providing that, in amending Section 306(b) of the Act, *34 77 P.S. § 512(2), the General Assembly eliminated the requirement that an employer must offer an injured employee an actual job and "lowered the Kachinski burden of proof by allowing an employer to obtain modification or suspension of benefits on evidence of earning power proved through expert testimony,” but noting that Kachinski still applies in certain circumstances
How later courts described this case
- providing that, in amending Section 306(b) of the Act, *34 77 P.S. § 512(2), the General Assembly eliminated the requirement that an employer must offer an injured employee an actual job and "lowered the Kachinski burden of proof by allowing an employer to obtain modification or suspension of benefits on evidence of earning power proved through expert testimony,” but noting that Kachinski still applies in certain circumstances
- providing that, in amending Section 306(b) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 512(2
- stating that calculation of earning power by labor market survey only approximates a claimant’s true earning power
- Kachinski filled gap existing before 1996 Act amendments by delineating evidentiary standards for employers seeking modification or suspension of benefits
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*85 Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, except for its indication that, with the 1996 amendments to Section 306(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 512, the General Assembly “replaced” this Court’s approach under Kachinski v. WCAB (Vepco Const. Co.), 516 Pa. 240 , 532 A.2d 374 (1987). See Majority Opinion, at 1292.1 find this assertion to be confusing, since this Court has continued to apply and refine Kachinski , most recently in Lewis v. WCAB (Giles & Ransome, Inc.), 591 Pa. 490 , 919 A.2d 922 (2007). Moreover, the Commonwealth Court has maintained that an employer may establish job availability, alternatively, through the use of a labor market survey as prescribed in Section 306(b) or via the Kachinski method entailing, inter alia, identification of an available job within the claimant’s capabilities. See, e.g., Rebeor v. WCAB (Eckerd), 976 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009). Thus, while the majority’s characterization is consistent with the opening passage of Section 306(b)(2), 77 P.S. § 512(2) (providing that “ ‘[ejarning power’ shall be determined by the work the employe is capable of performing and shall be based upon expert opinion evidence which includes job listings with agencies of the department, private job placement agencies and advertisements in the usual employment area”), it suggests a substantial shift in actual practice as reflected in prevailing decisional law. Accordingly, I would leave the issue of whether the Section 306(b) amendments replaced Kachinski to a case in which the question is squarely before the Court.
Justice BAER and Justice TODD join this concurring opinion.