The opinion
Lindley and Troutman, JJ.
(dissenting). We respectfully dissent. We agree with the majority’s conclusion that County *1580 Court erred in denying that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking suppression of the statement he made to the police in which he admitted possession of the firearm. Unlike the majority, however, we cannot conclude that the error is harmless. Where, as here, “a conviction is based on a plea of guilty[,] an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision, unless at the time of the plea he [or she] states or reveals his [or her] reason for pleading guilty. This is especially true when the defendant has unsuccessfully sought to suppress a confession” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 379-380 [1978]; see People v Wells, 21 NY3d 716, 717-718 [2013]; cf. People v Lloyd, 66 NY2d 964, 965 [1985]). In the absence of proof “that [a defendant] would have [pleaded guilty] even if his [or her] motion had been granted, harmless error analysis is inapplicable” (People v Henry, 133 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2015]). Here, there is no such proof (see People v Coles, 62 NY2d 908, 910 [1984]; cf. Lloyd, 66 NY2d at 965 ). Although the firearm is admissible and was found on defendant’s person (see People v Beckwith, 303 AD2d 594, 595 [2003]), we cannot say that the erroneous denial of the motion to suppress the statement did not contribute to defendant’s decision to accept the plea offer that was extended to him by the People. We would therefore reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, grant that part of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress the statement at issue, and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.
Present — Carni, J.P., Lindley, DeJoseph, Troutman and Scudder, JJ.