State v. Goodpasture

[Cite as State v. Goodpasture, 2023-Ohio-4060.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :

:

Appellant : C.A. No. 29743

:

v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 3069

:

MICHAEL JAMES GOODPASTURE : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas

: Court)

Appellee :

:

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OPINION

Rendered on November 9, 2023

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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellant

JOHN C. CUNNINGHAM, Attorney for Appellee

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LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant the State of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Montgomery

County Common Pleas Court which sustained appellee Michael James Goodpasture’s

motion to suppress. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be

reversed, and the case will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Procedural History and Facts

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{¶ 2} Goodpasture was indicted on November 18, 2022, by a Montgomery County

grand jury on one count of having a weapon while under disability (prior offense of

violence), in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree; one count of

having a weapon while under disability (prior drug conviction), in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3), a felony of the third degree; and one count of improper handling of a

firearm in a motor vehicle (loaded/no license), in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), a felony of

the fourth degree.

{¶ 3} On January 23, 2023, Goodpasture filed a motion to suppress evidence

obtained from a warrantless search and seizure, including statements made in violation

of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). A hearing

on the motion was held on February 3, 2023. Prior to presenting evidence at the hearing,

Goodpasture narrowed the motion to challenge only the warrantless seizure and not the

alleged Miranda violation.

{¶ 4} At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of Officer Riley Brown, a

police officer with the City of Dayton for approximately four years, along with a video

recording from Officer Brown’s police cruiser and body camera footage from the officer

who Mirandized Goodpasture. Officer Brown testified that on July 1, 2022, he was

driving a marked cruiser and wearing his police-issued uniform. Shortly after midnight,

Officer Brown and his partner, Officer John Rice, were in the area of Nassau Street and

Clover Street in the City of Dayton.

{¶ 5} Officer Brown saw a white Chevy Malibu driving toward their police cruiser

when it quickly pulled to the curb and parked. He saw the driver, later identified as

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Goodpasture, get out of the car and walk away from the police cruiser while repeatedly

looking back at the cruiser and then at the ground. It appeared to Officer Brown that

Goodpasture was attempting to put a distance between himself and the officers.

Goodpasture was the only occupant of the vehicle.

{¶ 6} Officer Brown stated that when he drove by Goodpasture’s car after

Goodpasture had already gotten out, he could tell, based on his training and experience,

that the window tint was excessive. Officer Brown explained that the legal limit for

window tint in Ohio is 50 percent, but Goodpasture’s car was measured to have an illegal

5 percent window tint.

{¶ 7} Officer Brown saw Goodpasture turn down an alley, so the officers followed

him. When Goodpasture turned into a backyard where there were several vacant

garages, the officers lost sight of him. The officers then circled back around the block to

where Goodpasture had left his car.

{¶ 8} Officer Brown approached Goodpasture’s parked car to look through the

window. At that time, it was approximately 12:25 a.m. and dark outside. However,

using his flashlight, Officer Brown was able to see a purple handgun sitting on the center

console armrest. After observing the gun, the officers drove back into the alley to locate

Goodpasture but were unsuccessful. The officers returned to the street and saw

Goodpasture coming out of the front of a house and walking toward his car. The officers

made a U-turn and stopped Goodpasture.

{¶ 9} Upon stopping Goodpasture, Officer Rice obtained his information and

learned that Goodpasture was a convicted felon, meaning that he was prohibited from

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possessing a firearm. Goodpasture claimed that the firearm and the car belonged to his

fiancée. His fiancée came outside during the investigation, but Officer Brown did not

speak with her.

{¶ 10} Goodpasture testified in his own defense. Goodpasture stated that he was

40 years old and had lived in Dayton all his life. He explained that he worked from home

doing storage auctions and some tattoo work. On July 1, 2022, he had just finished

packing his truck and his fiancée’s car because they planned to go to the Dixie Strip Flea

Market that weekend. He parked his fiancé’s car near the corner of Nassau on Clover

Street behind his house.

