Opinion

State of Iowa v. Jerin Douglas Mootz

  • 808 N.W.2d 207
  • 2012 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 10
Court
Supreme Court of Iowa
Filed
Jan 27, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Wiggins
On the bench
Zager, Wiggins, Mansfield
Cited by
78 cases
Authority
More cited than 13.5%

holding that a presumption of prejudicial error follows an erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge, thereby mandating a reversal of the defendant’s conviction

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a presumption of prejudicial error follows an erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge, thereby mandating a reversal of the defendant’s conviction
  • holding court’s erroneous ruling on a reverse-Batson challenge leading to denial of a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal because “[a]ny other conclusion would leave the defendant without a remedy”
  • discussing use of peremptory challenges, including to “eliminate those jurors perceived as harboring subtle biases ,.. which were not elicited on voir dire or which do not establish legal cause for challenge” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 928 N.E.2d 917, 927 (2010))
  • noting Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009), held mistaken denial of peremptory strike was not structural error under the federal constitution, apd Rivera recognized the possibility of automatic reversal on state law grounds

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

WIGGINS, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur in the decision because we should presume prejudice occurs when the court allows a juror who it should have excluded to sit on the jury. The reason I am writing specially is to state that a logical extension of this rule occurs when the court forces a party to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who the court should have removed, but failed to do so, for cause.

Factually, when a party is required to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who the court should have excused for cause, that party is unable to use that peremptory strike to remove another questionable juror. In this circumstance, the court allows a questionable juror who should not be on the jury to sit, and we should presume prejudice occurred. This was the rule in State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 232 , 46 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1951), and State v. Reed, 201 Iowa 1352, 1353-54 , 208 N.W. 308, 309 (1926), before this court expressly overruled Beckwith and impliedly overruled Reed in State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Iowa 1993). Although I believe this court was wrong when it overruled Beckwith and Reed , in Neuendorf , we will have to leave this issue for another day when confronted with the proper factual situation.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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