holding that “to prevail on an after- discovered evidence claim for relief under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi), a petitioner must prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “to prevail on an after- discovered evidence claim for relief under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi), a petitioner must prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict”
- holding that there is no presumption that a public record imputes knowledge to an incarcerated pro se petitioner, and directing PCRA courts to consider “whether, if the facts were unknown to the petitioner, the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, including an assessment of the petitioner’s access to public records.”
- holding that public record cannot presumption does not apply to pro se petitioners who are incarcerated, but stating that such petitioners must still plead and prove that the facts at issue were unknown to the petitioner and not ascertainable by the exercise of due diligence.”
- holding that -6- J-S12010-22 the presumption that information which is of public record cannot be deemed ‘unknown’ for purposes of the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s one-year time limit does not apply to pro se, incarcerated petitioners
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR,
concurring
I join the majority opinion based upon the precedent established by Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382 , 930 A.2d 1264 (2007), supplemented by the present opinion’s developed explication of the unreasonableness in enforcing a strong presumption of access to public records at least as against unrepresented prisoners.
To the extent that the majority undertakes to reaffirm and buttress the logic of Bennett , however, I continue to have great difficulty with the approach to statutory construction by which the Bennett majority decoupled the “facts” contemplated by Section 9545(b)(ii) of the PCRA from the “claims” serving as the explicit bases for statutory post-conviction relief per Section 9543(a). See Bennett, 593 Pa. at 402-10 , 930 A.2d at 1275-80 (Saylor, J., dissenting).