Rodriguez v. Super. Ct.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

MARIO RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

S272129

Sixth Appellate District

H049016

Santa Clara County Superior Court

C1647395, C1650275

December 14, 2023

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and

Evans concurred.

RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

S272129

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

A criminal defendant cannot be tried while mentally

incompetent. (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)1 Although such

defendants may be involuntarily committed for the purpose of

restoring their competency (see § 1370; Jackson v. Superior

Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100–101), the commitment may not

last indefinitely (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1); Jackson v. Indiana (1972)

406 U.S. 715, 720; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801 (Davis)).

The statutory scheme governing competency proceedings limits

the term of commitment. For individuals like defendant Mario

Rodriguez charged with offenses that carry a maximum

sentence exceeding two years, the period of commitment due to

incompetency is limited to two years. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(1).)

In this case, Rodriguez was adjudged incompetent,

committed to a state hospital, and then returned to court when

a medical director of the hospital filed a certificate indicating he

was restored to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1).) The

certificate was filed within the two-year time limit specified by

section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) (section 1370(c)(1)). By statute,

the court was supposed to determine whether to approve the

certificate — that is, decide “whether or not” Rodriguez has

1

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise specified.

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“recovered competence.” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1).) However,

primarily because of restrictions on court operations due to the

COVID-19 pandemic, Rodriguez did not receive such a hearing

within the two-year period of section 1370(c)(1). Claiming the

time for commitment had run out, Rodriguez moved to dismiss

the charges against him. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim.

It held that time had not run out because a commitment ends

when a certificate of restoration is filed, not when the court

determines whether the defendant has been restored to

competence. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2021)

70 Cal.App.5th 628, 652 (Rodriguez).)

The parties ask us to resolve a question of statutory

interpretation: For purposes of calculating the maximum

commitment period under section 1370(c)(1), does an

incompetency commitment end when the medical treatment

provider informs the court that the defendant has regained

competency by filing a certificate of restoration, or does the

commitment end only when the court has determined whether

the defendant has been restored to competency? We resolve this

question by determining whether the period between the filing

of the certificate, and the court’s ruling on that certificate, is

covered by section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit. And we conclude

this period is not excluded from the two-year limit.

Because we reject the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that an

incompetency commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of

restoration, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. We

remand with instructions for the Court of Appeal to consider

issues that remain outstanding, including whether Rodriguez’s

aggregate commitments have exceeded the limit set by section

1370(c)(1) and what remedy he may be entitled to if the limit

has been exceeded. (See, e.g., Camacho v. Superior Court (2023)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

15 Cal.5th 354, 382–390 & fn. 5 (Camacho); Jackson v. Superior

Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2016, the Santa Clara County District

Attorney charged Rodriguez with several felonies, each carrying

a maximum sentence in excess of two years imprisonment. The

charged offenses included assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,

subd. (a)(1) [maximum punishment of four years in state

prison]); oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or

fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [maximum punishment of eight years

in state prison]); rape by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear

(§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (a) [eight years]); and infliction

of corporal injury on a present or former spouse, or a present or

former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a) [four years]). Rodriguez

was held to answer on all charges.

In late 2017, the court declared a doubt as to Rodriguez’s

competency, ordered a hearing regarding his competency, and

suspended all proceedings. In May 2018, the court found

Rodriguez not competent to stand trial. On May 24, the court

issued its commitment order, directing that Rodriguez “be

committed to the [State] Department of State Hospitals for

placement in a locked psychiatric facility.” The order specified

that “[t]he Sheriff shall redeliver the patient to the Court upon

receiving from the state hospital a copy of the certification of

mental competency.” (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372, subd.

(a)(2).) The court also ordered the State Department of State

Hospitals (Department) to “provide a placement for defendant

for treatment of his mental illness and restoration of

competency by 5:00 p.m., June 29, 2018” and that Rodriguez be

transported to his placement by that date. The record does not

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

indicate when Rodriguez was actually transported or admitted

to a state hospital.

On September 7, 2018, the medical director of Atascadero

State Hospital certified Rodriguez as restored to competency.

The parties stipulated that the certificate of restoration was

filed with the superior court the same date. On September 20,

the court found Rodriguez had been restored to competency and

reinstated criminal proceedings.

In early January 2019, the court declared a new doubt as

to Rodriguez’s competency to stand trial and again suspended

criminal proceedings. In April, the court found Rodriguez not

competent.

On May 16, 2019, the court issued a second commitment

order, once more directing that Rodriguez be committed to the

Department. As before, the court specified a date by which the

Department was to provide a placement for Rodriguez, setting

that date as June 14, 2019. The court further noted in its

commitment order that it found Rodriguez did “not have the

capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication,”

and it ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic

medication.

On January 9, 2020, the medical director of Atascadero

State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was restored to

competency. The parties stipulated the certificate of restoration

was filed with the superior court the same date. Among the

documents transmitted to the court, the medical director

included a letter stating that Rodriguez was “being returned to

court on psychotropic medication.” “It is important,” continued

the director, “that [Rodriguez] remain on this medication for his

own personal benefit and to enable him to be certified [as

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

competent] under Section 1372 of the Penal Code.” The date

when Rodriguez was discharged from the state hospital does not

appear in the record. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at

p. 638.)

On January 24, 2020, the court set May 21 as the date for

a contested hearing on Rodriguez’s competency. In March, the

court suspended almost all its operations due to the COVID-19

pandemic. As a result, the competency hearing set for May 21

did not take place.

On July 17, 2020, the parties returned to court following

the relaxation of certain COVID-19 restrictions. The court

rescheduled the competency hearing for August 24, a date later

reset to September 21 at the request of both parties. The

hearing did not occur on that date either. Instead, the court

continued the hearing to November 2 “due to the COVID-19

pandemic and the lack of courtrooms and court resources

available.” The court subsequently continued the competency

hearing several times due to the “pandemic and the [s]uperior

[c]ourt’s limited trial capacity.”

In March 2021, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss. Even

though the Department had timely determined that he was

competent to stand trial, Rodriguez argued that he was entitled

to a dismissal because his commitment had lasted more than

two years. Rodriguez contended a commitment must be

measured based on “dates from one judicial decision until a

second judicial decision” — in this case, from the date when the

court issued the commitment order to the date when it

eventually approved or rejected the certificate of restoration.

Rodriguez thus argued his total commitment period — counting

days from his first and second commitments — exceeded two

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

years and was ongoing. (See In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th

1230, 1232 (Polk) [holding that the limit on a commitment term

“applies to the aggregate of all commitments under the same

charges”].)

On March 16, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to

dismiss, reasoning that it had to first determine whether

Rodriguez had regained competency before it could ascertain

whether the statutory two-year limit had been reached. The

court explained, “the days between the restoration certificate

and the restoration hearing [would] only count towards the two-

year maximum commitment if, in fact, it is determined that the

defendant is not restored to competence.” If instead “the

defendant is [judicially determined to be] restored to

competence,” the court continued, “then the date on the

certificate of restoration will serve as the date of restoration for

purposes of counting the days towards the maximum

commitment.” After the court announced its decision,

Rodriguez’s counsel asked for a continuance, requesting that the

court sign an order so that counsel could receive Rodriguez’s

updated mental health records related to his recent placement

on “24-hour hold” and “suicide watch” while in county jail.

Between the date of the second commitment order and the

court’s decision on March 16, 2021, a total of 670 days had

elapsed. When combined with the period between the first

commitment order and the court’s decision on September 2,

2018, finding Rodriguez restored to competency, 789 days — or

more than two years — had passed. In contrast, if a

commitment were deemed to begin with a commitment order

and end upon the filing of a certificate of restoration, Rodriguez

had been committed for a total of 344 days — or less than one

year — during the two commitments.

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Rodriguez challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion

to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in the Court

of Appeal, raising the same argument he presented in the trial

court. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, agreeing with

the People that Rodriguez’s commitment ended when the

certificate of restoration was filed. (Rodriguez, supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.) Unlike the trial court, the Court of

Appeal concluded that the filing of the certificate of restoration

terminates a commitment regardless of whether the court

subsequently approves or rejects the certificate. (See id. at

pp. 635–636.)

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal disagreed

with People v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136 (Carr), which

held that a judicial determination of competency, “not a health

official’s certification of competency that initiates court

proceedings to consider whether the defendant has regained

competency, terminates the defendant’s commitment.” (Id. at

p. 1140; Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.)

We granted review to resolve the split in authority. We

now reject the Court of Appeal’s holding that the two-year clock

set by section 1370(c)(1) stops with the filing of a certificate of

restoration.

II. DISCUSSION

To determine whether the running of the clock set by

section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of a certificate of

restoration, we provide an overview of the relevant statutory

framework, and then analyze the text of the governing statute

and the context, history, and purpose of the competency scheme.

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A. The Competency Statutory Scheme

1. Pre-1974

A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if “as a

result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability,

the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a

rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Prior to 1974, “California

law provided that persons charged with criminal conduct but

found incompetent to stand trial were committed to state

hospitals until they became ‘sane’ (i.e., competent). Because

attainment of competence was the sole standard for release the

commitments were indefinite, even permanent, so long as

incompetence persisted.” (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980)

28 Cal.3d 161, 167 (Hofferber).)

In 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court held

that “indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on

account of his incompetency to stand trial” offends

constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.

(Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 731.) The court

explained, “[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense

who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed

to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time

necessary to determine whether there is a substantial

probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable

future.” (Id. at p. 738.) “If it is determined that this is not the

case” — that is, the defendant is not likely to soon regain

competency — “then the State must either institute the

customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required

to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the

defendant.” (Ibid.)

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The following year, our court “adopt[ed] the rule of the

Jackson [v. Indiana] case.” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.)

We further accepted that “the duration of commitments to state

hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose

which originally justified the commitment” (id. at p. 805), which

is to “provide observation, care and treatment of [the committed

individuals’] mental condition, with a view toward restoring

their capacity to stand trial” (id. at pp. 805–806). Accordingly,

we instructed trial courts to direct hospital authorities to

examine the persons committed and periodically report to the

courts on their progress toward recovery of competency. We

delegated to trial courts the discretion to “decid[e] whether, in a

particular case, sufficient progress is being made to justify

continued commitment pending trial” but imposed no specific

time limits on how long a person may be held in “continued

commitment.” (Id. at p. 807.) Consistent with Jackson v.

Indiana, however, we specified that if “there exists no

reasonable likelihood that the person will recover his

competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, then the

court should either order him released from confinement or

initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under

the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et

seq.),” California’s civil commitment scheme. (Ibid.)

2. 1974 to the Present

In response to Davis, the Legislature enacted Assembly

Bill No. 1529 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) in 1974. (Stats. 1974,

ch. 1511.) Sponsored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy, the bill

was designed to “bring California’s statutory provisions into

accord” with the guidelines in Davis and Jackson v. Indiana.

(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324; see also Parker, California’s

New Scheme For The Commitment Of Individuals Found

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Incompetent To Stand Trial (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 484, 489

(Parker).) The Legislature specified that a defendant found

incompetent to stand trial cannot be committed for more than

three years. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.) The

Legislature also provided for the return of a defendant to court

if “ha[ving] been committed for 18 months” — half of a

maximum three-year commitment term — the defendant is still

hospitalized as incompetent. (Ibid.) Upon returning to court, a

hearing is held to determine the defendant’s competency. (Ibid.)

As part of the same enactment, the Legislature created a

new type of conservatorship, referred to as a “Murphy”

conservatorship after the sponsor of Assembly Bill No. 1529

(1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) (see, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court,

supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102). This allows for a one-year,

renewable commitment of qualifying mentally incompetent

defendants who have reached the maximum time for a

commitment under section 1370(c)(1). (See Stats. 1974,

ch. 1511, §§ 6, 12, pp. 3319, 3322; see also, e.g., Conservatorship

of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096–1097; Hofferber, supra,

28 Cal.3d at pp. 169–170.) This new civil commitment

procedure, together with the imposition of a maximum

commitment period and additional periodic reporting

requirements, sought to “integrate and resolve the conflicting

concerns of protecting society from dangerous individuals who

are not subject to criminal prosecution . . . and safeguarding the

freedom of incompetent criminal defendants who present no

threat to the public.” (Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at p. 485; see

also, e.g., People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568

(Waterman); Hofferber, at pp. 176–177.)

The 1974 statutory scheme has been amended numerous

times. Particularly relevant for our purposes are amendments

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enacted in 1980 and 2018. In 1980, the Legislature amended

section 1372 to add procedures following the filing of a certificate

of restoration of competency. As added, section 1372,

subdivision (a)(2) specified that “[u]pon the filing of a certificate

of restoration, the defendant shall be returned to the committing

court.” (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1516.) The Legislature also

added subdivisions (c) and (d) to section 1372 at that time.

Subdivision (c) requires the court to provide notice of “the date

of any hearing on the defendant’s competence and whether or

not the defendant was found by the court to have recovered

competence” when a defendant is returned to court. (Stats.

1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.) Subdivision (d) specifies the court’s

responsibilities regarding the defendant’s custodial status if it

approves the certificate of restoration. (Stats. 1980, ch. 547,

§ 14, p. 1517.)

In 2018, the Legislature reduced the maximum term of

commitment from three years to two years. (Stats. 2018,

ch. 1008, § 3.) The author of the bill explained that the

legislation was motivated by (1) the need to reduce “[w]ait lists

for placements in state-operated treatment facilities,” and (2) a

reassessment of the maximum period of time reasonably

necessary “for restoring a person to competency, or for

determining that he or she is not restorable” in response to

advancements in “modern medical science.” (Sen. Com. on

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg.

Sess.) as introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) As part of the same

bill, the Legislature eliminated the requirement that a

defendant who remains committed for 18 months be returned to

court for a redetermination of competency. (Stats. 2018,

ch. 1008, § 3.)

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3. Current Law Governing Competency

As it now stands, the statutory scheme governing

competency works as follows: When a doubt arises in the trial

court judge’s mind regarding the mental competency of a

criminal defendant, the judge may order a hearing to determine

the defendant’s competency.2 (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).) All

criminal proceedings are suspended once the order issues. (Id.,

subd. (c).) At the competency hearing, the defendant is

presumed competent and incompetence must be proved by a

preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); see also

Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446–449, 452–453.) If

a defendant is found incompetent, criminal proceedings remain

“suspended until the person becomes mentally competent,” and

the court issues a commitment order. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).)

Specifically, “[t]he court shall order that the mentally

incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State

Department of State Hospitals facility, as defined in Section

4100 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as directed by the

State Department of State Hospitals, or to any other available

public or private treatment facility, including a community-

based residential treatment system approved by the community

program director, or their designee, that will promote the

2

The judge must order such a hearing if defense counsel

also declares a doubt regarding a defendant’s competency.

(§ 1368, subd. (b).) Even where counsel believes the defendant

is competent, however, the court “may nevertheless order a

hearing.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58,

82 [explaining that our court has construed section 1368 “ ‘in

conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law’ ”

to mean that “[i]f the court is presented with substantial

evidence of mental incompetence . . . the court must declare a

doubt about the question and initiate an inquiry”].)

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defendant’s speedy restoration to mental competence, or placed

on outpatient status as specified in Section 1600.” (§ 1370, subd.

(a)(1)(B)(i).) After the issuance of the commitment order, a

defendant who is ordered “delivered . . . to a . . . State Hospitals

facility” is to be admitted to a state hospital or a facility under

contract with the Department. (Ibid.)

Whether admitted to a state hospital facility, delivered to

a community-based residential treatment program, or placed on

outpatient status, a defendant is returned to court when any of

the following occurs: (1) a medical director or comparable

personnel certifies to the court that the defendant has been

restored to competency;3 (2) an appointed psychiatrist or

psychologist opines that the defendant has regained

competency;4 (3) the court determines that “treatment for the

defendant’s mental impairment is not being conducted” (§ 1370,

subd. (b)(4)); (4) a medical director or comparable personnel

reports to the court that there is no substantial likelihood the

3

Section 1372, subdivision (a).

4

Section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) (“If, at any time after

the court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial

pursuant to this section, counsel for the defendant or a jail

medical or mental health staff provider provides the court with

substantial evidence that the defendant’s psychiatric symptoms

have changed to such a degree as to create a doubt in the mind

of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental incompetence,

the court may appoint a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist

to opine as to whether the defendant has regained competence.

If, in the opinion of that expert, the defendant has regained

competence, the court shall proceed as if a certificate of

restoration of competence has been returned pursuant to

paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1372”).

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defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future;5 or

(5) the maximum commitment period set by section 1370(c)(1)

has been reached.6 For ease of reference, we sometimes use the

term “designated medical professional” through the remainder

of this opinion to include the medical director of the Department

or any relevant designee under the competency statutes.

5

Section 1370, subdivision (b)(1)(A) (specifying the

reporting obligations of medical personnel and stating “[i]f the

report [filed by the medical director of the State Department of

State Hospitals, the person in charge of a treatment facility, or

outpatient treatment staff] indicates that there is no substantial

likelihood that the defendant will regain mental competence in

the foreseeable future, custody of the defendant shall be

transferred without delay to the committing county and shall

remain with the county until further order of the court. The

defendant shall be returned to the court for proceedings

pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) no later than

10 days following receipt of the report. The court shall not order

the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department

of State Hospitals under the same commitment”).

6

Section 1370(c)(1) (“At the end of two years from the date

of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the

maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most

serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or

complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by

law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision,

whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the

expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a defendant

who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to

the committing court, and custody of the defendant shall be

transferred without delay to the committing county and shall

remain with the county until further order of the court. The

court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of

the State Department of State Hospitals under the same

commitment. The court shall notify the community program

director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court

orders”).

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Regarding the first path back to court, under section 1372,

if the designated medical professional “determines that the

defendant has regained mental competence,” that person “shall

immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate

of restoration.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Within 10 days of the

filing of the certificate of restoration, the defendant “shall be

returned to the committing court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(3)(C).)

