R.J. Spencer v. City of Franklin & County of Venango TCB

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Randy J. Spencer, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

City of Franklin and County : No. 648 C.D. 2022

of Venango Tax Claim Bureau : Argued: October 10, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: November 6, 2023

Randy J. Spencer (Spencer) appeals from an order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Venango County (trial court) denying Spencer’s petition to

compel conveyance of real property held in repository by the County of Venango

Tax Claim Bureau (Bureau). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

I. Background

Spencer wishes to buy four parcels of real property in the City of

Franklin (City) that were acquired by Venango County (County) at tax sales and are

being held in repository.1 See Spencer v. City of Franklin (C.P. Venango, No. 632-

1

Spencer initially submitted bids to buy five properties, but only four of them are at issue

in this appeal.

2021, filed Aug. 19, 2022), Op. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), slip op. (1925(a) op.)

at 1. He submitted bids to the Bureau, which duly notified the City of his offers.

See id. However, after a vote at a regular meeting of the City Council, the City sent

the Bureau letters objecting to the sales. See id. The Bureau accordingly rejected

Spencer’s bids. See id.

Spencer, acting pro se, filed a document titled “Motion for Rule to

Show Cause” in the trial court against the City and the Bureau, alleging that the City

unreasonably withheld its consent to the sales and seeking to compel the acceptance

of his bids and the conveyance of the properties to him. 1925(a) op. at 1; Reproduced

Record (RR) at 4a-6a. The trial court’s Civil Case Docket Report reflects that

Spencer’s filing was treated as a civil complaint. See Notice of Appeal, Civ. Case

Docket Report (designating the “Case Type” as “Complaint”). The parties thereafter

proceeded to file pleadings pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,

including answers, new matter, and replies to new matter. See RR at 2a. Spencer,

still acting pro se, then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id. at 2a

& 37a. However, when the parties appeared before the trial court for argument on

the motion for judgment on the pleadings, they declared themselves ready to proceed

with an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 35a-37a. Acceding to the parties’ wishes, the

trial court held a hearing and the parties presented all of their evidence, as well as

some oral argument. See generally id. at 35a-118a.

After the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the relief

Spencer had sought in what the trial court labeled as his “petition.” 1925(a) op. at

3. In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its reasoning as follows:

Of particular significance was [the City Code Enforcement

Officer’s] testimony that . . . Spencer has a history of

allowing properties he owns in an adjoining jurisdiction to

become blighted. Spencer is involved in an ongoing

2

dispute with the State regarding vehicle parts and other

items of his personal property that flowed from his land

into the Allegheny River during a flood. The City is

concerned that if Spencer acquires [the] parcels held in

repository, he will move abandoned vehicles from his

other land onto the parcels in the [C]ity.

Id. at 2. Applying Section 627 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (RETSL),2 72 P.S.

§ 5860.627, to the evidence adduced at the hearing, the trial court found the City did

not unreasonably withhold its consent to the sales. Id. at 3.

Spencer did not file a motion for post-trial relief. Instead, he filed this

immediate appeal of the trial court’s order.

II. Issues

On appeal,3 Spencer raises two overarching issues, which we

paraphrase as follows.

First, Spencer posits that the City’s objections to his bids constituted

adjudications that required adherence to procedures specified in applicable

provisions of administrative law. He contends that the City did not follow the

requisite procedure before sending its objection letters, and therefore, the Bureau’s

resulting rejections of Spencer’s bids were void ab initio. Spencer suggests that the

only proper remedy is to compel conveyance of the properties to him.

2

Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5860.101-5860.803. Sections

625-630 of the RETSL were added by the Act of July 3, 1986, P.L. 351, 72 P.S. §§ 5860.625-

5860.630.

3

“Our scope of review of a judgment following a non-jury trial is limited to determining

whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by [substantial] evidence and whether the

trial court committed an error of law.” GAI Consultants, Inc. v. Homestead Borough, 120 A.3d

417, 422 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (first citing McGaffic v. City of New Castle, 74 A.3d 306, 310

n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (en banc); and then citing Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 938 A.2d 1157,

1160 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)).

3

Second, Spencer asserts that the City acted unreasonably in objecting

to his bids. He claims the City improperly relied on a recent amendment to Section

627 of the RETSL that had not yet become effective when the City sent its objection

letters. He argues that the Bureau’s rejection of his bids also violated the purpose of

the repository provision of the RETSL to foster removal of properties from

repository, which should have been paramount in the City’s consideration of his

bids.

