BRITTANY BUDLOVE v. JONETTA JOHNSON

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

BRITTANY BUDLOVE,

Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM JOHNSON,

Appellee.

BRITTANY BUDLOVE,

Appellant,

v.

JOENETTA JOHNSON,

Appellee.

BRITTANY BUDLOVE,

Appellant,

v.

SUSANNE CAMPBELL,

Appellee.

BRITTANY BUDLOVE,

Appellant,

v.

TANYA LEWIS,

Appellee.

BRITTANY BUDLOVE,

Appellant,

v.

RAFAELA McCOY,

Appellee.

Nos. 2D22-1549, 2D22-1550, 2D22-1551, 2D22-1552, 2D22-1553

CONSOLIDATED

December 29, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Lauralee Ganson

Westine, Judge.

Dayna Maeder of Maeder Infantolino, LLC, Jupiter, for Appellant.

N. Rivver Cox and Anthony M. Innacio of Bush Graziano Rice & Platter,

P.A., Tampa, for Appellee, Tanya Lewis.

No appearance for remaining Appellees.

ATKINSON, Judge.

Brittany Budlove appeals an April 8, 2022, order granting the

petitions of the five appellees—William Johnson, Joenetta Johnson,

Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy—for protection

against stalking pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048, Florida

Statutes (2021).1 We affirm the entry of all five injunctions for stalking

and reject without discussion Budlove's argument that there was

1 The five cases are consolidated for the purposes of the opinion.

2

insufficient evidence for the trial court to impose the injunctions against

her pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048. However, the scope of

all five injunctions exceeds that which is allowed by the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution by imposing a prior restraint on

protected speech. To the extent that they do so, the injunctions must be

reversed in part.

On January 15, 2021, the trial court issued a final judgment

terminating Budlove's parental rights with regard to T.B., Budlove's

biological child. Each of the appellees was involved in the dependency

case that led to the termination.

During the period between the filing of the petition for termination

of parental rights and the order terminating Budlove's parental rights,

Budlove was twice ordered to refrain from either contacting some of the

appellees or posting certain information on online platforms. On

December 21, 2020, Ms. Johnson requested, and the trial court issued, a

"no contact order" against Budlove and her now ex-husband, John

Budlove. The order stated that Brittany and John Budlove were not to

have any "direct, indirect, or third person contact with the caregiver,

Joenetta Johnson," were to "remain at least 500 feet from Joenetta

Johnson's residence, place of employment, and/or any other place Ms.

Johnson is," and were not "permitted to have any written, telephonic,

electronic, or social media contact with Ms. Johnson."

Then, on August 17, 2021, the trial court found that Budlove had

been posting

multiple videos and information on social media, including,

but not limited to the following: unredacted police reports

from the investigation; confidential information about the

child [T.B.] and the child, M.B.; photos of the child, T.B.;

details from mediation; and names of all parties, including

3

judges, attorneys, CPIs, detectives, and the caregiver.2

The trial court ordered Budlove to "remove all confidential information

relating to [T.B.'s dependency case] from online or from any posting sites

within twenty-four (24) hours of service of [the] order."

After learning that Budlove continued to post some things online

related to the dependency case even after the August 17 order—although

Budlove maintains that none of those posts violated the orders—the five

appellees all filed petitions for injunctions against Budlove for stalking.

At hearings on the petitions, the appellees claimed that Budlove was

harassing and cyberstalking them and causing Budlove's followers on

social media platforms to do the same. On April 8, 2022, the trial court

announced that it was granting all five petitions for injunctions against

Budlove for stalking. The written order broadly prohibits Budlove from

having any contact with the appellees. And "adding to the traditional

language in the injunctions," the trial court ordered Budlove in open

court to "not post online anything relating to [T.B.'s] dependency case."

The trial court explained that "[t]his includes, but is not limited to, the

names of parties related to the case, such as case managers, Assistant

State Attorneys, caregivers, or other children in this case." The written

order then stated the following: "[Budlove] shall not post on social media

about case [redacted], includ[ing] but not limited to case managers,

parties, and other minor children to [the] case. Anything already posted

on social media about case #[redacted] shall be removed." While

Budlove does not argue on appeal that the entry of the injunctions

violated the First Amendment, Budlove argues that the prohibitions of

the injunctions against her are unconstitutional prior restraints on

2 M.B. is Budlove's ex-husband's niece and was previously in the

care of Budlove and her ex-husband.

