The opinion
FILED
Nov 06, 2023
12:18 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Kimberly Satterfield ) Docket No. 2019-03-1440
)
v. ) State File No. 7635-2019
)
Smoky Mountain Home Health and )
Hospice, Inc., et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard October 5, 2023
Compensation Claims ) at Knoxville
Lisa A. Lowe, Judge )
Affirmed and Certified as Final
This is an appeal of the trial court’s compensation order awarding extraordinary relief
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242. The employee was working as a home
health nurse when she slipped on ice and injured her right shoulder, middle finger, hip, and
knee. After an initial compensation hearing, the employee was awarded permanent partial
disability benefits consistent with her impairment rating and future reasonable and
necessary medical benefits. At the end of her initial benefit period, she filed a new petition
for benefits seeking permanent total disability benefits or, in the alternative, extraordinary
relief. After a hearing at which the employee and two vocational experts testified, the court
awarded two hundred seventy-five weeks of permanent disability benefits pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2). The employer has appealed. Upon
careful consideration of the record and the arguments of counsel, we affirm the court’s
decision and certify it as final.
Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.
Tiffany B. Sherrill, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Smoky Mountain
Home Health and Hospice, Inc.
Timothy A. Roberto, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Kimberly
Satterfield
1
Factual and Procedural Background
Kimberly Satterfield (“Employee”) is a registered nurse who slipped and fell on ice
while working for Smoky Mountain Home Health and Hospice, Inc. (“Employer”) on
January 29, 2019. She landed on her right knee with her arm outstretched, resulting in
injuries to her right shoulder, middle finger, hip, and knee. Employer accepted the claim
as compensable and provided authorized treatment with Dr. Paul Brady for her shoulder,
Dr. Conrad Ivie for her knee and hip, and Dr. Timothy Renfree for her middle finger. Dr.
Brady treated her for a rotator cuff tear in the shoulder, which he stated was more than fifty
percent caused by the work injury and resulted in an eleven percent impairment. Dr. Ivie
determined Employee’s knee and hip injuries, which included a meniscal tear in the knee,
were more than fifty percent related to the work injury and assigned a three percent
impairment. Dr. Renfree found Employee’s middle finger injury was caused by the work
fall and assessed a two percent impairment. Finally, Employee was evaluated by Dr.
William Kennedy, who provided a combined impairment of twelve percent and opined that
the impairment for all her injuries was primarily caused by the work accident.
At the initial compensation hearing in June 2022, Employer argued Employee’s fall
was idiopathic in nature and/or caused by her multiple sclerosis (“MS”). In support of its
position, Employer presented records from prior physicians indicating Employee had
suffered past falls and weakness on the right side due to her MS. In response, Employee
asserted that most of the episodes as reflected in past medical records did not occur or were
depicted incorrectly in the medical records. Following the compensation hearing, the trial
court awarded permanent partial disability benefits equating to a 12% vocational disability
and future reasonable and necessary medical benefits. The order contained language
acknowledging that the initial benefit period had not expired pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A), and thus, the court was unable to determine whether
Employee was entitled to increased benefits or extraordinary relief at that time. That order
was not appealed.
On October 7, 2022, Employee filed a new petition for benefit determination, stating
that the initial benefit period had expired and that she was seeking “increased, additional,
and permanent total disability [benefits].” A dispute certification notice (“DCN”) was filed
on December 7, 2022, identifying jurisdiction and compensability as the disputed issues.
Following the entry of a scheduling order, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing Employee was precluded from being awarded permanent total disability benefits
as her initial petition filed in November 2020 did not allege that she was permanently and
totally disabled and she did not present proof at the June 2022 compensation hearing that
she was permanently and totally disabled. Therefore, Employer argued, Employee had
waived any claim to permanent total disability benefits. It further argued that the specific
language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(B) prohibits an award of
permanent total disability when an employee files for increased benefits after an award of
permanent partial disability. In support of this position, Employer pointed to the language
2
stating that permanent total disability benefits can only be sought “[w]hen an injury not
otherwise specifically provided for in this chapter totally incapacitates the employee from
working at an occupation that brings the employee an income.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
207(4)(B) (emphasis added). Hence, Employer argues that because Employee received
permanent partial disability benefits at a compensation hearing, her injury did not qualify
as one “not otherwise specifically provided for in this chapter,” and she could not qualify
for an award of permanent total disability benefits.
