The opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-10657 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 10/11/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10657
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
SHANTERIA B. COOKS,
as personal representative of the estate
of Dusharn Weems,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRIAN KREMLER,
officer, individually,
Defendant-Appellant,
CITY OF TAMPA,
USCA11 Case: 23-10657 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 10/11/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 23-10657
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-02570-MSS-SPF
____________________
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dusharn Weems and an unidentified female passenger were
driving in Tampa, Florida. A police officer observed Weems’s driv-
ing, conducted a license plate inquiry, and discovered that the ve-
hicle Weems was driving had been reported stolen. The officer fol-
lowed Weems into a parking lot and activated his police lights.
Weems eventually abandoned the car and ran away on foot.
About three minutes later, Officer Brian Kremler hit Weems
with his police car and killed him. Exactly what transpired in those
three minutes is disputed by the parties. Officer Kremler says he
learned from dispatch that Weems was armed and dangerous. Of-
ficer Kremler also says that he did not intentionally run over
Weems. Shanteria Cooks, representing Weems’s estate, contends
that Officer Kremler did not think that Weems was armed and that
he intentionally struck Weems with his car to detain him.
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23-10657 Opinion of the Court 3
Cooks says that if a jury believes her version of events, then
Officer Kremler used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and wrongfully caused Weems’s death in violation of
Florida state law. Officer Kremler moved for summary judgment,
arguing that a reasonable jury could not agree with Cooks and that
he is, therefore, immune from suit under the federal qualified im-
munity doctrine and Florida’s good-faith immunity statute.
The district court denied Officer Kremler’s summary judg-
ment motion after concluding that a jury needed to resolve multi-
ple factual disputes. Namely, a jury needed to determine (1)
whether Officer Kremler ever believed that Weems was armed and
dangerous and (2) whether Officer Kremler intentionally struck
Weems with the police vehicle. The district court likewise identi-
fied subsidiary factual issues that bear on the resolution of those
two factual questions—e.g., what information was available to Of-
ficer Kremler about Weems, whether Officer Kremler slowed
down or sped up his vehicle as he approached Weems, and
whether Officer Kremler turned his vehicle toward or away from
Weems in the moments leading up to the impact.
Officer Kremler filed an interlocutory appeal of the district
court’s order denying summary judgment on the grounds of qual-
ified immunity. Although we generally are without jurisdiction to
review a denial of summary judgment, there is an exception for
orders denying qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511 (1985). That exception is limited, however. We have interloc-
utory jurisdiction only when the appeal from a district court’s
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10657
denial of qualified immunity presents a legal question. See English
v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 2023). We
have no authority to review the district court’s view of the factual
record alone. See id. So, if a district court denies qualified immunity
only because it holds that there are genuine issues of material fact
in need of jury resolution, we are without jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from that order. See id. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,
313 (1995); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1996).
Applying these standards, we lack jurisdiction over this ap-
peal. Officer Kremler conceded at oral argument in the district
court that he violated clearly established law if a jury credited
Cooks’s version of the facts; he simply disagreed that any reasona-
ble jury could side with Cooks on the facts. In line with that con-
cession, Officer Kremler’s arguments to us are entirely record-
based. That is, he asks us to overturn the district court’s conclusion
that a reasonable jury could rule in Cooks’s favor on any of the
factual disputes identified by the district court. Instead, he argues
that the undisputed evidence reflects that “Weems posed a threat
of serious physical harm to the officers as well as the public” and
Kremler “did not intentionally strike Weems with his vehicle.” He
also asks us to exclude the testimony of an expert witness. These
are not the kinds of questions that we can resolve on an interlocu-
tory appeal.
The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.