Before we may reach either of these issues, however, we must first

determine whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. Specifically, we must

determine the nature of Spencer’s action in the trial court. If it was a statutory

petition authorized under the RETSL, the rules of civil procedure were not

applicable. However, if it was a civil complaint, as it was designated by the trial

court, it was subject to the rules of civil procedure, including the rule governing

motions for post-trial relief. In that event, Spencer’s failure to file a motion for post-

trial relief constituted a failure to preserve any issues for appeal.

III. Discussion

A. Preservation of Issues

A civil action may be commenced in one of two ways: a praecipe for a

writ of summons or a complaint. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1007. Here, Spencer’s initial filing in

the trial court was designated as a complaint in the Civil Case Docket Report. Notice

of Appeal, Civ. Case Docket Report. Original process, be it a writ of summons or a

complaint, must be served on the party defendant by a sheriff. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

400(a). That was done in this case. The parties then filed a series of civil pleadings

including answers, new matter, and replies to new matter. See RR at 2a.

4

By contrast to a complaint, a motion or petition is not original process,

but rather, an application for relief filed subsequent to the complaint. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

206.1(a). A rule to show cause proceeds under petition practice. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

206.4(a) & 206.7. Documents filed in the course of petition practice must be served

on the opposing party’s counsel of record but may be served by regular mail. See

Pa.R.Civ.P. 404(a)(1).

Where the rules of civil procedure apply, a party aggrieved by either a

jury verdict or a trial court’s order following a bench trial must file a motion for

post-trial relief raising all trial court errors the party intends to raise on appeal.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c) (“Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after (1)

verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to agree, or nonsuit in the case of

a jury trial; or (2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case of a trial

without jury.”). Any issue not raised in the post-trial motion is not preserved for

appeal. See L.B. Foster Co. v. Lane Enters., Inc., 710 A.2d 55, 55 (Pa. 1998) (per

curiam) (concluding that parties must “file post-trial motions in order to preserve

issues for appeal. If an issue has not been raised in a post-trial motion, it is waived

for appeal purposes.”) (first citing Benson v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 342 A.2d 393

(Pa. 1975); and then citing Commonwealth v. Metz, 633 A.2d 125 (Pa. 1993));

Liparota v. State Workmen’s Ins. Fund, 722 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)

(holding that “[w]here a party fails to file timely post-trial motions after a bench

trial, no issues are preserved for this Court to review”).

Here, neither the trial court nor any party raised the issue of whether

Spencer was required to file a post-trial motion in order to preserve his claims of

error for appeal in this Court. However, this Court may consider it sua sponte. See

Borough of Shenandoah v. Cruz (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 715 C.D. 2016, filed May 22,

5

2017), slip op. at 3 n.4 (explaining that “[e]ven where neither party has raised a

failure to preserve issues for review by not filing post-trial motions pursuant to

Pa.R.C[iv].P. [] 227.1, that failure does not prevent this Court from doing so sua

sponte”) (citing Borough of Harveys Lake v. Heck, 719 A.2d 378, 380 n.4 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1998)).

We find Battisti v. Tax Claim Bureau of Beaver County, 76 A.3d 111

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), instructive here. In Battisti, a taxpayer filed objections to a tax

upset sale at which her property was sold, alleging lack of the requisite advance

notice of the upset sale. The tax claim bureau filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, which the court granted. The taxpayer appealed, arguing that the court

erred by failing to allow her to present evidence. See id. at 113-14.

In analyzing the procedure to be followed for adjudicating the

taxpayer’s objections to the upset sale, this Court explained that a taxpayer objecting

to an upset sale may choose between filing a petition to set aside the sale under

Section 607 of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 5860.607, and a civil complaint in equity. See

Battisti, 76 A.3d at 114. Although the statutory procedure set forth in Section 607

is not the exclusive method of objecting to a tax upset sale, a taxpayer who elects to

proceed under Section 607 must follow the statutory procedures provided therein,

according to the practice of the court where the petition is pending; papers filed in

those procedures are not pleadings, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure

do not apply. See id. at 114-15. The court in Battisti had a standing order setting

forth procedures for disposing of petitions under Section 607 of the RETSL, and that

order did not provide a mechanism for disposition based on the petition and answer

without taking evidence. See id. at 115. Therefore, the lower court erred in granting

judgment on the pleadings. See id.

