holding that the language of Section 1547 does not (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 16 - J-A23018-22 ____________________________________________ constitute an independent exception to the warrant requirement under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions
How later courts described this case
- holding that the language of Section 1547 does not (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 16 - J-A23018-22 ____________________________________________ constitute an independent exception to the warrant requirement under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions
- stating that under the Implied Consent Law, a licensee arrested for driving under influence of alcohol “has a critical decision to make[,]” and setting forth the consequences the licensee must weigh before deciding whether or not to submit to chemical testing
- holding that an unconscious arrestee was incapable of voluntarily consenting to a blood test because his unconscious state deprived him of ability to make a knowing and conscious choice under the totality of the circumstances
- explaining that Birchfield’s holding -6- J-S10019-24 “supports the conclusion that … an individual must give actual, voluntary consent at the time that testing is requested”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE TODD,
Concurring
I agree with the majority that, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, Myers had an unequivocal statutory right to refuse blood testing. Furthermore, I agree that statutory right was violated in the instant case. Finally, and as a result, I agree that suppression was warranted. See Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 531 Pa. 103 , 611 A.2d 681, 683 (1992) (“blood test results acquired in contravention of [Section 1547] must be suppressed”). In my view, the statutory analysis suffices to resolve the issue before us, and so I would not address the constitutional dimensions. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II.A, II.B, and II.D of the Majority Opinion, and its mandate, but do not join the remainder.