4

speech. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (noting

the "distinction, solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints

and subsequent punishments").

Constitutional issues are "question[s] of law subject to de novo

review." See State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 416 (Fla. 2012) (quoting

Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2011)). States are prohibited from

"abridging the freedom of speech." See amend. I, U.S. Const.; see also

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (noting that the First

Amendment is applicable to the states). The First Amendment requires

courts to scrutinize restrictions on "expression because of its message,

its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.

564, 573 (2002) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,

65 (1983)). Content-based "[p]rior restraints on speech and publication

are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First

Amendment rights." Concerned Citizens for Jud. Fairness, Inc. v. Yacucci,

162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v.

Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). "Temporary restraining orders and

permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech

activities—are classic examples of prior restraints." Alexander, 509 U.S.

at 550. And "[a]ny form of prior restraint of expression comes to a

reviewing court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional

validity; therefore, the party who seeks to have such a restraint upheld

carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such

a restraint." State ex rel. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d

904, 908 (Fla. 1976) (first citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.

713 (1971); and then citing Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58

(1963)).

5

Neither the government nor courts may restrain speech "based on

hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed."

R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). "[C]ontent-based

restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only

when confined to the few 'historic and traditional categories [of

expression] long familiar to the bar.' " United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.

709, 717 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). Otherwise, content-based speech restrictions

"may be justified only if . . . they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling

state interests." Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.

2361, 2371 (2018) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163

(2015)). A speech restriction is not narrowly tailored when the restriction

regulates "in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on

speech does not serve to advance its goals." See Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).

"There is no categorical 'harassment exception' to the First

Amendment’s free speech clause." Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240

F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,

458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982) (holding that "[s]peech does not lose its

protected character" even when the speech involved publicly listing the

names of individuals who did not participate in a boycott); Org. for a

Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971) (holding that First

Amendment protection applied to the distribution of leaflets when those

leaflets accused an individual of racism and provided personal

information about the person, including his telephone number). While

the Florida Legislature has found that individuals should under some

circumstances be entitled to an injunction against harassment even

when that harassment unquestionably limits a person's speech, see, e.g.,

6

§§ 784.0485(1) ("For the purposes of injunctions for protection against

stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the

offense of cyberstalking."); 784.048(1)(d)1 (" 'Cyberstalk' means . . . [t]o

engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be

communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or

through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed

at or pertaining to a specific person . . . ."), courts are not permitted to

enjoin a course of conduct to the extent that it encompasses

constitutionally protected activity, see § 784.048(1)(b) (specifying that the

"[c]ourse of conduct" constituting cyberstalking "does not include

constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized

protests"). Here, the scope of the injunction exceeds that which is

permitted under the First Amendment by enjoining a course of conduct

that includes activity that is constitutionally protected. See Neptune v.

Lanoue, 178 So. 3d 520, 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ("The injunction issued

by the trial court [against cyberstalking] is impermissibly broad and,

insofar as it states 'the Respondent shall not "post" on the Internet

regarding the Petitioner,' in violation of Appellant's First Amendment

right to free speech.").

Injunctions which prevent "communications to" an individual can

be permissible under the First Amendment, but those enjoining

"communications about" an individual are generally unlawful prior

restraints. David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871, 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)

(emphasis in original); accord DiTanna v. Edwards, 323 So. 3d 194, 203–

04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); Krapacs v. Bacchus, 301 So. 3d 976, 980 (Fla.

4th DCA 2020) ("[W]e find that the portion of the trial court's order

prohibiting Krapacs 'from posting Nisha Bacchus, Nisha Elizabeth

Bacchus or any part thereof, on any social media or internet websites' "

7

and ordering him to " 'take down all social media and internet posts that

reference Nisha Bacchus, Nisha Elizabeth Bacchus, or any part thereof

immediately' is overbroad."). This distinction is consistent with several

United States Supreme Court decisions, in which the Court

distinguished in principle between communications directed at a single

person and communications directed to the public. See, e.g., Org. for a

Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 420 (holding that a party could not enjoin

individuals from distributing leaflets that criticized the party's business

practices anywhere in a city because, in part, he was "not attempting to

stop the flow of information into his own household, but to the public");

Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (upholding a ban

on mailings sent to people who demanded that the mailer stop sending

them mail because the restriction was on speech written to an unwilling

reader because "no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an

unwilling recipient"); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163

(2015) ("Government regulation of speech is content based if a law

applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or

message expressed.").

