Com. v. Carter, C.

J-S35039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

CORDELL HASSAN CARTER :

:

Appellant : No. 600 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002206-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023

Appellant, Cordell Hassan Carter, appeals from the judgments of

sentence following guilty pleas to possessing a controlled substance with

intent to deliver and flight to avoid apprehension entered before the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County.1 Specifically, Appellant argues the

sentencing court abused its discretion by not giving more weight to mitigating

factors when it imposed an aggregate term of six to twelve years’

incarceration. We affirm.

Appellant failed to appear for a preliminary hearing for charges arising

from a high-speed chase resulting in a collision (which charges are listed under

CP-22-CR-0000387-2021). A bench warrant, one of several, was issued for

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(3) and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a), respectively.

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his arrest. The United States Marshall’s Task Force located Appellant in

Swatara Township, Dauphin County on April 29, 2021. When the members of

the task force approached and identified themselves, Appellant ran across a

parking lot to avoid arrest. Appellant was apprehended after discarding a black

bag. The bag was subsequently recovered and found to contain $2,600 and

possible drug paraphernalia. While in the back seat of a patrol car, Appellant

was apprised of, and waived, his rights to remain silent and to counsel, and

agreed to reveal where additional drug-related items could be found. Under

the rear passenger seat of Appellant’s car parked in the lot, officers found a

digital scale with white residue on it and a plastic bag containing 58 grams of

cocaine. On January 24, 2023, Appellant entered guilty pleas to possessing a

controlled substance with intent to deliver, a felony, and flight to avoid

apprehension, graded as a felony of the third-degree.2

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2 The notes of testimony from Appellant’s guilty pleas in the instant matter,

conducted by a different court than the sentencing court, are not contained in

the appellate record. As a result, the foregoing statement of facts has been

pieced together from the sentencing court’s opinion, the arrest warrant

affidavit in this case, the trial court entries for the high-speed chase case, and

statements made at the consolidated sentencing proceeding from which this

appeal is taken. “It is the obligation of the appellant to make sure that the

record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary

to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 249 A.3d 575, 584 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting

Everett Cash Mutual Insurance Company v. T.H.E. Insurance

Company, 804 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted)). Where the

record is incomplete and thereby interferes with our ability to review the claim

raised, waiver may apply. Shreffler, 249 A.3d at 584. Here, Appellant asks

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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On March 1, 2023, Appellant was sentenced by the Honorable Edward

M. Marisco, Jr. Two other dockets were consolidated for sentencing along with

the instant matter: under Docket 387-2021 were six jury convictions in

December 2022 arising from the high-speed chase on September 16, 2020;

and under CP-22-CR-0002309-2020 were two convictions of possessing a

controlled substance with intent to deliver crack cocaine, on November 27,

2019 and on January 16, 2020, to which Appellant had entered guilty pleas

immediately prior to sentencing (the “controlled buy case”). Both of the sales

of crack cocaine in the controlled buy case occurred before the high-speed

chase in September 2020. The high-speed chase occurred before Appellant’s

arrest in possession of 58 grams of cocaine in the instant matter.

Appellant was represented by present counsel for sentencing on both

drug-related cases, that is, the controlled buy case and the instant matter.

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us to evaluate the exercise of discretion by a sentencing court, which should

be influenced by the facts upon which he pleaded guilty, and therefore, those

facts should be included in the record. Pa.R.A.P. 1911; Commonwealth v.

Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 410 (Pa. 2011) (“The plain terms of the Rules

contemplate that the parties, who are in the best position to know what they

actually need for appeal, are responsible to take affirmative actions to secure

transcripts and other parts of the record”). The record on appeal does not

contain any request by Appellant for transcription of the guilty plea notes. In

this instance, we are confident we understand the gist of the particular crimes

to which Appellant pleaded guilty under Docket 2206-2021, and so will not

find waiver of Appellant’s claim. See Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d

443, 458-459 (Pa. Super. 2014) (relying on the trial court’s statement of facts

to review, rather than waive, a suppression claim where the notes from the

suppression hearing were not requested).

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Appellant had separate counsel for sentencing on the jury convictions arising

from the high-speed chase. The court read the sentencing memoranda

submitted, and heard the arguments on the sentencing guidelines, pre-

sentence investigation report (“PSI”), application of the substantial amount of

time credit, interpretation of Appellant’s lengthy criminal record, and

Appellant’s allocution. N.T. 3/1/13, 5-23.

The sentencing court noted its familiarity with the facts of each case and

Appellant’s record, specifically that Appellant was released from custody only

to reoffend before the pending cases could be resolved. It turned to the instant

matter first because it was the last incident to occur. The court imposed

consecutive terms of incarceration of: five to ten years for possessing a

controlled substance with intent to deliver; and one to two years for fleeing to

avoid apprehension. The court ordered Appellant to pay costs but no fine and

applied the full 28 months and three days credit to the aggregate term of six

to twelve years’ imprisonment. Crediting the full time possible to the instant

matter made Appellant eligible sooner for drug rehabilitation while

incarcerated. N.T. 3/1/22, 23-26.