In response to the dispositive motion, Employee submitted an affidavit from
vocational expert Michael Galloway asserting Employee was, in his opinion, one hundred
percent vocationally disabled as evidence that she had sufficient proof to establish she was
permanently and totally disabled. Furthermore, Employee argued she could not have
known she was permanently and totally disabled at the time she filed her initial petition for
benefits because she had not yet reached maximum medical improvement. Finally,
Employee argued the language upon which Employer relied from section 50-6-207(4) was
a “relic” from the pre-reform law and was intended only to refer to scheduled member
injuries, which are no longer included in the Workers’ Compensation Law.
The court heard the motion for summary judgment in April 2023. However, because
the DCN only certified jurisdiction and compensability as disputed issues, the court issued
an order holding the motion in abeyance, noting it could only adjudicate matters certified
as disputed issues by the mediator on a DCN pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-239(b)(1). The court referred the case back to mediation and requested the
mediator to certify permanent disability benefits as a disputed issue if the matter did not
resolve at post-discovery mediation, which had previously been set by the court in the
scheduling order. Employer did not appeal the trial court’s order holding the motion for
summary judgment in abeyance and ordering the mediator to identify permanent disability
benefits as a disputed issue in the event the case was not settled.
The claim did not settle at mediation, and the mediator issued a DCN identifying
permanent disability benefits as a disputed issue, to which Employer objected. A
compensation hearing was held on June 27, 2023. Employee, Mr. Galloway, and Michelle
McBroom Weiss, the vocational expert retained by Employer, all testified live, and Drs.
Brady and Kennedy testified by deposition. The parties agreed Employee had not returned
to work, but nearly all remaining issues were contested. As a threshold issue, Employer
argued Employee could not receive any further disability benefits as permanent disability
was not listed as a disputed issue on the December 7, 2022 DCN. Employee argued that
the petition for benefit determination itself clearly indicated additional permanent disability
benefits were being sought, and the petition was attached to the DCN. When those
documents were considered as a whole, in Employee’s view, the issue was not waived.
Employer also reiterated its argument from the summary judgment hearing that Employee
could not seek permanent total disability, as she had previously been adjudicated as
permanently partially disabled.
3
Finally, Employer further disputed that Employee was unable to return to her pre-
injury occupation as certified by Dr. Brady pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-242(a)(2)(B) or, if she indeed was unable to return to that occupation, that it was due
to Employee’s pre-existing MS rather than her work injuries. Employer argued that
Employee could return to her pre-injury occupation due to her extensive education, which
included a Bachelor of Nursing, a Master of Science of Nursing with a concentration in
women’s health, and a Doctorate of Nursing Practice, as well as her extensive work history
as a nurse practitioner, home health nurse, and nurse education instructor.
In response, Employee presented permanent work restrictions from both Dr. Brady
and Dr. Kennedy placing her in the “sedentary” category of work. Mr. Galloway reiterated
his opinion that Employee was one hundred percent vocationally disabled despite her
extensive education. Although Ms. Weiss had not been asked by Employer to provide a
percentage of vocational disability, she did testify that the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles used by Mr. Galloway was not appropriate in this case because it was outdated and
written before telehealth was utilized in the nursing profession. As such, she testified she
had found ten nursing jobs in Employee’s labor market that she could perform based on
her education, work experience, and restrictions. Employee disputed that she could
perform any of the positions listed by Ms. Weiss for a variety of reasons, including
difficulty keyboarding because of her finger fracture, pain in her right arm, and a lack of
certifications required for certain positions. Ms. Weiss testified she had performed a labor
market study, contacting various employers seeking nursing professionals, and that those
businesses had confirmed Employee would be a candidate based on her education and
experience. Employee further testified her MS did not contribute to her inability to work,
stating she had always been able to perform her job duties prior to the work injury without
any accommodations due to her MS.
Following the hearing, the court awarded 275 weeks of permanent disability
benefits as extraordinary relief in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-
6-242. The trial court determined “while [Employee] is not permanently and totally
disabled, she established by clear and convincing evidence it would be inequitable to limit
her to increased benefits alone, since she has no real job possibilities.” In response to
Employee’s claim for permanent total disability, the court stated that, although Employee’s
employment opportunities were “significantly limited,” they were not “non-existent.” The
court agreed with Ms. Weiss that some jobs existed that Employee could perform, which
precluded an award of permanent total disability. 1 The court did not address Employer’s
argument that the issue of permanent disability benefits was waived in the December 2022
dispute certification notice. Employer has appealed.