“When a defendant is returned to court with a certification that

competence has been regained,” the court shall notify the

appropriate personnel “of the date of any hearing on the

defendant’s competence and whether or not the defendant was

found by the court to have recovered competence.” (§ 1372,

subd. (c)(1).)

Although section 1372 refers to a “hearing on the

defendant’s competence” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1)), it does not “set

forth any . . . procedures” for such a hearing. (People v.

Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 867 (Rells).) We have held,

however, that “section 1372 allows its gaps to be filled by Penal

Code section 1369,” which establishes the procedures for the

initial hearing on the issue of a defendant’s mental competence.

(Id. at p. 868.) Thus, when a defendant returns to court after a

certificate of restoration has been filed, the defendant is

presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise

at a hearing. (See id. at pp. 867–868.) “If the committing court

approves the certificate of restoration” (§ 1372, subd. (d)) — thus

finding the defendant has recovered competency — criminal

proceedings resume (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and the court “shall

hold a hearing to determine whether the person is entitled to be

admitted to bail or released on own recognizance status pending

conclusion of the proceedings” (§ 1372, subd. (d)). The court

may, however, “reject[] a certificate of restoration” based on a

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medical evaluation (§ 1372, subd. (c)(2)), at which point a

defendant may be returned to a treatment facility if the

maximum commitment period has not yet been reached. (See

§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra,

4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

Different procedures apply if the maximum commitment

term has been reached. As mentioned, section 1370(c)(1)

prohibits commitments lasting more than two years. If the

defendant has not regained competency, the statute does not

provide for a hearing to redetermine a defendant’s competency

at this point. (Accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233,

239, 246 (Taitano) [holding that trial courts are not authorized

to hold competency hearings after the maximum statutory

commitment period has expired where the court “had not

received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to

competence by certain mental health officials (including the

county medical health director) or the conservator”]; People v.

Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375 (Quiroz) [holding that

a trial judge has no power “to convene a competency hearing

after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been

involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to

stand trial, is not likely to regain competency”].) Instead,

section 1370 directs the committing court to “initiate

conservatorship proceedings for the defendant” if “it appears to

the court that the defendant is gravely disabled.” (§ 1370,

subd. (c)(3).)

A defendant is gravely disabled if, “as a result of a mental

health disorder,” the defendant “is unable to provide for his or

her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Alternatively, a defendant

is gravely disabled — and subject to a Murphy

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conservatorship — if the defendant “has been found mentally

incompetent” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)) and certain facts obtain,

including that “[t]he person represents a substantial danger of

physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or

disorder” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv)). If the defendant is deemed

gravely disabled under either definition, the defendant may be

confined as long as “conservatorship is still required.” (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b).) On the other hand, “If the

defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be

released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in

the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 [citations]. Such

a dismissal is ‘without prejudice to the initiation of any

proceedings that may be appropriate’ under the [Lanterman-

Petris-Short] Act.” (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th

at p. 102.)

To summarize the steps in the commitment process most

relevant to the issue before us: A defendant found mentally

incompetent to stand trial shall be committed by court order.

(See § 1370.) If the designated medical professional finds that

the defendant’s competency has been restored, the person files

a certificate of restoration, triggering the defendant’s return to

court. (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.) Following the

defendant’s return, the court holds a hearing to determine

whether to approve or reject the certificate. (See § 1372.) If a

defendant has not regained competency within two years of the

date of commitment, the defendant is either released or subject

to civil conservatorship proceedings. (See § 1370, subd. (c);

Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102.)

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B. Determining Whether a Commitment Continues

Past the Filing of a Certificate of Restoration

Because it involves a pure question of law, we review de

novo the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the filing of a

certificate of restoration terminates an incompetency

commitment. (See, e.g., Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 870.) In

interpreting the competency statutory scheme, “ ‘[O]ur task is to

ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the

purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the words

of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the

Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a

statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an

enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context

of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (Kim v. Reins

International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).) If

“ ‘the [statutory] language supports more than one reasonable

construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the

ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ”

(Ibid.)

1. The Statutory Text Is More Consistent with

Rodriguez’s Position than the People’s

“The relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at

which an incompetency commitment ends” when a certificate of

restoration has been timely filed. (Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th

at p. 1144.) That is, section 1370(c)(1) does not expressly specify

when a commitment ends for a defendant who has been certified

as restored to competence. Likewise, section 1372 — the

provision pertaining to certificates of restoration of

competence — is silent regarding how the issuance of the

certificate affects the running of the two-year maximum period

of commitment.

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Nonetheless, as we explain below, the crucial competency

assessments before and after the filing of the certificate of

restoration require judicial action and approval. The “legal

force and effect” of the “filing of the certificate” is simply to

“cause[] the defendant to be returned to court for further

proceedings” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868; see also § 1372,

subd. (a)), and even that return occurs pursuant to a court order.

(See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); § 1372, subd. (a)(2).) When the

court’s central role in competency proceedings is juxtaposed

against the limited significance of a certificate of restoration, we

conclude the Legislature did not intend for the filing of a

certificate to “fix[] . . . the end date for calculation of the

commitment treatment period under section 1370(c)(1),” as the

court below concluded. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at

p. 652.)

a. The statutory text suggests that the two-year

clock of section 1370(c)(1) does not stop with the

filing of a certificate of restoration

We begin, “as always, with the text” of the relevant

statutes. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021)

11 Cal.5th 104, 114.)

Section 1370(c)(1) provides that “[a]t the end of two years

from the date of commitment . . . but no later than 90 days prior

to the expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a

defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be

returned to the committing court.” Even when a certificate of

restoration of competency has been filed, it is the court’s decision

whether to accept a certificate that determines whether criminal

proceedings may resume, or whether — if the two-year

timeframe has not elapsed — further treatment is required

instead. A finding that a defendant has recovered mental

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competency requires a court order, and the court must act to

approve the certificate of restoration even when not contested

by the parties. (See § 1372, subds. (c), (d).) Moreover, before the

court adjudicates a defendant competent, the defendant cannot

seek bail or otherwise challenge the underlying charges because

criminal proceedings remain suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d),

1370, subd. (a)(1).) This array of procedures suggests that until

the court decides whether to accept a certificate, the two-year

clock on an incompetency commitment (§ 1370(c)(1)) has not

stopped.

Section 1370(c)(1) also requires the defendant’s return to

court 90 days before the expiration of the maximum two-year

commitment period. The reservation of a 90-day period cannot

be wholly explained by the time it should take to transport the

defendant. Section 1370 makes clear that the defendant must

be transported “without delay” (§ 1370(c)(1)), “immediate[ly]”

(id., subd. (c)(2)(A)), and most concretely, “within 10 calendar

days” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)). The statute thus allows time for

necessary subsequent judicial proceedings to be completed

before reaching the maximum period of commitment.

It is true the Legislature did not appear to have the issue

before us specifically in mind when it amended section

1370(c)(1) in 2014, effective January 1, 2015, to include this

90-day period. (See Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 2625 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended

Apr. 24, 2014, p. 1 [indicating that the language was added with

the aim “to reduce the backlog of patients awaiting a state

hospital placement in county jails by ensuring defendants found

incompetent to stand trial (IST) who cannot be restored to trial

competency are returned to their original county of commitment

in a timely manner”].) Nonetheless, the 90-day window is

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consistent with Rodriguez’s general position that some judicial

action is necessary to end a commitment period.

b. The People’s interpretation of the statutory text

is unpersuasive

The People’s arguments do not persuade us that “the plain

language of the statutory scheme” requires courts to exclude the

period following the filing of a certificate of restoration from the

two-year maximum commitment period.

i. Section 1372

First, the People rely heavily on section 1372’s provisions

regarding the certification of restoration to competence. Yet it

is not clear how this section supports the People’s

interpretation. As previously summarized, section 1372

specifies that “[i]f the medical director of a state hospital [or

other appropriate personnel] determines that the defendant has

regained mental competence, the director or designee shall

immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate

of restoration with the court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Because

the court’s initial commitment order must have directed the

sheriff to “redeliver the patient to the court . . . upon receiving

from the state hospital or treatment facility a copy of the

certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(2)), “the patient shall be

returned to the committing court no later than 10 days following

the filing of a certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)).

Upon a defendant’s return to court, all further proceedings occur

at the court’s discretion. (See § 1372, subds. (c)–(e).) In short,

section 1372 specifies what the filing of a certificate of

restoration accomplishes: It causes the sheriff to “redeliver the

patient to the court” pursuant to the court order. (§ 1372,

subd. (a)(2).) Section 1372 contains no hint that the time

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between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a court’s

ruling on the certificate is excluded from the commitment

period.

The People maintain that “[n]othing in the plain language

of the statutory scheme suggests that the discretionary hearing

contemplated by section 1372 falls within the commitment time

enumerated in section 1370, subd. (c)(1).” The Court of Appeal

reached the same conclusion. (See Rodriguez, supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 650 [“Section 1372 does not explicitly state

any timeframe within which the restoration hearing must be

held and does not reference section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year

maximum for an incompetency commitment”].)