For the high-speed chase case, the court imposed the following terms

of incarceration consecutive to each other, and to the aggregate sentence

imposed on instant matter, of: two and one-half to five years on fleeing

apprehension and one to two years on criminal trespass. It imposed terms

concurrent to the two-and-one-half to five-year term of: nine to 18 months

incarceration for tampering with evidence, and six months’ probation for

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driving under the influence. It also imposed costs and $800 in fines and

ordered restitution of $1,750. No further penalty was imposed on the careless

driving and reckless driving convictions. The aggregate term was three-and-

one-half to seven years’ imprisonment consecutive to the sentence imposed

in the instant matter. For the controlled buy case, the court imposed

concurrent terms of one-and-one-half to three years’ incarceration on each of

the convictions for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver and

ordered 22 months and eight days’ time credit. The aggregate term imposed

on all three cases consolidated for sentencing was nine-and-one-half to 19

years’ imprisonment, $800 in fines, and $1,750 restitution. N.T. 3/1/22, 26-

29.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on March 13, 2023, seeking to

withdraw his guilty pleas in the instant matter and, in the alternative,

requesting the court to modify his sentence because it “abused its discretion

and imposed an unduly harsh sentence, without considering the history and

characteristics of [Appellant] and failed to state sufficient reasons on the

record.” Post-Sentence Motion ¶ 12. The court denied Appellant’s motion by

an Order entered on March 21, 2023. Appellant timely appealed.

Appellant raised the following claims of error for us to review:

The sentencing Court erred in imposing an aggregate sentence of

six (6) to twelve (12) years of incarceration, and subsequently

denying defendant’s post-sentence motion, when this sentence is

manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. The

individual sentence at each count were excessive and

unreasonable and constitute too severe a punishment considering

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the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant] as well as the Court’s

overall sentencing scheme.

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement. Notably, Appellant’s claim in his post-

sentence motion that the court did not provide adequate reasons for the

sentence imposed was not preserved in the Rule 1925(b) Statement. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not

raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”).

In his Statement of Questions Presented, Appellant raises a single claim

that:

… the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed … a

sentence of three and a half to seven years in state prison without

considering the history and characteristics of [Appellant]; thus

constituting a manifestly unreasonable sentence considering the

rehabilitative needs of the [Appellant]

Appellant’s Brief, 6.

Appellant’s preserved claim is an assertion that the sentencing court

abused its discretion when it allegedly failed to consider his history and

characteristics and imposed terms, both individually and in the aggregate,

that were “manifestly excessive,” “manifestly unreasonable,” or “unduly

harsh” (as variously described in the documents), in light of his rehabilitative

needs. As such, Appellant’s claim is a challenge to the discretionary aspects

of his sentence:

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not

appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d

73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015). Rather, an appellant challenging the

sentencing court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction

by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the

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issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the

sentence; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a

separate section of the brief setting forth a concise statement of

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence; and (4) presenting a

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), or

sentencing norms. Id. An appellant must satisfy all four

requirements. Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.

Super. 2013).

Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal

denied, 2023 WL 4755198 (Pa. July 26, 2023).

As discussed, Appellant satisfied the first two requirements. Thus, we

turn to the Rule 2119(f) statement included in his brief to discern whether a

substantial question has been raised.

We determine whether there is a substantial question on a case-by-case

basis. Commonwealth v. Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 78 (Pa. Super. 2021).

“We cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the

prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question

exists.” Crawford, 257 A.3d at 78-79 (quoting Commonwealth v. Radecki,

180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018)) (brackets omitted). A substantial

question is presented where:

… an appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentence

imposed is either inconsistent with a specific provision of the

Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms which

underlie the sentencing process. At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f)

statement must articulate what particular provision of the code is

violated, what fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the

manner in which it violates that norm.

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Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585–86 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 826 n. 6 (Pa. Super.

2008)) (citation omitted).

Within his Rule 2119(f) Statement, Appellant first asserts that the

sentence “was so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion,”

and that it was “not consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of

the offenses, and [Appellant]’s rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s Brief, 11.

This assertion contains no reference to the terms imposed or any reference to

the instant case other than naming Appellant. Nonetheless, we conclude

Appellant raised a substantial question with respect to his preserved claim.

