finding that a public policy exception applies only when there is a ‘clear mandate of public policy” embodied in “constitutional or statutory provisions” and thus finding a public policy exception for whistleblowers only as to the reporting of criminal activity, where Maryland has a statute barring retaliation for reporting criminal activity but otherwise lacks a statutory remedy for private sector whistleblowers
How later courts described this case
- finding that a public policy exception applies only when there is a ‘clear mandate of public policy” embodied in “constitutional or statutory provisions” and thus finding a public policy exception for whistleblowers only as to the reporting of criminal activity, where Maryland has a statute barring retaliation for reporting criminal activity but otherwise lacks a statutory remedy for private sector whistleblowers
- in which we found that even though a clear public policy mandate exists protecting employees from discharge based upon reporting suspected criminal activities to law enforcement authorities, termination resulting from an employee investigating his store manager's suspected criminal activity and reporting that suspicion to his supervisors did not allege facts in contravention of the public policy
- declining to find a sufficiently compelling public policy to protect an employee who made internal reports of corporate wrongdoing, instead ot reporting the illegal activities to the proper authorities
- finding a generally applicable public policy was declared by a section of the criminal code not at issue in the case
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Glynn v. Edo Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 595 (2008)
803 A.2d at 492, is distinguishable because Maryland does not provide a comprehensive scheme of protection for private employee-whistleblowers, and thus there was no civil remedy whatsoever for the
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
ELDRIDGE, Judge.,
in which BELL, Chief Judge., joins.
In my view, the decision today and Judge Battaglia’s plurality opinion are inconsistent with this Court’s holding in Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621 , 672 A.2d 608 (1996). In Molesworth , a former employee of a veterinarian brought a common law abusive discharge action against the veterinarian. The former employee claimed that her employment had been terminated because of her gender. This Court, in an opinion by Chief Judge Murphy, held that Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, §§ 14 and 15, prohibiting employers from discriminating based on gender, provided “a sufficiently clear mandate of public policy to support Molesworth’s common law wrongful discharge cause of action,” even though the defendant veterinarian was not an employer within the meaning of the statutory provisions. Molesworth v. Brandon, supra, 341 Md. at 630-632 , 672 A.2d at 613-614 .
Similarly, the enactments by the General Assembly protecting various categories of “employee-whistleblowers,” cited in the plurality opinion, furnish “a sufficiently clear mandate of public policy to support” the petitioner Wholey’s cause of action.
In addition, I continue to disagree with the extremely narrow scope which majorities of this Court have repeatedly accorded the tort of abusive discharge. This Court unanimously recognized the tort of “abusive discharge” in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981). *77 Subsequently, however, the Court has so limited the tort action that numerous discharges from employment, which are abusive and clearly contrary to public policy as a matter of common sense, are held to be beyond the scope of the tort. It is illogical to recognize a tort action and then hold that virtually nothing falls within the action. See Caldor v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 677-678 , 625 A.2d 959, 980-981 (1993) (Eldridge, J., joined by Bell, J., dissenting); Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 487-493 , 588 A.2d 760, 770-772 (1991) (Eldridge, J., dissenting in part); Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hospital, 320 Md. 483, 498-503 , 578 A.2d 766, 774-776 (1990) (Adkins, J., joined by Eldridge, J., and Cole, J., dissenting); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 626-646 , 561 A.2d 179, 190-200 (1989) (Adkins, J., joined by Eldridge, J., and Cole, J., dissenting). See also Insignia v. Ashton, 359 Md. 560, 574-575 , 755 A.2d 1080, 1087-1088 (2000) (Eldridge, J., concurring).
Chief Judge BELL agrees with the views here expressed and joins this opinion.