As we have recognized, however, section 1372 “does not set

forth any . . . procedures whatsoever” to govern the hearing on a

defendant’s recovery of mental competency. (Rells, supra,

22 Cal.4th at p. 867; see also People v. Murrell (1987)

196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [observing that “section 1372 does not

directly provide for a hearing where the defendant may

challenge the medical director’s certification of competence” and

the legislative intent to provide for such a hearing must be

inferred].) Thus, the fact that section 1372 does not mention

section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit is neither surprising nor

illuminating.7

7

We also note that section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii)

specifies that “[i]f a certificate of restoration of competency was

filed with the court pursuant to Section 1372 and the court

subsequently rejected the certification,” the court shall provide

“a new computation or statement setting forth the amount of

credit for time served, if any, to be deducted from the

defendant’s maximum term of commitment based on the court’s

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ii. The statutory presumption of competence

Second, the People rely upon the presumption of

competence (see § 1369, subd. (f)), which applies at a section

1372 hearing at which a judge determines whether to approve

or reject a certificate of restoration. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th

at p. 862.) The court below likewise relied on this presumption,

reasoning that the absence of further treatment together with

the presumption of competence meant that a defendant could no

longer be regarded as subject to a commitment after the

certificate’s filing. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 653,

655–656.) But there is reason to question this analysis.8

The presumption of competence applies at every trial and

retrial of a defendant’s competency, even where there is reason

to doubt a defendant is competent. As we have previously noted,

“[t]he presumption that the defendant is mentally competent . . .

rejection of the certification.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii), italics

added.) This language appears to contemplate that when “a

certificate of restoration of competency was filed with the court

pursuant to Section 1372 and the court subsequently rejected

the certification,” the period in between the filing of the

certificate and the court’s rejection thereof is relevant for

purposes of computing the maximum period of commitment

allowed by section 1370(c)(1). (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)

8

The Court of Appeal relied on Rells in concluding that “the

filing of the certificate triggers a presumption of mental

competency under section 1372.” (Rodriguez, supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.) But Rells merely stated that the

filing of the certificate of restoration “trigger[s] a hearing on a

defendant’s recovery of mental competence.” (Rells, supra,

22 Cal.4th at p. 868, italics added.) At this hearing, as

explained post, the presumption of competence operates as a

principle of law as in any competency proceeding. It is a

misreading of Rells to conclude that a restoration certificate

itself creates the presumption of competence.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

is applicable at a trial of the defendant’s mental competence”

when a court first declares doubt as to the mental competence of

the defendant. (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867.) The

presumption therefore applies “in spite of the fact that it may

run counter to any doubt expressed by the court and supported

by the opinion of [the defendant’s] own counsel.” (Ibid.) When

the statute provided for a defendant’s return to court if the

defendant was still incompetent after an 18-month commitment

(see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; former § 1370, subd.

(b)(2)), the presumption of competence was likewise applicable

at the retrial of the defendant’s competence “in spite of the fact

that it is inconsistent with his apparent nonrecovery of mental

competence.” (Rells, at p. 867.)

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature

simply intended for the presumption of competence to operate

as a principle of law that a court applies in making a competency

determination at any stage. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at

p. 862 [stating that the presumption of competence “operates to

impose the burden of proof on the party, if any, who claims that

the defendant is mentally incompetent, and fixes the weight

thereof at preponderance of the evidence”]; Medina v.

California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 449 [explaining that the

presumption of competence has limited legal effect, “affect[ing]

competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases

where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence

that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence

that he is incompetent”].) It goes too far to conclude that the

presumption reflects the Legislature’s understanding that a

commitment ends upon the filing of a certificate of restoration.

Furthermore, even when the presumption of competence

does not run counter to doubts regarding the defendant’s

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competency — and instead “conforms in fact with the certificate

of restoration filed by the specified mental health official” (Rells,

supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867, italics omitted) — the court has the

statutory authority to reject the certification and find a

defendant incompetent (see § 1372, subd. (c)(2)).9 Yet, under the

People’s interpretation, even an erroneous certificate of

restoration terminates an incompetency commitment. The

People offer no persuasive explanation why the Legislature

would intend that an incompetent defendant — who like

Rodriguez may be moved between a state hospital and the

county jail, all the while remaining confined and involuntarily

medicated — should not have such time counted toward the

maximum term of commitment merely because his doctor

mistakenly concluded that he has regained competency.

iii. The asserted primacy of location

The People’s third textual argument is based on section

1370. The People assert that section 1370 uses the words

“delivered” and “committed” synonymously in arguing that a

commitment consists only of that period “wherein the defendant

is physically placed in the care and custody of the state hospital

for restoration treatment.” (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i)

[specifying that once a defendant is found incompetent, “[t]he

9

This contrasts with previous versions of the law, in which

a designated medical professional’s certification that a

defendant has recovered mental competency served to render a

person competent as a matter of law. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511,

§ 7, p. 3320; People v. Ashley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 339, 359 (Ashley)

[after a superintendent of a state hospital certifies that a

defendant has regained competence, “[t]he defendant is then to

be tried”]; In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 843–844 (Phyle);

People v. Superior Court (Contra Costa County) (1935) 4 Cal.2d

136, 145 (Contra Costa County).)

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court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be

delivered by the sheriff to a State Department of State Hospitals

facility . . . or to any other available public or private treatment

facility . . . or placed on outpatient status”]; id., subd. (a)(2)

[referring to the order made under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) as

“the order directing that the defendant be committed to the

State Department of State Hospitals or other treatment facility

or placed on outpatient status”].) Because a defendant is

“committed” only upon being “delivered” to a treatment facility,

the People maintain, “the definition of the ‘commitment’ . . .

should not be conflated with the period of court-adjudged

incompetency.” Instead, according to the People, this language

signifies that it is a defendant’s presence at a treatment facility

that constitutes a commitment. And because a defendant is

transferred back to county custody after being certified as

having been restored to competency, the People contend, the

defendant is no longer committed for purposes of calculating the

two-year time limit.

There are significant problems with the People’s argument

that commitment only occurs when the defendant is physically

present at a treatment facility. First, if location is

determinative of whether a defendant is committed, then a

commitment should end with a defendant’s actual transport

from the treatment facility back to county custody — not with

the filing of a certificate of restoration, as the People claim.

Section 1372 makes clear that such transport may take as long

as 10 days from the filing of the certificate. (§ 1372,

subd. (a)(3)(C) [“In all cases, the patient shall be returned to the

committing court no later than 10 days following the filing of a

certificate of restoration”].) The People’s position that a

commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of restoration is

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therefore inconsistent with their own assertion that a

commitment consists of the period when a defendant is

physically in a treatment facility.10

Second, the People’s position is inconsistent with various

statutory provisions relating to competency determinations and

proceedings that treat “commitment” as distinct from events

such as “admission,” “transfer,” or “confinement.” For example,

Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 “establish[es] a

program for the [D]epartment to perform reevaluations

primarily through telehealth evaluations for felony incompetent

to stand trial (IST) individuals in jail who have been waiting for

admission to the [D]epartment.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4335.2,

subd. (b).) Among the stated goals of allowing for such

telehealth evaluations is “[t]o permit the [D]epartment to

conduct reevaluations of IST defendants committed to the

[D]epartment and awaiting admission to [D]epartment

facilities.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added; see also id., subd. (c)

10

In this case, the dates of the trial court’s orders of

commitment are not the dates of Rodriguez’s transport to a state

hospital or the dates of his admission to such a facility — i.e.,

they are not when Rodriguez was “physically placed in the care

and custody of the state hospital for restoration treatment.” The

record does not reflect when Rodriguez was transported to or

from a state hospital for either of his two commitments (see

Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 636–638), making it

impossible to evaluate how long Rodriguez has been committed

under the People’s reading of the statutes. This gap in the

record may be explained by the fact that the parties below

agreed that the dates of the transports were not legally

significant. Before the Court of Appeal, the People “apparently

concede[d] that Rodriguez’s ‘commitment’ under section

1370(c)(1) began on the date of the trial court’s order of

commitment.” (Id. at p. 650, fn. 14.)

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[“The [D]epartment, or its designee, have the authority and sole

discretion to consider and conduct reevaluations for IST

defendants committed to and awaiting admission to the

[D]epartment”], italics added.) This provision suggests that a

defendant is deemed committed upon having his or her place of

treatment judicially determined, not when the defendant

actually enters a treatment facility.

Along the same lines, section 1370 requires the

Department to “make a written report to the court . . .

concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of mental

competence” “[w]ithin 90 days after a commitment made

pursuant to subdivision (a).” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).)

“Commitment,” as used in this provision — i.e., “a commitment

made pursuant to subdivision (a)” — refers to the court’s

commitment order, and not admission to or physical placement

in a state hospital. (Ibid.) Similarly, other subdivisions of

section 1370 refer to “commit[ment]” and “confine[ment]” or

“commit[ment]” and “transfer” to a facility as separate events.

(See, e.g., § 1370, subd. (a)(5) [“When directing that the

defendant be confined in a State Department of State Hospitals

facility pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall commit the

defendant to the State Department of State Hospitals”]; id.,

subd. (a)(6)(A) [specifying appropriate actions a court may take

in the event “the defendant is committed or transferred to the

State Department of State Hospitals pursuant to this section”].)

