explaining that “a denial of access to information can work an injury in fact for standing purposes, at least where a statute (on the claimants’ reading) requires that the information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C.Cir. 2002))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “a denial of access to information can work an injury in fact for standing purposes, at least where a statute (on the claimants’ reading) requires that the information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C.Cir. 2002))
- holding that "there is no reason to doubt [plaintiff's] [informational] standing" when it claimed that "information provided by Section 10(c) [of the Endangered Species Act] helps it meaningfully participate in the Act's permitting process, as well as engage in related advocacy efforts to protect [certain animals]"
- concluding that Section 10(c) of the ESA required the disclosure of information about the taking of three antelope species and therefore the deprivation of that information could inflict a concrete, particularized informational injury
- holding that a statutory direction to issue a rule “without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule” effectively changed the Endangered Species Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SENTÉLLE, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately not because I have any deep disagreement with the majority — indeed, I wholly embrace the majority’s conclusion and nearly all of its lan *1046 guage — but only to express a single misgiving. As the majority makes plain, “the requirement that a claimant have ‘standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.’ ” Maj. Op. at 1040 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733 , 128 S.Ct. 2759 , 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). I am not convinced that appellant has carried that burden with respect to its constitutional, separation-of-powers claim. Rather, as the district court reasoned, the breach of right for which the Friends of Animals seek redress is informational. See Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 82 F.Supp.3d 265, 273 (D.D.C. 2015). The alleged constitutional violation does not cause that breach. I therefore would prefer that we affirmed the district court as to the constitutional claim on the basis relied upon by that court. That is, that plaintiffs have not established standing. Plaintiffs have not alleged that the unconstitutional act caused them harm or that its redress can be had in this lawsuit.
That said, nonetheless I join entirely the disposition of the majority. I agree that the majority’s analysis of the constitutional claim is legally correct. I concur entirely with everything else in the majority’s opinion.