Despite use of the qualifier "generally," our concurring colleague

misreads the preceding paragraph as describing a categorical

proscription on injunctions that enjoin speech about an individual. To

the contrary, we would agree with our concurring colleague that whether

the communication is directed at an individual or merely pertains to an

individual is not necessarily "the determining factor." The distinction is,

however, a factor, as First Amendment jurisprudence makes clear. And

injunctions that enjoin the latter are likely to offend the Constitution

because they constitute a content-based restriction on speech.

8

Similarly, our concurring colleague erroneously suggests that the

majority opinion requires that the trial court upon remand must be

limited to enjoining only activity "directed at" the appellees. Nothing in

this opinion does, or should be construed to, so narrowly confine the

trial court's discretion upon remand.

Our concurring colleague also points out that some case law relied

upon in the majority opinion predates the most recent amendment to

section 784.048, which added the phrases "directly or indirectly" and

"pertaining to" to the definition of cyberstalking. In those cases decided

before the statute was amended, the relevant analysis is that of the

provisions of the injunction or restraint under review and whether those

proscriptions pass muster under the Constitution, not whether they

satisfy the criteria of the applicable injunction statute. Without

conceding that the only way to read those opinions is to infer a holding

that enjoining communications about an individual constitutes a per se

unconstitutional restraint on speech, we do agree with our concurring

colleague insofar as he cautions against such a bright-line rule—which

would not take into account communications about individuals that

constitute unprotected speech such as incitement.

In this case, the injunctions granted against Budlove do not merely

prohibit Budlove from having any contact with the appellees, sending

communications to the appellees, or causing others to send

communications to the appellees or inflict some manner of harm against

them. In addition to preventing any contact with or communications to

the appellees, the trial court ordered that Budlove cease communicating

publicly about the appellees, ordering that she refrain from "post[ing]

online anything relating to [T.B.]'s dependency case." (Emphasis added.).

In other words, the injunctions prevent Budlove from engaging in public

9

speech about a court proceeding and the individuals involved. This

content-based prior restraint on speech is not tailored at all, much less

narrowly tailored. The prospective proscriptions on Budlove's social

media communications are, for example, not confined to constitutionally

unprotected speech such as "fighting words," "those personally abusive

epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter

of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction," see

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citing Chaplinsky v. New

Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)); "true threats," "those statements where

the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to

commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of

individuals," see Black, 538 U.S. at 359; or "incitement,"

communications " 'directed [at] producing imminent lawless action,' and

likely to do so," see Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73 (2023)

(alteration in original) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447

(1969)).

To the extent that the injunctions broadly prohibit Budlove from

merely making public statements about the appellees, T.B., or her

dependency case, the injunctions are overbroad and impermissibly

enjoin a constitutionally protected course of conduct. See §

784.084(1)(b); Krapacs, 301 So. 3d at 980 ("A regulation of speech that

'references' Bacchus is necessarily a regulation of the subject matter of

that speech."). The entry of the injunctions granted to William Johnson,

Joenetta Johnson, Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy

are affirmed in part, but the injunctions are reversed to extent that they

enjoin Budlove from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by

making public statements not sent directly to the appellees.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

10

VILLANTI, J., Concurs.

SLEET, C.J., Concurs in result with opinion.

SLEET, C.J., Concurring.

I concur with the result reached by the majority in that I agree that

the trial court did not err in finding the existence of prior stalking

warranting entry of the injunctions at issue in this case. I also agree

with the majority that, as written, the injunctions restrain Budlove from

future conduct that is constitutionally protected activity. However, I

disagree with the majority's conclusion as to what communications the

trial court's injunctions can and cannot enjoin Budlove from making.

Section 784.085(1), Florida Statutes (2021), "create[s] a cause of

action for an injunction for protection against stalking" and states that

"[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under

this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of

cyberstalking." To be entitled to the issuance of such an injunction,

"[t]he sworn petition shall allege the existence of such stalking and shall

include the specific facts and circumstances for which relief is sought." §

784.085(3)(a). "Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court

that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such

relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [r]estraining

the respondent from committing any act of stalking." § 784.0485(6)(a)1.3

However, in fashioning such a remedy, the court is necessarily restrained

by the statutory definition of stalking, and because the statute

3 The statute also allows for injunctions "[o]rdering the respondent

to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services,"

"[r]eferring a petitioner to appropriate services," and "[o]rdering such

other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of

stalking, including . . . directives to law enforcement agencies."

