persons who might have been within

the premises to be searched.” The circumstances presented here

do not reflect that either the decision to procure this warrant, or

the inclusion of this language in the warrant, was tainted by any

illegal conduct by law enforcement. (See Nix v. Williams (1984)

467 U.S. 431, 444; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016,

37

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We also agree with the Attorney General that defendant’s

argument largely overlooks the significance of the plain view

doctrine. “Officers executing a warrant may seize items of

evidence or contraband not listed in the warrant but observed in

plain view.” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 166.) “The

plain view doctrine does not create an independent ‘exception’ to

the warrant clause, but simply is an extension of whatever may

be the prior justification for the officers’ ‘access to an object.’

[Citation.] The officers lawfully must be in a position from

which they can view a particular area; it must be immediately

apparent to them that the items they are observing may be

evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to lawful

seizure, and the officers must have a lawful right of access to the

object.” (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1295.)

There is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s

determination that seizures of items not specifically described

in the warrant were nonetheless appropriate under the plain

view doctrine, and did not reflect a general, indiscriminate

search of the premises. Detective Nash testified that seizures

were made in light of “[t]he entire picture of what [they] were

getting as [they] were getting it and whether it was related to

this series of murders and financial stuff.” He further explained:

“So we wouldn’t just arbitrarily say yeah, that’s related. We

would actually have information at some point in there that we

felt that it was related to the series of crimes.” And Detective

Nash responded in the affirmative when asked whether he had

1040 [“Evidence need not be suppressed if the prosecution can

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the

information would inevitably have been discovered by lawful

means”].)

38

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

made “every effort to try to seize only those items that were

either specifically listed in the search warrant or items which

[he] believed there was probable cause to believe constituted the

fruits [or] instrumentality of the crime.” Similarly, Detective

Chiabotti testified that the evidence that was seized at the

premises “related to instrumentality of the crimes [they] were

investigating, evidence that would tend to show who committed

the crimes, how the crimes were committed, evidence which

went to state of mind . . . , planning, preparation.”

There also is ample support for the trial court’s

determination that the seizure of various items in plain view did

not involve officers searching in places that the warrants did not

allow. (See Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [in properly

executing a warrant, “officers merely looked in a spot where the

specified evidence of crime plausibly could be found, even if it

was not a place where [such items] normally are stored”]; People

v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 799; People v. Nicolaus (1991)

54 Cal.3d 551, 575.) And it would have been immediately

apparent to officers conducting this search that many seized

“items might have had some bearing on the current offenses”

(Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1306), whether as relating to

motive or to other relevant circumstances of the crimes under

investigation. (See, e.g., Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.

Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [“probable cause must be

examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought

will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction”]; People v.

Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 623 [“the required ‘nexus’ ”

for application of the plain view doctrine “is that between the

item discovered and a criminal activity, though not necessarily

the criminal activity denominated in the warrant”]; U.S. v.

Menon (3d Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 550, 562 [“the immediate

39

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

apparency of criminality should be measured, at a minimum, by

the collective knowledge of the officers on the scene”].)

We pause here to emphasize the limited inquiry before us.

The issue before us is not whether the officers properly seized

every specific item of evidence (such as the posters or evidence

of witchcraft) under the two challenged warrants.10 Rather, the

question here is whether the unusual remedy of blanket

suppression of all seized evidence should be applied. A review

of the entire record before us and the totality of the officers’

conduct does not reveal the kind of flagrant disregard of Fourth

Amendment protections that might justify the extraordinary

remedy of wholesale suppression of all seized evidence.

Defendant’s arguments resemble the claims we considered and

rejected in Kraft, where the defendant “vaguely assert[ed], ‘It is

not any single item that presents the problem, but the overall

array of items taken and the failure to present any substantial

reason for seizing many items that highlights the overall legal

problem.’ ” (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1049–1050.) This

court found that the argument was so lacking in specificity that

it “virtually defies review,” and that defendant’s argument that

the People bear the burden to justify the seizure of items in plain

view is contrary to the established rule that “on appeal[,] all

presumptions favor the judgment.” (Id. at p. 1050.)

The cases defendant relies upon to support his request for

wholesale suppression involved substantially more egregious

10

Even if defendant had developed an argument on appeal

challenging individual seizures, it is at the very least doubtful

that the items mentioned in his briefing likely affected his

decision to plead guilty. (Cf. People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731,

767, fn. 36 [noting the relevance and incriminating nature of the

items at issue in that case].)

40

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

conduct by the executing officers. (See, e.g., Foster, supra,

100 F.3d at pp. 850–851 [complete suppression appropriate

where officers executing search warrant engaged in “fishing

expedition for the discovery of incriminating evidence,”

admittedly “ ‘took anything of [monetary] value,’ ” and made “no

attempt . . . to substantiate a connection” between items seized

and the terms of the warrant in a “deliberate and flagrant action

taken in an effort to uncover evidence of additional

wrongdoing”]; U.S. v. Rettig (9th Cir. 1978) 589 F.2d 418, 421–

423 [complete suppression ordered where the warrant that the

officers obtained from one magistrate “was used as an

instrument for conducting the search for which permission had

been denied [by a different magistrate] on the previous day” and

“the agents did not confine their search in good faith to the

objects of the warrant”].) Also inapt is U.S. v. Sedaghaty (9th

Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 885, in which officers procured a warrant

authorizing the seizure of documents relating to the preparation

of a tax return, but ultimately seized a large volume of

documents relating to a charity formed by the defendant which

the United States government suspected of funding terrorist

activities. (Id. at pp. 891, 912.) The federal appellate court

determined that these seizures could not be justified by

reference to the warrant or its affidavit. (Id. at pp. 912–913.)

This determination, which is not binding upon us, is in any

event distinguishable. The warrants here were far broader than

the warrants involved in Sedaghaty, and that court did not

discuss the possible application of the plain view doctrine or the

exclusionary rule to the facts before it — except to hold that

complete suppression of all seized evidence was unwarranted.

(Id. at p. 915.) Neither that decision, nor any other authorities

41

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

cited by defendant, provides persuasive support for his position

that total suppression is appropriate here.11

In sum, we assume for argument’s sake that the remedy

of total suppression may be appropriate in extreme

circumstances of flagrant government misconduct. Even so, we

conclude defendant has not shown the drastic remedy of

suppression of all evidence is warranted here. He has not

demonstrated that the executing officers grossly exceeded or

flagrantly disregarded the terms of the warrants at issue. Even

assuming some of the items seized were not identified in the

search warrants, this does not transform an otherwise valid

search warrant into an unconstitutional general warrant. The

behavior of the officers, the conditions under which the evidence

was obtained, and the nature of the evidence seized — whether

viewed individually or collectively — does not convince us that

this extreme remedy is warranted.

III. OTHER ISSUES

A. Jury Selection

Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused a

potential juror, and that it erred when it denied his request to

11

Defendant also likens the situation here to the dog sniff of

the exterior of a residence that the United States Supreme

Court in Florida v. Jardines (2013) 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 found to

constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. He reasons

that in both that case and here, law enforcement exceeded their

“license” vis-à-vis the premises in question. We do not view the

analysis in Jardines, which was concerned with the threshold

Fourth Amendment question of whether a search occurred, as

especially relevant to the quite different question of whether the

officers here so exceeded the authorization conferred by the

search warrants as to potentially call for complete suppression.

42

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

ask prospective jurors a question regarding the impact that

certain evidence might have on their assessment of the

appropriate sentence. We find defendant’s arguments

unpersuasive.

