The opinion
Case: 23-30253 Document: 00516992270 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/06/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
____________
December 6, 2023
No. 23-30253 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Jason E. Walls, individually and on behalf of his deceased father,
William E. Walls; William Walls, individually and on behalf of
his deceased father, William E. Walls,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Sheriff’s Office of Caddo Parish; Ryan Chapman;
Stephen W. Prator,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:22-CV-579
______________________________
Before Jolly, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam *:
William E. Walls died of a heart attack he suffered while detained in
the back of a Caddo Parish, Louisiana, patrol car. His survivors filed a civil
rights lawsuit against a Caddo Parish deputy, the Caddo Parish sheriff, and
the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office. The defendants removed the lawsuit to
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5
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No. 23-30253
federal court and moved to dismiss several of the plaintiffs’ claims. As
relevant to this appeal, the deputy invoked qualified immunity to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ excessive force claim against him. The district court denied
qualified immunity. The deputy appealed. We AFFIRM.
I.
A.
On appeal from a denial of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss
stage, “[w]e must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, draw all inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and view all facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568
F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1) (federal
pleading rules apply to actions removed from state court). Here, the petition
alleges the following facts.
On March 9, 2021, Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputy Ryan
Chapman and other deputies attempted to execute an arrest warrant for Chad
Deloach. The deputies believed that Deloach was living on William E.
Walls’s Keithville property. When the deputies arrived at the property,
Walls told them he did not know Deloach’s location and cooperated with
their investigation. Walls invited the deputies into his home so they could
search for Deloach. Walls also offered to call his son, who lived in a separate
trailer on his property, and ask him where Deloach was. Deputy Chapman
rejected Walls’s offer, cursed at him, threatened him, and ordered him back
inside his home. Walls obeyed but revoked consent for the deputies to re-
enter his home.
Upon returning inside his home, Walls observed the deputies
searching the exterior of another residence on his property. As Walls watched
the deputies through the windows of his home, he held his phone. Chapman
saw Walls with his phone and thought that he was videotaping the deputies.
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In response, Chapman forced his way into Walls’s home. Chapman
“forcefully grabbed” Walls, ROA.16, threw him against his kitchen counter,
ROA.19, handcuffed him, ROA.16, “aggressively and violently” pulled him
from his home, ROA.19, “slammed” him against the hood of the patrol car,
ROA.19, and “forced” him into the back of the car. ROA.19.
After a short period of time detained in the patrol car, Walls (a senior
citizen) suffered a heart attack and stopped breathing. The deputies pulled
him from the patrol car and administered CPR. Walls died at the scene.
B.
Walls’s two surviving sons (hereinafter “plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit in
Louisiana state court against Chapman, Caddo Parish Sheriff Stephen Prator,
and the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office. They asserted claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law. The plaintiffs asked for money
damages and costs.
The defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court and moved to
dismiss several of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). As relevant to this appeal,
Chapman invoked qualified immunity as a defense to the § 1983 excessive
force claim. The district court denied Chapman’s qualified immunity
defense, and Chapman timely appealed. Our review is de novo. See Club Retro,
L.L.C., 568 F.3d at 194.
II.
Plaintiffs seek money damages from a law enforcement officer. To
win, they must overcome qualified immunity. That means they must show
(1) that Chapman violated Walls’s constitutional rights and (2) that the right
at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. See
Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
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Deputy Chapman challenges only the second requirement—clearly
established law. So that is all we address.
Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
63 (2018) (quotation omitted). It “shields officers from civil liability so long
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” City
of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
“[T]o show a violation of clearly established law, [the plaintiff] must identify
a case that put [the officer] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.”
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021) (per curiam).
Courts must be careful “not to define clearly established law at too
high a level of generality.” City of Tahlequah, 595 U.S. at 12 (quotation
omitted). “[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context . . . .” Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6 (quotation omitted). In particular,
“excessive force is an area of the law in which the result depends very much
on the facts of each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qualified
immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at
issue.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (citation
and quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court has never said that circuit precedent is sufficient
to put officers on notice of their constitutional obligations. See Wesby, 583
U.S. at 66 n.8 (“We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our
own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”);
see also Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 672 (5th Cir. 2023) (Oldham, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But our court has repeatedly said
that circuit precedent can clearly establish the law. See, e.g., Boyd, 74 F.4th at
670–71 (majority op.).
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Assuming our precedent can clearly establish the law, two of our cases
are relevant here. See Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008); Deville v.
Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009). In Bush, we denied qualified
immunity where the officer slammed a compliant arrestee’s face into the
window of a nearby car, injuring her jaw and teeth. See 513 F.3d at 500–02.
And in Deville, we denied qualified immunity where the officer pulled over a
woman for speeding, ordered her out of the car, and then (when she did not
comply) broke the vehicle’s window, pulled the woman out, and caused her
multiple injuries (including “contusions to both wrists, neuropathy of her
hands, right shoulder strain, left shoulder bruising (with hand prints), and
multiple cuts caused by broken glass”). See 567 F.3d at 167–69.
Under Bush and Deville, the district court did not err. On the well-
pleaded facts of this case, Walls was not suspected of any crime, posed no
immediate threat to the safety of the deputies or others, and made no attempt
to actively resist arrest or evade arrest by flight. Chapman violently seized
Walls only because Chapman mistakenly thought Walls was videotaping the
officers. There was no evidence that Chapman’s actions were compelled by
necessity and exigency. Walls was injured in the arrest and then died.
Assuming the truth of the facts as pleaded, Chapman violated clearly
established law.
AFFIRMED.
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