§ 784.0485(6)(a)2-4.

11

specifically states that stalking includes cyberstalking, the court also

must fashion a remedy within the statutory definition of cyberstalking.

Section 784.048(1)(d)1 defines cyberstalking as

[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause

to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or

language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic

communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person

. . . causing substantial emotional distress to that person and

serving no legitimate purpose.[4]

(Emphasis added.)

A course of conduct is defined in the statute as "a pattern of

conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however

short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b).

Importantly, the statute specifically states that "[t]he term does not

include constitutionally protected activity." Id.

Accordingly, in order to be entitled to entry of an injunction based

on an allegation of cyberstalking, a petitioner needs to allege and prove

that the respondent has already electronically communicated to the

respondent words, images, or language that are directed at the

respondent or that pertain to the respondent OR that the respondent has

directly or indirectly caused such words, images, or language to have

been communicated to the respondent AND that the communication of

the particular words, images, or language caused the respondent

substantial emotion distress AND that there was no legitimate purpose

behind the communication of the particular words, images, or language.

See § 784.048(1)(b), (d)1. Furthermore, once a petitioner has met this

burden, the remedy fashioned by the trial court may include enjoining

the respondent from further acts of stalking (including cyberstalking) but

4 Section 784.048(1)(d)2 provides an alternate definition of

cyberstalking that is not applicable to the instant case.

12

may not include enjoining the respondent from engaging in

"constitutionally protected activity." See id.

Here, the allegations of the petitioners all stem from a dependency

case in which Budlove's parental rights were terminated. The final order

of injunction includes the following language: "Respondent shall not post

on social media about [the dependency case] includ[ing] but not limited

to case managers, parties, and other minor children to case. Anything

already posted on social media about [the dependency case] shall be

removed."

On appeal, Budlove first argues that the trial court erred in

entering the injunction because petitioners failed to establish the

previous existence of cyberstalking as defined in the statute.5 She

maintains that petitioners failed to show that her communications served

no legitimate purpose, that they resulted in substantial emotional

5 In the summary of the argument section of her initial brief before

this court, Budlove argues: "The order granting the cyberstalking

injunction must be reversed because the necessary legal elements were

not proven. In order for an injunction to be entered, Appellee[s were]

required to prove the posts had no legitimate purpose, that they were

directed to Appellee, and that Appellee experienced substantial emotional

distress." (Emphasis added.) She further argues that "[b]ecause

Appellee[s] failed to prove even one of these elements by competent,

substantial evidence, let alone all three required elements, this court

should reverse and remand with instructions to dissolve the injunction."

(Emphasis added.) In the argument section of her brief, she challenges

the basis upon which the injunction was entered by making specific

arguments as to how her previous posts did not amount to cyberstalking.

Finally, in her conclusion section, Budlove states, "The lower court erred

in its legal analysis of the statutory requirements for entering an

injunction, and the evidence does not support its findings." (Emphasis

added.)

13

distress suffered by petitioners, or that they were directed at petitioners.6

I find no merit to these arguments.

Petitioners presented evidence that in her electronic posts, Budlove

included their contact information, signaled that she condoned slapping

by stating that "someone needs to slap her . . . . I aint saying kill nobody

but you . . . could slap the s___ out of somebody every once and a

while,"7 and intimated threats by stating that no one involved in the

dependency case would ever be able to live in happiness or bliss, that no

one involved in the case would go unpunished, and that if she could not

parent her child, no one involved would be able to parent theirs. These

communications served no legitimate purpose and certainly do not

qualify as fundraising, protest, or activism as Budlove argues on appeal.

6 I also note that much of Budlove's argument on appeal is

boilerplate argument that cites case law but then only makes bold

conclusory statements without pointing to support in the instant

records. She argues that her social media postings were made for

"fundraising," "protest," or "activism" but fails to discuss any specific

statements or explain how they fall into one of these categories. When

arguing that petitioners had failed to establish substantial emotional

distress, she does not make any arguments regarding any specific

petitioner or their testimony regarding their emotional distress. Nor does

she explain how her specific statements would not cause substantial

emotional distress in a reasonable person. Based on these deficiencies

alone, this court could conclude that Budlove has failed to meet her

burden of establishing trial court error with regard to entry of the

injunction. See generally Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla.

