The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Olympus and Sompo America :
Insurance Company, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 38 C.D. 2022
: Submitted: September 9, 2022
Dana Eiselen (Workers’ Compensation :
Appeal Board), :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: October 23, 2023
Olympus and Sompo America Insurance Company (together, Employer)
petition for review of the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Board) that affirmed the decision of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)
granting the Petition to Review Compensation Benefits (Review Petition) filed by
Dana Eiselen (Claimant) and denying Employer’s Petition to Terminate
Compensation Benefits (Termination Petition). On appeal, Employer argues that
Claimant’s medical expert’s testimony, upon which the WCJ relied to expand the
description of Claimant’s work-related injuries and find that Claimant was not fully
recovered, was not legally competent to support those determinations. Employer
further argues that the WCJ’s decision was not reasoned as required by Section
422(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),1 and, therefore, should have been
reversed by the Board. Upon review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Petitions
Claimant sustained work-related injuries on March 30, 2017, described in a
Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP) as “a contusion and multiple
head injuries.” (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1.) The NTCP’s narrative
described how the injuries occurred as “[Claimant] fell ill after eating dinner 3/29
with colleague. Sick all night. Collapsed in morning 3/30 on hard surface and hit
head. Went to [emergency room] and then was admitted to hospital 3/30.”
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a.) The NTCP converted to a Notice of
Compensation Payable (NCP) by operation of law. (FOF ¶ 1.)
Claimant has returned to work for Employer without a loss of earnings,
resulting in the suspension of her wage loss benefits, which leaves only her ongoing
receipt of medical benefits at issue. (Id. ¶¶ 6d, 18.) On May 30, 2019, Employer
filed the Termination Petition, averring that Claimant had fully recovered from her
work-related injuries as of January 2, 2019, based on the opinion of Leonard Bruno,
M.D. (Id. ¶ 3.) Claimant filed the Review Petition on December 10, 2019, seeking
to expand the description of the work injury to include a concussion. (Id. ¶ 4.) Both
Employer and Claimant filed answers to the others’ Petitions, denying the
allegations therein. (R.R. at 8a, 13a.)
1
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 834.
2
B. Proceedings Before the WCJ
The Petitions were assigned to the WCJ, who held multiple hearings.
Claimant testified, and the parties presented the deposition testimonies of their
respective experts, Dr. Bruno for Employer, and Daniele Shollenberger, C.R.N.P.
(Ms. Shollenberger) for Claimant.
Claimant testified2 concerning the work-related incident and the treatment she
received. Claimant’s general practitioner referred her to Ms. Shollenberger, a
Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner (CRNP), who manages Claimant’s
concussion treatment plan, which includes speech therapy, physical therapy, and
massage therapy. Claimant has challenges with focusing, short-term memory,
speaking, sleeping through the night, and insomnia. She continues to have pain in
her shoulder and neck and headaches multiple times a week, and performing daily
activities results in mental fatigue. Prior to the work injuries, Claimant did not have
issues with her memory, speech, and headaches. Since the COVID-19 pandemic,
Claimant has worked from home, which has resulted in regression in some of the
improvements in her speech, memory, and focus. Claimant denied having any prior
head injuries or that she felt listless or had less stamina or energy three to four weeks
before she sustained the work injuries. Claimant acknowledged being diagnosed
with aplastic anemia in June 2017, for which she received a bone marrow transplant,
a week of chemotherapy, and some physical and occupational therapy. Claimant’s
aplastic anemia treatment ended in August 2018, after which her cognitive and
occupational treatment for the work injuries resumed. Claimant does not feel fully
recovered from her work-related injuries.
2
Transcripts of Claimant’s March 6, 2020 deposition and July 28, 2020 video hearing
testimony are found, respectively, at Certified Record Item Nos. 24 and 17 and pages 20a-52a and
233a-47a of the Reproduced Record. This testimony is summarized in Findings of Fact 5 and 6.
