imposing a duty on architects, stressing actual knowledge of a danger on the part of architects who had a contractual duty to supervise the work and power to halt work until safety precautions were taken
How later courts described this case
- imposing a duty on architects, stressing actual knowledge of a danger on the part of architects who had a contractual duty to supervise the work and power to halt work until safety precautions were taken
- evidence authorized a finding that architects with the right to stop work if the contractor began to shore the roof in an unsafe manner had been negligent in failing to inspect and watch over the shoring operation.
- finding workers foreseeable plaintiffs
- analyzing the liability of an architect for personal injury suffered by a collapse of a proof due to faulty design
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Axen v. Ockerlund Construction Co.
An architect’s duty is defined as follows: Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill.App.2d 38, 91, 208 N.E.2d 249, 274 (1965), aff'd, in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 37 Ill.2d 278, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967), superseded by statute, Axen v. Ockerlund Constr. Co., 281 Ill. App.3d 224, 217 Ill.Dec. 24, 666 N.E.2d 693 (1996).
The opinion
Mr. Justice House, dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority. As the opinion notes at the outset, the case “presents a novel issue of first impression before this court.” It concedes that a finding of negligence on the part of the architects must either be based upon their failure to prepare more detailed specifications for the shoring or their failure to oversee and inspect the shoring method used. The opinion apparently is bottomed on the latter. It imposes a legal duty on an architect not only to prepare plans and specifications, but to inspect the methods employed by the contractor leading up to completion under the general inspection clause of his contract.
I cannot read into the contract a duty which is not imposed by it. The architect’s contract used here is a more or less standard form generally used by architects and engineers. It provides for detailed plans and specifications, obtaining approval of various governmental agencies, issuing certificates of payment and general administration. Supervision is limited. The architect contracts to attempt prevention of defects but specifically disclaims a guarantee of the performance by the contractor.
The continuous form of supervision envisioned by the majority opinion is neither contemplated by, nor given under, such a contract. When continuous supervision is required by the owner it is customary for a clerk-o f-the-works (resident inspector) to be selected by the owner and architect and paid by the owner. This contract has such a provision and specifically provides that the architect’s supervision “is to be distinguished from the continuous personal superintendence to be obtained by the employment of a clerk-o f-the-works. ”
Again, the opinion concedes that architects have no duty to specify the method used to accomplish the finished building, but the belief was stated that the architects “had the right” to insist upon a safe and adequate use of that method. True, but to parlay that “right” into a duty is neither consistent with generally accepted usage nor contemplated by the contract. Obviously, the architect did not contract to be present or represented at all phases of construction and he should not be held responsible for methods used by the contractor which may result in injury. Since there is no contractual obligation, liability is fixed by an expansion of the common law.
I find no support for such a radical departure in either this or any other jurisdiction. The cases cited for comparison are usually between contractor and architect or owner and architect, but not for liability of an architect to an employee of the contractor. The general view is stated in Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537 , 255 P.2d 352 , 357: “To say that he [architect] must supervise the method of doing the work before there is full supervision would place the architect in an entirely different role from that of an architect. * * * As a matter of law the courts recognize that an architect merely supervises the results and does not dictate the methods when not controlled by the specifications.”
There are sound reasons for the prevailing view that the architect’s primary duty is to provide a sound completed structure in accordance with the owner’s requirements, but not to dictate the methods by which the contractor attains that obj ective. There would be utter chaos if the contractor or his superintendent were to give an order to use his most efficient equipment and personnel, and the architect attempted to countermand and order that the work be done by another method requiring different equipment and skills. When a contractor bids a job he expects to use his equipment and the special talents and experience of his organization. If the threat existed that the details of carrying out his contract be subject to outside interference, contractors naturally would take that into consideration in fixing their bids. If the duty of architects is expanded to require that they be on the job at all times and prescribe methods of construction or be held liable for the negligence of employees of the contractor, they will reflect the added burden in their supervision fees. All of this adds up to an additional and, I think, unnecessary and unwarranted financial burden upon the public without a commensurate benefit. Liability of architects as imposed here is economically unsound.
The huge construction industry in this country has functioned very well without the imposition of liability upon architects and engineers who design, but do not build, structures and other facilities. I see no justification for extending the common law to place liability on architects.
Mr. Justice Klingbiel joins in this dissent.