6

Here, Spencer’s claim arises under Section 627 of the RETSL

governing sales from repository, not objections to an upset sale under Section 607.

Unlike Section 607 as discussed in Battisti, Section 627 has no related provision in

the RETSL that prescribes a procedure to challenge the Bureau’s acceptance or

rejection of a bid to purchase a repository property. Therefore, unlike the taxpayer

in Battisti, Spencer’s only option in this case was to commence a civil action by

filing original process, i.e., a complaint, in the trial court. That is what he did.

Therefore, this case was governed in the trial court by the rules of civil procedure.

Although the trial court originally anticipated argument on the motion

for judgment on the pleadings, the parties, by mutual agreement and with the trial

court’s acquiescence, proceeded by hearing and presented all of their testimonial and

documentary evidence to the trial court. When the parties proceed in such a fashion,

the proceeding constitutes a bench trial. See Gardner v. Carter (Pa. Cmwlth., No.

413 C.D. 2020, filed Mar. 1, 2023),4 slip op. at 5 (explaining that where a trial court

held a hearing relating to a summary judgment motion, the court in effect conducted

a bench trial). We conclude that is what happened here.

Because the trial court decided this case after conducting a bench trial,

Spencer was required to file a motion for post-trial relief in order to preserve any

issues for appeal. See L.B. Foster Co. Because he did not do so, he has failed to

preserve any issues, and therefore, all issues are waived.5

4

This unreported opinion of this Court is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section

414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

5

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that “[a]n appeal is ‘quashed’ when the

court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal in the first instance . . . . When the appellant has failed to

preserve issues for appeal, the issues are waived, and the lower court’s order is more properly

‘affirmed.’” In the Interest of K.L.S., 934 A.2d 1244, 1246 & n.3 (Pa. 2007) (first citing Sahutsky

v. H.H. Knoebel Sons, 782 A.2d 996, 1001 n.3 (Pa. 2001); and then citing Sellers v. Runkle, 267

A.2d 847, 848 (Pa. 1970)).

7

Nonetheless, for completeness, we address the issues raised on appeal.

We discern no merit in those issues.

B. Application of Administrative Law

As set forth above, Spencer argues that the City was required to provide

him an administrative hearing before sending its objection letters, in that the votes

regarding the objections constituted adjudications. On appeal, Spencer asserts that

because the City’s objections were improper, the Bureau’s rejections of his bids were

void ab initio and he is automatically entitled to conveyance of the properties to him.

However, the record demonstrates that Spencer clearly and repeatedly waived this

argument during the hearing before the trial court.

First, at the commencement of the hearing, during preliminary

discussions with the trial court, Spencer’s counsel, Michael R. Hadley, Esquire

(Counsel or Mr. Hadley) discussed with the trial court the issue of applying

administrative law and the available remedy if there had been an adjudication

without a hearing. The following colloquy occurred:

[COUNSEL FOR THE CITY]: . . . There has been an

argument in the memorandum that [Spencer] wasn’t

provided an adjudicatory hearing on an administrative

level. It is inapplicable in this matter . . . . I don’t think

Mr. Hadley realized that there had been a vote by City

Council that had authorized moving forward with these

objections. So, I don’t believe that the adjudication issue,

the agency law issue, is applicable here . . . .

....

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Hadley, as far as administrative

procedure . . . , you’re talking about [the Local Agency

Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 551-555 & 751-754] and Section 553[,

2 Pa.C.S. § 553]?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, Your Honor . . . . We believe [the

Local Agency Law] applies . . . . [T]here’s no precedent

8

either way for Your Honor. You’ll have to make a case of

first impression. Neither of us have a case that clearly says

does a disgruntled or an unsuccessful bidder have an

administrative remedy. But I think if you just look to the

definition of the word adjudication - - and the broad phrase

is any and all decisions - - findings that affect property and

so forth - - we believe this was an adjudication and that it

is properly before the Court. It’s covered by the local

procedures in the [Local Agency Law]. Apparently this has

never come up anywhere before to give you precise

guidance, so it’s a matter how you read [the Local Agency

Law].

THE COURT: You’re not asking the Court then to

effectively remand the case to the City for administrative

hearing?

