LOUIS SPAGNUOLO, JAY LEWIS FARROW, AND FARROW LAW, P.A., vs INSURANCE OFFICE OF AMERICA, INC., JOHN K. RITENOUR, HEATH RITENOUR, ROY CASWELL, AND J. DAVID NAUGHTON, IV

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

LOUIS SPAGNUOLO, JAY LEWIS FARROW,

AND FARROW LAW, P.A.,,

Appellants,

Case Nos. 5D21-1324

5D21-1326

v.

LT Case No. 2020-CA-000725

INSURANCE OFFICE OF AMERICA, INC.,

JOHN K. RITENOUR, HEATH RITENOUR,

ROY CASWELL, AND J. DAVID NAUGHTON, IV,

Appellees.

________________________________/

Opinion filed February 28, 2023

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Seminole County,

Susan Stacy, Judge.

Holiday Hunt Russell, of Holiday

Hunt Russell PLLC, Fort Lauderdale,

for Appellants, Jay Lewis Farrow

and Farrow Law, P.A.

Jay Lewis Farrow and Meera K.

Koodie, of Farrow Law P.A., Davie,

for Appellant, Louis Spagnuolo.

Brian J. Moran, Christopher R.

Parkinson, and Jason DelRosso, of

Moran Kidd Lyons Johnson Garcia,

P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

EDWARDS, J.

Appellants seek to vacate a temporary injunction which prohibits them

from making or sharing extremely unflattering, possibly defamatory,

statements, about some or all Appellees, via email and on social media sites.

The injunction also prohibits Appellants’ unlicensed use of Appellees’

names, logos, and likenesses. Among other topics, the communications

from Appellants that led to issuance of the injunction accuse Appellees of

various fraudulent, dishonest, unethical, or criminal business conduct

regarding Appellees’ insurance brokerage firm. For the reasons explained

below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for

further proceedings. 1

Background

Parties

Appellants include a lawyer, Jay Farrow, and his law firm, Farrow Law,

P.A. (“the Farrow Parties”). The other Appellant is Louis Spagnuolo, a client

1

Our rulings only concern the temporary injunction.

2

of Farrow who sued Appellees regarding the termination of a prior business

referral relationship with Insurance Office of America, Inc. ("IOA").2

Appellees are IOA, a large insurance broker, and John Ritenour and

Heath Ritenour, principals in IOA.

Initial Actions Targeting Appellees

It is undisputed that Spagnuolo entered into a paid referral

arrangement with John Ritenour as a result of and limited to referring one

client to IOA. Spagnuolo received payments related to that referral beginning

in 2014; however, the payments ceased in January 2019 when John

Ritenour terminated his role as producer of the relevant accounts.

In March 2019, the Farrow Parties served a written demand for

settlement on Heath Ritenour, the CEO of IOA, and his wife, who was not an

officer or employee of IOA. The demand was served at the couple’s home

and demanded payment of more than five million dollars to resolve the

Farrow Parties’ clients’ claims. The Farrow Parties’ demand threatened that

Heath Ritenour and IOA would be subjected to a “public spectacle” if

2

David Naughton (“Naughton”), Roy Caswell (“Caswell”), Woodrow

Power (“Power), and Spagnuolo were identified as clients of Farrow Law and

were listed as defendants below (“Clients”). Of the Clients, Spagnuolo was

the only one directly involved and specifically bound by the injunction and

thus the only one who appealed. The trial court found no direct evidence

that the other Clients were involved in harming Appellees.

3

payment was not forthcoming. In connection with this demand, the Farrow

Parties served demand and document preservation letters on some of IOA’s

customers and certain insurers with which it did business. The Farrow

Parties also sent a similar demand letter to Don Whitten, who is both pastor

of the Ritenours’ church and Heath Ritenour’s father-in-law.

Appellants’ Lawsuits, Postings, and Communications

When the settlement demand was not paid, the Farrow Parties filed

actions in September 2019 for each Client against the IOA Parties alleging

violations of Florida’s civil RICO statute and fraud, among other claims.

