“A contract does not cease to be one of insurance merely because it requires compensation in something other than money, whether the other form of payment is the equivalent of money or merely the rendering of some act of value to the insured.”
How later courts described this case
- “A contract does not cease to be one of insurance merely because it requires compensation in something other than money, whether the other form of payment is the equivalent of money or merely the rendering of some act of value to the insured.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Foster, J.
(concurring in the dissent) — I concur in the views of Chief Justice Hill. The construction placed upon this statute by In re Knight’s Estate, 31 Wn. (2d) 813, 199 P. (2d) 89 , became as much a part of the statute as if the words had been added by legislative enactment. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 , 92 L. Ed. 840 , 68 S. Ct. 665 . Subsequent change is exclusively a legislative prerogative. After the legislature has four times rejected proposals to overturn the rule of the Knight case, the court should not now do so. My reasons for this conclusion are stated in detail in Windust v. Department of Labor & Industries, ante p. 33, 323 P. (2d) 241 .
July 3, 1958. Petition for rehearing denied.