MR. HADLEY: You would absolutely have the right to

since there was admittedly no hearing or opportunity to be

heard before the City of Franklin. If you just said today

I’m finding [the Local Agency Law] applies, you would

have the authority to either conduct your own hearing today

or remand it and say [to] the City hold a hearing. They’d

have a right to do that, and you could issue that right now

and there’s nothing I could do about it. You have the

discretion - - If you find [the Local Agency Law] applies,

and there was no hearing or opportunity, you have the

choice to do it yourself or remand it, and we couldn’t

disagree with any decision on appeal. That is your call how

you want to proceed if you find [the Local Agency Law]

applied. You can do it here originally or send it back to

City Council . . . for a hearing opportunity.

....

. . . Whoever you remand it [] to may be the Tax Claim

Bureau and not the City . . . . I’m not sure that’s not logical.

They’re also a defendant here. If you decided you would

remand it for a record to be made, I would not object it be

remanded to the . . . Bureau for that to be the venue for the

proceeding.

THE COURT: Is there any provision for a hearing before

the . . . Bureau on the issue?

9

MR. HADLEY: Yes, Your Honor. If you find there is a

property right being adjudicated you are required to give

notice and opportunity to be heard before the decision

maker, be that the County or the City, make their decision.

THE COURT: What does the statute provide as far as how

the . . . Bureau deal[s] with this?

MR. HADLEY: It would be just the regular . . . procedures

as laid out in the [Local Agency Law]. As any other

procedure that would come before any governing body, a

local agency, that’s how it would be conducted. That

would be our anticipation.

THE COURT: The [RETSL] doesn’t contain any

provisions for a hearing?

MR. HADLEY: Any [sic] of itself it does not, but nor does

many of them. They’re all covered by the universal [Local

Agency Law], which covers the generic term of

adjudication be it in any number of the titles of our code.

THE COURT: So, your argument is this wasn’t [sic]

adjudication?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, Your Honor, certainly.

RR at 39a-46a. Thus, Counsel was not asserting that Spencer was automatically

entitled to conveyance of the properties as a remedy for being denied a hearing, but

rather, that he was merely entitled to a hearing and that such a hearing could properly

take place in the trial court. The trial court then proceeded with the hearing on that

basis.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court specifically returned to

a discussion of the administrative law issue, and the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Well, with regard to [the

potential procedural requirements of administrative law]

and as the discussion we had at the beginning today about

whether there was a need for a hearing or some

adjudication that either the City or the . . . Bureau did not

comply with a requirement for a hearing before they made

10

their decision, I guess, Mr. Hadley, is that still an issue? I

mean, I - - for practical purposes, if I would send it back I

think you already know what the result would be. Do you

want me to even consider that at this point?

MR. HADLEY: At this point, if you were to send it back,

I think we would make the same record. When you

decided to take the testimony and make a record; I think

this is the record that you can decide to make unreasonable

[sic].

THE COURT: You’re not asking to send it back?

MR. HADLEY: I don’t think we need to. You have made

the record and the record before you is sufficient.

THE COURT: All right . . . . Anything else today?

....

MR. HADLEY: No, Your Honor.

RR at 116a-17a.

The preceding colloquies establish unequivocally that the relief

Spencer sought for the absence of an administrative hearing was that he be provided

with a hearing – which he was, by the trial court, and with his Counsel’s express

consent. Having agreed to the hearing process as his remedy, Spencer will not now

be heard to assert that he was entitled to some other relief instead. Accordingly,

Spencer’s first argument is without merit.

C. Unreasonable Withholding of Consent

Section 627(a) the RETSL, as it was in effect until August 29, 2021,

provided:

(a) The [B]ureau may, with the written consent of all the

taxing districts where the property is located, accept an

offer of any price for property placed in the “repository for

unsold properties” without court approval and published

notice of sale. Any taxing district may not unreasonably

withhold its consent to the sale of the property.

11

Former 72 P.S. § 5860.627(a). Spencer asserts that the City violated former Section

627(a) because it acted unreasonably in objecting to his bids. We disagree.