1. Excusal of Prospective Juror

a. Factual background

Defendant asserts the trial court’s removal of prospective

juror J.W. based on her views regarding the death penalty

violated his federal constitutional right to due process and an

impartial jury.

In her written questionnaire, when asked to describe her

general feelings regarding life in prison without the possibility

of parole, prospective juror J.W. wrote, “I believe it would be a

terrible sentence to receive.” When asked to describe her

general feelings regarding the death penalty, J.W. wrote, “I’m

not sure that I believe in the death penalty.” She opined that

the death penalty was imposed “too often.” When asked if she

would be willing to listen to all of the evidence and the court’s

instructions on the law, and give honest consideration to both

life in prison without the possibility of parole and death before

reaching a penalty, J.W. answered “Yes,” adding, “I think?” In

response to another similarly worded question, J.W. again

answered “Yes” and added, “Hopefully.” When asked if she had

opinions that would cause her to never vote for the death

penalty, regardless of the evidence presented at the penalty

trial, she answered “No.” J.W. indicated that she was

“[m]oderately against” the death penalty, explaining: “I think I

lean toward being against the death penalty. I’m just not sure

what I would decide.” When asked if it would be difficult for her

43

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to apply the law if the court’s instructions on the law differed

from her own beliefs and opinions, J.W. checked “Yes.”

During voir dire, the trial court noted J.W.’s answer that

it might be difficult for her to disregard her own beliefs to follow

the court’s instructions and asked her how she felt about that.

She replied, “Still I think it would be difficult.” The court asked

if she would be able to follow the law even though it would be

difficult. J.W. replied that she “really believe[d] in the system

that we have” and thought she could follow the law. The court

noted that some time had passed since J.W. filled out her

questionnaire and asked if she still believed she could consider

both penalties equally. J.W. replied, “I thought about it, you

know, I have to say that if I had to vote on the death penalty I

would vote against it. That being said, could I just — don’t know

what I would do.”

During the prosecutor’s voir dire, he first spoke to the

group of prospective jurors, noting that some people indicated

they were inclined to be against the death penalty, but could still

vote for it in an appropriate case. He then spoke to J.W., stating,

“[Y]ou said a couple things — ‘I’m not sure I believe in the death

penalty.’ Another point you said something like, ‘I’m inclined to

be against it’ or something like that, that’s kind of the sentiment

you expressed here this afternoon. [¶] And it also sounds like

you’ve thought about it a little bit between when you came in

here three weeks ago and today; is that a fair characterization?”

J.W. confirmed it was fair. The prosecution asked her if she

would be able to follow the law as instructed. J.W. explained,

“I’m thinking that I would like to say that I would, you know,

you just don’t know until the time comes, you know, what you’re

going to [do].” The prosecutor explained that the law never

requires a juror to impose the death penalty, and that jurors are

44

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

not expected to abandon their “morality or . . . belief structure”

while deliberating. He asked J.W., “If what I’m saying here is

accurate, that you do bring your own sense of morality

and . . . who you are as a human being to bear on this case,

would you agree that it would be very difficult, if not impossible

for you, given your belief structure, to ever impose the death

penalty?” J.W. opined that there was a one percent chance,

based on her moral beliefs, that she would be able to impose the

death penalty. When the prosecution sought to clarify this

answer by asking whether that meant that 99 out of 100 times

J.W. would not vote for death, based on her moral or

philosophical beliefs about the death penalty, J.W. responded in

the affirmative.

When defense counsel began her voir dire, she told J.W.

that it appeared the prospective juror had “strong reservations

about the imposition of the death penalty,” and J.W. agreed.

When counsel asked if J.W. could see herself imposing the death

penalty in an appropriate case, J.W. said, “I couldn’t see myself.”

Counsel then asked if the prospective juror would consider

death as an option during deliberations. J.W. replied, “I just

don’t know what I would do. [¶] . . . [¶] But I sincerely doubt

that I would.” Defense counsel asked J.W. if she felt like she

would keep an open mind, to which J.W. answered, “I like to

think I would.” But when counsel again asked if J.W. could

impose the death penalty in “the appropriate case,” the

prospective juror said, “I doubt it. [¶] . . . [¶] I just don’t know.”

The prosecution challenged J.W. for cause. Defense

counsel submitted the issue without argument. The trial court

sustained the challenge: “I do believe that [J.W.] has a bias

against the death penalty such that I think she said in one

percent she might have been thinking — considering it, but in

45

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

all reasonable likelihood, not very likely. I will excuse [J.W.] for

cause.”

b. Discussion

“[N]ot all who oppose the death penalty are subject to

removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that

the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in

capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing

to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule

of law.” (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176

(Lockhart); see People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 778.)

To determine whether a prospective juror should be excluded for

cause because of his or her views on the death penalty, we

inquire “whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in

accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Wainwright v.

Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); see Witherspoon v. Illinois

(1968) 391 U.S. 510.) A prospective juror’s bias need not be

proven with “ ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ” (Witt, at p. 424.) We

recognize that many prospective jurors “simply cannot be asked

enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been

made ‘unmistakably clear’ . . . [and] may not know how they will

react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be

unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.”

(Id. at pp. 424–425.)

Recognizing that the prospective juror’s demeanor is an

important consideration, we accord deference to the trial court

judge “who sees and hears the juror.” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at

p. 426; see People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 388 (Flores)

[“The trial court was in the best position to observe [the

prospective juror’s] demeanor, vocal inflection, and other cues

46

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

not readily apparent on the record, and we reasonably infer that

the trial court based its decision not only on what [the

prospective juror] said, but also on how he said it”].) In

“situations where the trial court has had an opportunity to

observe the juror’s demeanor, we uphold the court’s decision to

excuse the juror so long as it is supported by substantial

evidence.” (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 659.)

The trial court’s excusal of J.W. for cause is supported by

substantial evidence. As previously detailed, in her written

questionnaire, J.W. indicated that if the court’s instructions

conflicted with her beliefs, she would have difficulty applying

the law. Although some of J.W.’s answers also expressed a

willingness to listen to all of the evidence and jury instructions

and consider both penalty options, she also equivocated on this

point, adding “I think?” and “Hopefully” to these expressions of

intent. She also responded that she was “not sure” she believed

in the death penalty and believed it was imposed “[t]oo often.”

Later, during voir dire, J.W. told the court that she believed she

could follow the law but also advised that, after thinking about

it, “I have to say that if I had to vote on the death penalty I would

vote against it.” She then confirmed to the prosecutor that if the

court allowed jurors to use their moral compasses in making a

decision, her moral compass would be inconsistent with voting

for the death penalty, and she could impose it only one percent

of the time. Finally, J.W. agreed with defense counsel that even

in an “appropriate case,” she could not see herself voting for the

death penalty, and that she did not know but “sincerely

doubt[ed]” that she could consider death as an option. Upon

further probing by defense counsel, J.W. stated that although

she liked to think she would keep an open mind, she doubted, or

47

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

just did not know, whether she could vote to impose the death

penalty “in the appropriate case.”

This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s

excusal of J.W. as a potential juror. “Comments that a

prospective juror would have a ‘hard time’ or find it ‘very

difficult’ to vote for death reflect ‘a degree of equivocation’ that,

considered ‘with the juror’s . . . demeanor, can justify a trial

court’s conclusion . . . that the juror’s views would “ ‘prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a

juror . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 12.) The

trial court, which was in a position to observe J.W. during voir

dire (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 388), reasonably could have

concluded that J.W.’s responses to the juror questionnaire and

to questions posed by the court and counsel established such

impairment. (See People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 297–

298 [according substantial deference to trial court’s evaluation

of prospective jurors’ expressions of doubt demonstrating

substantial impairment].)