3
Ms. Shollenberger3 is an autonomous provider who works with the chief of
neurosurgery if needed, is the Program Director of the Concussion and Head Trauma
Program (Concussion Program) at the Lehigh Valley Health Network, and treats
concussion patients. Ms. Shollenberger first saw Claimant in April 2017, when she
obtained a history of the work-related incident, and Claimant’s immediate treatment,
which included a diagnosis of a concussion. Following Ms. Shollenberger’s
examination of Claimant, which revealed continued trouble with sleeping, fatigue,
light sensitivity, decreased appetite, dizziness, headaches, posterior cervical pain,
trapezius pain, issues with balance, and difficulty in focusing of the eyes,
concentration, and focus, Ms. Shollenberger, too, diagnosed Claimant with a
concussion. Ms. Shollenberger continued to treat Claimant as of April 1, 2020,
during which time Claimant had ongoing symptoms. Ms. Shollenberger changed
Claimant’s diagnosis to post-concussive syndrome because Claimant’s symptoms
continued for more than a month after initial treatment. In Ms. Shollenberger’s
opinion, Claimant was not fully recovered. Ms. Shollenberger was aware of
Claimant’s treatment for aplastic anemia, during which time she did not see
Claimant. Ms. Shollenberger did not review those records and acknowledged that
chemotherapy can cause fatigue and cognitive issues. She also acknowledged that
it would be abnormal to develop new symptoms of post-concussive syndrome three
years after the trauma, and she described Claimant’s concussion as “mild” because
it was not accompanied by head trauma and positive diagnostic studies. (FOF ¶ 7n-
o.)
3
Ms. Shollenberger’s deposition testimony is found at Certified Record Item No. 19 and
pages 129a-96a of the Reproduced Record. It is summarized in Finding of Fact 7.
4
Dr. Bruno,4 a board-certified neurosurgeon, performed an Independent
Medical Examination of Claimant on October 29, 2018, during which Claimant
complained of intermittent headaches, balance issues, and cognitive function
impairment as a result of the incident, and described her treatment for aplastic
anemia. The results of Dr. Bruno’s physical and neurological examination of
Claimant were normal, with no balance, gait, or memory issues, and no positive
neurologic findings. Dr. Bruno’s review of Claimant’s initial hospital records
revealed a normal computerized tomography (CT) scan and no reference to skull
trauma, and Claimant’s records from April 26, 2017, reflected complaints of
decreased energy from a severe viral infection in January 2017. This viral infection,
Dr. Bruno opined, caused Claimant’s aplastic anemia, which accounted for
Claimant’s complaints of having less energy than normal. Based on his examination
of Claimant and Claimant’s medical records, Dr. Bruno concluded that the March
30, 2017 incident was related to Claimant’s aplastic anemia; her work-related injury
was limited to a head contusion, from which she had fully recovered; she did not
suffer a work-related concussion; and her ongoing cognitive issues, sensitivity to
light, headaches, and visual disturbances were the result of the aplastic anemia and
related chemotherapy. According to Dr. Bruno, Claimant no longer required
treatment for the work-related head contusion and could return to full duty without
restrictions.
Upon her review of the record, the WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony, citing
the WCJ’s personal observations of Claimant and the consistency of Claimant’s
testimony with her medical records. (FOF ¶ 10.) As between the medical witnesses,
4
Dr. Bruno’s deposition testimony is found at Certified Record Item No. 23 and pages 73a-
108a of the Reproduced Record. It is summarized in Finding of Fact 8.
5
the WCJ found Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony more persuasive than Dr. Bruno’s
testimony because
Ms. Shollenberger has had the opportunity to observe Claimant over a
longer period of time than Dr. Bruno. In addition, the medical records
from Claimant’s hospital stay immediately following her fall diagnose
a concussion, Claimant’s symptoms are consistent with post-
concussive syndrome[,] and she continues to work despite her
symptoms[,] elevating [Claimant’s] credibility and that of her medical
expert.
(Id. ¶ 11.)
Having credited Ms. Shollenberger’s opinions, the WCJ found that Claimant
had met her burden of proving that the description of the work injury should include
a concussion and post-concussive syndrome, granted the Review Petition, and
modified that description accordingly. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14; WCJ Decision, Conclusion of
Law (COL) ¶ 2.) Finding that Claimant’s work injuries include a concussion and
post-concussive syndrome, the WCJ rejected Dr. Bruno’s opinion of full recovery
because he did not address those injuries. (FOF ¶ 12.) Thus, the WCJ found that
Employer did not meet its burden of proof on the Termination Petition and denied
the same. (Id. ¶ 15; COL ¶ 3.)
