“We have . . . rejected ‘alleg[ations] that if counsel had “followed up” during voir dire with more specific questions, there would have been a basis for a for-cause challenge’ as ‘mere conjecture.’” (quoting Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 939 (Fla. 2002))
How later courts described this case
- “We have . . . rejected ‘alleg[ations] that if counsel had “followed up” during voir dire with more specific questions, there would have been a basis for a for-cause challenge’ as ‘mere conjecture.’” (quoting Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 939 (Fla. 2002))
- “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CANADY, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the decision to affirm the denial of relief regarding Durousseau’s conviction. But I dissent from the decision to require a new penalty phase. As I have previously explained, Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), should not be given retroactive effect. See Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248 , 2016 WL 7406506 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
POLSTON, J., concurs.