United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBIN CARLTON BROWN, a/k/a Robert

No. 95-5322

Chariton Brown, a/k/a Robert

Charleton Brown, a/k/a Robert

Charlton Brown, a/k/a Robert D.

Brown,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Leonard D. Wexler, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation.

(CR-94-687)

Submitted: April 9, 1996

Decided: April 19, 1996

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

David P. McCann, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Pres-

ton Strom, Jr., United States Attorney, Brucie H. Hendricks, Assistant

United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Robin Carlton Brown for knowingly making a

false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer in connection

with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1996) (Count 1), and for pos-

sessing a firearm while being a convicted felon in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (West Supp. 1996) (Count 2). Brown

appeals, contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated

and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

Because we find no merit to Brown's claims, we affirm his convic-

tions.

I.

After the grand jury indicted Brown, federal agents arrested him

while he sat in a car with his girlfriend. They removed Brown from

the car, but Brown's girlfriend stayed in the passenger's seat while

agents conducted a search to protect themselves and to look for weap-

ons. No weapons were found. But agents did seize Brown's driver's

license from an open map pocket on the driver's door. Agents verified

that they had arrested the right man and that the information on the

license matched the information provided on ATF Form 4473.

Before trial, Brown moved to suppress the driver's license, con-

tending that the arresting officers left Brown's girlfriend in the car as

a pretext to conduct a protective search for weapons and other evi-

dence. The district court denied the motion, finding that no Fourth

Amendment violation occurred.

At trial, the Government introduced evidence that in December

1993, a man purchased a 9mm pistol from the Best Buy Gun Shop

in Charleston, South Carolina. Joseph Howell, a federally licensed

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firearms dealer, owned the gun shop and handled the transaction.1 The

purchaser completed ATF Form 4473, identifying himself as Robin

Charlton Brown, and presented his driver's license bearing the num-

ber 004388686. Howell compared the picture on the license with the

purchaser. The purchaser indicated on the form that he had not been

convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year. Had the purchaser answered this question

in the affirmative, Howell testified that he would not have completed

the sale. Howell also testified that after he completed a purchase, he

gave the firearm to the person who completed the ATF form. The

9mm pistol sold to the man originated from outside South Carolina.

Fingerprints on the ATF form completed by the purchaser identify-

ing himself as Robin Charlton Brown at the Best Buy Gun Shop

matched those of the defendant, Robin Carlton Brown. In addition, a

handwriting expert compared the handwriting on the ATF form to

Brown's handwriting and concluded that Brown completed the ATF

form. Brown was a convicted felon.

At the close of the Government's case-in-chief, Brown moved for

a judgment of acquittal on both counts, which the court denied. A jury

found Brown guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced him to

a total of 180 months imprisonment followed by a total of five years

of supervised release. This appeal followed.

II.

Brown challenges the district court's denial of his motion to sup-

press the driver's license, contending that the search violated the

Fourth Amendment because it was not made to protect the arresting

officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence and because agents

intentionally waited until Brown entered his car before arresting him.

This claim is meritless.

Brown's driver's license was seized during a search incident to a

lawful arrest.2 Agents searched the car after Brown had been removed

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1 Howell testified at trial based on his normal procedures and business

records rather than from independent recollection.

2 Brown does not allege that the arrest was unlawful.

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from the car and arrested on the charges in the indictment. Once

Brown was under arrest, agents were free to conduct a search of the

car's interior, including the open map pocket on the driver's door.

Therefore, the license was properly seized under current Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,

224 (1973) (stating that police may search arrestee pursuant to a law-

ful arrest); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1981) (extend-

ing search incident to lawful arrest to search of passenger

compartment of vehicle and any containers within passenger compart-

ment). Accordingly, we find that the district court properly denied

Brown's suppression motion. See United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537,

540 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating standard of review).

Brown also contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Brown

asserts that the evidence at trial did not establish that he possessed the

firearm because the Government did not introduce a firearm into evi-

dence. We review a denial of a motion for acquittal under a suffi-

ciency of evidence standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29; see United States

v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1269-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,

63 U.S.L.W. 3817 (U.S. May 15, 1995) (No. 94-8163). The relevant

question is not whether we are convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, but rather whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Government, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact

to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1996); see

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). If substantial evi-

dence exists to support a verdict, the verdict must be sustained.

Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80.

To sustain a conviction for making a false statement to a federally

licensed firearms dealer in connection with the purchase of a firearm,

the Government had to prove that Brown knowingly made a false

statement to a licensed firearms dealer, that the false statement was

made in the acquisition of a firearm, and that the false statement was

likely to deceive the firearms dealer. United States v. Petitjean, 883

F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir. 1989). Brown claims he never acquired the

firearm. But § 922(a)(6) does not require that anyone receive a fire-

arm, only that an attempted acquisition was made. United States v.

Gardner, 579 F.2d 474, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1978). Further, Howell testi-

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fied that he was a federally licensed firearms dealer and that he han-

dled a transaction with a person identifying himself as Robin Charlton

Brown. Brown completed the ATF form, stating that he had not been

convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment.

Howell testified that had this question been answered in the affirma-

tive, he would not have completed the sale. Therefore, allowing the

Government the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts

proven, United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.

1982), a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Brown made

a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer in connection

with the acquisition of a firearm. See Gullett , 75 F.3d at 947; Glasser,

315 U.S. at 80.

We also find the evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to

have convicted Brown of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The

essential elements require proof that Brown previously had been con-

victed of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; that

Brown possessed, transported, shipped, or received a firearm; and that

the firearm travelled in interstate commerce. United States v. Langley,

62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 64

U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-7106). Brown claims that

he never possessed the firearm.3

The Government's primary evidence of possession consisted of the

ATF form with Brown's fingerprints and handwriting on it and How-

ell's testimony that he routinely checks the ATF form against picture

identification. The information on Brown's driver's license matched

the information provided on the ATF form. And Howell testified that

he always delivers the firearm to the person who completed the paper-

work. When Howell delivered the 9mm pistol to Brown, it necessarily

was within his immediate possession and control. United States v.

Hayes, 919 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1990). Taking the evidence in

the light most favorable to the Government, Tresvant, 677 F.2d at

1021, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Brown

received the firearm from Howell when the sale was completed and

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3 Brown stipulated that he had been convicted of a crime punishable of

more than one year in prison. And testimony established that the 9mm

pistol originated outside of South Carolina.

5

that Brown possessed it. See Gullett, 75 F.3d at 947; Glasser, 315

U.S. at 80.

III.

Accordingly, because the district court properly denied Brown's

suppression motion and because the Government presented sufficient

evidence to support Brown's convictions, we affirm. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-

quately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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