C. Appeal to the Board and the Board’s Opinion
Employer appealed to the Board, raising the same arguments as it does here.
Upon review, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. The Board held that
Pennsylvania courts have recognized that nurses may provide competent, medical
expert opinions because their training and experiences make them more
knowledgeable in that field than an ordinary individual. (Board Opinion (Op.) at 7
(citing Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 5 A.3d 212 (Pa. 2010); Miller v. Brass Rail
6
Tavern, Inc., 664 A.2d 525 (Pa. 1995)).) Citing Ms. Shollenberger’s credentials as
a registered nurse and CRNP in the field of neurology and brain trauma, and
concussions in particular, the Board found no abuse of discretion or error in the WCJ
finding Ms. Shollenberger competent to opine as to Claimant’s condition and the
causal connection between the work incident and that condition. (Id. at 8-9.) The
Board noted that because Claimant did not have to disprove a causal connection
between her concussion and aplastic anemia, Ms. Shollenberger’s limited
knowledge of aplastic anemia went to the weight, not competency, of her testimony.
(Id. at 9.) The Board further held the WCJ’s decision was reasoned because it
summarized the testimony presented, provided objective reasons for crediting Ms.
Shollenberger’s competent testimony and rejecting Dr. Bruno’s contrary testimony,
and allowed for adequate appellate review. For these reasons, the Board found no
error in the WCJ’s decision granting the Review Petition and denying the
Termination Petition. Employer now petitions this Court for review.5, 6
II. DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles
Section 413(a) of the Act authorizes WCJs to modify an NCP if the
description of the injury contained therein is incorrect, 77 P.S. § 771,7 and WCJs are
also authorized to expand the description of a work injury to include additional
5
This Court’s scope of review “is limited to determining whether necessary findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether
constitutional rights were violated.” Elberson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Elwyn, Inc.), 936
A.2d 1195, 1198 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
6
Employer requested supersedeas from this Court, which we denied by Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated May 10, 2022.
7
Section 413(a) states, relevantly, that “[a WCJ] may, at any time, review and modify or
set aside a [NCP] . . . if it be proved that such [NCP] was in any material respect incorrect.” 77
P.S. § 771.
7
injuries, Commercial Credit Claims v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
(Lancaster), 728 A.2d 902, 902, 904 (Pa. 1999). In a review petition seeking to add
an injury, where the causal relationship to the work injury is not obvious, a claimant
bears the burden of proving such causal relationship through unequivocal medical
evidence. AT & T v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hernandez), 707 A.2d 649, 653
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). If the claim is based on an NCP being incorrect when originally
issued, the claimant must “establish that a material mistake of fact or law was made
at the time the NCP was issued.” Anderson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa.
Hosp.), 830 A.2d 636, 641 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
In contrast, the burden in a termination proceeding is on the employer, which
must demonstrate that the claimant has fully recovered from the work-related
injuries and can return to their pre-injury position without restrictions or that any
remaining disability is unrelated to the work injuries. Udvari v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeal Bd. (US Air), 705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Pa. 1997). Where a claimant has
ongoing subjective complaints, termination may be obtained where an employer’s
medical expert unequivocally testifies that the claimant is fully recovered and can
return to work without restriction and there is no objective medical evidence that
substantiates the complaints or relates them to the work injury. Id. A claimant has
no burden of proving anything in a termination proceeding. Cent. Park Lodge
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Robinson), 718 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
It is well settled that WCJs are the factfinders and “sole arbiter[s] of
credibility, and where [their] findings are supported by substantial, competent
evidence, we may not disturb them on appeal.” AT & T, 707 A.2d at 655. As
factfinder, a WCJ “is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including
a medical witness, in whole or in part.” Greenwich Collieries v. Workmen’s Comp.
