finding that Witt’s first factor weighed in favor of retroactively applying Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State to capital defendants whose sentences were final before Ring because “the ultimate decision of whether a defendant lives or dies rests on these factual findings, only strengthening the purpose of the new rule” but denying retroactivity based on Witt’s remaining two factors
How later courts described this case
- finding that Witt’s first factor weighed in favor of retroactively applying Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State to capital defendants whose sentences were final before Ring because “the ultimate decision of whether a defendant lives or dies rests on these factual findings, only strengthening the purpose of the new rule” but denying retroactivity based on Witt’s remaining two factors
- stating that, by calling the defendant a pedophile, 9 the prosecutor “suggests the defendant has engaged in repeated sexual abuse of 10 minors and raises a profiling argument, namely that because he is a pedophile, it is 11 likely that he would sexually molest children, including this specific victim”
- holding that Hurst is not retroactive to cases that became final before the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)
- holding that Hurst does not apply retroactively to sentences of death that became final before the Supreme Court issued its 2002 decision in Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
POLSTON, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that Hurst v. Florida, _ U.S. _, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), does not apply retroactively to cases that were final when Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), was decided. To be clear, this decision does not address whether Hurst v. Florida applies retroactively to those cases that were not final when Ring was decided but were final when Hurst v. Florida was decided.
However, while I agree with the majority that Hurst v. Florida is not retroactive to pre-Ring cases under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1980), I believe that the retroactivity analysis the United States Supreme Court announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 *30 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), is the proper and applicable test. See Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 413 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring). I also continue to dissent to the majority’s expansion of the meaning of Hurst v. Florida as well as the majority’s holding that chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional. See Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40, 77-83 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., dissenting); Perry v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S449 , 210 So.3d 630 , 2016 WL 6036982 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).