concluding that “[i]f the legislature wanted to exclude” from a statute particular claims, “it would have said so, as it has in other statutes”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “[i]f the legislature wanted to exclude” from a statute particular claims, “it would have said so, as it has in other statutes”
- concluding a statute should be interpreted broadly because if the legislature wanted to limit the statute’s scope, “it would have said so, as it has in other statutes”
- explaining “a key purpose” of statutory immunity “is to avoid costly litigation, and that legislative goal is thwarted when 13 claims subject to immunity proceed to trial”
- applying subjective standard under Iowa statute and citing other jurisdictions that have done so in construing similar statutes
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CADY, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result reached by the majority. It is a result that ultimately comes down to the reasonableness of the permissible inferences that would support a finding of the lack of good faith of Dr. Lindaman during the time he assisted in the assessment of child abuse. There is evidence in the record to show Dr. Linda-man participated in good faith, though mistaken in medical fact. On the other hand, the evidence in the record does not support a legitimate inference that Dr. Linda-man was sfeeking to avoid the assessment of child abuse or that he did not express an honest belief. The inferences raised by the Nelsons concerning Dr. Lindaman’s lack of good faith were too speculative to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, summary judgment based on *16 immunity granted under Iowa Code section 232.73 (2009) is appropriate.