{¶ 11} After stepping out of the car, he saw the police cruiser stop at the stop sign

and then go through the intersection. He noticed that it slowed down as it drove past,

but the officers did not stop him or indicate there was any problem. He walked to the

back of his house and through his yard to go into the house. When he got inside, he told

his fiancée that two cops had gone by but informed her there was nothing wrong. His

fiancée told him that she would go out to her car and his truck and lock them up.

{¶ 12} After about five minutes inside the house, Goodpasture went back outside

through the front of his house to make sure the truck was locked up; the officers sped

around the corner with their lights on. Goodpasture testified that he put his hands up

and the officers immediately handcuffed him.

{¶ 13} Goodpasture stated that the firearm was not in the vehicle while he was in

it, implying that his fiancée had put it in there after he got out of the car. According to

Goodpasture, the firearm belonged to his fiancée, who had a concealed carry permit. He

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further stated that the window tint on his fiancée’s car was a “negative five tint” and that

there would have been “no way [to see anything] with any kind of flashlight” inside the car

due to the significant window tint. Tr. 47.

{¶ 14} The trial court sustained Goodpasture’s motion to suppress on March 7,

2023, based on the following findings of fact:

On July 1, 2022, Mr. Goodpasture, an adult male, was driving a

vehicle and parked it on a public street. Police officers observed him exit

the vehicle and followed him because they believed he was acting

“suspiciously.” Subsequently, the police used a flashlight to illuminate into

the vehicle Goodpasture had been driving and saw “in plain view,” a firearm

(handgun) lying on the front seat of the vehicle. Based on seeing the

handgun, the officers decided to stop and detain Mr. Goodpasture to

determine if he was legally carrying a handgun.

The Court specifically finds as a matter of fact that even though the

officers testified that the vehicle had tinted windows, the reason the officers

stopped and detained Mr. Goodpasture was the observation, when using a

flashlight to look into the vehicle, of a handgun on the front seat of the

vehicle. No evidence was presented that the police officers had reason to

believe that Mr. Goodpasture was not a “qualifying adult” or that the

handgun was a “restricted firearm.”

(Emphasis added.) Decision Sustaining Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, p. 1-2.

{¶ 15} In sustaining Goodpasture’s motion, the trial court found that as a result of

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the enactment of R.C. 2923.111, Ohio’s constitutional carry law that came into effect on

June 13, 2022, coupled with the “Second Amendment posture of the regulation of firearms

after New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,” 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 2111,

213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022), the trial court could not find that the officers had reasonable

articulable suspicion to detain Goodpasture based merely on the presence of a handgun

observed in a parked motor vehicle. The State filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant

to R.C. 2945.67(A) and Crim.R. 12(K).

II. Reasonable Suspicion

{¶ 16} The State’s sole assignment of error states that:

Notwithstanding the perceived pretextual nature of their actions, the

officers had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to

justify Goodpasture’s investigatory detention. The trial court erred,

therefore, in sustaining Goodpasture’s motion to suppress.

{¶ 17} Under this assignment of error, the State contends that the trial court erred

in refusing to consider that the window tint violation provided the officers with reasonable

articulable suspicion to lawfully detain Goodpasture. The State points to several

statements made by the trial court during the motion to suppress hearing as

demonstrating the trial court’s refusal to consider the window tint violation, including:

• “the legal question * * * [is] not the tint * * * [j]ust the weapon.” Tr. 46.

• “To my analysis, tint doesn’t matter. * * * I’ll give you the tint. Doesn’t

matter.” Id. at 47.

• “[The State] can argue that [Goodpasture could be detained for the

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window tint violation], but I’m throwing it out. * * * I’m only looking at –

I’m only looking at what I think are the guts of the case, which is the

weapon.” Id. at 55.

{¶ 18} Goodpasture, on the other hand, contends that the trial court’s decision was

supported by competent, credible evidence and, therefore, the trial court did not err in

determining that the basis for the stop was for the firearm, not the window tint violation,

such that the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him.

a. Standard of Review

{¶ 19} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier

of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the

credibility of witnesses.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-

Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial

court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. * * *

Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine,

without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the

applicable legal standard.” (Citations omitted.) Id.

b. Terry Stops

{¶ 20} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894

N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391, 745 N.E.2d 1036 (2001).