Defendant contends the trial court erred when it excused

J.W. because her estimation that she could vote for the death

penalty in one percent of cases confirmed her willingness to

engage in the weighing process and impose a death sentence if

she thought it was appropriate. But “the mere theoretical

possibility that a prospective juror might be able to reach a

verdict of death in some case does not necessarily render the

dismissal of the juror” erroneous. (People v. Martinez (2009)

47 Cal.4th 399, 432.)

Defendant also relies on People v. Pearson (2012)

53 Cal.4th 306 (Pearson) in arguing that the trial court erred,

but his reliance is misplaced. In Pearson, prospective juror C.O.

48

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

noted in her questionnaire that she could be an impartial juror

and it would not be impossible for her to vote for or against the

death penalty in any one case. (Id. at p. 328.) During voir dire,

C.O. acknowledged that she did not know if she was personally

for or against the death penalty, but she could nonetheless vote

to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case. (Id. at

p. 329.) And she repeatedly confirmed that she would be able to

vote for the death penalty. (Id. at p. 330.) We concluded the

trial court erred in excusing C.O. for cause, noting that “[t]o

exclude from a capital jury all those who will not promise to

immovably embrace the death penalty in the case before them

unconstitutionally biases the selection process,” and a juror

should not be disqualified for failing to “enthusiastically support

capital punishment.” (Id. at p. 332.)

Pearson is readily distinguishable from the present case.

Although C.O. was not expressly in favor of the death penalty,

she repeatedly affirmed she could be a fair and impartial juror,

weigh the evidence, and vote for the death penalty in an

appropriate case. (Pearson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 328–330.)

Here, J.W. did not repeatedly affirm that she could be a fair and

impartial juror. Rather, she repeatedly expressed doubt

regarding her ability to impose the death penalty, even in an

“appropriate case.”12

12

In supplemental briefing, defendant asserts that People v.

Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735 bolsters his claim that the trial

court erred when it excused J.W. for cause. In Armstrong, we

concluded that the trial court improperly excused at least four

jurors when it “applied an erroneous standard to the question of

qualification” and “relied on factual bases not supported by the

record.” (Id. at p. 751.) Neither circumstance is present here;

49

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Therefore, we reject defendant’s claim of error in

connection with the trial court’s excusal of prospective juror

J.W.

2. Denial of Voir Dire Question

a. Background

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion

when it denied his request to ask the prospective jurors whether

evidence of dismemberment would prevent them from imposing

a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

At a hearing to discuss voir dire, the prosecution objected

to two of the defense’s proposed questions. Question 133 asked,

“What purpose do you think the death penalty serves?”

Question 134 asked, “In what types of cases do you think the

death penalty should be imposed?” The prosecution argued that

the questions invited prospective jurors to prejudge the

evidence, and it would be “highly inappropriate” to invite the

jurors to speculate under which circumstances they think the

death penalty should be imposed. Justin’s counsel responded

that Question 134 would “save time” because “[i]t goes right to

the heart of a well-recognized challenge for cause . . . potential

jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty under

particular circumstances.” Defendant’s counsel offered to

as discussed, the trial court applied the correct standard of law

and the record supports its excusal of J.W. Relatedly, defendant

argues in his supplemental briefing that the trial court “fail[ed]

to comply with the Legislature’s clearly expressed limitation on

death qualification of California juries.” Defendant

acknowledges that we rejected a similar argument in a more

recent case, People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116 (Suarez), and

he does not present any new argument to warrant our

reconsideration of the constitutionality of death qualification.

50

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

withdraw Question 133 but maintained that Question 134 was

necessary.

The prosecution disagreed, arguing that “it is absolutely

inappropriate for counsel . . . to inquire of the jurors whether

they, if they were to assume true certain facts like, for instance,

dismembering of bodies, and in those circumstances would they

impose the death penalty, absolutely requires them to prejudge

the evidence, that is clearly an objectionable question. [¶] What

is not objectionable, what they can ask, what this questionnaire

does include, is inquiries into whether or not based upon the

special circumstances themselves would those alone be enough

or cause them to automatically vote for the death penalty in

every case, okay, we agree with that.” The prosecution further

argued that the question invited the jury to speculate on areas

where they would or would not impose the death penalty.

Justin’s counsel argued that Question 134 did not contain any

factual information related to the case, but rather, it asked the

prospective jurors, “[W]hat is your view? Do you think the death

penalty should . . . always be applied in some situations? What

are they?”

After a brief recess, the court turned to Question 135,

which asked: “Are there any circumstances where a person

convicted of murder should automatically receive the death

penalty?” The court offered an alternative phrasing: “Are there

any types of factual circumstance[s] for which you feel the death

penalty should always be imposed, if yes, please explain.” The

court concluded that it would not accept Questions 133 or 134,

but would allow Question 135 in either the proposed form or its

alternative suggestion.

51

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

At a hearing on March 1, 2004, defendant’s counsel

informed the court that the parties had agreed on a final

questionnaire. A few days later, defendant changed his plea to

guilty and the court granted Justin’s motion to sever.

On September 17, 2004, defendant proposed a question

that would ask the prospective jurors if viewing photographs or

videos would “upset you or influence you so that you would be

unable to remain impartial to either side in this case?” The

prosecution objected and proposed to reword the question to ask

the prospective jurors if they would be able to keep an open

mind, rather than remain impartial. The trial court noted that

in Justin’s trial, the prospective jurors had been asked the

following question: “As a juror, you may be required to view

graphic photographs of the victims and the crime scenes. Would

you be able to do this and continue to carry out your other duties

in this case as a juror?” The prosecution agreed with the

question, but defense counsel requested more time to come up

with a compromise.

The defense subsequently proposed asking prospective

jurors, “Are there any factual circumstances for which you feel

the death penalty should automatically be imposed?” The

prosecution objected, arguing that the question asked the jurors

to prejudge the evidence. The court acknowledged that “most

people” answer this question with a circumstance unrelated to

defendant’s case — i.e., something related to children — and

that the circumstances relevant to the case were covered by

other questions. The trial court rejected the defense’s question.

One week later, defendant filed a motion seeking to

conduct voir dire on case-specific evidence of mitigation and

aggravation. At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel

52

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

expanded on her desire to question the prospective jurors

regarding the photographs. “Judge, my concern is that because

of the gross and gruesome and horrendous and horrific nature,

and all the other words that have been in the newspaper, facts

of this case and the evidence . . . that the jurors have to have

some preparation for what they’re going to see.” The court

confirmed that the prospective jurors would be told that they

would see photographs depicting body parts but advised defense

counsel that insofar as she sought to ask jurors if they would

always impose death if the crime involved “this fact and this fact

and this fact,” counsel was “asking them to make a

predetermination based upon certain facts that you’re giving

them. And that, I don’t want to do.”

In further argument, defense counsel stated that she

wanted to ask the prospective jurors how they felt about

dismemberment and whether they would “be able to sit here and

say this man should live” after hearing that he “desecrated and

dismembered three people’s bodies.” After the court said such a

question would also be asking the jurors to prejudge the case,

defense counsel clarified that she wanted to ask if they could put

“that” aside and not prejudge the case. The prosecution replied

that “[t]hey don’t have to put that aside. That’s a circumstance

in aggravation.” The prosecution suggested that counsel could

ask the prospective jurors if they could keep an open mind and

not make any decisions about the case until they have heard all

the evidence presented. Defense counsel replied that it was

important to inform the potential jurors that the pictures would

be gruesome.