Generally, the suits filed by the Farrow Parties for the Clients alleged that

IOA and the Ritenours were involved in stock manipulation, inflated the value

of IOA’s private stock, stole accounts from competitors, overbilled clients,

and engaged in impermissible insurance rebating to their customers.

After those suits were filed, the Farrow Parties issued what they

referred to as “press releases” and “notices to witnesses” in both written and

video formats. The “press releases” and “notices to witnesses” repeated or

referenced the contents of the Clients’ accusatory pleadings and sought

anybody with information to contact them. The Farrow Parties paid one or

more third parties to forward their “press releases”; they were not picked up

or disseminated by newspaper, radio, or television.

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Some of the “press releases” contained the IOA trademarked logo as

well as photos of John Ritenour, Heath Ritenour, and Heath’s mother,

despite having no permission for doing so. Some of these “press releases”

contained a decades’ old mug shot of Heath Ritenour taken after he was

arrested for a traffic offense that was completely unrelated to any of the

Clients’ litigation or claims.

Various “press releases” and “notices to witnesses” asserted that IOA

and the Ritenours engaged in securities fraud, RICO violations, stealing,

illegal activities, nefarious actions, Ponzi schemes, gangster-like behavior,

gender discrimination, unequal pay, mistreatment of female IOA employees,

and that IOA’s insurance license had been or was likely to be revoked.

Certain of the Farrow Parties’ “press releases” reported on the outcome of

various hearings or other litigation in a misleading manner to create the

impression that they or their clients prevailed when in fact they had not.

These “press releases” were posted and reposted almost

simultaneously by Spagnuolo on three different LinkedIn accounts that he

controls. Only one of the accounts, his own, was legitimate. Another was

identified as VIP Risk America, a defunct company, associated with

Spagnuolo. The final LinkedIn account was completely fictious, using a

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fictious individual identity, Charles Reynolds, with its profile photograph

being that of Spagnuolo’s former colleague, Charles Goldman. 3

Spagnuolo sometimes employed hashtags of IOA’s clients so as to

target them and he tagged the Ritenours’ church in one post.

Emails with similar claims or accusations were sent by one or more of

Appellants from anonymous “proton” email accounts to IOA’s clients and

business partners. Other proton emails were sent to the Florida Bar,

accusing IOA’s in-house counsel of criminal witness tampering and included

links to various of the Farrow Parties’ “press releases.”

Appellees’ Suit for Damages & Injunction

In March 2020, IOA and the Ritenours filed suit against the Farrow

Parties and the Clients seeking money damages for alleged defamation,

tortious interference with IOA’s existing and potential business relationships,

and abuse of process. They later moved for entry of a temporary injunction

to halt alleged ongoing tortious interference with IOA’s business. The Farrow

Parties and Clients filed opposing papers in which they asserted that

injunctive relief was barred by the Free Speech clause of the First

Amendment and the common law litigation privilege.

3

Goldman, who is not a party to this case, had not given permission

for the use of his likeness on the fictitious Reynolds account.

6

Injunction Hearing and Court’s Findings

The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings over the course of three

days during which certain parties and experts testified and numerous

exhibits were admitted into evidence regarding the motion for temporary

injunction.

Jay Farrow testified that his notices to witnesses were not efforts to

obtain new clients but were efforts to investigate and gather evidence to

support the Clients’ claims. He further testified that because they were

supposedly not advertisements, they were not subject to review or regulation

by the Florida Bar which does pre-screen lawyer advertisements of all sorts.

Farrow admitted sending out demand letters to Heath Ritenour and the

demand and preservation letters to some of IOA’s clients and customers. He

further admitted that he uses “heavy-handed” and “relentless” litigation

tactics. Evidence was presented of a podcast in which Farrow stated that he

“goes after spouses of people that he is going after in court.”

Spagnuolo claimed in his testimony that IOA stole millions of dollars

from him, and he was looking for witnesses to support his lawsuit. He said

he had been a part owner of VIP Risk America, which no longer existed at

the time of the hearing, and admitted to owning and controlling the defunct

company’s website and social media accounts. Spagnuolo testified about

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operating the fictitious LinkedIn account of Charles Reynolds and the VIP

Risk America LinkedIn accounts. He said that he would receive Farrow

Parties’ communications about IOA, then post them to one account, add a

comment, then forward it to another account, and so forth. Spagnuolo

testified that this posting and reposting was done to “give more color to the

story.”

In addition to the foregoing, Spagnuolo created and controlled a

website named “johnritenour.com” which featured photos of John Ritenour,

his wife, and Heath Ritenour. The website was created without John

Ritenour’s permission; likewise, none of the Ritenours gave permission for

the use of their names on that site. Spagnuolo posted the Farrow Parties’

“press releases” to this website and also posted links to the website on the

fictious Charles Reynolds account. He admitted that he posted videos

regarding the Ritenours and IOA on the johnritenour.com website. In an

effort to distance himself from the website, Spagnuolo transferred ownership

and control of this site to a third-party webhost “Njalla” which attempts to

maintain its customers’ anonymity.

Heath Ritenour testified that he was personally aware of having lost

numerous accounts and potential accounts due to the Farrow Parties’ “press

releases.” He advised the court that in the current business world, potential

8

customers unfamiliar with IOA would typically search the internet for

information and due to Appellants’ activities, they would be led to the

unflattering, possibly defamatory, misleading or false statements described

above. He also identified screen shots depicting one method of leading

potential clients to the Farrow Parties’ “press releases” or website. Paid click

through ads, sponsored by the Farrow Parties, would be first in line in a

Google search for anybody searching for IOA. When clicked, those ads

would take the searcher to the Farrow Parties’ website where the various

“press releases,” all negatively commenting on IOA, were available for

review.

Heath Ritenour discussed two specific customers targeted by

Appellants’ communications, who advised IOA in writing that they were not

going to do business with IOA because of what they had read in the Farrow

Parties’ articles and out of concern for the Farrow-created rumor that IOA

was at risk of losing its insurance license.

Heath Ritenour testified that he was forced to fly to Texas to meet with

one client or potential client, during the Covid pandemic, in an effort to offer

reassurances in the face of the Farrow Parties’ “news releases” which the

client had reviewed. Heath further testified that IOA lost employees and at

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least one intern as a result of the Farrow Parties’ misleading

communications.

One of IOA’s clients, a professional sports team, received an email,

which included portions of the Farrow Parties’ paid press releases, from a

proton email account controlled by one of Appellants, stating that IOA was

facing fraud and racketeering charges.

The trial court found that the Farrow Parties had delivered the initial $5

million demand to Heath Ritenour and his wife and that there was

uncontroverted evidence that the Farrow Parties conferred and consulted

with Spagnuolo on a routine basis with regard to the “press releases” they

posed and reposted. The trial court determined that the press releases and

notices to witnesses included information or allegations that were unrelated

to lawsuits pending at the time of their release. The court further found

Appellants’ use of the term “notices to witnesses” was disingenuous; they

were advertisements intended to further the business interests of the Farrow

Parties. The trial court concluded that the Appellants’ press releases had

reported the outcome of hearings and litigation related to Appellees in a

misleading fashion.

The trial court determined that Appellants had been engaged in “an

ongoing and systematic campaign to interfere with the business relationships

10

of Plaintiff, IOA, through the targeting of business associates, with internet

communications, Proton emails and social media tagging, and direct

demands.” The court went on to find that Appellees had laid the foundation

for proving the elements of tortious interference and that Appellants’

activities harmed IOA by damaging business relationships with customers,

potential customers, insurance companies, and others who were known by

the Farrow Parties and Spagnuolo. The trial court found that Appellants’

interference with IOA’s business was not justified and in fact was malicious.

Finally, as to the tortious interference claim, the court found that there had

been damages but that quantifying them would be nearly impossible at this

time leading to the conclusion that they had or may suffer irreparable harm.

According to the court’s findings, the use of the Ritenours’ names,

likenesses, creation of the johnritenour.com web site, and utilizing the IOA

logo was done by Appellants without permission from Appellees and

constituted a violation of section 540.08, Florida Statutes (2020). The trial

court made similar findings as to Appellants’ use of Charles Gordon’s

photograph in connection with the fictitious Charles Reynolds LinkedIn

account. Appellants’ use of Heath Ritenour’s 23-year-old mugshot,

according to the trial court, was without permission and an effort by

11

Appellants to mislead those having or contemplating business relations with

IOA.

Temporary Injunction

On April 26, 2021, the trial court entered its written temporary

injunction. The temporary injunction order contained eight numbered

paragraphs which enjoined one or more of Appellants from engaging in

various stated conduct or communications which the trial court found to be

either misleading to the public, interfering with Appellees’ business

relationships, in violation of Florida statutory law, otherwise objectionable, or

some combination of those inappropriate qualities. Rather than repeat the

verbiage of the temporary injunction at this point, each paragraph of the order

will be set forth and analyzed below.

Applicable Legal Principles

The following general principles are important to keep in mind when

analyzing the temporary injunction that is being appealed. “[A] party seeking

injunctive relief must show (1) irreparable harm, (2) an inadequate legal

remedy, and (3) the existence of a clear legal right.” Murtagh v. Hurley, 40

So. 3d 62, 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Zimmerman v. D.C.A. at Welleby,

Inc., 505 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)).

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Special considerations come into play when the actions to be enjoined

are or may be protected as First Amendment free speech. “[P]rior restraints

on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable

infringement on First Amendment rights.” Fox v. Hamptons at Metrowest

Condo. Ass’n, 223 So. 3d 453, 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting Vrasic v.

Leibel, 106 So. 3d 485, 486–87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). “Temporary

restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually

forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.” Id.

(quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)).

“[I]njunctions are not available to stop someone from uttering insults or

falsehoods.” Krapacs v. Bacchus, 301 So. 3d 976, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020);

see Vrasic, 106 So. 3d at 487 (“[P]rotection against prior restraints on speech

extends to both false statements and to those from which a commercial gain

is derived.”). “In fact most prior restraints on an individual’s constitutional

right of free expression are presumptively unconstitutional.” Weiss v. Weiss,

5 So. 3d 758, 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). “Because injunctive relief is generally

unavailable, a complainant is typically left to his or her remedy at law.” Id.

Although equity will typically not be used to enjoin a person from

making allegedly defamatory statements, there is an exception for

defamatory statements which are uttered or published incident to another

13

tort, including interference with a present or prospective business

relationship. See Murtagh, 40 So. 3d at 65–66; DeRitis v. AHZ Corp., 444

So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that an injunction was the proper

remedy in cases alleging interference “with a present or prospective

business relationship”); Azar v. Lehigh Corp., 364 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d DCA

1978) (holding that a trial court has broad discretion to enter a temporary

injunction to prohibit interference with business relationships).

Detailed Analysis of Injunction

The first paragraph enjoining Appellants states:

1. The Court is enjoining the reporting on court hearings in a

manner which misleads the public with false information. The

Court finds that as to Jay Farrow and Farrow Law that the

press releases concerning the January 5, 2021 hearing, as

well as the reporting on the NuView settlements, are

misleading.

First Amendment free speech and press rights typically make injunctive relief

unavailable to prevent the publication of false or misleading information.

Krapacs, 301 So. 3d at 980; Vrasic, 106 So. 3d at 487. The temporary

injunction forbidding the Farrow Parties from reporting on the court

proceedings, even in a misleading fashion, is an unconstitutional prior

restraint that cannot stand. For that reason, we quash the above paragraph

and instruct the trial court on remand to remove it by issuance of an amended

temporary injunction.

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The second paragraph enjoining Appellants states:

2. As to Louis Spagnuolo, the Court is enjoining the use of the

VRA (VIP Risk America) and Charles Reynolds' LinkedIn

accounts, as well as the use of Charles Goldman's image and

biography to comment on IOA, its owners, employees or

customers, while finding that Mr. Spagnuolo has a right to

utilize his first amendment rights for his own personal use, but

he does not have the right to make posts under the guise of

third parties who are not consenting or through fictitious

LinkedIn profiles for non-existent persons or entities as this

misleads the public and interferes with legitimate business

interests, as to whose opinions are being put forth.

The second paragraph likewise constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint

on the exercise of First Amendment free speech, this time the rights of

Spagnuolo. Accordingly, we quash the second paragraph and instruct the

trial court to remove it on remand by issuance of an amended temporary

injunction.

The third paragraph enjoining Appellants states:

3. The Court enjoins the use of Heath Ritenour's 23-year-old

mugshot from an arrest which arose from an issue unrelated

and not in connection with writings included on press

releases, posts or websites that are unrelated in time, date

and subject area to the allegations behind the arrest, for the

use of interfering with legitimate business interests and

partners. The Court finds this combination of picture and

allegations in the lawsuit are not connected to any of the

current allegations and misleads the public to believe the

Plaintiff was arrested in connection with his business or the

lawsuits. The "notices to witnesses" which utilize this practice

are not reasonably likely to lead to finding witnesses or

discoverable evidence in this or the other employment-based

cases. The use is a vehicle to interfere with the business

15

relationships of Heath Ritenour, the managing partner of IOA,

and to harm IOA's business by misleading the public as to

when and why the incident occurred.

To the extent that Appellants were using the mugshot to further their own

commercial interests, as the trial court found, the injunction is specifically

authorized by section 540.08, which states in pertinent part:

(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly

use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising

purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any

natural person without the express written or oral consent to such

use given by:

(a) Such person;

****

(2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not

obtained, the person whose name, portrait, photograph, or other

likeness is so used, . . . .may bring an action to enjoin such

unauthorized publication, printing, display or other public use,

and to recover damages for any loss or injury sustained by

reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a

reasonable royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages.

Appellants’ argument that the mugshot is not being used to market the

Farrow law firm falls short. The statute prohibits its use, without Heath

Ritenour’s permission, for any trade, commercial, or advertising purpose

which certainly encompasses Appellants’ use of the photograph to

encourage settlement through personal harassment and intentional

interference with Appellees’ current and potential business relationships.

16

Appellants’ argument that a litigation privilege permits them to

repeatedly use the 23-year-old mugshot is likewise unavailing. Florida

recognizes two types of privilege which shield litigation participants from

liability for uttering defamatory or otherwise tortious statements during or in

connection with litigation. The first is an absolute immunity as to acts

occurring or comments made during the course of a judicial proceeding as

long as it has some relationship to the proceeding. See Arko Plumbing Corp.

v. Rudd, 230 So. 3d 520, 523–24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). There is also a

qualified privilege that offers protection to a litigation participant for a

comment or action that occurs during informal litigation-related

circumstances, such as during investigative conversations with potential

witnesses if it is relevant to the litigation-related subject of inquiry. See

DelMonico v. Traynor, 116 So. 3d 1205, 1218 (Fla. 2013). Neither litigation

privilege attaches to Appellants’ use of the decades-old mugshot as it is

completely irrelevant to Appellants’ litigation against Appellees. Nor do

Appellants have a First Amendment right to use the old mugshot to

intentionally interfere with Appellees’ current or future business relationships.

See Murtagh, 40 So. 3d at 65-66. We thus affirm this paragraph of the

temporary injunction.

The fourth paragraph enjoining Appellants states:

17

4. The Court is enjoining the use of John Ritenour's, Heath

Ritenour's and Valli Ritenour's name and likeness and the IOA

logo without authorization. The Court finds that some of the

posts were for purposes other than for notices to witnesses in

that they appear to advertise for Mr. Farrow’s law firm or for

himself personally.

To the extent that Appellants are using John Ritenour’s, Heath Ritenour’s or

Valli Ritenour’s name and likeness “for purposes of trade or for any

commercial or advertising purpose” without their permission, it would appear

to violate section 540.08, Florida Statutes, and that could be enjoined.

However, the above-quoted paragraph from the temporary injunction says

that only “some” were used for advertising; thus, there is no basis under

section 540.08 to completely ban Appellants’ actions and communication.

“An injunction should never be broader than is necessary to secure to the

injured party relief warranted by the circumstances involved in the particular

case.” Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1091 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2014) (citing DeRitis, 444 So. 2d at 94). “Entry of an overly broad

injunction [barring or limiting communication] can constitute a violation of the

First Amendment.” Id.

Accordingly, we reverse as to this fourth paragraph and remand with

instructions for the trial court to limit this aspect of the injunction so as to

prohibit only the use of their names or likeness for trade, commercial, or

advertising purposes. To the extent that Appellee IOA proved that

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Appellants have used its duly registered trademark without authorization, the

injunction is affirmed.

The fifth paragraph enjoining Appellants’ actions states:

5. The Court is enjoining any actions in violation of either

Sections [540.08] and 817.568, Florida Statutes. The Court

enjoins the unauthorized use of the LinkedIn profile for

Charles Reynolds and any use of the images of people who

Mr. Spagnuolo did not, and does not, have authorization

from to post about IOA, Heath Ritenour and John Ritenour

as it is misleading and appears to offend the referenced

Florida Statutes.

An injunction which generally states that those enjoined shall not

violate the law or specific statutes is typically considered too vague to stand.

An injunction “may not be drawn to enjoin all conceivable breaches of the

law; it must instead be carefully tailored to remedy only the specific harms

shown.” Pediatric Pavilion v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., 883 So. 2d 927,

930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). “It must be adequately particularized and phrased

in such language that it can with definiteness be complied with.” Id. (quoting

Fla. Peach Orchards, Inc. v. State, 190 So. 2d 796. 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)).

Additionally, this paragraph appears to prohibit the use of the Charles

Reynolds account by Spagnuolo for making any comments about IOA, Heath

Ritenour, or John Ritenour. We agree with Appellants that the scope of this

paragraph is overly broad, as it prohibits Spagnuolo from making and posting

comments that are perfectly acceptable and protected by the First

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Amendment. In Delgado v. Miller, the Third District held that the relevant

order was overbroad when it “prohibit[ed] either party from ‘engag[ing] in any

social media of any nature which comments, directly or indirectly, on the

other party’s emotion or mental health or personal behavior.’” 314 So. 3d

515, 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

Finally, we note that section 817.568, Florida Statutes (2021), is a

criminal statute that provides punishment for those who are convicted of

using personal identification information fraudulently or to harass a person.

By its clear text, that section prohibits the unauthorized personal

identification of an individual, deceased individual, or a dissolved business

entity and specifies that “individual” means a single human being and

excludes, inter alia, any corporation. § 817.568(1)(d), Fla. Stat. Thus, it has

no application to IOA and does not explicitly provide a private cause of

action.

Accordingly, we reverse as to this fifth paragraph and instruct the trial

court to remove same from any amended temporary injunction.

The sixth paragraph enjoining Appellants states:

6. The Court enjoins Defendants, Jay Farrow, Farrow Law

and Louis Spagnuolo, and any others acting in concert or

participation with them, from contacting clients or

prospective clients of IOA or IOA’s current or prospective

clients with the Farrow Law advertisements under the

guise of notice to witnesses. The Court is enjoining the

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use of misleading social media accounts to create a self-

reinforcing feedback loop by reposting matters about

IOA, John Ritenour and Heath Ritenour and making them

appear to be the words of someone other than the

Defendants in this case. Particularly, the Court enjoins

the use of hashtags or direct contacts to individual

companies known to do business with IOA for the

purpose of disparaging IOA to interfere with and harm its

business relationships, including those referenced in the

hearing such as Chubb, Custom Pools & Spa, the

Orlando Magic and the other entities which were

referenced in the testimony herein.

To the extent that this paragraph purports to enjoin anybody other than

Appellants from contacting Appellees’ current or prospective clients, it is

quashed because the trial court has no jurisdiction over non-parties and

without naming those “others,” Appellants are not sufficiently advised of

whom they must avoid.

Appellants’ argument that Appellees failed to make a prima facie case

on tortious interference with current and prospective business relationships

is unavailing. In Sobi v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 846 So. 2d 1204, 1207 (Fla.

5th DCA 2003), we set forth the following as the elements underlying tortious

interference:

(1) the existence of a business relationship; (2) the defendant’s

knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional and

unjustified interference with that relationship; and (4) damage to

the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the business relationship.

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With regard to the current clients listed in this sixth paragraph, Appellees did

establish that there are or were business relationships between IOA and

those clients. Appellees showed that Spagnuolo, the Farrow Parties, and

some of the other Clients had knowledge of those relationships. Moreover,

Appellees established that Appellants were intentionally and without

justification interfering with those relationships and likely caused some

damage to those relationships.

Appellees also offered proof of specific prospective business

relationships in terms of both clients and employees with IOA that received

and were disrupted by some of Appellants’ activities and communications,

but did not sufficiently prove that Appellants knew of their relationships with

Appellees. Therefore, this paragraph is overly broad because it purports to

bar Appellants from contacting prospective clients of IOA without identifying

them in a detailed fashion. See Angelino v. Santa Barbara Enters., LLC, 2

So. 3d 1100, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (finding temporary injunction

overbroad where it enjoined Angelino from usurping appellee’s business

opportunities, customers, and suppliers without listing the customers or

suppliers). The overbreadth also infects the ban on Appellants contacting

any current clients that were not identified in this paragraph. There is

competent, substantial evidence in the record to confirm that those named

22

in this sixth paragraph as current clients are accurately and adequately

described. The fact that Appellants sent demand and document

preservation letters to some of IOA’s current clients as well as Appellants’

use of hashtags and other targeting tools, undercuts their claimed lack of

knowledge regarding IOA’s business relationships.

On remand, the trial court for this paragraph shall include a list of the

current clients of IOA in accordance with the evidence who are not to be

contacted by Appellants. Likewise, the trial court shall further amend the

temporary injunction to enjoin Appellants from contacting any other entities

or individuals known by Appellants to be existing clients of IOA. However,

the evidence presented did not establish that Appellants had knowledge

regarding who were Appellees’ potential clients; thus, that portion of the

injunction prohibiting contact with potential clients is reversed and shall be

removed on remand. On remand, the trial court must revise the sixth

paragraph to correct the deficiencies discussed above or otherwise limit the

scope of that paragraph.

The seventh paragraph enjoining Appellants states:

7. The Court enjoins any false statements or inferences with

regard to IOA, John Ritenour or Heath Ritenour and the

suspension of their insurance license. The Court finds that it

is uncontroverted through all the evidence that the Court has

no evidence of any current actions before this Court, any other

Court, or any Administrative Agency, that there is an action to

23

suspend the licenses of these parties. No party or witness

testified that there were or are any current actions or even

alleged action that was occurring against the insurance

license of IOA.

Unlike the first paragraph discussed above, this seventh paragraph is

specific and identifies Appellants’ activities and communications that are

clearly intended to interfere with current or prospective clients, and which

would cause irreparable harm given the difficulty of quantifying the amount

of business that IOA lost or may lose in the future. Accordingly, we affirm

the seventh paragraph.

The eighth paragraph enjoining Appellants’ actions states:

8. Farrow, Farrow Law, and Spagnuolo are enjoined, and thereby

required to remove from public circulation, all statements or

communications that they have posted about IOA or any of the

other Plaintiffs that are false and would mislead the public or

violate Sections [540.08] and 817.568, Florida Statutes.

This eighth paragraph suffers the same infirmity as the first paragraph, to the

extent that it refers only to and requires removal of false or misleading

communications. First Amendment free speech and press rights typically

make injunctive relief unavailable to prevent the publication of false or

misleading information. Krapacs, 301 So. 3d at 980; Vrasic, 106 So. 3d at

487. Furthermore, Appellants are entitled to be advised of the specific

matters they must seek to remove where possible, such as the false claims

that IOA has or is at risk of losing its insurance license. Likewise, to the

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extent this eighth paragraph requires Appellants to remove content that

violates section 540.08, they are entitled to be advised of the specific

materials, such as Heath Ritenour’s old mugshot and the johnritenour.com

website, that fall within the affirmative injunction. On remand, the trial court

shall enter an amended paragraph that complies with this opinion.

Given the bases of our rulings with regard to each paragraph that

actually enjoined Appellants’ activities or communications, we need not

address any other issues. We remand this matter to the trial court for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

EVANDER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

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