1997) ("[F]ailure to fully brief and argue [points on appeal] constitutes a

waiver. . . ." (emphasis added)); Thurman v. Davis, 321 So. 3d 341, 344

(Fla. 1st DCA 2021) ("The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate

reversible error . . . ." (quoting JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Combee, 883 So.

2d 330, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004))).

7 It is unclear in context who the "her" is to whom Budlove was

referring, but as the trial court pointed out, it was said in a video post

about this case, wherein four of the five petitioners are women.

14

See Craft v. Fuller, 298 So. 3d 99, 104-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Whether

the purpose for [a particular] [communication] is 'legitimate' is evaluated

on a case-by-case basis. . . . However, courts have generally held that

[communication] is legitimate when there is a reason for the

[communication] other than to harass the victim.' " (first alteration in

original) (quoting Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA

2018))). And I find no error in the trial court's conclusion that a

reasonable person would be caused substantial emotional distress by

Budlove's posts. See generally id. at 104 ("In the context of a petition for

protection against cyberstalking, the question of '[w]hether a

communication causes substantial emotional distress should be

narrowly drawn and is governed by the reasonable person standard.' "

(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum, 191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla.

2d DCA 2016))).

With regard to Budlove's argument that her posts do not amount to

cyberstalking because they were not directed at petitioners, section

784.048 was amended in 2021 to add the bolded words in the following

definition of "cyberstalking": " 'Cyberstalk' means . . . [t]o engage in a

course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,

directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use

of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining

to a specific person . . . ." See ch. 2021-220, § 1, Laws of Fla.; see also §

784.048(1)(d)1.

Although Budlove cites and quotes the 2021 version of the statute

in her briefs before this court, she ignores the language added by the

2021 amendment and cites only preamendment case law for the

proposition that because she did not direct her social media posts at

petitioners, her posts do not meet the statutory definition of

15

cyberstalking. But this court does not have the luxury of ignoring words

and phrases contained in a statute; "[i]n interpreting the statute, we

follow the 'supremacy-of-text principle—namely, the principle that '[t]he

words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they

convey in their context, is what the text means.' " Ham v. Portfolio

Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Furthermore, the cases that

Budlove cites to support her contention all involve preamendment

versions of section 784.048, none of which included communications

pertaining to an individual in the definition of "cyberstalking."

But Budlove also argues that she had a First Amendment right to

publish the posts that she previously made on her social media outlets

and that the injunction is a continuing infringement on her right to

freedom of speech.8 Because Budlove is incorrect in her assertion that

all of her prior postings were constitutionally protected, see, e.g.,

Counterman, 600 U.S. at 76 (recognizing that the First Amendment

allows for "punishment [for incitement], whether civil or criminal [where]

the speaker's words were 'intended' (not just likely) to produce imminent

8 In her initial brief, Budlove designated her First Amendment

argument as point d under heading 1, which is titled,''There was no

evidence provided, and no findings made, that made the three-prong test

to prove cyberstalking.'' That heading has five points lettered a through

e: (a) Substantial emotional distress, (b) Directed at Appellee, (c) No

legitimate purpose, (d) First Amendment rights, and (e) Cyberstalking

overall. Under point d, Budlove quotes David, 189 So. 3d at 875, for the

proposition that ''[s]ection 784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment

rights of individuals by concluding that a 'course of conduct' for

purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.'' I interpret

this as clearly arguing that the entry of the injunction violated her First

Amendment rights.

16

disorder"), this argument does not establish error with regard to the

granting of the injunctions. I therefore conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing the injunctions. See Washington v.

Brown, 300 So. 3d 338, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).

However, as to the remedy fashioned by the trial court in crafting

the language of these injunctions, I agree with Budlove—and with the

majority opinion—that the plain language of the injunctions improperly

encompasses some "constitutionally protected activity." See §

784.048(1)(b) ("The term [course of conduct used in the definition of

cyberstalking] does not include constitutionally protected activity."); see

also Smith v. Short, 332 So. 3d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (stating

that an injunction should not be "broader than necessary to protect the

injured party under the particular circumstances" and "should be

adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be

permissible and proper" (quoting Smith v. Wiker, 192 So. 3d 603, 604

(Fla. 2d DCA 2016))).