A commitment thus does not necessarily coincide with actual

presence in a state treatment facility.11

11

We need not decide in this case whether defendants placed

on outpatient status (see § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(A)(ii)) are,

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iv. Other textual arguments

The People also rely on section 1370(c)(1), which specifies

that “a defendant who has not recovered mental competence

shall be returned to the committing court” at the end of a two-

year commitment period. The People argue that the two-year

time limit in section 1370(c)(1) cannot “apply to court hearings

after the defendant has been returned to court pursuant to

section 1372, given that the remedy [under section 1370(c)(1)] is

to return the defendant to the committing court — an event that

has already occurred.”

The People’s interpretation fails to recognize section

1370(c)(1)’s multiple functions. This statute not only compels

the transport of a defendant from one place to another, but also

limits the amount of time that a defendant may be committed

due to incompetency. (See § 1370(c)(1) [specifying that “[t]he

court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of

the State Department of State Hospitals under the same

commitment” if a defendant has reached his maximum term of

commitment].) Rodriguez seeks the application of this limit and

a declaration that as a defendant whose commitment has

reached the statutorily allowed maximum, “the court should

either order him released from confinement or initiate

appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at

in fact, committed for purposes of the two-year limit. Under the

People’s reading of the statutes, however, defendants who are

on outpatient status are never committed because they are never

physically in the custody of a treatment facility. It is unclear

what meaning, if any, section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit would

have under the People’s reading.

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p. 807) — neither of which is “an event that has already

occurred.”12

The People also contend that if we were to “conclud[e] that

a court’s competency finding is necessary to terminate [a]

commitment,” commitments would last “indefinitely” for certain

defendants. Specifically, the People point to defendants

returned to court when a designated medical professional

reports that “there is no substantial likelihood that the

defendant[s] will regain mental competence in the foreseeable

future” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)(A)) and those returned to court after

12

The People’s argument also ignores the possibility that an

incompetent defendant may be treated at the county jail.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 4100 enumerates the

types of facilities over which the Department has jurisdiction.

Among these are “county jail treatment facilit[ies] under

contract with the State Department of State Hospitals to

provide competency restoration services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 4100, subd. (g).) A defendant committed to a Department

facility could be at the county jail treatment facility for the

entire commitment period.

Section 1370(c)(1) therefore requires that defendants

treated at the county jails “be returned to the committing court”

and their “custody . . . be transferred without delay to the

committing county” at the end of their maximum terms of

commitment and “shall remain with the county until further

order of the court.” (Ibid.) This means that section 1370(c)(1)

requires defendants already in county custody be returned to

county custody until the court takes action regarding their

commitment status. (Ibid.) Yet, the People do not argue that

section 1370(c)(1) is inapplicable to defendants receiving

treatment at a county jail facility despite their county custody

constituting “an event that has already occurred.” For such

defendants, like those in Rodriguez’s situation,

section 1370(c)(1) is applicable regardless of the defendant’s

physical location.

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their maximum commitment term has expired (§ 1370(c)(1)).

The People maintain that because the statutes do not provide

for a court hearing to redetermine defendants’ competency when

they are returned via these two paths, such hearings would

never occur and the defendants “would remain indefinitely

committed.” (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 239;

Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.) But we are

addressing only the limited issue of whether the interval

between the filing of a certificate of restoration and the court’s

ruling on it is excluded from the maximum commitment time set

by section 1370(c)(1). Our holding does not mean that

defendants returned without such certificates will be committed

“indefinitely.”

Finally, in their amicus curiae brief submitted in support

of the People, the State Department of State Hospitals and the

State Department of Developmental Services make an

argument that relies on the timing of when a commitment

begins. According to amici curiae, “[i]t is undisputed that the

maximum commitment period does not include the time before

a court conducts an initial competency hearing,” i.e., a hearing

under section 1370. According to amici curiae, “[t]he time

between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a

section 1372 hearing should be treated the same way” and

excluded from the maximum competency period.

But a defendant awaiting a competency hearing under

section 1370 differs in important ways from a defendant

awaiting a competency determination under section 1372.

Before a court conducts an initial competency hearing under

section 1370, the defendant has not been legally adjudicated as

incompetent. In contrast, a defendant who has been certified by

medical personnel as restored to competency necessarily has

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been previously determined to be incompetent, and until a court

makes a competency finding pursuant to section 1372, the

defendant cannot be treated as legally competent. In addition,

a defendant who has not been adjudicated as incompetent may

still be released on bail. (See § 1371.) A defendant who has been

certified as competent, on the other hand, is ineligible for bail

consideration until the court determines the defendant has

regained competency. (See § 1372, subd. (d).)

In short, the period prior to a competency hearing under

section 1370 occurs before the period of commitment and thus

tells us very little about the period of commitment itself. The

fact that “the time before a court conducts an initial competency

hearing” under section 1370 is not counted toward the term of

commitment does not persuade us to likewise exclude from a

maximum period of commitment the interval before a court

conducts a competency hearing under section 1372.

2. Rodriguez’s Interpretation Furthers the Purposes

of the Statute

The statutory text read in context is consistent with the

understanding that the filing of a certificate of restoration does

not stop the two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1). But

because the language of these statutes “ ‘supports more than one

reasonable construction,’ ” we look for an interpretation of the

statute that will best “ ‘effectuate the purpose’ ” of the

competency statutory scheme. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.)

We conclude Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation furthers the

purpose of the relevant competency statutes.

We have explained that “[t]he incompetence program . . .

is a special form of pretrial detention” whose “purpose is

restoration of a specific mental state without which the criminal

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process cannot proceed.” (Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569,

italics omitted.) In adopting the “incompetence program” in

1974, the Legislature clearly intended to limit a defendant’s

time in “pretrial detention” and to suspend “the criminal

process” so that the defendant can be restored to “a specific

mental state.” (Ibid., italics omitted; see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511,

§ 16, pp. 3323–3324.) The Legislature also intended to

“eliminate uncertainty among all persons concerned regarding

court procedures.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324.) This

latter goal of providing certainty is evident in the Legislature’s

decision to limit the maximum term of commitment to three

years (and later two), rather than the “reasonable period of

time” mandated under Davis and Jackson v. Indiana. (Davis,

supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at

p. 738.) As we explained in Jackson v. Superior Court, “the

Legislature established the [then] three-year maximum in

section 1370(c) to protect defendants’ due process and equal

protection rights not to be committed solely because of

incompetence for longer than is reasonable.” (Jackson v.

Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.)

Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation — specifically, not

excluding the period between the filing of a certificate of

competence, and the court’s ruling on the certificate — is

consistent with the Legislature’s intent to limit the period of

detention due to incompetency and provide certainty regarding

the length of that detention period. Under this interpretation,

incompetent defendants are assured that they cannot be

confined simply on account of their inability to proceed to trial

for more than a specified two-year period.

By contrast, the People’s proposed interpretation runs

counter to the legislative goal of limiting a defendant’s

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confinement “solely because of incompetence.” (Jackson v.

Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.) If we were to adopt

the People’s interpretation, a defendant could be held

indefinitely while awaiting a competency hearing, subject only

to the limits imposed by the due process clause. As explained

previously, after the filing of a certificate of restoration but

before the court adjudicates the defendant competent, the

defendant cannot seek bail or otherwise challenge the

underlying charges because the criminal proceedings remain

suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Allowing

defendants to remain in this state of limbo is contrary to the

entire statutory scheme.

The People’s construction would also eliminate any

urgency in reaching a determination of competency. This again

runs counter to the Legislature’s intent, in imposing the two-

year limit under section 1370(c)(1), to eliminate the uncertainty

inherent in the “reasonable period of time” standard under

Davis and Jackson v. Indiana and ensure that individuals who

may never regain competence are not indefinitely detained with

the criminal process suspended.

Furthermore, the fact that a defendant may continue to

receive treatment even post-certification means that some of the

period following the filing of the certificate is reasonably seen as

a part of the process of treatment to determine whether

competence can be, and ultimately is, regained — which is what

the statute generally aims to expedite. (See Stats. 1974,

ch. 1511, § 16, pp. 3323–3324; see also, e.g., Davis, supra,

8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th

at p. 105.) Including this period within the limit of section

1370(c)(1) furthers the legislative intent underlying the

competency statutes for this reason as well.

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3. The Statutory Background Cuts Against the

People’s Position

Our interpretation of the relevant statutes is bolstered by

the evolution of the competency scheme, which since 1974 has

progressively moved control of incompetent defendants away

from designated medical professionals at facilities providing

competency restoration services, and toward supervision by the

courts.

a. The evolution of the competency statutory

scheme

In ending the indefinite commitment of mentally

incompetent defendants in 1974, the Legislature imposed on the

Department (and other facilities) the obligation to provide

periodic reports to the court. Specifically, the Legislature

mandated that “[w]ithin 90 days of a commitment . . . , the

superintendent of the state hospital or other facility to which the

defendant is committed shall make a written report to the court

concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of his

mental competence.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, pp. 3318–3319.)

