Opinion

Gonzales v. Reilley

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Nov 9, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Prisoner w/ out Counsel
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 14.2%

explaining that unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, and medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, and medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 22-40195 Document: 00516962858 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/09/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

November 9, 2023

No. 22-40195

Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Andrew Gonzales,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Paul Reilley; Anitra Lindley; Ashley L. Stephenson;

James Geddes; Linda R. Fickey,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:20-CV-131

______________________________

Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Andrew Gonzales is a prisoner formerly confined in a facility operated

by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. While imprisoned, Gonzales

underwent triple bypass surgery for heart damage. Gonzales brought suit un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various defendants had been deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs in the months preceding the

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 22-40195 Document: 00516962858 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/09/2023

No. 22-40195

operation, causing him to suffer permanent heart damage. We AFFIRM the

grant of summary judgment with regard to all defendants except Defendant

Stephenson. We MODIFY the judgment to dismiss without prejudice the

claim against Defendant Stephenson for lack of personal jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time of the events underlying this lawsuit, Andrew Gonzales

was incarcerated at the Allan B. Polunsky Unit in east Texas. On June 11,

2018, Gonzales made two visits to the prison medical unit for chest pain that

he rated as extremely severe. Gonzales was examined and then released that

same day from the medical unit. Gonzales visited the medical unit multiple

times over the following months. In February and March 2019, Gonzales

filed formal grievances seeking more effective care for his chest and breathing

pains. On March 28, 2019, Dr. James Geddes diagnosed Gonzales with car-

diac ischemia, leading to a triple vessel coronary artery bypass graft on April

11, 2019. On December 7, 2020, Gonzales was found unconscious in his cell

and later suffered cardiac arrest. Gonzales was given an automatic implanta-

ble cardioverter defibrillator as a result.

In June 2020, Gonzales filed, pro se, this Section 1983 suit in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The defend-

ants, employees of the University of Texas Medical Branch, are Paul Reilley,

a physician assistant; Anitra Lindley, a senior practice manager; Ashley Ste-

phenson, a grievance investigator; Dr. James Geddes, a physician; and Linda

Fickey, a nurse. All defendants except Stephenson moved for summary judg-

ment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to grant the

motion. The district court determined that the defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity and granted their motion for summary judgment. Gon-

zales appealed.

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No. 22-40195

DISCUSSION

I. Qualified Immunity

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Hyatt v. Thomas,

843 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2016). To overcome the defendants’ assertion of

qualified immunity, Gonzales must show they violated his clearly established

Eighth Amendment rights. See Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 462–63 (5th

Cir. 2006). Such a showing requires proof that he was harmed by the defend-

ants’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Thompson v.

Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 67 F.4th 275, 280–81 (5th Cir. 2023). “Deliberate

indifference exists when an official ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety.’ ” Id. at 281 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994)).

“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”

Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Un-

successful medical treatment, negligence, and medical malpractice do not

amount to deliberate indifference; absent exceptional circumstances, a pris-

oner’s disagreement with his medical treatment will not constitute deliberate

indifference either. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).

Whether to provide additional treatment is a decision left to medical judg-

ment. Id.

We analyze Gonzales’s claims against each defendant.

a. Nurse Fickey

Gonzales alleges that Nurse Linda Fickey saw him twice on June 11,

2018. Prison medical records, though, indicate she saw him only once that

day when he first presented for chest pain. The medical records for Gonza-

les’s second evaluation that day show he was seen by Licensed Vocational

Nurse Smith-Valdez, under the direction of Physician Assistant Paul Reilley.

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No. 22-40195

As to Nurse Fickey, the medical records establish that she made her entries

on Gonzales’s records approximately six hours after her evaluation occurred.

Gonzales has not offered any evidence to create a dispute about the accuracy

of these records. Gonzales underwent an electrocardiogram test (“EKG”)

and troponin testing, each of which gave no indication of heart problems.

Nurse Fickey noted that Gonzales’s vital signs were within normal limits,

provided him antacids, and released him from the clinic.

These medical records demonstrate that Gonzales was stable when

Nurse Fickey evaluated him and that she provided care. There is no evidence

that Nurse Fickey acted with deliberate indifference to Gonzales’s serious

medical needs.

b. Physician Assistant Reilley

The medical records indicate that Physician Assistant Reilley pro-

vided care for Gonzales on three occasions. Physician Assistant Reilley or-

dered the EKG and troponin testing after Gonzales was examined by Nurse

Fickey on June 11, 2018. Gonzales reported difficulty breathing later that

same day and was taken on a stretcher to be evaluated by Licensed Vocational

Nurse Smith-Valdez. In response to LVN Smith-Valdez’s evaluation, Phy-

sician Assistant Reilley ordered an injection of ranitidine and solumedrol for

acid reduction, which Gonzales received well. At the time this injection was

ordered, Gonzales had already undergone EKG and troponin testing. The

EKG and troponin testing gave no indication of heart problems. Ordering

the injection rather than more intensive care did not amount to deliberate

indifference. It was the result of an exercise of medical judgment, to which

we afford deference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.

Physician Assistant Reilley also saw Gonzales on February 11, 2019.