The court told counsel that it would not allow prospective

jurors to be shown pictures and then be asked whether they

could be a fair juror, but stated that it would inform potential

53

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

jurors that the case involved “gory” facts and “body parts.” The

court recognized that questioning on this subject involved a

“gray area,” but added that if counsel’s questions strayed from

the “issues” presented by the case and got “too far into a fact and

then a juror’s opinion based upon those facts,” the court would

sustain an objection. The court stated that the propriety of such

questions during voir dire would be resolved on a “question by

question” basis, adding, “But I think everyone knows how I feel

on that.”

The juror questionnaire that ultimately was used stated

that the Stinemans were an elderly couple and that

“dismembered remains of the Stinemans and Selina Bishop

were found floating in gym bags along the Mokelumne River

(Delta Region) in August 2000.” The questionnaire also

informed prospective jurors that they would be required to view

photographs or videos “of the people who were killed and the

scene where it occurred,” and asked whether that would

“influence you so that you would be unable or unwilling to

consider any other evidence presented?” The questionnaire did

not otherwise discuss the dismemberment of victims, or its

possible effect on juror deliberations. Prospective jurors were

also asked, “Would you always vote for the death penalty in a

case involving more than one murder [or murder committed

during a robbery or murder committed during a kidnapping]?

In other words, would you automatically vote for a sentence

imposing the death penalty regardless of what the evidence was

during the penalty trial?”

When the penalty phase voir dire began, the trial court

instructed the panel that the “proper frame of mind for a juror

entering the penalty trial would be to have an open mind, a

willingness to consider each of the two possible penalties in light

54

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of all the evidence and the Court’s instructions on the law. It

would be unacceptable for a juror to approach the penalty phase

having ruled out one penalty or the other.”

During voir dire, defense counsel advised a prospective

juror that the case “involves extreme violence” and asked

whether the juror could still, if appropriate, return a sentence of

life without parole. When the prosecutor objected to the

question, the trial court told defense counsel, “When you say

here are specific facts[] this case involves and could you vote a

certain way, you are asking them to prejudge the evidence. If

you say a case that involves extreme violence, is that going to

cause a problem for you? . . . You can’t ask him how specifically

they’re going to vote. You can’t do that, based on facts that

you’ve given in the hypothetical.” Later in voir dire, defense

counsel asked a cohort of prospective jurors, “the reality is that

you’re going to spend six or seven or eight weeks seeing

[defendant] every day in court. You know that he’s pled guilty

to five murders. You read the paragraph about the

dismembered bodies. [¶] The question is . . . Could you, if you

thought the case was appropriate, come back with a verdict of

life without the possibility of parole[?]”

One of the potential jurors who was asked this question

replied, “With the little that I know about this case being

multiple murders, being mutilation or dismemberment of

bodies, premeditation, I would consider the life without parole,

but that would be an uphill battle for me.” However, this

candidate subsequently clarified that his feelings regarding

such evidence would not preclude him from voting for life

without parole. And subsequently, the trial court provided the

following clarification to prospective jurors: “[A]gain, we’re not

going to be asking you . . . how you would vote. We don’t want

55

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to know that because you haven’t heard the evidence yet. If you

have certain feelings about certain issues in this case such as

multiple murder, you need to let us know about that. We’re not

going to get into specifics here. I won’t allow that. [¶] We can

ask [the prospective juror] with regard to multiple murder or

something like that, what her feeling is with regard to the death

penalty.”

b. Discussion

Defendant contends the trial court improperly prevented

his counsel from asking prospective jurors about the impact that

evidence of corpse dismemberment and desecration would have

on their deliberations, and that this alleged error violated

settled law, had no legitimate purpose, was an abuse of

discretion, precluded identification of jurors who would

automatically impose death, and violated his federal

constitutional rights. We disagree.

Defense counsel and the prosecution are permitted to ask

prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to

determine whether the juror harbors a bias, based on a

circumstance or fact shown by the trial evidence, that would

affect their ability to follow the court’s instructions when

weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence and determining

the penalty. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720–721.)

Death qualification voir dire “must not be so abstract that it fails

to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would

prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties

as jurors in the case being tried. On the other hand, it must not

be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge

the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and

aggravating evidence likely to be presented.” (Id. at pp. 721–

56

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

722.) A trial court has considerable discretion in determining

what questions are permitted. (People v. Holmes, McClain and

Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 758.) “Where the court

exercises its discretion to exclude certain questions from the

questionnaire, we will affirm unless the voir dire was so

inadequate that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair.”

(People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 586 (Leon).)

We have previously rejected arguments similar to those

raised by defendant. In People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th

1082 (Zambrano), the defendant killed and dismembered the

victim. (Id. at pp. 1096–1097.) During voir dire, defense counsel

sought to ask the prospective jurors if the gruesome nature of

the dismemberment might influence their views on an

appropriate penalty. (Id. at pp. 1118–1119.) The trial court

rejected the request, concluding that asking prospective jurors

about how dismemberment might affect them would require

them to prejudge the case. (Id. at p. 1119.) We affirmed the

trial court’s ruling, holding that it did not abuse “its broad

discretion.” (Id. at p. 1122.) We noted that the trial court

permitted the defense to explore several specific circumstances

of the case with the prospective jurors, including that the

defendant and the victim were both members of the same city

commission and the allegation that the defendant killed the

victim to eliminate him as a witness in an assault case. (Ibid.)

Several times, counsel’s inquiry touched upon the

dismemberment issue. (Ibid.)

We explained that “[i]n Cash — our only reversal of a

death penalty judgment for failure to allow sufficient inquiry

into jurors’ death penalty attitudes about particular facts — we

stressed that the court had refused to allow defense counsel to

ask prospective jurors about ‘a general fact or circumstance . . .

57

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death

penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating

circumstances.’ ” (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)

Unlike in Cash, “the condition of the adult murder victim’s body

when found — was not one that could cause a reasonable

juror — i.e., one whose death penalty attitudes otherwise

qualified him or her to sit on a capital jury — invariably to vote

for death, regardless of the strength of the mitigating evidence.

No child victim, prior murder, or sexual implications were

involved. Nor, to the extent juror emotions might thereby be

aroused, would there be evidence that [the victim] was

dismembered while alive.” (Id. at p. 1122.) We acknowledged

that the average juror would certainly be affected by a condition

like dismemberment, similar to any brutal circumstance of a

homicide. “But the fact of dismemberment, in and of itself, does

not appear so potentially inflammatory as to transform an

otherwise death-qualified juror into one who could

not deliberate fairly on the issue of penalty.” (Id. at p. 1123.)

Likewise, in People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, the

defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have

inquired whether prospective jurors’ penalty phase

decisionmaking would be affected by the facts “that defendant

was close to his three alleged murder victims, that one of the

victims was pregnant, that another was the mother of his child,

and that two were dismembered.” (Id. at p. 1152.) We rejected

the defendant’s assertion, explaining that “it was more than

sufficient that the prospective jurors — having been informed

that defendant allegedly murdered a male friend and two former

girlfriends — were asked, in various ways, whether there were

circumstances under which they would impose the death

penalty automatically regardless of other legally relevant

58

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

factors.” (Ibid.) We specifically addressed, and once again

rejected, the position that prospective jurors must be informed

that the charged homicide involves dismemberment, especially

absent evidence that dismemberment occurred while the victim

was alive. (Ibid.) In so holding, we explained that in such

situations, “it is ‘not error to refuse to permit counsel to ask

questions based upon an account of the facts of [the] case, or to

ask a juror to consider particular facts that would cause him or

her to impose the death penalty.’ ” (Ibid.)

