acknowledging that the Second Amendment was “meant to be a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and as a necessary and efficient means of regaining rights when temporarily overturned by usurpation.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- acknowledging that the Second Amendment was “meant to be a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and as a necessary and efficient means of regaining rights when temporarily overturned by usurpation.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
- holding the “core Second Amendment right . . . ‘wouldn’t mean much’ without the ability to acquire arms” (citation 1 “It shall be unlawful—(1) for any person—(A
- observing that the Second Amendment would have little meaning if individuals couldn’t acquire firearms
- holding that a “would-be operator of a gun store” had “derivative standing to assert the subsidiary right to acquire arms on behalf of his potential customers”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated in part by New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
873 F.3d 670, 682 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), abrogated in part by Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17
The opinion
OWENS, Circuit. Judge, concurring:
I join all but Part II,D of the majority opinion. In my view, we need not decide whether the Second Amendment guarantees the right to sell'firearms. It is enough that Heller left intact “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 , 130 S.Ct. 3020 , 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (“We- made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures!.]”). The ordinance at issue here falls within that category of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783 , and plaintiffs therefore “cannot, state a viable Second Amendment claim.” Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1044 .(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). As the dissent to the original panel decision put it, all “we’re dealing with here is a. mundane zoning dispute dressed up as, ..a Second Amendment challenge.” Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1064 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J., dissenting).