8
Appeal Bd. (Buck), 664 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). However, the legal
competency of a medical witness’s testimony is a question of law fully reviewable
by this Court. Swigart v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Williamsport), 131
A.3d 117, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “Competency[,] when applied to medical
evidence, is merely a question of whether the witness[’s] opinion is sufficiently
definite and unequivocal to render it admissible.” Cerro Metal Prods. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Plewa), 855 A.2d 932, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). “A medical
expert’s opinion is not rendered incompetent unless it is solely based on inaccurate
or false information.” Am. Contracting Enters., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Hurley), 789 A.2d 391, 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (emphasis in the original). Medical
testimony is “unequivocal if the medical witness, after providing a foundation,
testifies that, in [the witness’s] professional opinion, certain facts exist, or that [the
witness] believes or thinks certain facts exist, so long as the medical witness does
not recant the opinion or belief first expressed.” AT & T, 707 A.2d at 653. “Our
review [of a medical expert’s testimony] must encompass the witness’[s] entire
testimony, and not merely isolated statements, in reaching our determination.”
Swigart, 131 A.3d at 119 (quoting Buchanan v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (City
of Phila.), 659 A.2d 54, 56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)) (emphasis in original). With these
principles in mind, we turn to the issues raised by Employer.
B. Competency
Employer first argues the WCJ erred in relying on Ms. Shollenberger’s
testimony to grant the Review Petition and deny the Termination Petition.8
Employer’s challenge to the legal competency of Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony is
8
We have combined Employer’s first two issues, which attack the legal competency of
Ms. Shollenberger’s opinions.
9
three-fold: she is not a medical doctor; she lacks the foundational education and
expertise to differentiate between symptoms related to aplastic anemia and the
treatment for that condition and those related to concussions; and she could not
testify regarding Claimant’s aplastic anemia because it is outside her specialty per
the State Board of Nursing’s regulations. We address these challenges in turn.
Employer’s first challenge focuses on Ms. Shollenberger being a CRNP, not
a medical doctor. However, in Freed, our Supreme Court reversed its prior decision
in Flanagan v. Labe, 690 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1997), in which the Supreme Court held that
a nurse was precluded from offering opinion testimony as to the identity and cause
of a medical condition. In doing so, the Supreme Court explained that
in the context of legal proceedings, if a witness has any reasonable
pretension of specialized knowledge on the relevant subject, [the
witness] may be offered as an expert witness, and the weight to be given
[that] testimony is for the trier of fact to determine. Rule 702 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence also provides that “a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may
testify.” Pa.R.E. 702.
Freed, 5 A.3d 216-17 (citation omitted). Recognizing that “there are any number of
ways a nurse might obtain expertise that is beyond the ordinary range of training,
knowledge, intelligence, or expertise,” the Supreme Court held that “an otherwise
competent and properly qualified nurse is not prohibited . . . from giving expert
testimony at trial regarding medical causation.” Id. at 214, 217.
Accordingly, we discern no basis to conclude that Ms. Shollenberger is not
“an otherwise competent and properly qualified nurse [who] is not prohibited . . .
from giving expert testimony . . . regarding medical causation.” Freed, 5 A.3d at
214. Notably, Employer did not object to Ms. Shollenberger testifying or otherwise
challenge her qualifications during her deposition. And, reviewing those
10
qualifications, which include 40 years working as a registered nurse and CRNP,
creating and directing a concussion and head trauma program, and treating 50
patients in that program weekly, there can be no reasonable dispute that Ms.
Shollenberger possesses the training and experience necessary to establish that she
has a “reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge,” particularly on the topics of
concussions and head trauma. Id. at 216. Thus, the fact that Ms. Shollenberger is
not a medical doctor is not dispositive as to her competency to provide testimony
regarding the medical causation, as well as scope and continuing nature, of
Claimant’s work-related head injuries.
Employer next asserts that Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony was not legally
competent because she did not and could not, due to her lack of medical training and
review of Claimant’s records, distinguish between a concussion and aplastic anemia
as causing Claimant’s ongoing symptoms. In this regard, Employer cites Spotts
v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Superior Tube Co.), 541 A.2d 446 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1988), to argue a medical witness’s lack of knowledge of the underlying diagnosis
makes their testimony “equivocal and incompetent as a matter of law.” (Employer’s
Br. at 14.) Employer’s arguments assume, however, that Ms. Shollenberger had to
address Claimant’s aplastic anemia as a potential cause of Claimant’s condition and
that the failure to review records or inability to treat some alleged alternative
diagnosis goes to the competency of the testimony. We agree with the Board,
however, that Claimant was not required to disprove that her concussion and post-
concussive syndrome, and/or ongoing symptoms, were the result of the aplastic
anemia, and that whether Ms. Shollenberger reviewed Claimant’s records for her
aplastic anemia went to the weight, not legal competency, of Ms. Shollenberger’s
testimony. (Board Op. at 9.)
11
To meet her burden of proof on the Review Petition, Claimant was required
to prove her theory of the scope and nature of her work-related injuries. Claimant
sought to establish, through Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony, that Claimant sustained
a work-related concussion on March 30, 2017, which evolved into post-concussive
syndrome, and that Claimant continues to experience symptoms that require
treatment. Ms. Shollenberger’s credited testimony establishes those facts.
Reviewing Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony as a whole, that testimony was not “solely
based on inaccurate or false information,” American Contracting Enterprises, Inc.,
789 A.2d at 396, and was “sufficiently definite and unequivocal,” meaning not based
on possibilities, and, is, therefore, legally competent, Cerro Metal Products, 855
A.2d at 937; Coyne v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Villanova University),
942 A.2d 939, 954 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
Spotts does not require a different result. In that case, the referee, as WCJs
were previously called, accepted as unequivocal the testimony of an employer’s
medical expert that the claimant did not suffer work-related Trichloroethylene (TCE)
poisoning and denied the claimant’s claim petition. While the Board affirmed, this
Court reversed on further appeal. We held that the referee erred in finding that
testimony unequivocal because the medical witness “had never seen a case of acute
poisoning from TCE,” “had no idea how to recognize a case of TCE poisoning, did
not know what [the c]laimant was suffering from, assumed that [the c]laimant was
simply faking, and argued that if [the claimant] was not faking [the claimant] was
suffering from a disorder which could be related to TCE poisoning.” Spotts, 541
A.2d at 448-49. This testimony, we concluded, made the witness’s opinions, taken
as a whole, “interesting but entirely speculative” and equivocal. Id. at 449.
12
Unlike the medical witness in Spotts, Ms. Shollenberger has the experience
and training to recognize a concussion and post-concussive syndrome, she
specifically opined that Claimant suffered from those conditions as a result of the
March 30, 2017 work incident, and those opinions were not speculative, but based
on Claimant’s credited history of the incident and symptomology. Further, contrary
to the situation here, the employer’s expert in Spotts was trying to disprove the
claimant’s alleged cause of his work-related injuries, TCE poisoning, which was
supported by the claimant’s experts’ testimony, and, thus, had to directly address
why TCE poisoning could not cause the work-related injuries. Here, Claimant met
her burden of proving her theory of the work-related injuries and that her witness
did not offer an opinion as to Employer’s causal theory went to the weight, not
competency, of Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony. Marriott Corp. v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Knechtel), 837 A.2d 623, 631 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Finally, Employer appears to argue that Ms. Shollenberger is not qualified or
competent to testify as to any topic beyond concussions pursuant to the State Board
of Nursing’s regulations. The regulation at 49 Pa. Code § 21.251 defines a CRNP
as
[a] professional nurse licensed in this Commonwealth who is certified
by the [State] Board [of Nursing of the Commonwealth] in a specialty
and who, while functioning in the expanded role as a professional nurse,
performs acts of medical diagnosis or prescription of medical
therapeutic or corrective measures in collaboration with a physician
licensed to practice in this Commonwealth and in accordance with [The
Professional Nursing Law, Act of May 22, 1951, P.L. 317, as amended,
63 P.S. §§ 211-225.5 (Nursing Law)] and this subchapter. Nothing in
this subchapter is to be deemed to limit or prohibit a professional nurse
from engaging in those activities which constitute the practice of
professional nursing as defined in [S]ection 2 of the [Nursing Law].