1
The court later amended its order to account for a credit of fifty-four weeks, the original award, against
the two hundred seventy-five-week award.
4
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2022). When the trial judge has had the opportunity
to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable
deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn.,
Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar deference need be
afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v.
Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and application of
statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor
either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2022).
Analysis
On appeal, Employer raises two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether Employee
waived any claim for any additional permanent disability benefits based on the December
2022 DCN; and (2) whether Employee is entitled to extraordinary relief as awarded by the
trial court. In her responsive brief, Employee raises two additional issues: (1) whether the
testimony of Employer’s vocational expert should have been excluded due to her reliance
on hearsay in forming her opinions; and (2) whether Employee should have been awarded
permanent total disability benefits. For its part, Employer counters that Employee cannot
raise any issues of her own as she did not file a notice of appeal.
Waiver of Claim for Permanent Disability
Employer notes that the initial DCN completed after Employee filed her petition for
increased benefits, dated December 7, 2022, lists only two disputed issues: “Jurisdiction”
and “Compensability.” The category of “Permanent Disability Benefits” is not marked as
a “Disputed Issue” on the DCN, and although both parties were given time to respond to
the DCN before it was certified and submitted to the trial court, neither party requested any
edits or submitted any further issues. As such, Employer argues that Employee waived
any claim for additional permanent disability benefits by failing to include those benefits
as an issue on the DCN. We are unpersuaded.
5
Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-239(b)(1) states, in part:
Unless permission has been granted by the assigned workers’ compensation
judge, only issues that have been certified by a workers’ compensation
mediator within a dispute certification notice may be presented to the
workers’ compensation judge for adjudication.
(Emphasis added.) The language of this portion of the statute requires that an issue be
certified by a mediator on a DCN, not necessarily the initial DCN that is filed at the outset
of the claim. 2 The trial court noted at the time of the summary judgment hearing that
“Permanent Disability Benefits” was not marked as an issue on page one of the DCN under
“Disputed Issues” and ordered the mediator to include permanent disability benefits as an
issue following the post-discovery mediation if the parties were unable to resolve the case
at that time. The mediator did so in the May 10, 2023 DCN, and, as such, the issue of
increased permanent disability was properly before the court at the compensation hearing.
Furthermore, Employer’s argument would require the court to look at only one portion of
a DCN in a vacuum, which we have previously stated is not the proper course of action.
In Marzette v. Pat Salmon and Sons, Inc., No. 2014-08-0058, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 29, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 18, 2015), we explained, “it
is necessary to consider the document as a whole” and in the context of the entire record to
determine what issues were certified by the mediator. Id. In the case at hand, the mediator
noted on the December 2022 DCN that mediation had occurred regarding permanent
disability benefits and included the petition for benefit determination seeking increased
permanent disability benefits at the time of the certification to the court. As such, even
without the court’s instruction to include permanent disability benefits in the DCN
following the post discovery mediation, when viewing the December 2022 DCN as a
whole, and considering it in the context of the entire record as contemplated in Marzette,
we find that Employee did not waive the issue of additional permanent disability benefits
and that the trial court properly considered the issue. 3
Extraordinary Relief
Employer next argues that the trial court erred in awarding extraordinary relief in
this case. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) provides that “[i]f at the time
the period of compensation . . . ends, . . . the employee has not returned to work with any
employer . . . the injured employee may file a claim for increased benefits.” However, if
the “presiding workers’ compensation judge first determines based on clear and convincing
2
The initial DCN relative to Employee’s initial claim for benefits, which was filed on December 14, 2020,
did identify “Permanent Disability Benefits” as a disputed issue.
3
Employee argued that this defense from Employer was waived and not raised at the trial level. However,
Employer objected to the May 2023 DCN, and the argument is referenced in the Employer’s trial brief and
in the transcript of the proceedings. Thus, we find this assertion to be without merit.
