stating that although this Court is not “strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990,” those opinions are nonetheless “considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that although this Court is not “strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990,” those opinions are nonetheless “considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.”
- “[I]t [is] reasonable to draw the negative inference that we are not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990, but we think they are nevertheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.”
- this Court is “not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990, but [] they are nevertheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases”
- “[W]e are not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990, but we think they are nevertheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Riordan, J. (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent.
In this action under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq ., defendant appeals by leave granted 1 the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. I would reverse the trial court's order and remand with instructions to enter summary disposition in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff fell and was injured while outside her insured vehicle at a car wash. She sought no-fault benefits from defendant, which were denied. Plaintiff sued, claiming that defendant wrongfully refused to pay the claim. Defendant contended that plaintiff's claim was barred by the parked-vehicle exception to the no-fault act, MCL 500.3106(1). Plaintiff responded *127 that she was injured while performing maintenance to her vehicle, MCL 500.3105(1), so her claim was not affected by the parking exception. The trial court ultimately agreed with plaintiff and granted summary disposition in her favor. This appeal followed.
"This Court ... reviews de novo decisions on motions for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10)." Pace v. Edel-Harrelson , 499 Mich. 1 , 5, 878 N.W.2d 784 (2016). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)"tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint...." Joseph v. Auto. Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200 , 206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). "Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle ...." MCL 500.3105(1). Our Supreme Court has held that the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1)"shows that the Legislature ... chose to provide coverage only where the causal connection between the injury *617 and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than incidental, fortuitous, or 'but for.' " Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 425 Mich. 643 , 659, 391 N.W.2d 320 (1986). See also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Co. of America , 454 Mich. 626 , 634-635, 563 N.W.2d 683 (1997).
Disregarding the convoluted litany of caselaw discussed by the parties and the majority regarding whether a person washing their car is conducting maintenance and thus exempted from the parked-vehicle exception, summary disposition plainly should have been granted in favor of defendant because there was no question of fact that the causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and her automobile was merely incidental. See Thornton , 425 Mich. at 659 , 391 N.W.2d 320 . Plaintiff slipped and fell because of a condition on the *128 land-the floor of the car wash was slippery or icy. The fact that she may have been washing her vehicle at the time that she may have stumbled upon the allegedly dangerous condition on the land was, without question, "incidental, fortuitous, or 'but for.' " Id . Thus, pursuant to the Court's holding in Thornton , 425 Mich. at 659 , 391 N.W.2d 320 , summary disposition was required in favor of defendant.
I would reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. 2
We originally denied defendant's application for leave to appeal. Woodring v. Phoenix Ins. Co. , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 3, 2015 (Docket No. 324128). The Michigan Supreme Court later remanded this case to us to consider as on leave granted. Woodring v. Phoenix Ins. Co. , 501 Mich. 883 , 901 N.W.2d 887 (2017).
Our Supreme Court decided similarly on the same grounds in Williams v. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co. , 497 Mich. 875 , 857 N.W.2d 1 (2014), wherein the Court reversed a decision of this Court involving an insured sustaining injury caused by a falling tree branch when entering her car. Although plaintiff in this case makes no argument that she was entering her car, the panel in Williams v. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 6, 2014 (Docket No. 311008), p. 5 n. 5, 2014 WL 505260 , alternatively relied on the fact that the insured was conducting maintenance on her car immediately preceding the injury when she was removing other branches from her car. Despite that reasoning, the Michigan Supreme Court still reversed because the causal connection between the insured's injuries and vehicle was too tenuous. Williams , 497 Mich. at 875-876 , 857 N.W.2d 1 . I would hold similarly in this case.