However, I disagree with the majority's assertion that in

determining what is or is not "constitutionally protected activity" the

court should focus on whether the communication is directed at the

individual seeking the injunction or whether it merely pertains to the

individual. Although the majority attempts to assert that what it really is

saying is that this distinction is only but one factor that should be

considered in determining constitutional protections, its final conclusion

betrays that assertion by stating that the injunctions "enjoin Budlove

from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by making public

statements not sent directly to appellees." Thus, whether it intends to or

not, the majority is saying that making public statements not sent

17

directly to the individual who is the subject of the statements is

necessarily constitutionally protected speech. I cannot agree with that.

The majority relies on three cases out of the Fourth District in

reaching this conclusion: David, 189 So. 3d 871; DiTanna, 323 So. 3d

194; Krapacs, 301 So. 3d 976.

David involved a business dispute between David and Textor,

owners of competing video production companies that had filed lawsuits

against each other. Textor sought an ex parte injunction for protection

against stalking against David, alleging cyberstalking. The alleged acts

of cyberstalking consisted of (1) a text from David to Textor stating that

David would drop his lawsuit against Textor if Textor would give David

credit for previous work; (2) "an email from David to business associates

(other than Textor) that he had more information about Textor that

would be released soon, but not specifying what that information was";

(3) an online magazine article in which David was quoted saying that he

"would have killed Textor if he could"; (4) "articles about Textor that

David posted and reposted in various online outlets"; and (5) an email

sent from David to Textor threatening to release embarrassing

information about Textor if Textor did not settle their pending lawsuits.

189 So. 3d at 873-74.

The trial court in David entered an injunction "prohibiting David

from communicating with Textor or posting any information about him

online, and ordering that he remove any materials he already had posted

from the websites." Id. at 874. On appeal, David argued that "the

conduct alleged in Textor's ex parte petition for the injunction does not

constitute cyberstalking, and the injunction violates the First

Amendment." 189 So. 3d at 873.

18

The Fourth District, analyzing the 2014 preamendment version of

section 784.048, concluded that the trial court erred in finding the

existence of cyberstalking. The court concluded that "none of the

allegations in Textor's petition show acts constituting cyberstalking, in

that a reasonable person would not suffer substantial emotional distress

over them" and that "[t]hose communications made directly to Textor

served a legitimate purpose." Id. at 876.

But instead of stopping at reversal based on this sound reasoning,

as it should have, see Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 990 So.

2d 473, 482 (Fla. 2008) ("In Florida, it is well established that this Court

should refrain from deciding the constitutional questions when the case

may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the

First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or

language . . . directed at a specific person" in the definition of

cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its

constitutional analysis. The David opinion continued:

An injunction in this case would also violate First

Amendment principles. "[A] temporary injunction directed to

speech is a classic example of prior restraint on speech

triggering First Amendment concerns." Vrasic v. Leibel, 106

So. 3d 485, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). An injunction may not

be directed to prevent defamatory speech. Id. at

487; Chevaldina, 133 So. 3d at 1090. " '[P]rior restraints on

speech and publication are the most serious and the least

tolerable infringement on First Amendment

rights.' " Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.

Yacucci, 162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb.

Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section

784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of

individuals by concluding that a "course of conduct" for

purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. §

784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014). This includes speech that

may be offensive or vituperative. See Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S.

705, 708 (1969).

19

Here, the online postings simply provide information,

gleaned from other sources, regarding Textor and the many

lawsuits against him. The injunction prevents not only

communications to Textor, but also communications about

Textor. Such prohibition by prior restraint violates the

Constitution. If David's communications about Textor are

defamatory, then Textor can sue David for damages.

David, 189 So. 3d at 876 (underlined emphasis added).

Nothing in the first paragraph of this quotation states that

communications that are about a person but not directed to that person

are constitutionally protected based on that specific classification alone.

Nevertheless, the Fourth District went on to conclude in the second

paragraph, without any further citation to authority, that "[t]he

injunction prevents not only communications to Textor, but also

communications about Textor. Such prohibition by prior restraint

violates the Constitution." Id. By doing so, the Fourth District created a

bright-line rule where none had previously existed.

In three subsequent cases, the Fourth District quoted David for the

unsupported proposition that where an "injunction prevents not only

communication to [petitioner], but also communications about

[petitioner,] [s]uch prohibition by prior restraint violates the

Constitution." DiTanna, 323 So. 3d at 203 (quoting David, 189 So. 3d at

876); see also Krapacs, 301 So. 3d at 980-81; O'Neill v. Goodwin, 195 So.