6
evidence that limiting the employee’s recovery to the benefits provided [by that section]
would be inequitable,” that judge may award up to two hundred seventy-five weeks. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a)(2). To qualify for extraordinary relief, the employee must have
an impairment rating of more than ten percent (10%) and cannot be earning an amount
equal to or above seventy percent of his or her pre-injury wage at the time the compensation
period ends. In addition, the employee’s authorized treating physician must certify that the
employee no longer has the ability to return to his or her pre-injury occupation, which refers
to “the type of work one does as his or her ‘usual or principal work.’” Batey v. Deliver
This, Inc., 568 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tenn. 2019) (emphasis in original). Once the employee
obtains the certification form signed by the treating physician, the burden shifts to the
employer to provide clear and convincing evidence the employee could return to the pre-
injury occupation. Id. at 98.
In this case, Employee has extensive education as a nurse, including masters and
doctorate degrees. Employer presented proof regarding her work history as a professor in
nurse training as evidence Employee could return to her pre-injury occupation. In his
deposition, Dr. Brady acknowledged that although Employee would only occasionally be
able to grip a laptop, she would not be restricted from a lecture-style teaching position with
certain accommodations. He further testified that, in his opinion, Employee could not
return to a position as a registered nurse but that he believed she could likely work at a
computer.
Employer also presented proof from Ms. Weiss regarding potential employment
within the field of registered nursing. Ms. Weiss performed a labor market survey and
testified to ten possible positions in nursing that she believed, based on her experience,
Employee would be qualified to perform within her given restrictions. Several of the
positions were remote and involved telehealth. Employee testified she had no experience
with that type of work and that she believed her difficulties with keyboarding would
prevent her from doing that type of work.
While Employee had some experience as a professor, based on her testimony, the
bulk of her work history was as a registered nurse treating patients. Her restrictions from
the two testifying physicians placed her in a sedentary category, and the experts agreed she
would not have been able to return to any of her prior nursing positions. Dr. Brady
indicated that if she did return to teaching, accommodations would likely have to be made,
and there was little evidence in the record regarding the physical requirements of her
previous teaching position. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that it would
be inequitable to limit Employee to increased benefits, which in this case would have
allowed for increases based on her employment status and her age. Although Employer
presented evidence of possible positions Employee could perform within her restrictions,
we agree with the trial court that Employer did not meet its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that Employee could perform her pre-injury occupation. As such,
7
based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the preponderance of the evidence
supports the court’s award of extraordinary relief.
Appellee’s Right to Raise Issues on Appeal
In her brief, Employee argues both that Employer’s vocational expert’s testimony
should have been excluded and that the court erred by failing to award permanent total
disability benefits. Employer responded, arguing Employee waived her right to appeal any
issue by not filing a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
217(2)(B). Furthermore, it argued the timelines set forth in the applicable rules were not
conducive to raising a new issue in a response brief. Although Employer raises a legitimate
concern regarding the feasibility and timing of raising new issues in a response brief, we
have previously addressed this issue. “Once an appeal is properly perfected, the statute
does not restrict the Appeals Board to considering only issues identified by the appealing
party in a notice of appeal but allows consideration of issues specified and argued by a
party as long as the issue was properly presented and decided below.” Morgan v. Macy’s,
No. 2016-08-0270, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *24 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 31, 2016).
Employer notes that our opinion in Morgan was issued prior to amendments to the
language in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-217. Previously, the language of
subsection 217(a)(1)(B) stated that “within thirty calendar days after issuance of a
compensation order . . . either party may request an appeal. . . . Parties shall have fifteen
calendar days after an appeal is filed to file briefs with the workers’ compensation appeals
board.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(1)(B) (2014). Currently, subsection 217(a)(2)(B)
was amended to state, “[t]he appealing party has fifteen calendar days after the record is
filed with the clerk of the workers’ compensation appeals board to file a brief. A brief in
response, if any, must be filed within 15 days of the filing of the appellant’s brief.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2)(B) (2022). We conclude this amendment did not address or
limit a party’s ability to raise issues in a response brief. Moreover, the regulations
governing the appeals process contemplate that a reply brief may be filed within five
business days if the response brief “raises an issue or issues on appeal not previously
addressed in the appellant’s brief.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.06(3) (2020).
As such, although the timeline is stringent, the rules clearly provide a mechanism for the
appellee to raise additional issues in its response brief and for the appellant to reply to those
issues.
Furthermore, although the Rules of Appellate Procedure are not binding on this
Board, they are instructive. Under those rules, appellees may raise issues without filing a
8
separate notice of appeal once an appeal has been filed by another party. See Tenn. R.