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Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), “police officers

may briefly stop and/or temporarily detain individuals in order to investigate possible

criminal activity if the officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity

may be afoot, including a minor traffic violation.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Davenport,

2017-Ohio-688, 85 N.E.3d 443, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 21} “The propriety of an investigative stop by a police officer must be viewed in

light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d

291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]hese circumstances

are to be viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the

scene who must react to events as they unfold.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Andrews

57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991).

{¶ 22} In determining whether a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment, a

reviewing court must consider the objective assessment of a police officer’s actions in

light of the facts and circumstances then known to the officer at the time of the stop, and

not the officer’s subjective state of mind. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 6, 665

N.E.2d 1091 (1996). Accordingly, “where a police officer stops a vehicle based on

probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the

officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator

was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.” Id. at 11.

c. Analysis

{¶ 23} There is no dispute that Goodpasture had been observed by the officers

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driving the white Chevy and that the car’s windows were unlawfully tinted. The question

here is whether the trial court should have considered the window tint violation as a lawful

basis for detaining Goodpasture, or whether the trial court could refuse to consider that

evidence if the primary reason for the detention was the concern over seeing the handgun

inside the vehicle. We conclude that the trial court should have considered the window

tint violation as a lawful basis for the stop.

{¶ 24} “We have repeatedly held that a traffic stop for a suspected window-tint

violation is lawful.” Davenport, 2017-Ohio-688, 85 N.E.3d 443, at ¶ 18. Officer Brown

testified that he was unable to discern the window tint violation due to the darkness until

after the officers drove by Goodpasture’s car and Goodpasture had already exited the

vehicle. Upon exiting, the officers observed Goodpasture rubbernecking back toward

them as he distanced himself from the officers. Although the officers attempted to locate

Goodpasture by driving through the back alley, they were unable to locate him and

returned to Goodpasture’s vehicle. When the officers walked up to Goodpasture’s car

and looked inside with a flashlight, they saw a handgun in plain view. Notably, there was

nothing unlawful about the officers using a flashlight to look inside the parked car, and the

trial court acknowledged as much during the motion to suppress hearing. See State v.

Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28153, 2019-Ohio-3684, ¶ 8 (“an officer's use of a

flashlight to better illuminate a vehicle's interior does not convert the officer's action into

a search implicating the Fourth Amendment”). The fact that the officers became more

concerned about the firearm inside the vehicle than the window tint violation did not

detract from the fact that the officers had an objectively lawful basis to stop Goodpasture.

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Erickson at 11.

{¶ 25} Goodpasture directs our attention to State v. Johnson, 2020-Ohio-2742,

154 N.E.3d 387 (2d Dist.), claiming that the officers should have informed Goodpasture

of the reason for the stop rather than immediately seizing him. According to

Goodpasture, the officers’ failure to do so supported the trial court’s finding that the

purpose for the detention was only for the firearm and not for the window tint violation.

{¶ 26} In Johnson, Dayton Police Officer Zachary O’Diam testified that, while on

routine patrol, he and his partner observed a black Chrysler 300 with excessively tinted

windows. Id. at ¶ 3. O’Diam explained that one week earlier he had seen the same

vehicle, which he had tried to stop for a window tint violation, but it fled from his attempted

traffic stop. On cross-examination, O’Diam admitted that he knew the vehicle was

registered to a female. Id. at ¶ 13. Because the officers were driving in the opposite

direction of the Chrysler, they were able to see that the driver was a “tall skinny black

male.” However, due to the circumstances, O’Diam was not in a position to turn around

and chase after the Chrysler at that time, so the officers drove around for the next 15-20

minutes looking for the car. Id. at ¶ 3-4.

{¶ 27} Officer O’Diam then saw the Chrysler parked against the curb on Danner

Avenue. As O’Diam pulled up to the car, he turned on his overhead lights to initiate a

traffic stop. However, there was no driver inside the vehicle, and the passenger directed

O’Diam’s attention to a house across the street where Johnson was standing on the front

porch. Id. at ¶ 5. As O’Diam approached Johnson, who matched the description of the

driver, he initially asked Johnson if he had any identification and then attempted to distract

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him by asking Johnson if he had seen a kid in the area. Officer O’Diam explained that

he was trying to close the distance between himself and Johnson so that he could grab

ahold of Johnson and prevent him from fleeing, considering that the Chrysler had fled

from him the week earlier. Id. at ¶ 5-6. O’Diam was able to grab Johnson, but Johnson

tried to get away and was able to break free of his grasp. O’Diam again grabbed

Johnson and was able to detain him by forcing Johnson’s body against the house. Id. at

¶ 8. Johnson was then arrested for obstruction of official business. Id. at ¶ 9. A search

incident to arrest revealed a baggie of heroin, which led to the charge in the indictment.

Id. at ¶ 11.

{¶ 28} The question at issue in Johnson was whether the officer’s use of force in

detaining Johnson for obstructing official business was lawful. Id. at ¶ 39. A divided

court concluded that Officer O’Diam “did not engage in the least intrusive means

reasonably available to verify his suspicion and that his use of force in seizing Johnson

was greater than necessary to carry out his duties; therefore, his actions were unlawful

and unreasonable.” Id. at ¶ 72.

{¶ 29} In reaching that conclusion, we determined that Officer O’Diam’s encounter

with Johnson had been a Terry stop for the window tint violation. Id. at ¶ 65. However,

the window tint violation was only a minor misdemeanor, not an arrestable offense, and

there was no direct evidence that Johnson had been involved in the prior failure to comply,

nor was there any evidence to indicate Johnson was armed or a threat to the officers; as

such, the officers’ use of force to seize Johnson was unreasonable. Id. at ¶ 73. Since

Johnson had committed no overt act of obstruction or attempted flight prior to the officer’s

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use of unreasonable force, Johnson’s arrest for obstruction was unlawful, and the trial

court should have sustained his motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 73-74.

{¶ 30} The issue in Johnson was not whether the officers had a lawful basis to stop

Johnson, but rather whether excessive force was used to detain him, which led to an

unlawful arrest. We did not conclude that Officer O’Diam did not have reasonable

articulable suspicion to stop Johnson for the window tint violation. Rather, we focused

on the fact that O’Diam “did not engage in the least intrusive means reasonably available

to verify his suspicions and that his use of force in seizing Johnson was greater than

necessary to carry out his duties[.]” Id. at ¶ 72. In this case, the only issue raised by

Goodpasture at the motion to suppress hearing was whether the officers had reasonable

articulable suspicion to stop him. Because there was an objectively reasonable basis to

lawfully stop Goodpasture for the window tint violation, his motion to suppress should

have been overruled.

{¶ 31} During the hearing, the trial court acknowledged that there was a window

tint violation but refused to consider that as part of the legal analysis. Trial courts should

not ignore the evidence presented when conducting a legal analysis, particularly when

the parties do not dispute the evidence. Here, both Officer Brown and Goodpasture

testified that the officers saw Goodpasture driving the white Chevy and, further, that the

tint on the vehicle was excessively dark. The cruiser video also reflected that the officers

measured the level of tint and verified it was illegal. Accordingly, the trial court erred in

sustaining Goodpasture’s motion to suppress, as there had been reasonable articulable

suspicion to lawfully detain Goodpasture.

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{¶ 32} We note that the State does not argue on appeal that the trial court’s ruling

addressing the effect that Ohio’s “constitutional carry” law and the United States Supreme

Court’s Bruen case, 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387, had on R.C.

2923.16(B) was made in error. Because that issue is not before this Court, we need not

consider it and make no determinations about the correctness of the trial court’s analysis.

However, because the window tint violation provided sufficient reasonable articulable

suspicion to conduct a lawful detention, we sustain the State’s sole assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 33} Having sustained the State’s sole assignment of error, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

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TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.