13
49 Pa. Code § 21.251 (emphasis added). Citing this regulation, Employer maintains
that Ms. Shollenberger specializes in concussion and head trauma care, and,
therefore, is only qualified to testify as to those topics.9
Nonetheless, Employer’s argument on this basis is predicated on this Court
accepting Employer’s position that Ms. Shollenberger had to testify about
Claimant’s aplastic anemia and differentiate symptoms related to that condition from
those related to a concussion to be legally competent and unequivocal. As discussed
above, we discern no requirement that, to be competent, Ms. Shollenberger had to
address Employer’s alleged alternative cause of the injury and ongoing symptoms.
C. Reasoned Decision
Employer also argues that the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision based
on substantial competent evidence in the record. Because the WCJ relied on legally
incompetent evidence, Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony, Employer argues the WCJ
“arbitrarily and capriciously disregard[ed] the substantial competent evidence of
record,” i.e., Dr. Bruno’s testimony. (Employer’s Br. at 18.) According to
Employer, the WCJ failed to recognize Ms. Shollenberger’s inadequate qualification
under the State Board of Nursing’s regulation to testify about Claimant’s aplastic
anemia. As a result, Employer contends the WCJ failed to render a reasoned
decision under Section 422(a).
Claimant asserts the WCJ’s decision summarized the evidence presented and
made credibility determinations as to that evidence. Further, she argues, the WCJ
9
While we note that there are specialty certifications for CRNPs, there is also an
“unrestricted certification” for CRNPs. See 49 Pa. Code §§ 21.261(b), .271(c). It is not apparent
from the record which type of CRNP certificate Ms. Shollenberger holds.
14
explained the credibility determinations in a way that allows for appellate review of
the decision.
Section 422(a) of the Act states, in pertinent part, that
[a]ll parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a reasoned
decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
the evidence presented as a whole which clearly and concisely states
and explains the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine
why and how a particular result was reached. The [WCJ] shall specify
the evidence upon which the [WCJ] relies and state the reasons for
accepting it in conformity with this section. When faced with
conflicting evidence, the [WCJ] must adequately explain the reasons
for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted
evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an irrational reason;
the [WCJ] must identify that evidence and explain adequately the
reasons for its rejection. The adjudication shall provide the basis for
meaningful appellate review.
77 P.S. § 834. A reasoned decision allows for adequate appellate review, by either
the Board or the appellate courts, without further elucidation. Daniels v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 828 A.2d 1043, 1052 (Pa. 2003). “A reasoned
decision is no more, and no less.” Id.
On our review, we agree with the Board that the WCJ’s decision is reasoned
because
the WCJ summarized the testimony of the witnesses and made
credibility determinations. [The WCJ] explained the reasons for those
credibility determinations, and we were able to determine how [the
WCJ’s] result was reached. The WCJ’s decision allowed for adequate
appellate review by the Board.
(Board Op. at 9-10.) The WCJ’s decision also allowed for adequate appellate review
by this Court. The WCJ “articulat[ed] . . . objective bas[e]s for the credibility
determination[s]” made, and those bases are supported by substantial evidence in the
15
record, as is required by the reasoned decision standard. Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1053.
Moreover, as we have rejected Employer’s arguments that Ms. Shollenberger’s
testimony was not legally competent, and the WCJ credited that testimony over Dr.
Bruno’s contrary testimony, there was no capricious disregard of Dr. Bruno’s
testimony. The “express consideration and rejection” of an expert’s testimony is,
“by definition [] not capricious disregard.” Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
III. CONCLUSION
Because Ms. Shollenberger’s testimony was legally competent, we discern no
error in the Board affirming the WCJ’s reliance on that testimony to support the
grant of Claimant’s Review Petition and the denial of Employer’s Termination
Petition. Accordingly, we affirm.
__________________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
16
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Olympus and Sompo America :
Insurance Company, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 38 C.D. 2022
:
Dana Eiselen (Workers’ Compensation :
Appeal Board), :
Respondent :
ORDER
NOW, October 23, 2023, the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board, entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge