Cooper v. People Ex Rel. Wyatt

Mr. Justice Elliott.

I concur in the opinion of the court upon the main question involved in this case, and in the conclusion.. Counsel for respondents has chosen to rest the defense in this proceeding mainly upon the ground that the publishers of newspapers have a constitutional right to assail the integrity and impugn the motives of a judge in relation to his judicial action, even in cases pending and undisposed of, without being amenable to contempt proceedings therefor. That such a doctrine is opposed to sound reason as well as the great *369 weigítt of authority is clearly shown in the opinion of Mr. Justice Hayt, filed herein. The idea may be conveyed by the opinion of the court, though not necessarily so intended, that a district court or a district judge has authority by habeas corpus to release prisoners under commitment for contempt by another court or judge of concurrent jurisdiction. I am unwilling that such a rule of practice, should be sanctioned in our jurisprudence, even by inference, as such a rule, if followed, would lead to judicial anarchy.

It was assumed in the argument of this case without question, and by fair implication the record may be said to show, that the relator was under commitment by the criminal court for contempt against its authority in a matter wherein the criminal court had jurisdiction. This was repeatedly asserted in the publications complained of, which assertions were incorporated in the record as a part of the affidavit of the relator, and are not controverted in any way; moreover, the record in this case nowhere discloses that the crinfinal court had acted without jurisdiction in the matter of relator’s commitment; and hence its jurisdiction in the premises must be presumed. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that no district court or judge could lawfully discharge the relator from such commitment. Whether he could have been relieved by a higher tribunal need not now be considered.

This court has always, as in this case, manifested extreme delicacy in interfering with the judgments of other courts in contempt cases. It makes use of the writ of error therefor under careful restrictions.

In Church, Hab. Corp. (page 305), it is said: “One court of general jurisdiction should not review the proceedings of another on the writ of habeas corpus. The principles of comity should prevail.”

In Rap. Contempts (sec. 155), it is said: “ The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral remedy, and under the well *370 established rule that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a matter within that jurisdiction, cannot be collaterally impeached, it results that, no question of jurisdiction being raised or involved, a conviction or commitment for contempt cannot be reviewed by means of this writ; for it is well settled that an order of committal for contempt is in the nature of a judgment, and the person committed thereunder is committed in execution. If, therefore, the court have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and of the subject-matter out of which the alleged contempt arises, he can no more get relief on habeas corpus than he could if his committal had been in execution of a judgment founded upon a verdict in an ordinary prosecution for crime. If the court had jurisdiction, the rule making every superior court of record or legislative body the exclusive judge of con-tempts against its own authority and dignity closes the door to a review by this writ except in cases where excess of jurisdiction is clearly apparent.”

Hurd, Hab. Corp. (412) says: “The right of punishing for contempts by summary conviction is inherent in all courts of justice, and essential to their protection and existence. A commitment under such conviction is a commitment in execution, and the judgment of conviction is not subject to review in any other court unless specially authorized by statute. It cannot be attacked under the writ of habeas corpus except for such gross defects as render the proceeding void.”

Again, the same authority, speaking of summary convictions, applicable, though not limited, to contempt cases, on pages 404 and 405, says: “Where a person is committed in execution under such a conviction, he cannot claim, under the act 31 Car. II., nor under the acts of several of the states, as we have seen, to be discharged under a writ of habeas corpus. Courts, however, possessing a common-law jurisdiction over the writ, or judges or other officers upon whom jurisdiction is con *371 ferrecl without such limit, may, in exercise of such common-law or unrestricted jurisdiction, discharge the prisoner from such commitment if it be fatally and incurably defective. But as we have also seen, courts are reluctant to interfere then under the writ of habeas corpus without having the conviction before them; and they never do for mere error or irregularity, unless they have the record before them in such form as to enable them to act expressly and conclusively upon such error or irregularity.

“ Hence the importance of the writ of certiorari, and hence, also, the necessity of applying for relief from imprisonment in such cases to a court which, by its constitution and relation, possesses a corrective or revisory jurisdiction over the conviction, so that if it be erroneous it may be reversed, and then the prisoner be discharged.”

Again, Eap. Contempts, § 155, still speaking of the review of contempt cases by habeas corpus, says: “It therefore becomes clear that the question of relief or no relief, in these cases, by means of the writ of habeas corpus, depends upon the power of the court issuing the writ to inquire into and judge of the extent and limits of the jurisdiction of another court. Upon this subject the adjudged cases, apparently so harmonious in their statement of the general rule, are, upon a closer examination, perplexing and inconclusive. In cases where the court issuing the writ is clothed by law with appellate or 'superintending jurisdiction over the tribunal which committed the petitioner, there seems to be comparatively little difficulty in reconciling the adjudications.”

From an examination of the adjudged cases, I am satisfied that the simpler, safer and better rule in reference to the review of contempt proceedings is, as stated by the last-named author, “That one court should not judge the jurisdiction of another tribunal of co-ordinate authority and dignity.” Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 ; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 ; Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 ; *372 Davison’s Case, 13 Abb. Pr. 129 ;. Clark v. People, Breese, 340; Ex parte Thatcher, 2 Gilman, 167 ; State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 540; Robb v. McDonald, 29 Iowa, 330 ; In re Bissell, 40 Mich. 63 ; Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 50 ; Phillips v. Welch, 12 Nev. 158 ; State v. Galloway, 5 Cold. 326 ;. Ex parte Farnham, 3 Colo. 545 .

It is true our statute in general terms confers jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases upon district courts and district judges. Nevertheless, there must, in the nature of things, be some limitation to the exercise of such power, else the unseemly spectacle might be presented of one district court releasing prisoners committed by another district court, or even by the supreme court itself. The criminal courts have jurisdiction in many cases concurrent with the district courts; and in all -matters pertaining to the exercise of their lawful jurisdiction they should be upheld accordingly.

Respondents had an undoubted right to question the jurisdiction of the district court in the premises, and to criticise the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, in temperate and respectful language, as much as they pleased; but they had no right, at least while the proceedings were' pending, to subject the judge to ridicule, or to make insinuations against his good faith in connection therewith; for whether he had jurisdiction or not, he must, in any event, pass upon the question of such jurisdiction, — a matter of some difficulty, as we have seen,— and in so doing he should have been permitted to act uninfluenced by fear of injury to his reputation or other unworthy motive. Williamson’s Case, 26 Pa. St. 9. The decision in the case of People v. District Court, 6 Colo. 534 , is not in conflict with the views here expressed, but rather in support of them, when the whole opinion is considered.

Affirmed.