Spencer claims the City improperly relied on the 2021 amendment to

Section 627(a), which was enacted June 30, 2021, prior to the City’s objection, but

which did not become effective until August 29, 2021, after the City sent its

objection letters. Section 627(a), as amended, now provides:

(a) The [B]ureau may, with the written consent of all the

taxing districts where the property is located, establish a

minimum purchase price and accept an offer of any price

equal to or greater than the minimum purchase price for

property placed in the “repository for unsold properties”

without court approval and published notice of sale. The

[B]ureau shall require, as a condition of sale, that the

purchaser provide an affidavit that includes the

information specified under [S]ection 502-A.[6] Any

taxing district may not unreasonably withhold its consent

to the sale of the property and, if no consent is provided

within sixty (60) days of the date notice was received by

the taxing district, it shall be deemed that the taxing district

consents to the sale of the property. As a condition of its

consent, a taxing district may require that the purchaser:

(1) appear in person before the governing body of

the taxing district charged with reviewing

repository bids; and

(2) provide all of the information required under

[S]ection 502-A.

72 P.S. § 5860.627(a).

Section 502-A, referenced in Section 627(a), provides, in pertinent part:

In order to register for a scheduled upset sale or judicial

sale, the person must submit an application that includes

the following information:

6

Section 502-A of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 5860.502-A, was added by the Act of June 30,

2021, P.L. 33, and provides advance registration requirements for bidders at upset or judicial sales.

12

(1) If the applicant is an individual, the individual’s

name, residential address and phone number.

(2) If the applicant is not an individual, the

applicant’s name, including the name of all officers,

business address and phone number.

(3) If the applicant is a limited liability company,

the names, business addresses and phone numbers

of all members, managers and any other persons

with any ownership interest or right in the limited

liability company.

(4) An affidavit stating that the applicant:

(i) is not delinquent in paying real estate taxes

to any taxing district in this Commonwealth

and that the applicant has no municipal utility

bills, as defined in [S]ection 619.1(b), [72

P.S. § 5860.619a(b),7] that are not more than

one year outstanding anywhere in this

Commonwealth;

(ii) is not bidding for or acting as an agent for

a person who is barred from participating

in the sale under [S]ection 601(d)[, 72 P.S.

§ 5860.601(d)];

(iii) has not, within the three years preceding

the filing of the application, engaged in a

course of conduct or permitted an uncorrected

housing code violation, as defined in

[S]ection 619(e),[8] [72 P.S. § 5860.619(e),]

to continue unabated after being convicted of

an uncorrected housing code violation, as

defined in [S]ection 619(e), and has not

either:

7

Added by the Act of December 21, 1998, P.L. 1008.

8

Added by the Act of January 29, 1998, P.L. 24. Section 619(e) of the RETSL defines an

“[u]ncorrected housing code violation” as “any conviction of a violation of the local building,

housing, property maintenance or fire code which is not remedied within six (6) months of

conviction.” 72 P.S. § 5860.619(e).

13

(A) failed to maintain property owned

by the applicant in a reasonable

manner such that the property posed a

threat to health, safety or property; or

(B) permitted the use of property in an

unsafe, illegal or unsanitary manner

such that the property posed a threat to

health, safety or property . . . .

72 P.S. § 5860.502-A(1)-(4).

Here, Spencer does not allege that either the City or the Bureau required

him to submit an application containing the information or affidavit required by

Section 502-A before that requirement was in effect. He asserts, rather, that the City

applied buyer qualification criteria in Section 502-A before those criteria were in

effect. Specifically, the trial court found most significant the City’s objections based

on Spencer’s “history of allowing properties he owns in an adjoining jurisdiction to

become blighted,” his “ongoing dispute with the State regarding vehicle parts and

other items of his personal property that flowed from his land into the Allegheny

River during a flood,” and the City’s “concern[] that if Spencer acquires parcels held

in repository, he will move abandoned vehicles from his other land onto the parcels

in the [C]ity.” 1925(a) op. at 2. The trial court found these objections were not

unreasonable, and we discern no merit in Spencer’s contrary assertion.

Spencer mistakes the effect of Section 502-A. That provision sets forth

only requirements for documentation of the qualifications of prospective purchasers

of properties from a repository. Neither the City nor the Bureau required Spencer to

submit such documentation prior to the effective date of the statutory amendment

that added Sections 502-A and 619 to the RETSL. Spencer does not claim otherwise.