Defendant acknowledges the holdings in Zambrano and

Rogers, but asserts his case is different because it involved only

a penalty phase trial and particularly gruesome facts and

desecration beyond dismemberment of the corpse, notably the

feeding of human flesh to animals. We are not persuaded that

these differences require a different outcome than in Zambrano

and Rogers. The trial court here provided for an adequate

canvas of would-be jurors. Prior to answering any questions

regarding their opinion on the death penalty, prospective jurors

were informed in the juror questionnaire that the case involved

dismemberment and that remains were found floating in duffel

bags in the Delta. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the

prospective jurors considered these facts when filling out the

questionnaire, including its question regarding whether viewing

photographs or videos of the victims and the crime scene would

render them unable or unwilling to consider other evidence.

(See Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 587 [although the trial court

excluded questions about multiple murder, the jurors were

informed of that circumstance in the questionnaire and “it is

reasonable to believe the jurors had these charges and special

circumstances in mind when they completed the

questionnaire”].) Jurors were asked in the questionnaire

59

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

whether they would automatically vote for death in a case

involving more than one murder, or a murder committed during

a robbery or a kidnapping. The court and the parties also

repeatedly asked prospective jurors if they could keep an open

mind and consider all evidence presented before selecting an

appropriate penalty. These inquiries, along with the other

advisements given and questions posed to prospective jurors,

were sufficient under the circumstances presented and did not

render the voir dire “so inadequate that the resulting trial was

fundamentally unfair.” (Leon, at p. 586.) We therefore find no

abuse of discretion notwithstanding the fact that this case

involved only a penalty phrase trial and conduct by defendant

going beyond dismemberment.

3. Constitutionality of Death Qualification

Defendant contends the exclusion of prospective jurors

because of an unwillingness or impaired ability to impose death

violated his right to a representative jury. Both the United

States Supreme Court and this court have held that death

qualification does not unconstitutionally alter the makeup of a

defendant’s jury. (See Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 175–176

[“ ‘Death qualification’ . . . is carefully designed to serve the

State’s concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury

that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of

the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital

trial”]; Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 138 [“we have considered

and rejected claims that the death qualification process is

unconstitutional”].) Death qualification did not violate

defendant’s right to a jury selected from a cross-section of the

community.

60

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

B. Admission of Evidence

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion

when it admitted evidence of corpse dismemberment. He

specifically challenges the introduction of two pieces of evidence:

(1) photographs depicting the Stinemans’ and Bishop’s

dismemberment; and (2) the sound of a reciprocating saw which

played during the prosecution’s closing argument.

1. Factual Background

After defendant pleaded guilty, he filed a motion to limit

the photographic evidence that would be admitted at the penalty

phase. He argued that photographs depicting dismemberment

should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because

they were unduly prejudicial, irrelevant as an undisputed issue,

cumulative, and offensive to the victims’ families. Defendant

argued in the alternative that if the photographs were admitted,

they should not remain in the jury’s view “beyond its relevant

use.” The prosecution argued in response that the photographs

were “the best evidence of the methodical and cold-blooded

manner in which this defendant killed five people.” The

prosecution also argued that “the desecration of the

bodies . . . [is] directly related to the enormity of the crimes

committed.”

At the hearing on the motion, defendant argued that

because he had pleaded guilty, “there [was] no issue as to how

the deaths occurred, the manner in which they occurred.” He

further argued that the photographs of dismemberment were

inflammatory and lacked probative value for a penalty phase

trial. In response, the prosecutor argued that although

defendant had pleaded guilty, the prosecution was entitled to

present evidence regarding the manner in which the crimes

61

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

were committed. Additionally, he argued the photographs were

“circumstantial evidence of what is inside [defendant’s mind].

And therefore, they are very probative of the enormity of the

crime, which directly relates to the question of whether or not

the evidence in aggravation is so substantial that it warrants

imposition of the death penalty.”

The trial court noted that the prosecution had offered a

limited number of photographs in comparison to the “enormity

of the amount” of photographs taken, and that several

photographs had been used in Justin’s trial. The court opined

that the pictures of faces were “the hardest photos to look at”

but the fact that the jaws and teeth of the victims had been

hammered out was relevant for the jury in deciding which

penalty to impose. The court found that the photos were

relevant to the circumstances of the crime and that their

probative value far outweighed any prejudicial effect, and

agreed with defendant that the images should not remain in the

jury’s view indefinitely. During the trial, the photographs were

displayed only during the testimony of the coroner, Dr. Gregory

Reiber.

Prior to Dr. Reiber’s testimony, defendant moved to

exclude the operation and sound of the reciprocating saw, which

was to occur during the doctor’s testimony.13 The trial court

granted the motion to preclude activation of the saw, concluding

“it seems to me that seeing the body in pieces tells [the] story.

The doctor can talk about striations and we don’t need to turn it

on to show that.”

13

The physical saw itself had already been admitted into

evidence without objection from defendant.

62

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Prior to closing arguments, defendant again moved to

preclude activation of the saw on relevance grounds. The

prosecutor argued that “turning on the saw gets the jury closer

to the reality of what happened in that bathroom.” The

prosecutor emphasized that the saw was already in evidence

and turning it on would demonstrate how it operated, which was

relevant to the degree of the harm and to showing the jury the

care and deliberation required to manipulate the saw.

The trial court acknowledged that during Dr. Reiber’s

testimony, activating the saw was not relevant to explain how

the cuts were made. The court ruled, however, that activating

the saw during closing argument was “relevant to show and

demonstrate to the jury the gravity of the crime” and was “not

overly prejudicial.” The prosecutor activated the reciprocating

saw during his closing argument to the jury.

2. Discussion

Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.)

Evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency in reason to prove or

disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) “The trial court has

broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence

[citation], and we will not disturb the court’s exercise of that

discretion unless it acted in an arbitrary, capricious or patently

absurd manner.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 947.)

Evidence Code section 352 provides for the exclusion of evidence

“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” We

review a trial court’s admission of evidence under the abuse of

63

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

discretion standard. (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285,

339.) The “undue prejudice” contemplated by Evidence Code

section 352 “ ‘is that which “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an

emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which

has very little effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Chhoun

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 29, italics omitted.) “As to victim

photographs, the court’s discretion under Evidence Code

section 352 to exclude evidence showing circumstances of the

crime ‘is much narrower at the penalty phase than at the guilt

phase. This is so because the prosecution has the right to

establish the circumstances of the crime, including its gruesome

consequences ([Pen. Code,] § 190.3, factor (a)), and because the

risk of an improper guilt finding based on visceral reactions is

no longer present.’ ” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 105–

106.)

Defendant first contends the photographs depicting

dismemberment displayed during Dr. Reiber’s testimony were

irrelevant because they did not address a disputed fact. He

argues that because he had already pleaded guilty, there was no

need for the prosecutor to present evidence of the manner of

death. Defendant further argues that although dismemberment

was evidence of defendant’s disposal of the bodies, the trial court

incorrectly classified the photographs as evidence of the manner

of death. Defendant also contends that the activation of the

reciprocating saw during closing argument was similarly

irrelevant. Finally, defendant contends that both the

photographs and the sound of the saw violated his constitutional

rights to an impartial jury and rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair. We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the

photographs, and even assuming that the prosecution should

64

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

not have been allowed to activate the reciprocating saw during

closing, any assumed error was harmless.

