holding that Parole Board’s denial of credit for time spent at liberty on parole by mere act of checking “No” on report was not a sufficient exercise of discretion, and a contrary holding would render appellate review “a mere empty formality as . . . any decision by the Board must be affirmed, even if the Board acts arbitrarily or . . . misinterprets and misapplies the law,” a result that “comports neither with the Pennsylvania Constitution’s grant of review by a court of record, nor with basic notions of due process.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that Parole Board’s denial of credit for time spent at liberty on parole by mere act of checking “No” on report was not a sufficient exercise of discretion, and a contrary holding would render appellate review “a mere empty formality as . . . any decision by the Board must be affirmed, even if the Board acts arbitrarily or . . . misinterprets and misapplies the law,” a result that “comports neither with the Pennsylvania Constitution’s grant of review by a court of record, nor with basic notions of due process.”
- explaining that the Board has discretion to award credit for time spent at liberty on parole to a CPV recommitted to serve the remainder of his sentence unless otherwise enumerated in the statute
- holding that Section 6138(a)(2.1) requires the Board to articulate the basis for its decision to grant or deny a convicted parole violator credit for time spent at liberty on parole
- holding that the Board “must provide a contemporaneous statement explaining its reason for denying a [convicted parole violator] credit for time spent at liberty on parole”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR,
Concurring
I join the majority’s holding that the Board erred in its failure to exercise discretion in addressing the matter of credit, as well as the associated reasoning.
As to the requirement of a “contemporaneous statement” from the Board explaining the reasons for its decision, Majority Opinion, at 52-53, 159 A.3d at 474-75, I note that this Court has concluded that parole revocation determinations are subject to the Administrative Agency Law. See Goods v. PBPP, 590 Pa. 132, 142 , 912 A.2d 226, 232-33 (2006). 1 As relevant here, such enactment requires that “[a]ll adjudications of a Commonwealth agency shall be in writing [and] shall contain findings and the reasons for the adjudication ....” 2 Pa.C.S. § 507. My only potential difference with the majority opinion lies in the extent to which the opinion may be read to diverge *55 from this statutory requirement concerning the timing and/or content of written explanations by the Board.
Justice Todd joins this concurring opinion.
. I observe that the definition of "adjudication,” for purposes of the Administrative Agency Law, does not apply, at least by its own terms, to parole-related orders. See 2 Pa.C.S. § 101. While unfortunately Goods does not address this definition, the salutary effect of the decision is to reconcile the treatment of decisions of the Board that implicate a constitutionally guaranteed right of direct appellate review with the treatment generally afforded under the Administrative Agency Law, thus establishing the procedural framework supporting meaningful judicial review.
Parenthetically, and as the majority explains, there are a wide range of the Board’s decisions that do not implicate a constitutionally guaranteed appeal right. See Goods, 590 Pa. at 142 , 912 A.2d at 232 (citing Rogers v. PBPP, 555 Pa. 285, 292-93 , 724 A.2d 319, 322-23 (1999) (holding that routine parole denial decisions do not affect an existing enjoyment of liberty and, thus, do not implicate a constitutionally guaranteed right of appellate review)). Notably, the Court has not channeled such decisions into the Administrative Agency Law. See id.