Only if “the report discloses a substantial likelihood the

defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable

future” will the defendant “remain in the state hospital or other

facility.” (Id. at p. 3319.) After the initial report, “at six-month

intervals or until the defendant becomes mentally competent,

the superintendent of the hospital or person in charge of the

facility shall report to the court regarding the defendant’s

progress.” (Ibid.) Should a report at any point indicate that

“there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain

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his mental competence in the foreseeable future, the committing

court shall order him to be returned to the court.”13 (Ibid.)

In 1980, the Legislature extended the courts’ role in

overseeing competency procedures by making them responsible

for determining whether a defendant has regained competency

when the defendant is returned to court following the filing of a

certificate of restoration. (See Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14,

p. 1517.) Before this amendment, once the designated medical

professional certified a defendant as restored to competency,

“[t]he defendant [was] then to be tried.” (Ashley, supra,

59 Cal.2d at p. 359; see also Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.)

13

These reporting requirements have remained

substantially unchanged since 1974, although the statutory

language has been amended to take into account placement

options not previously available. (See § 1370, subd. (b).)

Relying on passages from various Court of Appeal

decisions, the People argue that “[t]he evil remedied by In re

Davis and later addressed by the Legislature in enacting section

1370, subd. (c)(1) [in 1974], was the languishing of incompetent

defendants in treatment facilities, not delays in judicial

determinations of competency or other court business when

defendants are within the court’s direct control.” Davis makes

clear, however, that we were also concerned with the lack of

court supervision over defendants “confined in state hospitals.”

(Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 806.) It was with an eye toward

imposing more judicial oversight that we directed “the hospitals’

authorities [to] report [to the superior courts] . . . regarding

the . . . progress toward competence” of “all persons . . .

committed as incompetent to stand trial.” (Ibid.) These

reporting requirements, designed to help courts determine

whether progress was made in restoring competency, were then

enacted into law when the Legislature overhauled the

competency statutory scheme in 1974. In other words, our court

in Davis and the Legislature in 1974 both sought to put

incompetent defendants more “within the court’s direct control.”

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That is, “the final determination” of a defendant’s restoration of

competency rested with the designated medical professional.

(Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 849.) The Legislature took away

the power to make this “final determination” when it required a

court to approve or reject a certificate of restoration. (Ibid.)

Now, a court may accept a certificate of restoration, finding the

defendant competent and allowing criminal proceedings to

resume. (See §§ 1372, subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Or, a court

may reject a certificate of restoration, finding that the defendant

remains incompetent. (See § 1372, subd. (c)(2).) In other words,

the court may disagree with the designated medical

professional, and it is the court’s judgment that carries legal

significance.14

14

The courts in Carr and Rodriguez touched on this point as

it relates to the question before us. The Carr court reasoned

that “if the commitment terminates when a health official files

a certification of competence, [no] plausible purpose [would be]

served in requiring [a] court to approve the certification as

expressly contemplated in section 1372, subdivision (d).” (Carr,

supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) The court below responded to

Carr by positing that “[t]he issuance of the restoration

certificate and the subsequent court hearing have distinct

statutory objectives.” (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at

p. 652.) According to Rodriguez, “[t]he certificate of restoration

to competence by the designated health official and prompt

return to the trial court vindicates the defendant’s right not to

remain longer than two years in the treatment facility,” whereas

“[t]he judicial determination of restoration of competency

ensures that the defendant is not tried if incompetent.” (Id. at

p. 655.) The fact remains, however, that the designated medical

professional and the court are making the same

determination — whether the defendant is competent — and

the court’s decision controls.

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In addition, courts are empowered to remove defendants

from their commitment placement without input from the

designated medical professional. In the 1974 enactment, the

Legislature declared that a defendant “shall be returned to the

committing court” if the court determines that “treatment for

the defendant’s mental impairment is [not] being conducted.”

(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; see also § 1370, subd. (b)(4).)

In 2018, the Legislature specified that “[i]f, at any time after the

court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial,” the

court receives “substantial evidence . . . as to create a doubt in

the mind of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental

incompetence,” the court may appoint an expert to examine the

defendant. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(G), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 34,

§ 25.) If the expert opines that the defendant has regained

competency, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of

restoration of competence has been returned,” although no such

certificate has been filed by the designated medical professional.

(Ibid.)15 Neither of these procedures requires the state

hospital’s involvement.

15

Likewise, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of

restoration of competence has been returned” if the Department

elects to conduct a telehealth reevaluation of a defendant

adjudicated mentally incompetent when the defendant is still in

county custody and “in the opinion of the department’s expert,

the defendant has regained competence.” (§ 1370, subd.

(a)(1)(H)(ii).) If the filing of a certificate ends a commitment as

the People argue, it follows that an opinion of restored

competency rendered under section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G)

and (a)(1)(H) should also automatically end a commitment. It

seems unlikely the Legislature would have intended for multiple

events, potentially happening on different dates, to mark the

end of a commitment, as that would sow conflict and confusion.

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To summarize: Through a series of enactments

concerning competency proceedings, the Legislature has vested

courts with responsibility for overseeing the progress of

defendants committed for the purpose of restoring their

competency. Much of this responsibility previously rested with

the Department and related entities. The Legislature, however,

has shifted this authority to the courts to ensure that “a person

charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed

solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be

held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to

determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will

attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” (Jackson v.

Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.) This sequence of

amendments cuts against the People’s argument and suggests

that the Legislature did not intend a certificate of restoration

filed by a designated medical professional to unilaterally stop

the two-year clock.

b. The People’s reliance on the 2018 amendment

As mentioned, in 2018, the Legislature shortened the

maximum commitment term from three years to two years.

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 3.) The People point to a summary

provided by the Legislative Counsel, which stated that the 2018

bill “would reduce the term for commitment to a treatment

facility when a felony [is] committed to the shorter of 2 years or

the period of commitment equal to the maximum term of

imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense

charged.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018

Reg. Sess.).) Relying on the phrase “to a treatment facility”

within this summary, the People argue that the Legislature did

not intend “the maximum commitment to include court hearings

that occur when the defendant is no longer receiving restoration

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treatment and is no longer in the care and custody of the state

hospital.”

To the extent the People are focused on a defendant being

in a “treatment facility” or in the “custody of the state hospital,”

the People are again arguing that physical presence in a facility

is determinative of commitment. The legislative history of the

2018 amendment does not support this claim. For example, the

Senate Committee on Public Safety’s analysis of the measure

simply stated, “The bill changes the maximum commitment

term for a felony from three years to two years.” (Sen. Com. on

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as

introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 5.) The analysis thus repeated the

Legislative Counsel’s Digest statement regarding the reduction

in the maximum term, but omitted the phrase “to a treatment

facility.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra.)

Similarly, another analysis explained that the bill “reduces the

maximum term of commitment to a treatment facility to restore

a defendant’s competency from three years to two years.” (Sen.

Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of

Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25,

2018, p. 1.) Yet the same analysis also stated that the bill

“[r]educes the maximum term of commitment for purposes of

restoring a defendant’s mental competency from three years to

two years,” again without mentioning treatment facilities. (Id.

at p. 3.) The varying language found in the legislative materials

does not establish that the legislators understood that only time

at treatment facilities would be impacted by the bill. The

Legislature instead could have referred to time spent in a

facility as a shorthand for the entire time of commitment,

without intending to exclude other time intervals from counting

toward the maximum commitment period.

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c. The People’s argument that treatment is

determinative

Based largely on their reading of the legislative history,

the People argue that the provision and termination of

treatment for incompetency marks the beginning and end of an

incompetency commitment.16

Underlying the People’s equation of treatment with

commitment are the assumptions that (1) incompetent

defendants always receive treatment while committed to

facilities like a state hospital, and (2) incompetent defendants

never receive treatment when they leave the facilities. Both

assumptions are unsupported.

First, the statutory scheme allows for the possibility that

even after a judge or jury finds a defendant incompetent to stand

trial and the court orders the defendant committed to the

Department, the Department can certify the defendant as

restored to competency — without providing any treatment.

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2, the

Department has the “authority and sole discretion to consider

and conduct reevaluations for IST defendants committed to and

awaiting admission to the department.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 4335.2, subd. (c).) Such reevaluations are done “primarily

through telehealth evaluations.” (Id., subd. (b).) If “the

16

As various amicus curiae point out, the People’s position

would mean that commitment does not encompass “the period

of time while an individual is awaiting treatment even where

the current average wait time for placement in a state hospital

competency restoration program” is significant. As discussed

ante, such an interpretation runs counter to the legislative

intent to limit the period of detention due to incompetency and

provide certainty regarding the length of the detention period.

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department clinician or contracted clinician” (see id., subd. (d))

conducting the evaluation concludes that the defendant has

regained competency (id., subd. (d)(1)), the clinician’s opinion

obligates the court to “proceed as if a certificate of restoration of

competence has been returned” (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd.

(a)(1)(H)(ii)). In other words, defendants may be returned to

court as if they have been certified as restored to competency

without any restoration treatment being extended. (See also

Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1225

(Medina) [“it was not necessary for Medina to have first been

provided care and treatment for a certificate of restoration to be

filed”]; Carr v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 264, 272

[similar]; Contra Costa County, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 146 [“The

medical superintendent of the Stockton state hospital [informed

the court] that he believed from the first that the defendant was

simulating insanity” and so requested that the defendant be

returned to court].)

