The opinion
T. M. Burns, J.
(concurring). It is with reluctance that I join with my brothers in support of the opinion authored by Judge Lesinski and concurred in by Judge Quinn. I cannot fault the fine reasoning of the majority in their resolution of the complex constitutional issues raised in this appeal. More attention, however, can and should be given to what appear to be the practical results of the no-fault system.
When the concept of no-fault insurance was first introduced, there was much enthusiasm about the idea. The thought of uncluttered courts and lower insurance premiums had a strong appeal. The momentum of the no-fault concept has been great, with numerous states having adopted some form of no-fault insurance at the present time, and even proposed Federal legislation designed to give effect to the no-fault theory on a national basis.
*373 The no-fault act has been labelled social reform legislation. It was enacted to rectify the inequities of the traditional means of compensating victims of automobile accidents. The principal evil existing in the former system was that of complicated, lengthy and costly litigation, providing no certainty that the innocent victim of an accident would ever be compensated. To remedy these inequities, no-fault promised to provide a uniform system of compulsory insurance at a reasonable cost. For the good of all of us as potential accident victims, we became, by force of law, policy holders.
Now that we have experienced the realities of this legislation, however, the initial enthusiasm appears to have waned. It has been suggested that not only have lower premiums not developed, but even higher premiums are now the rule. Insurance companies might be the real beneficiaries of this act. Uncertainty about the wisdom of the no-fault act, however, is not a proper legal basis for finding the legislation unconstitutional.
In short, what sounds so grand in theory may well not be so in reality. But as the history of constitutional challenges to the enactment of workmen’s compensation statutes demonstrates, it is not enough to say that such legislation is unwise or imperfect. What particular legislation does in fact is as important a consideration in judging its validity as what it is purported to do. As stated by Justice Pitney:
"The question whether a state law deprives a party of rights secured by the Federal Constitution depends not upon how it is characterized, but upon its practical operation and effect.” Mountain Timber Co v State of Washington, 243 US 219, 237 ; 37 S Ct 260 ; 61 L Ed 685 (1917).
*374 I have noted what I think are some of the practical effects of our present, statute. However, on this record, which was made in the relatively early days of the operative effect of the act, I am not able to conclude that the "practical operation and effect” of this legislation justifies a finding by this Court of unconstitutionality. On a more current record, a contrary conclusion may be justified.