holding that the "plain language of the [Bert Harris] Act provides that claims under the Act may not be based on government action on another parcel," but noting that, "[b]ecause reasonable minds may disagree with this interpretation" a statutory amendment passed nearly two decades after the original act "made clear that the Act does not apply to property owners whose parcel is not 'the subject of and directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity' " (quoting ch. 2015-142, § 1, Laws of Fla. (2015))
How later courts described this case
- holding that the "plain language of the [Bert Harris] Act provides that claims under the Act may not be based on government action on another parcel," but noting that, "[b]ecause reasonable minds may disagree with this interpretation" a statutory amendment passed nearly two decades after the original act "made clear that the Act does not apply to property owners whose parcel is not 'the subject of and directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity' " (quoting ch. 2015-142, § 1, Laws of Fla. (2015))
- explaining that "[l]egislative history can be helpful in construing a statute when its plain language is unclear"
- explaining that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary
- finding the majority’s discussion of the absurdity doctrine “improper” because “[t]he text of the statute fully resolves this case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*1168 LAWSON, J.,
specially concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority and most of the majority opinion, but concur specially because much of the majority’s analysis is unwarranted. The text of the statute fully resolves this case, leaving “no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction,” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citations omitted), and rendering section II of the majority opinion improper, id. As the plain language of the statute ends our inquiry, I would end our analysis with the conclusion in section I that: “The plain language of the Act provides that claims under the Act may not be based on government action on another parcel.” Majority op. at 1165.
CANADY, J., concurs.