3d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). I can find no other district court opinion in

Florida that has adopted a bright-line rule that enjoining

communications about an individual is per se a constitutional violation

and not simply a violation of the plain language of the preamendment

20

statute.9 I believe that David and the three Fourth District cases that

quote it amount to an outlier in this regard.

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court cases that the

majority cites do not turn on a "communications directed at" versus

"communications pertaining to" analysis. See Org. for a Better Austin v.

Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971) (reversing an injunction that

prevented the distribution of pamphlets containing statements about an

individual and his business practices on the basis that "the interest of an

individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices in

pamphlets or leaflets [did not] warrant[] use of the injunctive power of a

court" and concluding that Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728

(1970), relied on by respondent, was factually distinguishable as it

involved homeowners who sought to prevent junk mail from being

delivered to their homes under a federal statute); Rowan, 397 U.S. at

729, 738 (affirming district court ruling that Title III of the Postal

Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, "under which a person may

require that a mailer remove his name from its mailing lists and stop all

future mailings to the householder," was constitutional and "reject[ing]

the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or

otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another" and that

"[t]he asserted right of a mailer . . . stops at the outer boundary of every

person's domain"); Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 (addressing whether a town

ordinance was a content-based restriction on free-speech and concluding

9 In fact, in Scott v. Blum, 191 So. 2d 502, 503-04 (Fla. 2d DCA

2016), this court cited David as support for its conclusion that the

injunction entered in that case did not meet the preamendment statutory

requirements because the communication was not directed at the

petitioner, but this court stopped short of the constitutional questions,

stating, "We agree that Mr. Blum failed to meet his evidentiary burden

and reverse. As a result, we do not reach the First Amendment issue."

21

that the town had failed to meet its "burden to demonstrate that the

Code's differentiation between temporary directional signs and other

types of signs, such as political signs and ideological signs, furthers a

compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end").

Surely, communications about an individual but not directed to

that individual that incite others to violence are not constitutionally

protected activity. See Counterman, 600 U.S. at 73 (recognizing that

First Amendment recognizes communications "directed [at] producing

imminent lawless action" (alteration in original) (quoting Brandenburg v.

Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969))). Accordingly, I conclude that the trial

court could enjoin Budlove from making future statements about the

petitioners that incite others to violence against petitioners—regardless of

whether those communications are directed at petitioners—without

violating her First Amendment rights. However, the injunctions' broad

ban on Budlove's posting anything at all about the dependency case is

not particularly drawn and encompasses "activities [that] may be

permissible and proper." See Smith, 332 So. 3d at 1067. Accordingly, I

agree that portion of the final order must be reversed.

Finally, I would point out that the majority's reasoning creates a

conflict between its conclusion that the entry of the injunctions should

be affirmed and its conclusion that the scope of the injunctions should

be reversed because they "enjoin Budlove from engaging in

constitutionally protected speech by making public statements not sent

directly to appellees." (Emphasis added.) In order to be entitled to entry

of an injunction under section 784.085(3)(a), the sworn petition must

allege the prior existence of stalking, and in order for the court to grant

injunctive relief under section 784.085(6)(a), it must find "that the

petitioner is the victim of stalking." In the instant case, all of the

22

allegations of cyberstalking alleged in the petitions seeking these

injunctions describe solely communications pertaining to the petitioners,

and the trial court's oral findings indicate that the communications it

found to be prior instances of stalking consist solely of communications

pertaining to the petitioners that were not sent directly to them. If the

majority is convinced that communications pertaining to but not directed

at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct"

in section 784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected

activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of

cyberstalking in section 784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section

784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's

determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of

stalking based on communications that only pertained to petitioners? I

do not think the majority can logically have it both ways.

In conclusion, because many of Budlove's communications

pertaining to petitioners amounted to incitements to unlawful actions, I

agree that the portion of the trial court's orders finding the existence of

previous stalking and thus imposing the injunctions should be affirmed.

However, I would reverse the injunctions only to the extent that they

prohibit constitutionally protected activity and remand for the trial court

to more narrowly craft the injunctions to ensure that no constitutionally

protected activity is enjoined, but I would not limit the trial court to

prohibiting only communications directed at petitioners. Finally, I would

certify conflict with the Fourth District's David line of cases that suggest

a bright-line rule that a prohibition by prior restraint on any

communications about a petitioner violates the Constitution.

23

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

24