Opinion

Brown v. Sanford

  • 95 F.3d 48
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Jul 11, 1996
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-20223

Summary Calendar

_____________________

In The Matter of: TOMMIE RAY SANFORD

Debtor.

-----------------------

KAY BROWN,

Appellant,

versus

TOMMIE RAY SANFORD, doing business as Tommy Ray's,

Appellee.

________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-94-2452)

________________________________________________

July 5, 1996

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

At issue in this appeal from a district court order affirming

the bankruptcy court is whether the debtor's liability for a

judgment imposed by a state trial court, in which he (Tommie Ray

Sanford) was found liable pursuant to the Texas Dram Shop Act for

*

Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

injuries caused by an intoxicated patron of his bar, was

dischargeable. The bankruptcy and district courts both held that

debt to be dischargeable and not encompassed by 11 U.S.C. §

523(a)(6), which excepts from discharge those debts for willful and

malicious injury by the debtor to another entity. We AFFIRM.

I.

On October 2, 1990, Kay Brown was seriously injured when her

automobile was struck by another automobile. The other driver, Ed

Reasoner, was intoxicated at the time of the accident; he had left

"Tommy Ray's", a bar owned by Sanford, immediately prior to the

accident, and had been drinking continuously at the bar for several

hours.

Brown sued Sanford in state court; he failed to appear; and

Brown was awarded judgment for $1.9 million against Sanford d/b/a

Tommy Ray's. The judgment provided that Sanford was liable for

selling alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person, in

violation of Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. § 202 (The Texas Dram Shop

Act); and that Reasoner's intoxication was the proximate cause of

Brown's injuries.

Sanford filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in April

1993, and Brown filed her Complaint to Determine Nondischarge-

ability that July, claiming that Sanford's conduct was "willful and

malicious" and thus nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

The bankruptcy court found that Sanford did not personally serve

- 2 -

drinks to Reasoner and held that, although liable to Brown under

state law, the acts giving rise to that liability were at worst

negligent, and accordingly were not encompassed by the willful and

malicious standard required for nondischargeability. The district

court affirmed.

II.

We review the district court's review of the bankruptcy court

de novo, applying the same standard applied there. The bankruptcy

court's findings of fact are reviewed only for clear error, e.g.,

In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc., 712 F.2d 206,

209 (5th Cir. 1983); questions of law and mixed questions of law

and fact, de novo. E.g., Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194, 202

(5th Cir. 1990).

Brown urges that the bankruptcy court erred when it found that

the debt owed by Sanford as a result of his liability under the

Texas Dram Shop Act was dischargeable. For the reasons given by

the district court in its thorough opinion, we find no error. We

conclude that the court's factual finding that Sanford did not

personally sell any drinks to Reasoner is not clearly erroneous,

and agree with its holding that Sanford's actions, because he had

no personal involvement, were not willful, but rather, at worst,

negligent. Moreover, we agree with both lower courts that,

regardless of Sanford's liability under Texas state law for the

injuries Brown received, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code,

- 3 -

Sanford's actions were not a "willful and malicious injury by the

debtor". 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

- 4 -

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.