holding that a plaintiff had set an adequate foundation for expert testimony, the expert was professionally competent to testify in the area, and the expert testimony met a reasonable degree of medical probability, despite circuit court findings with factual citations to the contrary
How later courts described this case
- holding that a plaintiff had set an adequate foundation for expert testimony, the expert was professionally competent to testify in the area, and the expert testimony met a reasonable degree of medical probability, despite circuit court findings with factual citations to the contrary
- stating that an erroneous exercise of discretion only leads to a new trial if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome
- providing that, “for an error ‘to affect the substantial rights’ of a party, there must be a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the action or proceeding at issue” (citation omitted)
- asking whether the error “affected the substantial rights of the party,” meaning “there must be a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the action or proceeding at issue”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 95. (concurring). I join the majority opinion. I wrote a concurrence on the issue of harmless error in In re the Termination of Parental Rights to Jay ton S.: Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶¶ 37-42 , 246 Wis. 2d 1 , 629 N.W.2d 768 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). My views on harmless error expressed in that concurrence apply to the present case as well. Rather than repeat the concurrence verbatim in the present case, I refer the reader to the Evelyn C.R. case.