See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(stating that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion

that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial

question”).3

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3 As presented, Appellant’s three other assertions fail to present a substantial

question: that application of guideline sentence terms was “clearly

unreasonable” without any explanation for how that might be; that the “six

(6) to twelve (12) years of incarceration was ‘so disproportionate as to

implicate the fundamental norms which underline the sentencing process’”

without explication of said norms or whether the consecutive terms were

excessive on their face in light of the criminal conduct; and that imposition of

a sentence of total confinement after revocation of probation for a technical

violation violates a fundamental norm where there was no term of probation

revoked, much less for a technical violation. Appellant’s Brief, 11-12. We note

further that the Rule 2119(f) Statement was written so generally it could have

referred to any case, and that only the claim that the “six (6) to twelve (12)

year” term implicated fundamental norms appeared to directly address the

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Our standard of review for a challenge to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

other cases).

Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is

confined by statutory mandate. Id. at 826-827. More specifically, here, we

may only vacate and remand for resentencing if the sentencing court’s

application of guideline sentence terms was “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9781(c)(2). “[I]t is clear that the General Assembly intended the concept of

unreasonableness [for the purposes of Section 9781(c)] to be inherently a

circumstance-dependent concept that is flexible in understanding and lacking

precise definition.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. 2007).

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sentence terms imposed in the instant matter. It nonetheless failed to state a

substantial question. See Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 587 (sentencing courts

have discretion to impose terms consecutively and the decision to do so raises

a substantial question only where the aggregate sentence “appears on its face

to be” at “an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue”);

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“we have

held that a claim that a court did not weigh the factors as an appellant wishes

does not raise a substantial question”).

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In deciding whether a sentencing court imposed a sentence that was

unreasonable, we are to be guided by the considerations listed in 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9781(d) – nature and circumstances of the offense and history and

characteristics of the defendant; opportunity of sentencing court to observe

the defendant, including any presentence investigation; findings upon which

the sentence was based; and sentencing guidelines – and whether the trial

court properly considered the sentencing factors outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9721(b) – protection of the public, gravity of the offense with respect to victim

and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Walls, 926 A.2d

at 964; Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 12 (Pa. Super.), appeal

denied, 283 A.3d 792 (Pa. 2022).

We cannot say that the sentencing court abused its discretion by

imposing an aggregate term six to twelve years. When Appellant pleaded

guilty he was informed that he faced a maximum of 17 years’ imprisonment,

from which the sentence imposed was a significant reduction. Sentencing

Court Opinion, 4. At the time Appellant was arrested in the instant matter,

with possession of over 50 grams of cocaine and more than $3,000 in cash,

he had multiple outstanding charges against him, including additional drug-

trafficking charges to which he pleaded guilty prior to the consolidated

sentencing hearing, and an additional flight to avoid apprehension charge. The

sentencing court explicitly noted Appellant’s pattern of being released from

custody with charges pending and committing more serious crimes while on

bail in which the high-speed chase case and instant matter arose. N.T. 3/1/23,

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24. Ordering sentence terms to run consecutively was plainly reasonable in

light of Appellant’s repetitive criminal history.

In imposing sentence, the court is required to consider the

circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. It did so

here. The sentencing court explicitly acknowledged that it was crafting a

sentence consistent with Appellant’s prior record score, the nature of the

offenses, public safety, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, and it had the

benefit of a PSI. N.T. 3/1/23, 12, 25. When there is a PSI, we can “presume

that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors.” Commonwealth. v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).

Appellant also argues that the sentencing court “fully disregarded [his]

rehabilitative aims,” because the sentence was not “crafted” to “facilitate [his]

substance abuse or mental health rehabilitation.” Appellant’s Brief, 16. This

claim also fails, both as a matter of law because the court was in possession

of the PSI, Devers, 546 A.2d at 18, and as a matter of fact because the court

acknowledged that Appellant needed to overcome his addiction and learn to

make better choices. N.T. 3/1/23, 23, 25. The sentencing court also credited

Appellant with the full time available to the instant matter in order for him to

qualify for drug abuse rehabilitation as soon as possible while imprisoned, as

was explicitly requested by defense counsel. Id. at 23, 26.

Appellant further asserts that the sentence imposed “does not

rehabilitate [him], but exacerbates his underlying drug and mental health

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issues.” Appellant’s Brief 16. He did not present any evidence at the hearing

that some lesser sentence was necessary for his addiction or mental health,

nor may he shift the burden onto the sentencing court to “offer… evidence to

suggest that” the aggregate term “would allow [him] to receive substance

abuse or mental health treatment.” Appellant’s Brief, 17. While Appellant

requests this Court weigh the sentencing factors differently than the

sentencing court, that is beyond our purview. Commonwealth v. Bricker,

41 A.3d 872, 876 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“The weighing of factors under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) is exclusively for the sentencing court, and an appellate

court may not substitute its own weighing of those factors”) (citation omitted).

Our review of the record confirms that the sentencing court weighed the

statutory factors, including Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, and the sentence

it imposed was not clearly unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/09/2023

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