The clinic note stated he was seeing Gonzales as a “follow up for breathing

issues for over a year.” The note also acknowledged that Dr. Geddes had

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No. 22-40195

previously referred Gonzales for a stress test for potential heart conditions,

but Gonzales refused the test. Although Gonzales disputes that he refused

the stress test, the clinic note supports a finding that Physician Assistant Reil-

ley was unaware of a substantial risk to Gonzales’s health. The test for delib-

erate indifference is “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

requiring a person to disregard a substantial risk of which he is actually aware,

not one of which he should have been aware. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 836–40 (1994). Because Gonzales did not establish Physician Assistant

Reilley was aware of a substantial risk to his health, he cannot show Physician

Assistant Reilley acted with deliberate indifference.

c. Dr. Geddes

The medical records demonstrate that Dr. James Geddes saw Gonza-

les on the following dates and made the following notes:

July 10, 2018: Gonzales complained of “deep chest discomfort

brought on by exertion or anxiety for three weeks.” Gonzales “wants to hold

off on stress test referral for right now.” Dr. Geddes noted that he would

make a referral for a brace for unrelated knee pain.

November 15, 2018: Gonzales complained of chest pain, which was re-

lieved by belching. His symptoms were atypical for angina. Gonzales was

“not really wanting to go” for a stress test, and “due to [the] somewhat atyp-

ical nature of” the symptoms, Dr. Geddes “did not press the issue at this

time.” Gonzales was asked to avoid heavy exertion and notify the clinic if his

symptoms worsened.

February 21, 2019: Gonzales was still suffering from the symptoms he

reported in the November 2018 visit. Dr. Geddes ordered a stress test, which

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No. 22-40195

was scheduled for April. This was a routine, rather than expedited, stress

test.1

March 28, 2019: Dr. Geddes made a provisional diagnosis of cardiac

ischemia based on EKG results and expedited Gonzales’s stress test. He also

restricted Gonzales to the ground floor so he could avoid the use of stairs.

Dr. Geddes analyzed Gonzales’s symptoms each time he examined

him and provided a plan of care, including two stress tests which Gonzales

declined.2 Dr. Geddes’s February 2019 decision to order a routine rather

than expedited stress test may have been harmful in retrospect, but does not

amount to a constitutional violation. The decision of whether to provide ad-

ditional care is a decision left to medical judgment. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.

Given our deference to the medical expert on this point, we also defer on the

timing of that care. Dr. Geddes expedited the stress test when an EKG re-

turned a result suggesting heart damage.

These records indicate that Dr. Geddes, at worst, may have misun-

derstood the severity of the risk to Gonzales. Imperfect care or a misdiagno-

sis does not equate to deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Gobert, 463 F.3d at

346 (explaining that unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, and

medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference). Dr. Geddes

did not violate Gonzales’s Eighth Amendment rights.

_____________________

1

The record suggests that expedited referrals are carried out within thirty days,

while routine referrals may take up to six months.

2

As mentioned, the clinic notes state that Gonzales declined stress tests. We are

not persuaded by Gonzales’s contention that for the clinic notes to be valid, Dr. Geddes

also needed to provide refusal forms for any instance in which Gonzales declined a stress

test.

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No. 22-40195

d. Ms. Lindley

In February and March 2019, Gonzales filed grievance forms in an ef-

fort to receive more effective care for his health problems. Anitra Lindley

was a senior practice manager at the time and was involved with the receipt

and execution of Gonzales’s grievances. Gonzales alleges that Lindley com-

mitted spoliation, falsification of medical records, and fraud on the court in

relation to her handling of his grievance forms. Gonzales acknowledges that

his claims against her are “not adequately developed” because of insufficient

discovery. Contrary to Gonzales’s allegations, Lindley’s disclosures indicate

that she actively tried to help Gonzales. Lindley opened a new Step 1 emer-

gency grievance so that the unit medical department, and not just the griev-

ance program, could be contacted. Gonzales has not shown Lindley was de-

liberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

e. Summary

Gonzales’s allegations at most would support that some defendants

unsuccessfully treated him and caused damage to his health. Any failures in

their care fall short of the “extremely high standard” of deliberate indiffer-

ence that would allow Gonzales to overcome the defendants’ qualified im-

munity. Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.

II. Discovery

Gonzales alleges that the defendants’ disclosures were incomplete un-

der the existing scheduling order, keeping him from adequately developing

his claims against them.

We review decisions on pretrial discovery regarding qualified immun-

ity for an abuse of discretion. Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 481

(5th Cir. 2021). “A trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining the

scope and effect of discovery, and it is therefore unusual to find an abuse of

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No. 22-40195

discretion in discovery matters. . . . [T]he district court’s decision should be

reversed only in unusual and exceptional cases.” JP Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A. v. Datatreasury Corp., 936 F.3d 251, 255–56 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

We have mentioned the multiple disclosures made in this case. Those

disclosures contradicted Gonzales’s allegations of deliberate indifference.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional discovery.

III. Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Stephenson

Ashley Stephenson was not served and was not a party to the defend-

ants’ summary judgment motion. In recommending that Stephenson none-

theless benefit from summary judgment, the magistrate judge cited two of

this court’s opinions, Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) and

McCarty v. Zapata Cnty., 243 F. App’x 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2007). The magis-

trate judge understood these decisions to mean that “[a]n unserved defend-

ant . . . is entitled to the benefit of the appearing defendants’ favorable sum-

mary judgment motion.” We conclude, though, that only a defaulting de-

fendant who has been served is entitled to such a benefit under these prece-

dents. Although Gonzales moved for an entry of default against Stephenson,

the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed all outstanding

motions without having specifically addressed that motion. At the time the

district court granted summary judgment, therefore, Stephenson was an un-

served party who had not been held in default by the court.

“[A] fundamental rule of civil procedure [is] that before a federal

court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement

of service of summons must be satisfied.” Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 340

(5th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). It was not satisfied

for Stephenson.

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No. 22-40195

We MODIFY the judgment to state that Gonzales’s claim against De-

fendant Stephenson is dismissed without prejudice. We otherwise AFFIRM

the judgment of the district court with respect to all other defendants.

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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