explaining that there are “two types of agency interpretations which are accorded different levels of deference,” i.e. published rules and regulations versus “guidance documents” like manuals, policy statements, and advisories
How later courts described this case
- explaining that there are “two types of agency interpretations which are accorded different levels of deference,” i.e. published rules and regulations versus “guidance documents” like manuals, policy statements, and advisories
- observing that precedent permits granting “some measure of value to [agency] interpretations under certain circumstances”
- first determining that the statute “is thus obviously susceptible to two or more reasonable [J-12-2020] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 6 interpretations and as such it is ambiguous” before discussing agency deference
- “As I have explained in the past, I do not agree that reviewing courts should afford what often amounts to unqualified deference—i.e., Chevron deference—to an executive-branch agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.” (footnote omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR, Concurring
I join the majority opinion, except for the treatment of deference due to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. See Majority Opinion at 300-01. In this regard, I believe that some consideration should be given to the Board's adjudicative role at the time it proffered its interpretation of the governing statute. See, e.g. , Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn , 547 U.S. 268 , 292, 126 S.Ct. 1752 , 1767, 164 L.Ed.2d 459 (2006) (explaining that "agency adjudications typically warrant deference"); accord ARIPPA v. PUC , 792 A.2d 636 , 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (noting that deference is due to an agency's interpretation of a statute rendered while acting in an expert capacity during the course of an adjudication). Such a role seems less likely than that of an adversarial litigant to incentivize administrative agencies to "adopt positions arbitrarily and/or based on interests unrelated to ... legislative intent[.]" Huntley & Huntley v. Borough of Oakmont , 600 Pa. 207 , 229, 964 A.2d 855 , 868 (2009).
A pervading question in this field, of course, is how much deference is due in any given context. For present purposes, I find that the majority's able analysis of the relevant statute is substantially more persuasive than the reasoning supplied by the Board and surpasses the weight of the deference that I would accord. Further, and relatedly, the particular statutory-interpretation issue raised in the present matter only modestly implicates agency expertise.