holding that an additional factor to be considered is the defendant's experience in criminal matters
How later courts described this case
- holding that an additional factor to be considered is the defendant's experience in criminal matters
- handwriting analysis of note victim was writing at moment she was attacked to show her state of mind excluded
- test is voluntariness under the circumstances
- credibility of ordinary citizen presumed
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1 (1986)
People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 511 (1968), overruled on other grounds, People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1 (1986).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Rankin v. State, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1330 (1968)
There is no merit in this contention for the reason that People v. Hester, supra, is distinguishable and is not in point.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting:
This 14-year-old defendant, whose mental age the majority assumes to be that of a normal 11-year-old, was convicted of murder largely on the basis of his written confession. He signed that confession about 12J2 hours after he had been arrested. During the intervening period he was held incommunicado in the custody of the police. He was questioned by four officers. It is conceded that he was not told that he was under arrest, that he had the right to counsel, that he was not required to answer any questions or that anything that he said could be used against him in a criminal case.
Concerning the defendant’s requests to see his mother the opinion of the majority states: “We find it highly relevant in this regard that Officers Thomas and Perkins went to the home of defendant at approximately 2:45 P.M. on April 21, saw Hester’s mother, and apparently told her that defendant was being held by the police, although testimony as to that conversation was largely excluded when objected to on separate occasions by both the State and defense counsel. Defendant’s mother agreed the officers called at the home and further testified that she was notified at 2:3o P.M. by a classmate of Hester’s that he was in police custody, but she did not attempt to locate her son until aproximately 6:00 o’clock that evening; and while no reason appears in the record to explain why Mrs. Hester was unable to see defendant when she arrived at the Audy Home at 9:3o P.M., it is clear the she did see him there at 10 :oo A.M. the following morning.”
The majority finds it “highly relevant” that the defendant’s mother was “apparently told” by the officers who went to the defendant’s home that the defendant was being held by the police. What the record shows, however, is that the assistant State’s attorneys persistently objected to questions about what the officers had told the defendant’s mother when they spoke to her at her home on the afternoon of April 21. Testimony as to that conversation was totally excluded, and always upon the objection of the State. The defendant’s attorney objected once to a related question, but his objection was overruled. This is what occurred on the re-direct examination of Officer Thomas by Assistant State’s Attorney Stamos:
“Q. Officer Thomas, did you go by the home of the defendant on April 21st, 1961, at approximately three-thirty or four o’clock, write out on a piece of paper, a note for his mother?
A. Around a quarter to three, I did.
Mr. Feldman: I think I will have to object. Doesn’t this exceed the scope of the cross-examination?
The court: Well, it seems to me you are making an inquiry.
Mr. Feldman: You would not let me go any further.
Mr. Stamos: I would like to know the reason, whether the parents were notified or not, and that is our purpose in bringing this out.
The court: That is perfectly proper in view of the question of Mr. Feldman. Did you stop at the home of the defendant at that hour ?
The witness: Yes, sir. And I got—
The court: Did you see the mother of the defendant?
The witness: Yes, sir.
The court: Was she there at the time?
The witness: Yes, sir. We notified her to be—
Mr. Stamos: He can’t tell us this. You can’t tell us what you said.
The court: You can’t tell us what you said to her, but you saw her and you talked to her, did you ?
The witness: Yes, sir.
The court: All right.”
When the defendant’s mother was asked by his attorney “At any time on April 21st, 1961, did any police officer or school teacher inform you as to the whereabouts of your son, Lee Arthur Hester?”, both assistant State’s attorneys objected and the objection was sustained. Their objections to questions about her visit to her son’s school on that afternoon and about her trip to the neighborhood police station were similarly sustained.
The grounds upon which the prosecution’s objections and the court’s rulings were based does not appear in the record, and the majority opinion does not attempt to justify them. I can find no support in the record for the statement in the majority opinion that the defendant’s mother “did not attempt to locate her son until approximately 6:00 o’clock that evening.” What the record shows is that the prosecution consistently and successfully resisted every attempt to find out whether the police officers told the defendant’s mother where he was, and what efforts she made to see him. The defendant’s mother testified that she first learned where her son was at 6:00 o’clock that evening, but the prosecutor’s objection to the next question, “Who furnished you with this information ?” was sustained.
The burden was upon the prosecution to establish the voluntariness of the confession by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Harper, 36 Ill.2d 398, 402 ; People v. McGuire, 35 Ill.2d 219 ; People v. Thomlison, 400 Ill. 555, 561 .) In my opinion the prosecution failed to meet that burden, and the admission of the defendant’s confession violated his constitutional rights.