Opinion

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Loutzenhiser

  • 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 869
  • 140 S.W.3d 351
  • 2004 Tex. LEXIS 659
  • 2004 WL 1533271
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 9, 2004
Status
Published
Author
O'Neill
On the bench
Hecht
Cited by
432 cases
Authority
More cited than 60.7%

Superseded by statute, as recognized in Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chatha

holding that University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, part of University of Texas System, of which University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at San Antonio is another part, Tex. Educ Code § 65.02(a)(7), is a governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act

How later courts described this case

  • holding that University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, part of University of Texas System, of which University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at San Antonio is another part, Tex. Educ Code § 65.02(a)(7), is a governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act
  • explaining that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised for first time on appeal by parties or court and that courts have obligation to ascertain whether jurisdiction exists regardless of whether parties question its existence
  • holding that, in viewing statutory language generally, Legislature is bound to know consequences of making statutory requirement jurisdictional one, and courts must analyze whether it was Legislature's intent to confer such consequences
  • recognizing that courts should not construe statutes in a way that leads to absurd results

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Superseded by statute, as recognized in Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chatha

    Ctr. at Dall. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex.2004), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 511 (Tex.2012).
    Texas Supreme CourtAug 31, 2012by statuteother groundsmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

Justice O’NEILL,

concurring,

joined by Justice SCHNEIDER and Justice SMITH.

The only issue properly before us is whether a plaintiffs failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 101.101 of the Tort Claims Act deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. I agree with the Court that it does not. But having determined that notice is not jurisdictional — meaning the trial court’s ruling on whether the notice requirement has been met is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal — the Court proceeds to decide the very substantive issues that it concludes the court of appeals can’t reach. Because the Court’s opinion goes beyond the discrete jurisdictional issue presented, I concur in the Court’s judgment.

The Court holds that Stephen Loutzen-hiser was required to give notice of a claim within six months of his birth and failed to do so. 140 S.W.3d at 354. But whether a governmental entity had actual notice is often, if not always, a factual inquiry. See Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 343 , 2004 WL 1533264 (Tex.2004). 1 That determination should be made first by the trial court on a record informed by our decision in Simons and not in the context of an impermissible interlocutory appeal.

The consequence of the Court’s holding that the notice requirement is not jurisdictional is that the substantive issues the trial court decides are not immediately reviewable. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, there are good reasons that interlocutory appeals

are the exception, not the rule.... An interlocutory appeal can make it more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job — supervising trial proceedings. It can threaten those proceedings with delay, adding costs and diminishing coherence. It also risks additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work either when it presents appellate courts with less developed records or when it brings them appeals that, had the trial simply proceeded, would have turned out to be unnecessary.

Tyson Johnson v. Houston Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309, 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).

I agree with the Court that “having correctly concluded that the Medical Center’s notice arguments are not jurisdictional, the court of appeals did not have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to affirm th[e] portion of the trial court’s order” striking the Center’s plea to the jurisdiction. 140 S.W.3d at 366 . But the Court *367 itself exceeds the parameters of our own jurisdiction by proceeding to decide the substantive issues. While I largely agree with the Court’s analysis of those issues, I cannot join the Court’s opinion to the extent it ventures beyond deciding the jurisdictional question presented.

. I join the Court’s opinion in Simons defining “actual notice” because the issue is, in my view, sufficiently related to the central jurisdictional question for decision.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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