The photographs were relevant to the circumstances of the

crimes of conviction. “Under section 190.3, factor (a), the trier

of fact may consider, in aggravation, evidence relevant to ‘the

circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted

in the present proceeding and the existence of any special

circumstances found to be true.’ The ‘circumstances of the

crime’ as used in section 190.3, factor (a), ‘does not mean merely

the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime.

Rather it extends to “[t]hat which surrounds materially,

morally, or logically” the crime.’ ” (People v. Blair (2005)

36 Cal.4th 686, 748–749.)

Here, the disputed photographs shed light on the

circumstances of the crimes because, as the trial court reasoned,

they were strong evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt,

the seriousness of his crimes, and the manner of death and

subsequent disposal of the victims’ bodies. The images depicted

the removal of victims’ teeth and identifiable tattoos, which

demonstrated defendant’s intent to conceal the identities of his

victims. The photographs also assisted the jury in

understanding Dr. Reiber’s testimony concerning how the

dismembering cuts and organ removal were executed, and the

high degree of skill required to do so. Although these

photographs were disturbing, we cannot say that their relevance

was substantially outweighed by a countervailing consideration,

and thus find no error in their admission.

This conclusion finds support from our analysis in People

v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792 (Solomon). There, we held

that photographs depicting murder victims at various stages of

65

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

decomposition were admissible at the penalty phase of a capital

trial as evidence of the defendant’s intent and the manner of

death. (Id. at pp. 841–842.) We observed that the photographs

“were highly relevant to the circumstances of the crimes.

[Citation.] They disclosed the manner in which the victims died

and substantiated that defendant intended and deliberated the

murders. [Citations.] They demonstrated the callousness and

cruelty of defendant’s acts. [Citation.] And they corroborated

the pathologists’ testimony and assisted the jury’s

understanding of it.” (Id. at p. 842.) The photographs

introduced here were similarly relevant.

Defendant argues his case is different from Solomon

because the photographs in that case showed decomposition

premortem and perimortem as it pertained to the manner of

death. In his case, he argues, the photographs concerned

postmortem violence. This purported distinction carries little

weight. We recognized in Solomon that “[t]he ‘circumstances of

the crime’ include what happened to the victims’ bodies as a

result of defendant’s actions. [Citation.] The consequences of

criminal conduct often extend beyond the immediate result of an

isolated act.” (Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 842.) Further,

we have regularly upheld the admission of graphic postmortem

photographs of victims during the penalty phase of a capital

trial. (See People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 158 [upholding

admission of postmortem photograph of murder victim that also

suggested molestation]; Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at

pp. 1149–1152 [trial court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting graphic dismemberment photographs]; People v.

Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 34–35 [graphic photos excluded

during guilt phase were later admitted as penalty phase

evidence]; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201 [upholding

66

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

admission of photographs that were bloody and graphic].)

Therefore, contrary to defendant’s assertion, we have found

photographs of both premortem and postmortem violence to be

relevant under similar circumstances.

While the jury must be shielded from “ ‘depictions that

sensationalize’ ” the alleged crimes, “ ‘the jury cannot be

shielded from an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that

does not unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the jurors.’ ”

(People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 238.) In Streeter, the

defendant poured gasoline on his son’s mother and lit her on fire;

she suffered extensive burns on nearly 60 percent of her body

and died 10 days later. (Id. at pp. 212–214.) On appeal, the

defendant challenged the admission of three photographs

showing the victim’s burn injuries, expert testimony concerning

the nature and degree of the victim’s burns, and a tape recording

of the victim screaming in the ambulance. (Id. at pp. 234–236.)

We held that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion,

noting that “the evidence ‘did no more than accurately portray

the shocking nature of the crimes.’ ” (Id. at p. 238.) Here,

defendant cannot establish that the admitted photographs were

inaccurate depictions of the charged crimes, or that they

unnecessarily played upon the emotions of the jurors. Again,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the

photographs.

Defendant challenges the activation of the reciprocating

saw during closing argument on nearly identical relevance

grounds. Ruling on objections of this nature lies within the

court’s broad discretion. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98,

147 (Simon) [“Trial courts have broad discretion to control the

duration and scope of closing arguments”].) We acknowledge

the inflammatory nature of how this evidence was used during

67

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

closing argument. However, the saw itself had already been

admitted into evidence, with witnesses describing how it had

been used to dismember multiple victims. And the jury heard a

significant amount of testimony regarding defendant’s scheme

to murder the Stinemans and Bishop for money, and the manner

in which he kidnapped, murdered, and disposed of the victims.

Given this detailed account of the crimes, and the record as a

whole, there is no reasonable possibility that defendant would

have received a different outcome but for the activation of the

saw during closing argument. Thus, even if we were to assume

it was error to allow the prosecutor to activate the saw during

closing argument, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable

possibility the penalty verdict would have been different absent

the use of this evidence. (See People v. Silveria and Travis

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 266, citing People v. Lancaster (2007)

41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the standard that an “error is reversible if

there is a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict . . . is

essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24”]; see

People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable

possibility standard applies “when assessing the effect of state-

law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial”].)

C. Asserted Instructional Error

1. Proposed Instructions and Closing Argument

Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to instruct the

jury with certain instructions proposed by the defense, coupled

with the prosecutor’s asserted misstatement of the law during

closing argument, precluded the jury from considering

applicable mitigating circumstances. We find the prosecutor

misstated the law when arguing the applicability of section

68

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

190.3, factors (d) and (h) to the jury, but the prosecutor’s

misstatements do not warrant reversal.

a. Background

After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief and

rested, the parties discussed jury instructions. The defense

requested 38 instructions, many of which were proposed to

modify CALJIC No. 8.85.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 8 informed the

jurors that they could only consider section 190.3, factors (a)

through (c) as aggravating factors, and the remaining factors

could only be considered as mitigating factors. The trial court

rejected the proposed instruction, noting that it was not

required to differentiate which factors are mitigating and which

are aggravating.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 15 informed

jurors that they were not limited to the statutory mitigating

factors and may consider any circumstance in defendant’s

background, history, or character. The court rejected the

proposed instruction, finding it duplicative of section 190.3,

factor (k) in the standard instruction.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 16 expanded on

section 190.3, factor (d), the factor that directs the trier of fact’s

attention to whether the offense was committed while the

defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance, by informing jurors that: (1) they could

consider evidence of mental or emotional disturbance regardless

of whether there was an excuse or explanation for it; (2) such

disturbance is akin to heat of passion upon adequate

provocation, but it need not rise to the same level to be

considered mitigating; (3) such disturbance could be caused by

69

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

anything, including consumption of drugs and alcohol or mental

illness; and (4) if they found that defendant suffered from such

disturbance at the time of the crimes, then they must consider

it as a mitigating circumstance. The court rejected the

instruction, finding it argumentative.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 20 modified

section 190.3, factor (h) by informing jurors that the mental

impairment referred to in the standard instruction included

“any degree of mental defect, disease, impairment, or

intoxication” that jurors believed mitigated against death. The

court decided not to modify CALJIC No. 8.85 as requested and

instead gave the proposed instruction as its own instruction

immediately following CALJIC No. 8.85.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 21, to be read

following section 190.3, factor (h), informed jurors: (1) “mental

disease or defect,” as used in that factor, did not mean legal

insanity; (2) jurors could consider whether defendant was

unable to fully comprehend the wrongfulness of his conduct, or

whether, knowing his conduct was wrong, he was nonetheless

unable to fully conform his conduct to the law; and (3) the cause

of such disease or defect could be the consumption of drugs or

alcohol or any other reason. The court found the proposed

instruction to be argumentative and declined to give it.