Second, also contrary to the People’s assertion, treatment

may continue even after a defendant has been certified as

restored to competency. Section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(iii),

permits continued “involuntary administration of antipsychotic

medication to the defendant . . . when the defendant returns to

county custody” after a certificate of restoration has been filed.

This is precisely what happened in this case. When Rodriguez

was certified as competent, the medical director of the state

hospital informed the court that Rodriguez was “being returned

to court on psychotropic medication.” The director stressed that

Rodriguez needed to “remain on this medication . . . to enable

him to be certified” as competent. The record therefore

demonstrates it was contemplated that Rodriguez’s treatment

would continue even after he left the state hospital.

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There are also practical problems with the People’s

approach. It would be difficult to calculate exactly how long a

defendant has been committed if the provision of treatment

determined the length of a commitment. The provision of

treatment does not necessarily coincide with where the

defendant is located (e.g., in or outside a treatment facility) or

what part of the competency proceedings the defendant is in

(e.g., after a commitment order issues but before transport, or

after a certificate is filed but before transport). Given these

circumstances, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended for

the provision or cessation of treatment to delineate whether the

two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1) is running.

4. The Decisions Cited by the People Do Not Support

Their Interpretation of the Statutory Text

We are unconvinced that the decisions cited by the People

support their position that only time spent at a treatment

facility counts as part of a commitment period.

The court in Medina stated in dicta that “[i]n the usual

case, only days actually spent in commitment at a mental

institution or treatment facility are applied to the maximum

commitment period.” (Medina, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1203.) The statement, however, was made without any

support or elaboration, and the court emphasized it found the

case before it “unusual.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the defendant in

Medina had not received required treatment due to what the

Court of Appeal characterized as a “standoff” between the trial

court that issued a commitment order and the authorities

responsible for providing treatment, who refused to accept him.

(Id. at p. 1201.) The Court of Appeal resolved this impasse, and

the defendant’s resulting claim of a due process violation, by

including “all days since the date of the commitment order in

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which [the defendant] has been in jail, prison, or treatment” (id.

at p. 1203; see id. at p. 1230) as part of the commitment period.

The Medina court was not asked to decide whether a certificate

of restoration or a court’s subsequent order finding the

defendant restored to competency marks the end of a

commitment period, because no certificate of restoration was

ever filed in that case. (Id. at p. 1229.) Furthermore, that

court’s assessment of the “usual” calculations regarding the time

of commitment (id. at p. 1203) was inconsequential in light of

the remedy the court ultimately adopted.

Similarly distinguishable are People v. G.H. (2014)

230 Cal.App.4th 1548 (G.H.) and People v. Reynolds (2011)

196 Cal.App.4th 801 (Reynolds). Those courts held a

defendant’s precommitment custody credits did not apply when

calculating the then-applicable three-year maximum statutory

limit for a commitment. (See G.H., at p. 1553; Reynolds, at

pp. 803–804, 808–809.)17 The People and the Court of Appeal

17

In doing so, G.H. and Reynolds distinguished In re Banks

(1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 864. Banks held equal protection and due

process principles mandated application of precommitment

custody credits when the maximum commitment period is

measured by the maximum term of imprisonment for the most

serious offense charged because “the denial of credit[s]

necessarily results in longer confinement for indigents unable to

post bail bonds. This discriminatory treatment is

constitutionally forbidden.” (Id. at p. 869, fn. omitted.)

However, when the maximum commitment period is set to the

statutory maximum limit, G.H. and Reynolds held that there are

no potential equal protection or due process violations and the

statute controls because similarly situated defendants are not

deprived of the benefit of the precommitment jail time if

convicted. (See G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1557–1558;

Reynolds, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 808–809.)

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relied on G.H. and Reynolds in support of the notion “that a

defendant’s days in custody in which he or she is not being

treated for restoration to competence do not count toward the

maximum commitment period.” (Rodriguez, supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.) But here again, G.H. and Reynolds

were focused on an issue different from the one before us. The

analysis in G.H. and Reynolds centered on how to treat a

defendant’s time in custody prior to the issuance of a

commitment order when calculating the maximum commitment

period under section 1370(c)(1). By contrast, the court is here

asked to address the treatment of custodial time after a trial

court has ruled a defendant incompetent but before ruling on a

certificate of restoration. As we have explained, this distinction

is significant and counsels against relying on G.H.’s

characterization of the commitment period.18

5. We Are Not Persuaded by the People’s Remaining

Arguments

The People contend that “absurd and unintended

consequences” would result if we were to adopt Rodriguez’s

interpretation. (See, e.g., Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v.

18

In the course of its decision, G.H. stated that “[s]ection

1370, subdivision (c)(1)’s three-year statutory limit applies to

the total period actually spent in commitment at a mental

institution. ([Polk, supra,] 71 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1238 . . . .)”

(G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558–1559, italics added.)

As amicus curiae have observed, Polk in fact makes no mention

of any distinction between time spent postcommitment at a

treatment facility versus time spent postcommitment in county

custody awaiting judicial proceedings following submission of a

certificate of restoration. Polk held that the maximum statutory

period under section 1370(c)(1) applies to “the aggregate of all

commitments on the same charges.” (Polk, at p. 1238.) Nothing

in our decision contradicts this holding.

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Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27 [“we may reject a literal

construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent

in the statute or that would lead to absurd results”].) We

address each of the People’s arguments in turn.

a. “Arbitrarily truncated” time for treatment

The People contend that if a commitment does not

terminate with a filing of a certificate of restoration, time “to

provide necessary restoration treatment would . . . be arbitrarily

truncated” because medical personnel would need to “predict[]

whether the defendant will contest the hospital’s certification in

the future” and “how much time the defense will require to

prepare for such a hearing.”

The People’s argument implies that medical personnel

would take into account the time available until the maximum

term of commitment is reached in deciding when and how to

provide treatment, instead of expeditiously restoring defendants

to competency. But the Department denies it considers such

factors when providing treatment, and the People offer no

evidence to the contrary.

According to the Department, “[t]he focus of [the

Department’s] treatment is on restoration of competence in the

most expeditious manner possible.” (See § 1370, subd.

(a)(1)(B)(i) [specifying that the defendant shall receive

treatment “that will promote the defendant’s speedy restoration

to mental competence”].) If the Department is providing

services to restore competency “in the most expeditious manner

possible,” then it should not matter for purposes of treatment if

a defendant may be committed for a maximum of two years or a

maximum of two years minus the time it takes to conduct the

competency hearing under section 1372. In either case, the

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Department is extending the treatment necessary to restore

competency as soon as possible; it is not basing its treatment on

“predict[ions]” of whether the defendant will contest the

certification of competency or how much preparation time will

be needed if the matter is contested.

b. “Delays predicated on defense counsel’s needs”

The People further contend that contested competency

hearings following the filing of a certificate of restoration are

often delayed by defense counsel’s need to prepare for the

hearings. According to the People, “[i]f this court adopted

[Rodriguez’s] position, the trial court would have no . . .

discretion or control in balancing the needs of defense attorneys

to adequately prepare on behalf of their clients with concerns of

delay.”

An important premise underlying the People’s argument

is that the time defense counsel need to “adequately prepare”

would often push the competency hearings past the time limit

set by section 1370(c)(1). The People, however, have not

provided any persuasive evidence that a two-year maximum

term is likely to be routinely exhausted even when

postcertification judicial proceedings are taken into account.

Indeed, the available evidence suggests the contrary is true.

When the Legislature reduced the maximum period of

commitment permitted under section 1370(c)(1) from three

years to two years, it noted that “the vast majority (80–90%) [of

persons committed as mentally incompetent] becomes trial-

competent within six months of starting treatment, and nearly

all who attain competency do so within a year.” (Sen. Com. on

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as

introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) The Department likewise

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acknowledges that average “treatment time in a state hospital

operated by [the Department is] 270 days before return to

court” — well below the two-year limit.19

The Department states that “[i]n [its] experience,

competency hearings under section 1372 following a certificate

of restoration are often delayed, sometimes for a significant

length of time.” The only examples of delays that the

Department offers are those occurring in this case and in Carr.

But the proceeding here and in Carr demonstrate how unusual

these delays were.

This case involved extraordinary circumstances relating

to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the People themselves

acknowledge, “the continuances in th[is] case [including] the

final continuance past the two-year mark from the date of

commitment, were not due to gamesmanship by either party, or

institutional negligence like in Carr . . . but rather because of an

unprecedented national emergency and the consequences on

court capacity that resulted therefrom.”

19

To the extent the Department is concerned about running

out of time to provide treatment, its concerns appear to be based

on defendants who have been certified as competent and yet are

“returned to the hospitals for additional competency services.”

Defendants “returned to the hospital for additional competency

services” are those defendants whose certifications of

competency have been rejected by a court, or who had again

become incompetent in short succession. Although we do not

lightly dismiss the Department’s concerns that for these

defendants the Department will not have a full two-year period

in which to provide treatment, ultimately, in setting a maximum

term of commitment, the Legislature has accepted that there

will be some individuals for whom the allotted time is not

enough to restore competency. It is not the role of the courts to

second-guess these legislative choices.

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As for Carr, the defendant there (Carr) spent almost a

year in jail waiting to be transported to a state hospital. (See

Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.) Then without

ever being transported or receiving any treatment, Carr was

certified as competent by a Department psychiatrist. (Id. at

p. 1141.) Carr petitioned for a writ of mandate, claiming that

“ ‘the certification of his competency was employed as a

subterfuge to circumvent the state’s obligation to place him in a

state hospital.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected the claim.

(Ibid.) More than a year later, the trial court concluded that

Carr remained incompetent. (Ibid.) The court again committed

Carr to the Department, and he once more waited for transport

to a facility. (Ibid.) Three months later, while still waiting for

transport, “Carr moved for release on the ground he had

completed the maximum three-year commitment [then]

authorized by law.” (Ibid.) This procedural history makes it

difficult to infer that delays in holding competency hearings are

often so lengthy that the two-year limit is likely to be exceeded

in the normal course.

More generally, neither the facts of this case nor those in

Carr support the assertion that defendants have the incentive

to, and routinely, engage in dilatory tactics. As mentioned, the

People acknowledge that the delays that occurred in this case

were not attributable to “gamesmanship” by Rodriguez. The

court in Carr likewise noted that “there is no basis in this case

to infer Carr’s efforts to oppose the certification contributed to

his commitment exceeding the three-year maximum.” (Carr,

supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.) If a trial court is concerned

that a defendant is requesting continuances for the sole purpose

of exhausting the two-year period, the court may take that into

consideration when determining whether to grant a

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

continuance. (Cf. Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368

[“underscor[ing] the vital role of trial courts in safeguarding the

timely trial right of alleged [sexually violent predators]”].)

Finally, the People’s argument assumes that litigation

delays attributable to the defense cannot be excluded when

determining whether the two-year period has run out. We do

not decide whether that assumption is correct. (See pt. II.C.,

post.)

c. “Competent defendants evading prosecution”

The People contend that adopting Rodriguez’s

interpretation would “result in presumptively competent

defendants evading prosecution” because once section

1370(c)(1)’s limit has been reached, a defendant must be

conserved or released. In its amicus curiae brief, the San Diego

County District Attorney goes further, arguing that “dangerous

criminals” will be released “to the streets.” The statutory

scheme, however, provides safeguards against these results.

Individuals whose commitment terms have expired need

not be released to the community. Instead, they may be civilly

committed, including to long-term conservatorships. (See

§ 1370, subds. (c)(3), (e); Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 568

& fn. 1.) Specifically, a Murphy conservatorship is available to

keep in custody a criminal defendant who is incompetent to

stand trial and who may not be further committed under

section 1370. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(3).) An incompetent

defendant may be conserved under a Murphy conservatorship

if, among other criteria, the defendant “represents a substantial

danger of physical harm to others.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008,

subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).) The conservatorship may last as long as the

conditions supporting conservatorship persist. (See Welf. &

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b); Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at

p. 170; Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at pp. 485, 497.)

Accordingly, it is not the case that “dangerous persons” are

simply released “to the streets” if they are not committed under

section 1370. Even when an incompetent criminal defendant is

not conserved and felony charges are dismissed, the People may

refile charges if they believe the defendant has regained

competency. (See Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at

p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested, and a trial

court may order a new competency hearing, following the

prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges pursuant

to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously committed

for three years”].)

Finally, the People’s argument assumes that when the

two-year period runs out, even a defendant who has been

certified as restored to competence must be released. We do not

decide whether that assumption is correct either. (See pt. II.C.,

post.)

C. Issues to Address on Remand

As previously noted, Rodriguez was initially returned to

the trial court pursuant to a timely-filed certificate of

restoration to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1), (3).)

We have decided the issue of statutory interpretation

presented, concluding that section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year

maximum commitment period continues past the filing of the

certificate, through the court’s decision whether to accept the

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RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

certificate.20 We are not deciding, however, whether the two-

year maximum commitment period was reached here as a result

of Rodriguez’s aggregate periods of commitment. We instead

leave that question for the Court of Appeal to address on

remand.

Because the Court of Appeal concluded that section

1370(c)(1)’s two-year period had not run out, it did not need to

reach whether Rodriguez was otherwise entitled to his

requested remedy. It did not need to decide whether Rodriguez

would have been entitled to dismissal if the period had run out.

It did not need to decide whether expiration of the maximum

commitment period under section 1370(c)(1) mandates release

where the defendant is competent to stand trial. The issue of

what remedy is available when section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year

period has run out — including whether release or

conservatorship are the only appropriate remedies — was not

briefed here.

We therefore conclude these issues merit consideration on

remand to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court may decide

in the first instance what remedy exists if the two-year time

limit has been reached — either as a matter of statutory

interpretation or as a constitutional matter. (Cf. Jackson v.

Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106; Camacho, supra,

15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379, 382 & fn. 5 [noting that courts in

other contexts have suggested there may be other possible

20

Because we reach this conclusion based on a reading of the

statutes, we do not address Rodriguez’s argument that a holding

for the People here would violate constitutional principles of

“due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel,

and proscriptions on cruel and unusual punishment.”

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RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

remedies for unconstitutional delay, such as an order that

proceedings commence forthwith].)

Similarly, we remand to the Court of Appeal to address

whether section 1372 hearings may be continued upon good

cause such that the period between continuances is tolled for

purposes of calculating whether the maximum commitment

term under section 1370(c)(1) has been reached. Stated

differently, we do not address here whether the two-year clock

of section 1370(c)(1) can be paused by good cause continuances

that may arise during the period between a defendant’s return

to court and the trial court’s determination of competence.

Although the issue is mentioned in the parties’ briefing before

us, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal ruled on it.21

This issue is best addressed in the context of the other issues

that remain to be decided in the first instance by the Court of

Appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).)

We express no view on whether Rodriguez has reached the

maximum two-year commitment period; whether Rodriguez is

entitled to the remedy of dismissal he seeks; or whether and how

21

We briefly acknowledge the arguments the parties have

made for and against the availability of such tolling in this

context. Rodriguez argues that “[c]ontinuances and waivers are

not authorized by sections 1370 and 1372, so the courts cannot

read into the statutes what has ‘been omitted.’ ” The People, on

the other hand, counter that tolling, like many of the procedures

governing a section 1372 hearing, may be considered “implied”

by the statutes.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

the issue of tolling may affect Rodriguez’s entitlement to any

relief.22

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that an incompetency commitment does not end

with the filing of a certificate of restoration. Instead, the two-

year maximum commitment period set by Penal Code

section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of the certificate and

includes the time between such filing and the court’s decision

whether to accept the certificate. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Upon remand, the court shall consider whether the two-

year limit of section 1370(c)(1) was exceeded in this case. To

answer that question, the court may consider whether good

cause continuances can toll the limit of section 1370(c)(1). (Cf.

Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379.) If the court finds

that the two-year statutory period has indeed been exceeded, it

shall further consider the nature of the remedy Rodriguez is

entitled to at this point. In particular, the court should examine

whether Rodriguez is entitled to dismissal of the charges

pending against him or whether other relief is appropriate. (Cf.

Camacho, at p. 382, fn. 5; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra,

4 Cal.5th at p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested,

and a trial court may order a new competency hearing, following

the prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges

pursuant to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously

22

This court’s decision to issue a stay in connection with

granting Rodriguez’s petition for review should not be

understood to resolve the question whether Rodriguez is entitled

to the relief he seeks.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

committed for [the statutory maximum period permitted by

section 1370(c)(1)]”].)

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

55

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Rodriguez v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 70 Cal.App.5th 628

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S272129

Date Filed: December 14, 2023

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Santa Clara

Judge: Eric S. Geffon

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Brian C. McComas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for

Petitioner.

Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender (Contra Costa), and Diana Garrido,

Deputy Public Defender, for Contra Costa County Public Defender

Office and California Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae on

behalf of Petitioner.

Emi MacLean and Kim Pederson for American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation of Northern California and Disability Rights California as

Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

DLA Piper and Justin R. Sarno for Silicon Valley De-Bug as Amicus

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Alexandra W. Gadeberg, Crystal

Tindell Seiler and Barbara A. Cathcart, Deputy District Attorneys, for

Real Party in Interest.

Summer Stephan, District Attorney (San Diego), Linh Lam and

Jennifer Kaplan, Deputy District Attorneys, for the San Diego County

District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney

General, Gregory D. Brown and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys

General, for State Department of State Hospitals and State

Department of Developmental Services as Amici Curiae on behalf of

Real Party in Interest.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Brian C. McComas

The Law Office of B.C. McComas, LLP

PMB 1605, 77 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 101

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 814-2465

Emilou MacLean

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California

39 Drumm Street

San Francisco, CA 94111-4805

(929) 375-1575

Alexandra W. Gadeberg

Deputy District Attorney

70 West Hedding, West Wing

San Jose, CA 95110

(408) 792-2757