reasoning, in part, that “[p]eople do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility―sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search”
How later courts described this case
- reasoning, in part, that “[p]eople do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility―sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search”
- stating that “[pjeople do not lightly admit crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime ... carry their own indicia of credibility____”
- stating that "[p]eople do not lightly admit crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime ... carry their own indicia of credibility...."
- finding not “especially significant that neither the name nor the person of the informant was produced before the magistrate. The police themselves almost certainly knew his name . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by United States v. Zucco, 537 F. Supp. 901 (1982)
The vitality of Harris, a plurality opinion, has been questioned by more than one court.
Questioned by Guzewicz v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 730 (1972)
403 U.S. 573 (1971) leave us in doubt as to the continuing validity of this aspect of
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Gamboa, 23 C.M.A. 83 (1974)
United States v Harris, supra, is also distinguishable from the case at bar.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the opinion of The Chief Justice and the judgment of the Court, but I add a personal comment in order to make very clear my posture , as to Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), cited in several places in that opinion. I was a member of. the 6-2 majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Spinelli v. United States, 382 F. 2d 871 (1967), which this Court by a 5-3 vote reversed, with the pivotal Justice concluding his con *586 curring opinion, 393 U. S., at 429 , by the observation that, “Pending full-scale reconsideration of that case [Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959)], on the one hand, or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases on the other, I join the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a.vote to affirm would produce an evenly divided Court.” Obviously, I then felt that the Court of Appeals had correctly decided the case. Nothing this Court said in Spinelli convinced me to the contrary. I continue to feel today that Spinelli at this level was wrongly decided and, like Mb. Justice Black, I would overrule it.