The opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-10736 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 09/25/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10736
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
MICHAEL DAVID TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OFFICER ANDREW J. KUNCAS,
Defendant- Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20864-DPG
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10736
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Taylor appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a police officer. He
argues that the officer, Andrew Kuncas, lacked arguable reasonable
suspicion to detain Taylor and arguable probable cause to arrest
him. Taylor also argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b) motion for relief from the
judgment.
I.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the plaintiff. Fish v. Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1156-57
(11th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
A brief, investigatory stop does not violate the Fourth
Amendment “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion” that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.
Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000). Arrests must
be based on probable cause. Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1259
(11th Cir. 2006). “Probable cause exists when the facts and circum-
stances within the officers’ knowledge . . . would cause a prudent
person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect
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23-10736 Opinion of the Court 3
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
discretionary functions from liability for civil damages in § 1983 ac-
tions so long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1164.
In the context of an allegedly unconstitutional arrest, an of-
ficer is entitled to qualified immunity if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officer had arguable probable cause to make the
arrest. Fish, 838 F.3d at 1167. Arguable probable cause is a lower
standard than actual probable cause, and only requires that “under
all of the facts and circumstances, an officer reasonably could—not
necessarily would—have believed that probable cause was pre-
sent.” Id. Likewise, when an officer asserts qualified immunity in
the context of an allegedly unconstitutional investigatory stop,
“the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but
whether the officer had arguable reasonable suspicion to support
an investigatory stop.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166 (quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, Officer Kuncas moved for summary judgment
and supported same with a Statement of Material Facts. Taylor
filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, but he did
not file a competing Statement of Material Facts or any evidence to
support his allegations and assertions. Pursuant to Southern
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10736
District of Florida Local Rule 56.1(a)(2), 1 the district court deemed
admitted the facts in Kuncas’s Statement of Material Facts and
based its ruling on those undisputed facts. See S.D. Fla. R. 56.1(c)
(“All material facts in any party’s Statement of Material Facts may
be deemed admitted unless controverted by the other party’s State-
ment of Material Facts, provided that: (i) the Court finds that the
material fact at issue is supported by properly cited record evi-
dence; and (ii) any exception under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not ap-
ply.”).
The district court noted that Kuncas was dispatched follow-
ing a 911 call from a citizen advising that a man was walking on a
bridge carrying a flag and a gun. When Kuncas arrived at the
bridge, he observed Taylor still walking on the bridge carrying a
flag saying “Don’t Tread on Me,” an AR-15 rifle, a Glock pistol in a
holster on his hip, and a fishing pole, but with no bucket, bait, fish-
ing knife, net, or other equipment commonly used by fishermen.
The area was marked with “No Fishing” signs.
The district court acknowledged that although it was unlaw-
ful to openly carry weapons, there was an exception for a person
engaged in fishing or hunting or going to or returning therefrom.
The district court concluded:
1 “An opponent’s Statement of Material Facts shall clearly challenge any pur-
portedly material fact asserted by the movant that the opponent contends is
genuinely in dispute. An opponent’s Statement of Material Facts also may
thereafter assert additional material facts that the opponent contends serve to
defeat the motion for summary judgment.” S.D. Fla. R. 56.1(a)(2).
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23-10736 Opinion of the Court 5
Officer Kuncas had no reasonable basis to believe that
Plaintiff was fishing; nor was it apparent that Plaintiff
was going to or coming from a fishing expedition. Ra-
ther, Plaintiff was seemingly making a political state-
ment—parading his political flag and brandishing his
fishing pole and weapon as props. Prior to his arrest.
Plaintiff also refused to identify himself to Officer
Kuncas or present his fishing license.
Dist. Ct. Order, Doc. 33 at 5. Accordingly, the district court held
that the fishing exception was not applicable and held that Officer
Kuncas had reasonable suspicion to detain Taylor for an investiga-
tory stop, and also held that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Taylor. Alternatively, the district court also held that Officer Kun-
cas was entitled to qualified immunity (i.e. that he had at least ar-
guable reasonable suspicion to detain Taylor and arguable proba-
ble cause to arrest him).
We agree with the district court that Officer Kuncas is enti-
tled to qualified immunity. For the same reasons that persuaded
the district court, we agree that Officer Kuncas had at least arguable
reasonable suspicion to detain Taylor for an investigatory stop. It
was absolutely clear that Taylor was not fishing, and there was at
least arguable reasonable suspicion that Taylor was not either com-
ing from or going to a fishing location. And we agree with the dis-
trict court that, when Taylor refused to provide a fishing license,
the officer had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Taylor.
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10736
II.
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of
discretion. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d
1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
A district court may relieve a party from a final judgment
where there has been mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The moving party must show
that his mistake or neglect would affect the outcome. In re World-
wide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Taylor’s post judgment motion. We agree with the district court
that Taylor did not show good reason for his failure to follow the
local rules. Moreover, even if we considered Taylor’s belatedly
filed Statement of Material Facts (filed with his Rule 60(b) motion),
we cannot conclude that Taylor has shown a likelihood of a differ-
ent outcome.
AFFIRMED.