Defendant’s proposed jury instructions Nos. 22 and 23

sought to categorize specific factors, or the absence of a factor,

as aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The court declined

to give the instructions, reminding the defense that it “has

already determined that it doesn’t want to designate which

[factor] is mitigating and which is aggravating.”

70

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 24A would have

informed the jurors that the mitigating factors enumerated by

the court were merely examples of some of the bases on which

jurors can decide to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, and

that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. The court rejected the instruction, finding it duplicative

of section 190.3, factor (k).

During closing argument, the prosecutor explained section

190.3, factors (a) through (k) to the jury. He explained that

factor (b) involved prior criminal history, a circumstance in

aggravation “if it applied, but we don’t have it. Factor [(b)]

doesn’t apply.” He continued, “Factor [(c)], similar, prior felony

circumstances. We don’t have any of that in this case. So factor

[(c)] does not apply.” The prosecutor moved on to factor (d),

explaining that it concerned whether defendant was under the

influence of a mental or emotional disturbance. He

acknowledged the defense’s argument that methamphetamine

use caused defendant to act impulsively, and argued, “You know

what folks? That doesn’t apply in this case. Yes, the defendant

was using methamphetamine. . . . Not only do you not have

[evidence of a methamphetamine crash], this crime in this case

is as far removed from impulsivity and anger as it could be. This

is as cold-blooded and premeditated as it could possibly be. This

case is not the product of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance. Factor [(d)] does not apply here.”

When discussing section 190.3, factor (h), concerning

impairment due to intoxication, the prosecutor argued that this

factor also did not apply. He told the jury that defendant had

the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, as

evidenced by defendant trying to hide the bodies and kill

witnesses who could identify him. He argued to the jury that if

71

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

defendant was mentally ill and that illness prevented him from

appreciating the criminality of his conduct, “you should see all

kinds of criminality going on between 1990 [the time of his

alleged diagnosis] and 1998. And you don’t. Why? No matter

what you say, in the final analysis, whether or not you accept

the premise of mental illness, the fact of the matter is it does not

prevent the defendant the capacity to conform to the

requirements of [the] law. This factor does not apply.”

When discussing section 190.3, factor (k), the prosecutor

noted that “it’s the kitchen sink” and any extenuating

circumstance presented by the defense could be considered

mitigating under factor (k). The prosecutor reminded the jury,

however, of one limitation on mitigating evidence; jurors could

not consider sympathy for the defendant’s family as a factor in

mitigation.

Defense counsel did not object at any time during the

prosecutor’s closing argument. During defense counsel’s closing

argument, she reminded the jurors of their obligation to weigh

and consider all the evidence presented. She explained that

each juror had the right to give whatever weight that juror

wanted to each mitigating factor, to decide whether any

mitigating factor is significant enough to overcome the evidence

in aggravation, and the right to “find your own mitigating

factor.” She repeatedly reminded the jury that the law does not

require a death verdict and each juror had the right to form an

independent opinion, regardless of what fellow jurors believed.

She discussed defendant’s history of mental illness and drug use

and argued that defendant committed the crimes while under

the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

Counsel argued that defendant was “generous, kind, thoughtful

and caring to everyone he came into contact with” and that his

72

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

life was worth saving. She concluded by reminding the jury that

defendant took legal and personal responsibility for his actions,

and asserted that he did not deserve to die.

After closing arguments, the trial court read the

instructions to the jury. As relevant here, the court instructed

the jury with a slightly modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 and

six additional instructions immediately following CALJIC

No. 8.85. The additional instructions informed the jurors that:

(1) not every factor listed in CALJIC No. 8.85 would be relevant,

a factor not relevant to the evidence presented should be

discarded, and the absence of a mitigating factor does not

constitute an aggravating factor; (2) circumstances of the crime

can be considered mitigating or aggravating; (3) victim impact

evidence is not a separate aggravating circumstance but may be

considered as a circumstance of the crime; (4) mental

impairment is not limited to evidence which excuses or reduces

a defendant’s legal culpability, but includes any degree of

mental defect, disease, impairment, or intoxication; (5) jurors

are not allowed to consider aggravating circumstances beyond

the enumerated factors; and (6) jurors may consider whatever

sympathy or compassion arises from the evidence presented as

a reason to reject the death penalty. The trial court also

instructed the jury that it must accept and follow the law as

provided by the court, and if “anything said by the attorneys in

their argument or any other time during the trial conflicts with

[the court’s] instructions on the law, [the jury] must follow [the

court’s] instructions.”

b. Discussion

Defendant acknowledges that the trial court instructed

the jury to consider, take into account, and be guided by the

73

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

mitigating factors provided in CALJIC No. 8.85 as applicable to

defendant’s case. He is not arguing the trial court erred when

it refused his proposed instructions, nor is he arguing that the

prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. He

is arguing, however, that the prosecutor misstated the law

regarding aggravating and mitigating factors and that the trial

court’s rejection of his proposed instructions, and failure to

provide curative instructions, compounded the prosecutor’s

error. We agree the prosecutor misstated the law regarding

section 190.3, factors (d) and (h), but we conclude the error was

harmless.

Defendant asserts that when the prosecutor argued there

was no prior criminal history or prior felony convictions, he

effectively told the jury that the lack of a criminal history did

not apply as a mitigating factor. A complete reading of the

prosecutor’s argument, however, does not support defendant’s

argument. When discussing the jury’s responsibility in

weighing the evidence presented, the prosecutor started by

explaining that it was up to the jurors to decide what evidence

was aggravating, what evidence was mitigating, and how much

weight to give each piece of evidence. When discussing

circumstances in aggravation, the prosecutor noted that prior

criminal history “could be a circumstance in aggravation, if it

applied, but we don’t have it.” He similarly said that because

there were no prior felony circumstances, section 190.3, factor

(c) likewise did not apply. The prosecutor then shifted gears,

saying, “Now, let me talk about those other factors.” The

prosecutor did not argue that the absence of section 190.3,

factors (b) and (c) evidence was not mitigating.

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor erroneously

argued that section 190.3, factor (d) did not apply. We agree.

74

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The prosecutor suggested that factor (d) applies only to acts

committed as a result of “impulsivity,” “extreme anger,” and

“heat of passion.” He further asserted that the factor “does not

apply” in this case because defendant’s crime was “as far

removed from impulsivity and anger as it could be” and was “as

cold-blooded and premeditated as it could possibly be.” The

factor, by its terms, is not so limited; it applies if “the offense

was committed while the defendant was under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” (§ 190.3, factor (d);

see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 145–146

[prosecutor’s statement that factor (d) “ ‘exists for people who

are psychotic’ . . . was incorrect” but prosecutor “corrected” the

misstatement “by characterizing factor (d) more expansively as

describing ‘people who are so badly disturbed that . . . you as a

human being and the law and your morality says maybe we

ought to consider how screwed up they were and give them a

break’ ”]; but see People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 444

[prosecution’s statement, “[w]hen discussing the applicability of

factor (d),” that “there was no evidence defendant was ‘psychotic,

delusional, paranoid, schizophrenic, or that he hallucinated’ . . .

was proper argument since factor (d) concerns extreme

emotional problems”].)