The previous absence of a statutory documentation requirement does

not mean, however, that Spencer was automatically qualified or entitled to purchase

14

the properties. Specifically, nothing in the addition of the documentation requirements

to the RETSL supports Spencer’s assertion that the City could not previously have

objected to Spencer’s bids based on his ordinance violations related to other

properties or his unrelenting resistance to ordinance enforcement efforts against him

regarding those properties. Likewise, nothing in the 2021 amendment to Section

627(a) supports the proposition that an objection to a repository purchase would have

been unreasonable prior to the effective date of the amendment where, as here, the

bidder had longstanding ordinance violations and a history of litigating those

violations and resisting their correction. To the contrary, adding a formal statutory

requirement that the Bureau document a bidder’s qualifications before a sale

strongly supports the reasonableness of the City’s objection where those

qualifications were lacking. The City could always have objected on the basis of

ongoing ordinance violations by a prospective purchaser, and such an objection

would always have been reasonable. Notably, with regard to the reason for objection

credited by the trial court, the City’s counsel explained at the hearing:

We would argue that given the history of litigations, as . . .

Spencer himself testified, he’s been dealing with alleged

property violations for a number of years with Cranberry

Township. I don’t know - - I would like to believe that I

could or that we could take him at face value when he says

he will abide by all rules and regulations, and we disagree

with that. So, we are very concerned about - - and to be

very frank, we think this is not just for investment, that this

is an intent to move these vehicles and these other junk

items onto these properties in the City . . . . And if he does

that, then we will be dealing with significant zoning

ordinance, property maintenance issues, well head

protection issues; and the like . . . . In our opinion, it

doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out he wants to

access a lot of land for one purpose and one purpose only.

15

It’s not for investment.[9] It’s to move his Jeep collection

and or his abandoned vehicles from Cranberry Township

into the City . . . and eliminate the problem that . . . he’s

trying to deal with, and we’re not interested in inheriting

the problem.

RR at 113a-14a.

Spencer admitted at the hearing that Cranberry Township has been

asserting ordinance violations against him relating to his junk vehicles since 1994,

that the violations were eventually adjudicated, and that he was fined $250,000. See

RR at 102a-03a. Nonetheless, he continues to insist that the vehicles he stores on

his properties in the township are not abandoned or junk vehicles, but a private

collection. See id. at 104a. He also continues to dispute Cranberry Township’s

contention that he is operating a junkyard in violation of the township’s zoning

ordinance. See id. at 105a. Thus, Spencer’s own testimony demonstrates the

reasonableness of the City’s unwillingness to “inherit[] the problem,” id. at 114a,

and amply supports the trial court’s finding of fact that the City’s objections to

Spencer’s bids were not unreasonable.

Further, the locations of Spencer’s other properties outside the City are

immaterial. Whether in the City or elsewhere, Spencer’s extensive history of

ordinance violations regarding his use and maintenance of his properties was a red

flag for the City. We agree with the trial court that the City did not act unreasonably

in objecting to proposed sales from the repository that would invite new problems

with those properties.

Spencer argues further that the Bureau’s rejection of his bids violated

the purpose of the repository provision of the RETSL to foster removal of properties

9

It is not surprising that the City and, apparently, the trial court did not credit Spencer’s

testimony that his sole reason for purchasing the properties at issue was simply to own them. See

RR at 106a.

16

from repository, which should have been paramount in the City’s consideration of

his bids. Once again, we disagree.

Section 625 of the RETSL, relating to sales from a repository, provides:

It is the intent of this subarticle to establish a procedure to

minimize the number of properties which the county,

through the [B]ureau, holds because of delinquent tax

claims, recognizing that some properties have little or no

value except perhaps to a neighboring property owner and

that holding such properties constitutes a cost to the

[C]ounty and [B]ureau.

72 P.S. § 5860.625. Contrary to Spencer’s claim, this language does not suggest that

removing properties from repositories must be the paramount consideration of a

taxing district. Removal of properties from a repository is a laudable goal, but it

does not require the City to accept a purchase offer from an unacceptable buyer.

Here, the City acted not only reasonably, but responsibly, in declining to achieve the

removal of properties from the repository at the likely cost of future ordinance

enforcement problems with the prospective buyer that would simply trade one set of

costs for another.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

denying Spencer’s petition to compel conveyance of the properties by the Bureau.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s order.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

17

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Randy J. Spencer, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

City of Franklin and County : No. 648 C.D. 2022

of Venango Tax Claim Bureau :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2023, the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Venango County dated May 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge