Anita C. Cooke v. Sgt. Randy Duane Brashears

USCA11 Case: 23-10191 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2023 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10191

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ANITA C. COOKE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SGT. RANDY DUANE BRASHEARS,

OFFICER KENDARIOUS MAYFIELD,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04680-ELR

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10191

____________________

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Anita C. Cooke appeals the district court’s grant of the mo-

tion to dismiss based on qualified immunity filed by Sergeant

Randy Duane Brashears and Officer Kendarious Mayfield, in her

lawsuit alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Cooke asserts the district court erred in concluding

arguable probable cause existed to (1) make a warrantless arrest of

her; and (2) support an arrest application for her. After review, 1 we

affirm the district court.

Cooke asserts Brashears and Mayfield arrested and prose-

cuted her based on the changing story of a minor, A.W., even

though A.W. “was lying through his teeth when speaking to”

Brashears and Mayfield, such that “[a]ny reasonable police officer

would or should have spotted these lies instantly,” and not relied on

A.W.’s statements.

As to false arrest, Cooke alleges Brashears and Mayfield vio-

lated her Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested her.

Brashears and Mayfield contend qualified immunity shields them

1 We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based on qualified

immunity de novo. Chandler v. Sec. of Fla. Dept. of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198

(11th Cir. 2012).

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23-10191 Opinion of the Court 3

from this claim because they had probable cause, or at least argua-

ble probable cause, to arrest Cooke for the crimes charged.

To survive a motion to dismiss,2 Cooke must have alleged

sufficient facts to support a finding of a constitutional violation of

a clearly established law. Chandler v. Sec. of Fla. Dept. of Transp., 695

F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2012). In the context of an arrest, proba-

ble cause exists “when the facts, considering the totality of the cir-

cumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable of-

ficer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal activ-

ity.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (quot-

ing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). In assessing

whether there was probable cause for an arrest, we “ask whether a

reasonable officer could conclude that there was a substantial

chance of criminal activity.” Id. at 902 (quotation marks and alter-

ation omitted). “Probable cause does not require conclusive evi-

dence and is not a high bar.” Id. at 899 (quotation marks omitted).

“[A]rresting officers, in deciding whether probable cause exists, are

not required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues

of credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present a

sufficient basis for believing that an offense has been committed.

Nor does probable cause require certainty on the part of the po-

lice.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated

on other grounds by Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945,

1955 (2018).

2 Cooke does not dispute that Brashears and Mayfield were engaged in a dis-

cretionary function.

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10191

To determine whether there was probable cause for Cooke’s

arrest, we ask whether a reasonable officer could have concluded

there was a substantial chance she had committed the crimes of

hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, kid-

napping in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, aggravated assault in

violation of O.C.G.A § 16-5-21, and cruelty to children in the third

degree in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(d).

“A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle

in the first degree when such person, while in possession of a fire-

arm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual . . . by

force or intimidation.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b)(1). “A person com-

mits the offense of kidnapping when such person abducts or steals

away another person without lawful authority or warrant and

holds such other person against his or her will.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-

40(a). “A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when

he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon . . . which, when used

offensively against a person, is likely to . . . result in serious bodily

injury.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). A person commits the offense of

cruelty to children when, “[s]uch person, who is the primary ag-

gressor, intentionally allows a child under the age of 18 to witness

the commission of a forcible felony, battery, or family violence bat-

tery.” O.C.G.A.§ 16-5-70(d).

According to Cooke’s own allegations, she was driving a sto-

len truck with her pistol on the dashboard and A.W., a minor, in

the backseat when she first made contact with Mayfield. When

Mayfield questioned A.W. regarding who owned the vehicle, A.W.

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23-10191 Opinion of the Court 5

“gave conflicting answers” but eventually reported the truck be-

longed to his father. At no point did A.W. suggest the truck be-

longed to Cooke. While Cooke was talking to Mayfield, another

officer reported to Mayfield that the truck had been reported sto-

len. Cooke’s allegations state while A.W. originally stated his

brother had willingly given Cooke keys to the truck, A.W. later

stated “Cooke had taken the truck at gunpoint,” and accused

Cooke of “pressing the barrel of her gun against his neck as she

was driving him around the complex,” as well as “cocking the ham-

mer back on her pistol, threatening to shoot him.” Although

Cooke’s version of the facts is different, the officers were not re-

quired to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of cred-

ibility at the time of the arrest, so long as the totality of the circum-

stances presented a sufficient basis for believing that an offense had

been committed. See Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1234. These allegations are

enough to establish probable cause for hijacking a motor vehicle,

kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children. Accord-

ingly, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss

on the false arrest claim.

As to malicious prosecution, to allege a claim for malicious

prosecution, Cooke must first allege she suffered a seizure pursuant

to legal process that violated the Fourth Amendment. Laskar v.

Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020). Because the existence

of “[p]robable cause renders a seizure pursuant to legal process rea-

sonable under the Fourth Amendment[,] ... the presence of proba-

ble cause defeats a claim that an individual was seized pursuant to

legal process in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Washington,

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10191

25 F.4th at 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). The ex-

istence of probable cause to arrest Cooke for hijacking a motor ve-

hicle, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children de-

feats Cooke’s malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the district

court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss on this claim.

The district court did not err in dismissing Cooke’s com-

plaint based on Brashears’ and Mayfield’s entitlement to qualified

immunity. We affirm.3

AFFIRMED.

3 The district court also dismissed Cooke’s state law claims, but Cooke does

not appeal the dismissal of those claims in her brief. Thus, those claims are

abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.

2014).