We likewise agree that the prosecutor misstated the law

regarding the applicability of section 190.3, factor (h). As

defendant notes, the prosecutor’s argument indicates that factor

(h) requires that defendant lack the capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or conform to the requirements of the

law. However, factor (h) simply calls for consideration of any

impairment of the relevant capacities by mental disease, defect,

or intoxication. Thus, the prosecutor’s argument incorrectly

suggests that factor (h) does not apply because it requires

75

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

defendant to lack the capacity to conform his conduct to the law,

rather than that those capacities merely be “impaired.”

However, the prosecutor’s comments regarding section

190.3, factors (d) and (h) do not warrant reversal. Defense

counsel reminded the jury that defendant “was and is mentally

disturbed,” and devoted almost her entire closing argument to

the proposition that the murders “were an aberration, a

culmination of mental illness and drug abuse that resulted in a

bizarre and completely unrealistic scheme to save the world.”

She told jurors that their “rights” included “[t]he right to give

whatever weight [you] want[] to each mitigating fact or factors,”

“[t]he right to decide for yourself whether any mitigating factor

is significant enough to overcome all the aggravation,” and “[t]he

right to find your own mitigating factor and assign to it

whatever weight you think is sufficient for a vote for life.”

Furthermore, following closing argument, the trial court

instructed jurors that “[t]he mental impairment referred to in

this instruction is not limited to evidence which excuses the

crime or reduces the defendant’s legal culpability, but includes

any degree of mental defect, disease, impairment or intoxication

which the jury determines is of a nature that death should not

be imposed.” The court also instructed on section 190.3, factor

(k), telling jurors that they must take into account “[a]ny other

circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even

though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any

sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or

record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less

than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is

on trial.” And the prosecution reminded the jury in his

argument that “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates”

could be considered under factor (k). We have consistently held

76

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that this instruction allows jurors to consider mental conditions

that do not qualify as mitigating factors under factors (d) and

(h). (E.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 768–769.)

Finally, we note that the trial court instructed the jurors

that they should follow the law provided in the instructions and

if counsel said anything conflicting, the jurors must follow the

court’s instructions. Nothing in the record before us suggests

the jurors did not follow this instruction.

In light of defense counsel’s argument and the trial court’s

instruction, “there is not a reasonable likelihood that the [jurors]

would have inferred that they could not consider” evidence of

defendant’s mental state “in mitigation of penalty.” (People v.

Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 694.) On the contrary, they

“undoubtedly considered defendant’s mental state in

determining the appropriate sentence” and, under our

precedents, “whether [they] did so under” section 190.3, factor

(k) “instead of” under section 190.3, factors (d) or (h) “is

irrelevant.” (People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1120.)

2. Impact of Execution

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously

instructed the jury regarding the emotional impact of his

execution on his family as mitigating evidence during penalty

deliberations. The court instructed the jury using CALJIC

No. 8.85, subdivision (k), which states: “Sympathy for the

family of the defendant is not a matter that you can consider in

mitigation. Evidence, if any, of the impact of an execution on

family members should be disregarded unless it illuminates

some positive quality of the defendant’s background or

character.” Defendant acknowledges that this court has

repeatedly rejected this claim. (See People v. Battle (2021)

77

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

11 Cal.5th 749; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165

(Williams); People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353.) He does not

provide a persuasive reason to revisit this precedent.

3. Proposed Instruction on Death Sentence

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously

rejected two proposed instructions informing the jury that it

could impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,

instead of the death penalty, for any reason.

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 13 provided in

relevant part: “The normative function of deciding which

penalty should actually be imposed is entirely in your hands.”

Defendant’s proposed jury instruction No. 28 provided in

relevant part: “You may impose a life sentence without finding

the existence of any statutory mitigating circumstance. Even if

you should find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a

statutory aggravating circumstance and find no mitigating

circumstance, you may still decide that a sentence of life

imprisonment without possibility of parole is the appropriate

punishment in this case. In other words, you may, in your good

judgment, impose a life sentence for any reason at all that you

see fit to consider. [¶] It is not essential to a decision to impose

a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole that

you find mitigating circumstances. You may spare the life of

[defendant] for any reason you deem appropriate and

satisfactory.” The trial judge ultimately rejected the proposed

language of both instructions as argumentative.

We have consistently held that CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88

“ ‘adequately and properly instruct on the jury’s determination

of sentence.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 424.)

Furthermore, to the extent that the proposed instructions

78

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

sought to advise the jurors that they could return a verdict of

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even if the

aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating

circumstances, or in the complete absence of mitigating

circumstances, we have repeatedly held a trial court is not

required to give such instructions. (See People v. Bryant, Smith

and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 457 [the trial court is not

required to instruct that the jury “could return a life verdict even

if no mitigating factors had been established”].)

To the extent the proposed instructions sought to advise

the jurors that they could consider mercy or sympathy in

weighing the circumstances presented, they were duplicative of

CALJIC No. 8.85. (See People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542,

610.) Furthermore, as requested by defendant, the trial court

instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85.6, explaining that it

could reject the death penalty solely on the basis that mitigating

evidence, such as testimony from defendant’s friends and

family, gave rise to compassion or sympathy.

D. Challenges to the Death Penalty Law

Defendant raises several challenges to California’s death

penalty statute. He acknowledges that we have previously

rejected similar challenges to the death penalty statute and

provides no persuasive reason to revisit these previous holdings.

Death row delays “do not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment because they resulted from the ‘desire of our courts,

state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument

that might save someone’s life.’ ” (People v. McDowell (2012)

54 Cal.4th 395, 412.) Further, “The slow pace of executions in

California, . . . does not render our system unconstitutionally

arbitrary.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 654.)

79

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Defendant’s argument requesting consideration of the impact of

a death sentence on the families of both the victims and the

condemned inmate does not alter our conclusion.

Defendant contends the Legislature has effectively

suspended his rights to counsel, confrontation, and other

elements of due process by failing to provide him with habeas

corpus counsel in a timely manner. We have previously rejected

these claims as “entirely speculative” and do so again here.

(Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 202.)

“California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the

class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citation.] Section 190.2, which

sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death may

be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 294.)

“Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the

crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the

death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” (People v.

Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.)

The death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to

require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating

factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable

doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation

beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the

appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.

Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126.) These conclusions are not

altered by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Hurst

v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S.

584, and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466. (People v.

80

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1038; Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th

at p. 149; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235, fn. 16.)

“The adjectives ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in statutory

mitigating factors (d) and (g) of section 190.3 do not prevent the

jury from considering mitigating evidence.” (People v. Leonard

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1429 (Leonard).)

“The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that

statutory factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) in section 190.3 are

relevant only as mitigating factors, not as aggravating factors.”

(Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1430.)

Finally, California’s death penalty does not violate

international law or international norms of decency. (People v.

Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 837.)

E. Asserted Cumulative Error

Defendant contends reversal is warranted because of the

cumulative prejudice from the errors he identifies. Even

assuming the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to activate

the reciprocating saw during closing argument, we have

concluded it was harmless. And although the prosecutor

misstated the law regarding the applicability of section 190.3,

factors (d) and (h), defendant suffered no prejudice. Even

considered together, these errors are harmless and there is no

cumulative prejudice that warrants reversal.

81

PEOPLE v. HELZER

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

82

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Helzer

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal XX

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S132256

Date Filed: January 22, 2024

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Contra Costa

Judge: Mary Ann O’Malley

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Jeanne Keevan-Lynch, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A.

Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias,

Assistant Attorney General, Glenn R. Pruden and Sarah J. Farhat,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Jeanne Keevan-Lynch

Attorney at Law

P.O. Box 2433

Mendocino, CA 95460

(707) 895-2090

Sarah J. Farhat

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 510-3792