Opinion

Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons

  • 113 S.W.3d 85
  • 2003 Ky. LEXIS 164
  • 2003 WL 21990220
Court
Kentucky Supreme Court
Filed
Aug 21, 2003
Status
Published
Author
Keller
On the bench
Johnstone, Lambert, Cooper, Graves, Wintersheimer, Keller, Stumbo
Cited by
202 cases
Authority
More cited than 13.7%

explaining that if the defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that if the defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
  • “The most important factor in determining whether a duty exists is foreseeability.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
  • discussing the distinct legal concepts of duty and causation
  • mixed question of law and fact must be determined as a matter of law on motion for summary judgment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice KELLER.

Concurring Opinion by

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, although a jury could find that Pathways breached its duty to Hammons, Pathways’ placement of Hammons at Moore’s Boarding Home “was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries for which Ham-mons is claiming damages in her action against Pathways.” 1 Accordingly, because Pathways’ alleged breach of its duty was not a legal cause of Hammons’ injuries, I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Pathways. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the duty that Pathways owed to Hammons.

The majority holds “that Pathways owed a duty to Hammons to use the current list of registered boarding homes circulated to it by the Department of Health when Royse searched for a boarding home that would accept Hammons.” 2 In my view, this articulation of Pathways’ duty is erro *94 neous in its level of specification, which addresses itself more to a breach analysis than to a definition of the duty owed. In Kentucky, “[t]he rule is that every person owes a duty to every other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable injury.” 3 Although the majority correctly observes that legislative and administrative enactments help define the scope of risks foreseeable to an actor, and the record in this case establishes that Moore’s Boarding Home was operating in violation of law, Pathways itself violated no law by placing Hammons in an unlicensed facility. And, “[s]ince this is not a case in which the relevant standard of care is supplied by [statute or] regulations, the duty owed ... must be defined by common law, i.e., that degree of care exercised by reasonable and prudent” 4 mental health care service providers. In my view, the Court of Appeals appropriately characterized Pathways’ duty when it stated, “Pathways is in the profession of providing services to mentally ill patients and owes a duty to render those services with reasonable care.”

. Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 85, 93 (2003).

. Id. at 91 .

. Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328, 332 (1987).

. Carman v. Dunaway Timber Co. Inc., Ky., 949 S.W.2d 569, 571 (1997).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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