App. P. 3(h) and 13(a). In short, we find this issue to be without merit. 4
Exclusion of Testimony
Employee argues that the testimony of Employer’s vocational expert should be
excluded as unreliable because it was, at least in part, based on hearsay. See Tenn. R. Evid.
703. Specifically, Ms. Weiss testified that she or someone on her staff contacted various
employers with open advertised positions she believed Employee may be qualified to
perform. She (or her staff) discussed Employee’s work history, education, and restrictions
with the potential employer and, by so doing, created a list of potential employers within
the nursing field. At trial, Employee’s attorney objected to the testimony despite the fact
that it was elicited by that same attorney. The court took the objection under advisement
but also questioned Ms. Weiss, who confirmed “based on her experience and opinion as an
expert, that [Employee] would qualify for at least one or more of these positions even if
[she had not made] the phone calls.” Ultimately, and as stated previously, the court
considered Ms. Weiss’s testimony and relied upon it in its determination that Employee’s
job opportunities were “not non-existent.”
On appeal, Employee reiterates that she believes Ms. Weiss’s testimony to be
unreliable and based on hearsay, arguing that her conversations with the potential
employers were possibly rooted in observation bias. We find this argument to be without
merit and unconvincing. Ms. Weiss was not presenting these positions as actual jobs being
offered to Employee but as potential opportunities for employment she believed Employee
was qualified for and physically capable of performing. In addition, as noted above, the
Rules of Evidence allow an expert to rely on evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible
if it is of a “type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field.” Tenn. R. Evid.
703. In short, we conclude Employee’s objection goes to the weight, not the admissibility,
of this expert testimony.
Permanent Total Disability
Finally, Employee argues that the court should have determined she is permanently
and totally disabled based on the evidence presented at trial. For its part, Employer
reiterates that Employee’s previous award of permanent partial disability precludes the
court from awarding her permanent total disability. An award of permanent total disability
is appropriate only if a work-related injury “totally incapacitates the employee from
working at an occupation that brings the employee an income.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
207(4)(B). In analyzing an award of permanent total disability, “[t]he statute contemplates
4
We also note that, although the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply at this stage of the case, if our
opinion were appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, those rules would apply. Thus, the appellee would
be allowed to raise any issues in a response brief as allowed by the rules noted above. Prohibiting the
presentation of such issues at the current stage would violate precepts of judicial economy.
9
employment in the open labor market and not a return to the employee’s previous position.”
Prost v. City of Clarksville, Police Dep’t., 688 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn. 1985).
Employee’s vocational expert, Michael Galloway, testified he believed Employee
to be “one hundred percent vocationally disabled.” However, he admitted he at least
partially based that opinion on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which he
acknowledged was outdated with regard to employment opportunities in the subspecialty
of telehealth. He further admitted there were options for Employee using a dictation device
and/or working as a lecturer in the field of nursing, albeit with certain accommodations.
Ms. Weiss, as stated earlier, believed there were at least ten open positions that Employee
could perform, although she did not offer an opinion as to a percentage of vocational
disability in her report. As noted by the trial court, Employee’s physical restrictions are
substantial; however, an award of permanent total disability must be based on a finding
that the employee cannot return to any position that would earn him or her an income, not
just a prior position. Given her education and work experience, as well as the testimony
of Ms. Weiss and the admissions of Mr. Galloway, we find no error in the court’s
determination that Employee is not permanently totally disabled. In short, the
preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s determinations. As such, because the
trial court did not find that Employee is permanently and totally disabled, we need not
address whether an employee can receive a permanent total disability award after
previously being adjudicated as permanently partially disabled.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court and certify it as final.
Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.
10
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Kimberly Satterfield ) Docket No. 2019-03-1440
)
v. ) State File No. 7635-2019
)
Smoky Mountain Home Health and )
Hospice, Inc., et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard October 5, 2023
Compensation Claims ) at Knoxville
Lisa A. Lowe, Judge )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 6th day
of November, 2023.
Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Tiffany B. Sherrill X tbsherrill@mijs.com
Gregory H. Fuller ghfuller@mijs.com
Timothy A. Roberto X troberto@brownandroberto.com
cmagnusson@brownandroberto.com
Lisa A. Lowe, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims
Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov